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StJ't4AAY 
What is the relation between philosophical analysis and sociological 
method? Sociology has traditionally looked to Philosophy to provide 
either an indubitable epistemic foundation for its practices or alternat-
ively to legislate invariant criteria of scientificity which might guide 
the social sciences in questions of methodology. But has Philosophy 
itself such an autonomy from the developing knowledge domains of the 
different sciences,natural and social? A structural analysis of philosophic 
discourse in the twentieth century reveals as a key element of recent 
philosophic'al thought a central anthropologism. This study traces the 
rupture in philosophic thought which has occurred with the dissolution 
and collapse of classical epistemology and the emergence in turn of a 
radically new mode of philosophizing based on a recognition of the 
centrality of social reality to ontological judgement and epistemological 
critique. Just as the analytic epistemOlogy of the seventeenth century 
can be seen as an accommodation by Philosophy to the emergence and develop-
ment of the empirical natural sc~ences, so the appearance of 'conversational' 
epistemology can be viewed as Philosophy's attempt to think'the implications 
for the nature of knowledge-in-general of the emergence and subsequent 
development of the social sciences at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The key theoretical instance which demarcates classical epistemology fram 
the anthropologistic philosophy since the 1920's is its inability to 
accommodate the category of intersubjectiv:itJY successfully within its 
egological structure. Contemporary philosophy, phenomenological, analytical, 
pragmatist and marxist, is forced to grapple with the new awareness of man's 
essential sociality. This has profound implications for epistemology. 
The question of the relationship of philosophical analysis to sociological 
method must be re-addressed in the light of the revealed epistemic proximity 
of the two disciplines. What sort of philosophical critique, we ask, is 
possible and appropriate in an age of sociological reason and historical 
method? 
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4. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Many will cross and Imowledge will be expanded". This plate 
(Fig. 1) appears at the head of Francis Bacon's Novum Organon. It 
represents the voyage of the fragile ark of science, guided by the 
navigational skills provided by the new "real philosophy" or empiric~l 
method, beyond the limits of classical learning, symbolized in this 
case by the Pillars of Hercules, the imagined terrestial limit of the 
Classical Greek world. 1 
Bacon announces that the founding of "real studies", real because 
they study things and not mere words, alone promises a progressive 
augmentation of our knowledge of matter and invention. The founding of 
such a method however requires a break with the past i.e. a breaking 
out of, or beyond, a set of epistemic limits which constrain the develop-
ment of Imowledge within the choking tendrils of scholastic rhetoric 
and tradition. 
Philosophy, as a set of methodological reflections on the basis and 
epistemological implications of the new science, will preside over this 
rupture. Philosophy is a vigilance. It is pledged to safeguard and 
strengthen the "proficience and advancement of learning, divine and 
hwnan", promised by real studies. Bacon's philosophy confronts the 
Aristotelian tradition at the historical moment that marks its final 
dissolution. For him, it represents a decaying carcass, a stranded 
leviathan, washed ashore and left behind by the tide of time. It is an 
obstacle. Its continued presence is a source of putrefaction, a 
malignance wi thin active Imowledge acquisition. It is the origin he 
believes of the various "distempers" which attack real learning in his 
age. Natural philosophy must shatter the bewitching dominance of 
Scholasticism which has ossified the Aristotelian heritage in a welter 
of disputational rhetoric. 
In the new organon of Bacon, classical epistemology is prescribed 
a definite function, if not actually given a specific form. It becomes 
concerned with the underwriting of guarantees for natural science. , a 
search for the certainity of a method. Classical epistemology emerges 
as a response to the development of natural science in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries; that is its engagement. This epistemic 
terrain, demarcated by the necessity to think the implications of the 
appearance of natural sCi,ence, experimental and theoretical, for the 
conditions of possibility and structure of knowledge per se, is that upon 
which Hobbes and Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz, and Kant find themselves. 
In my struc~ural exploration of classical epistemology I have attempted 
to sketch some of the major discursive dimensions of this terrain. I 
have invoked the notion of tregologicismtr to graphicize the essential 
structure of this discourse. 
Classical epistemology, a prococious offspring of an emerging bourgeois 
culture, has at its foundations an a-social conception of self, language 
and cognition - the epistemological absoluteness of the ego is dyadically 
related to the objectivity of the world-as-phenomena. Each is a mirror 
reflection of the other. This subject-object problematic forbids any 
real epistemological consideration of the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity. 
Positivist Sociology, as explicated by Durkheim is the sorry heir to 
systematic oversight of the epistemological implications of social reality. 
My examination of classical epistemology and its egological structure 
is prosecuted by an analysis of the theories of signification and cognition, 
at play in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In particular I 
examine the ideal language schemes which so preoccupied the philosophers 
and scientists of this period. In these plans for a universal character 
we witness the utopian yet concrete expression of that distinctive series 
of intermingling themes and philosophies of signification, cognition and 
mind which indeed characterizes egological epistemology. This invaluable 
textual resource is explored (all too schematically) in chapters two and 
three. What,I feel, a critical reading of these schemes and the other 
texts of the classical epistemologists reveal is the high de~ree of 
continuity within classical discourse, a unity undisturbed by the post~ 
facto attribution of the labels "empiricism" and "rationalism" to the 
differing dynamics within egologicism. 
In the fourth chapter the role of Kant is examined as the concrete 
agent of synthesise of the two philosophic traditions. Again however, 
the historical and structural conditions for this explicit attempt at 
synthesis are given in the very unconscious unities already at play in 
and between these traditions i.e. in egological discourse itself. Kant 
articulates in his critical epistemology a transcendental grounding for 
epistemic egoism. The place of scientific rationality is determined within 
the coordinates of human knowledge and purpose, as circumscribed by 
bourgeois individualism. The measure of scientific objectivity become 
the subject itself; not the concrete, human, socially and historically 
located subject but the transcendental self, an ideal surrogate. In 
the course of his critique Kant sketches the limits of egological 
discourse itself. These limits will remain intact and unbreached 
effectively for almost a century. 
Since the end of the nineteenth century however, the limits of 
philosophical discourse, that is what can be said in a particular period 
intelligibly and what remains necessarily unsaid, un sayable , have been 
increaSingly challenged. Classical epistemology in the egological mode 
comes under fire. That structure of philosophic discourse which is 
heralded by Bacon and Descartes methodological prescriptions, given its 
fcr-rn definitiveAby Kant and which Hegel struggles in vain to surpass, is itself 
in dissolution. In Husserl's work we divine that acute sense of paniC 
which is the effect of bourgeois rationalism's perception of its own 
immanent collapse but simultaneous inability to cross beyond its own 
egological limits and think the terms of the new socially reflexive 
philosophy. Wi ttgenstein too, in his earlier work struggles to defend 
European rationality by imprisoning it wi thin an egological theory of 
representation established as early as the seventeenth century. 
The nineteenth century saw the emergence and development of a new 
mode of knowledge - the social sciences. With the development of the 
sciences of History, Linguistics and Political Economy, and lastly the 
emergence of that fledgling discipline we now know as Sociology, Philosophy 
was again forced to redefine itself. And, just as in the seventeenth 
century the emergence of a radically new mode of acquiring knowledge 
viz. the empirical natural sciences led to a theoretical reflection on 
the conditions for gaining and validating knowledge in general, so 
similarly, in the nineteenth century, the development of the social 
sciences became the occasion and indeed condition for a rethinking, 
by Philosophy, of the general form of our knowing. The site and stake 
of philosophy in the twentieth century has been this rupture in knowledge 
produced by the unsolicited emergence of the social sciences. 
(But where, we may ask, is the new organon?) 
Indeed, the major trend in twentieth century philosophising in the 
four major traditions, Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, phenomenology, 
marxism and pragmatism, has been a departure from egological modes of 
theorizing which begin from the asserted primacy of the cognizing ego 
and givenness of the world-as-object,and a corresponding convergence on 
a philosophic universe of discourse characterized by an emergent interest 
in the social construction of reality. 
The terrain where-upon this convergence in philosophic thought 
occurs since the 1920' s, I have called the "conversational paradigm". 
The metaphor of the conversation serves to highlight the determjning 
characteristic of this thought, namely its opposition to the epistemic 
. egoism of Classical epistemology and the new stress on language and social 
life as constitutive dimensions of ~OJJ. The metaphor peculiar to 
egologicism of cognition-as-guided-vision is replaced by a model which 
lays stress on the mediating role of human dialogue and interaction in 
man's cognitive appropiation of the world-as-object. In addition, the 
metaphor indicates, if only obliquely, the limitations of the philosophical 
revolution of the twenties; the impartial rupture from the subject-
object problematic of egological discourse; the particular epistemic 
effects of the cloying residues of egologicism, namely the appearance 
of a personalistic philosophical anthropology which comes to dominate 
the thought of the period. 
The second half of the 1920's is the crucial period here. For the 
first time a theoretical reflection on the centrality of social process 
and communicational practice becomes central to epistemology. 
However Philosophy has continued to successfully evade its respon-
sibility to think through the implications of its frightening proximity 
to the social sciences. This it has been able to do by employing a number 
of differing tactics. Firstly, in its positivist phase, it attempted 
to replace the enquiry into the theoretical implications of the specific 
contiguity of Philosophy and Sociology with the prescriptive activity 
of legislating invariant criteria of scientificity which Sociology and 
the other social sciences must follow if they are to be deemed scientific. 
These criteria in turn are generated by philosophers of science from an 
idealized reading and hypostatization of the methods of certain of the 
physical sciences. 
Alternatively Philosophy, ignorant of the historical fact so acutely 
grasped by Bacon, that specific sciences always precede and surpass their 
philosophical critiques, attempts to establish an apodictic foundation 
for the social sciences in philosophy itself. Husserl attempts to do 
precisely this. 
More recen~, analytic philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, 
having abandoned its foundational pretenSions has conceived of the 
relationship between the disciplines of Sociology and Philosophy as one 
in which a second order activity, Philosophy, non-substantive, rather 
analytic in character, concerns itself with the analysis of the method-
ological assumptions and conceptual "logic" of a first order practice 
Sociology. This movement differs from the earlier prescritpive relation-
ship fostered under positivism, in that in post-Wittgensteinian linguistic 
philosophy, the logic of sociological explanation and theorizing is not 
merely subjected to the withering criticism of philosophy, but actually 
reduced in toto to a philosophical analysis of the conceptual structures 
and linguistic usages prevalent in a particular cultural "form of life". 
Sociology is construed as misbegotten epistemology. This is Winch's 
project. 
Contemporaneously Continental philosophy, committed and restless 
as ever in the post-war period, attempted this reduction by proclaiming 
with a heightened sense of moral indignation, the essential centrality 
of philosophical anthropology to social science; measurement and logic 
must give way to "man'~ it preached. History and social structure became 
merely the phenomenal shel1, the muted shadow, of man's development as 
human essence. The sciences of History and Political Economy are replaced 
by a phenomenology of inter-personal relations which plots the invariant 
and contentless structure of such interaction. 
Wi th the advent of Critical Social Theory and Structuralism, and 
the revival in Marxist philosophy as a meta-theory of philosophical 
knowledge,it has been increasingly difficult for philosophers to evade 
their reflexive responsibilities. The relation of Philosophy and social 
science can remain unthought no longer. 
These three approaches share a concern (if they share nothing else) 
with a critique of attempts to explain a philosopher's "mistakes" and 
''Problems'' by questioning his individual consciousness on some standard 
of eternal verification. Instead, they insist on treating the author 
as an a.gent wi thin a discourse and set of social relations of knowledge 
production, which render that agent as theorizer indeed possible. The 
concern becomes to objectively reconstruct, by historical and semiological 
analYSiS, the essential forms of his or her discourse, erecting in them 
a definite structure and intrinsic meaning: and plotting their specific 
existential base. 
Similarly I have attempted to show in this work that many of the 
traditional problems which have occupied and still bewitch bourgeois 
philosophy viz. that of the possibility of our knowledge of other minds; 
of the "meaning of meaning"; of the search for a radical and indubitable 
foundation for our knowledge are in fact non-problems generated from the 
discursive structure of an outmoded structure of thought. A "solution" to 
these "problems" must be sought outside the discursive structure which 
they themselves so adequately characterize. 
However this essay is not a work of theoretical exposition of either 
Critical Theor,y or Structuralism or indeed of recent Marxist epistemology 
(though it is certainly indebted in its method and stance to each of these 
three methodological approaches). Rather, it is a return to the scene of 
a rupture i.e. a return to that pervading discontinuity in the fabric of 
European knowledge which marks the appearance of the historical, cultural 
and social sciences. It is an attempt to trace the effects of this 
rupture in a particular region of theoretical discourse - Philosophy. 
The conversational paradigm which appears in the 1920' s is Philosophy's 
slow and reluctant accommodation to the appearance of a mode of knowledge 
which in describing its object, necessarily refers to the conditions of 
its own existence. 
But, we return to the scene of this rupture precisely to illustrate 
the discursive foundations of Philosophy in the twentieth century. Only 
by so doing can the question - ''What sort of philosophical method is 
possible and appropriate in an age of sociological reason and historical 
method?" be approached intelligibly and indeed asked at all. The 
discovery of the emergence and development of sociologism as a central 
tenet in philosophic theorizing in the twentieth century, albeit refracted 
and obscured in the viscous density of philosophical discourse itself, 
throws a radically new light on the question of the relationship between 
Philosophy and Social Science. For if as I have attempted to show, 
philosophic method and social theory have a common epistemic foundation, 
forged by social science if only later explicitly articulated by philosophy, 
then claims for the specificity of Philosophy can no longer rest on the 
asserted formal and conceptual nature of philosophical analysis as 
opposed to the substantive empirical approach of Sociology. Nor can they 
rely on Philosophy's pretensions with dealing with a formal ontology of 
being human i.e. a philosophical anthropology as distinct from the social 
sciences empirical accounts of historical process, social structure and 
personality. The former grounds for Philosophy's pretensions are 
inadmissible, for analytical philosophy has, in its conversational phase, 
abandoned the rigid distinctions between conceptual and empirical issues, 
analytic and synthetic conditions. All of these are recognized as being 
quite inapplicable to a conventionalist approach to language and meaning. 
The latter condemns Philosophy to moralism, anti-scientism and irrational-
ism and still paradoxically remains dependent, even in its illusions, on 
its epistemic proximity to the social sciences. This it cannot exorcize. 
The fundamental issue of the specificity of philosophic method in 
an age of sociological reason and historical method is re-addressed in 
the final chapter of the work. Here I address the central "problem" of 
the relativism which seems to haunt any historical epistemology which 
confronts the absolutisms of traditional philosophy of scientific method 
wi th a sociolog1stic scepticism. The central problem wi thin philosophy 
in the conversational mode has, I would argue, become how to theorize 
certain social relations as constitutive of scientific practice, but 
maintain a non-reductive and hence non-relativistic account of their 
relationship. The problem is more properly seen as one of having adequate 
theories of history, of scientific production and of language. A 
properly materialist epistemology will I argue, draw on each of these 
three areas. Increasingly a materialist epistemology is emerging as a 
tentative synthesis between a concrete history of scientific practices 
and a semiotic study of scientific and other theoretical discourses. 
This synthesis is accomplished within the theoretical ambit of historical 
. materialism, the historical science of social formations and their 
determining modes of production. Hopefully this study may contribute to 
that synthesis. 
Chapters five and six, and indeed seven and eight return directly 
to the scene of the rupture. After pausing at the beginning of chapter 
five, to trace in schematic form some of the major structural unities 
and differences which define egologicism, I attempt to give some textual 
content to the analysis of discontinuities between egological and con-
versational discourse. This is done by sketChing the work of a number 
of authors each of whom theorize at the very interface of these two 
discourses; in the slip-stream of that discontinuity. Wi ttgenstein 
and Husserl explore the limits of egologicism but from within, 
the J atter in his inevitable return to that "wonder of wonders" trans-
cendental subj ecti vi ty. The former does so in his cri tique of pure 
language, the Tractatus. Alternatively, Durkheim and Sartre find them-
selves, almost unwillingly, outside of the apodicticity of egological 
discourse. Each confronts the centrality of the social as a constitutive 
dimension of being and knowing, but each remains trapped by the residues 
of egologicism and in particular the choking tendrils of the subject-
object problematic. Each remains incorrigibly petit-bourgeois. 
It is however chronologically much earlier in the precocious theoriz:1Dg 
of Marx and Nietzsche, the one critically reflecting on the sciences of 
History and Political Economy, the other on that of Philology that we 
get the clearest glimpse in the nineteenth century of the possibility of 
a reflexive philosophy. In the depth and fervour of their critique of 
classical epistemology, so different and yet so alarmingly similar, we 
witness a radically new and fundamentally materialist set of philosophical 
practices. Durkheim and "Sociology" trapped wi thin a posi ti vism, itself 
a residue of classical epistemology are unable to offer such a trenchant 
critique of bourgeois culture and philosophy. They remain flanked and 
trapped by ~he antinomies of egologicism. 
What we have in these chapters (6, 7, 8) is not a comprehensive 
history of philosophical thought in the second half of the nineteenth 
century but a series of structural snapshots of the dissolution of 
Classical epistemology and the emergence of a socially and historically 
reflexive Philosophy. Alligned alongSide the earlier sketches of the 
emergence and formation of classical epistemology given in the first 
chapters, they permit some indication of the discontinuities which have 
structured modern philosophy. 
To give a sharper focus to my analysis of the dissolution of 
classical epistemology and the emergence of conversational paradigm as 
the philosophical accommodation to the appearance of the social sciences, 
I have treated in some depth a segment of a particular philosophical 
tradition - phenomenology. Here in the . of the texts of 
Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty we can witness, in the debate between 
transcendental and existential phenomenology, the epistemic effects, 
of dissolution and emergence, of discontinuity and residue , involved in 
the sto~ passage beyond egological discourse to the conversational 
paradigm. Simultaneously we glance over our shoulders at a series of 
strikingly parallel developments taking place in the 1920 I s in the 
pragmatist (Mead and Dewey) Anglo-saxon (Wi ttgenstein) and I'\arxist 
traditions (Volosinov). We cart in the comparison get some small measure 
of. this crucial period in the redefinition of modern thought. fhisperiod 
in which the philosophy of language, mind and science is rethought from the 
fundamental starting point of social process and communicational practice. 
In the final and necessarily lengthy chapter I return to my initial 
preoccupation of chapter one with philosophical method. What is the 
appropriate form of philosophical method in an age of sociological reason 
and historical method? . +---? 
Hopefully having revealed the discursive terrain on which philosophy 
is wittingly or unwittingly conducted via an analysis of the conversational 
paradigm, the terms in which this question must be posed will be more 
obvious. If as I would argue, Philosophy since the 1920's has been a 
reluctant thinking-through of the implications, epistemological, moral 
and political of man's fundamental sociality and historicity, then the 
poverty of analytical philo sophy's pretenSions vi s a vis Sociology should 
perhaps be apparent. 
'The practice of social science, precedes, surpasses and constantly 
informs its philosophical critique. 
But what manner of epistemological critique or intervention can 
philosophy mount with regards the social sciences? 
Surely science is not immune to philosophical critique? 
I believe these perplexing questions can best be answered by examining 
the role of philosophical reflection and critique within the sciences of 
History and Revolutionary Politics. Within the traditional Marxist 
concerns about the relationship of theory to practice, that is revolut-
ionary theor,y to the political practice of the Worker's movements, the 
question can at least be pinned down, and the issue of Philosop~'s 
relevance given some determinate content. 
Sadly however, even within the Marxist intellectual tradition, the 
status of philosophy and its stake in the defence of Marxism, as a set 
of historical, economical and political sCiences, has been obscured b=.~ 
a new scholasticism; obscured by those, to quote Bacon, who 
"hunt more after words than matter; and more after the 
choiceness of phrase, and the round and clear compositions 
of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses and 
the varying and illustration of their works with tropes 
and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of 
subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or 
depth of judgement."2 
This new scholasticism, the degeneracy of Marxism as a living 
theoretical and politically active tradition, must grasp itself as a 
political and cultural effect, i.e. as a tragic sublimation of the 
intellectuaYs political impotence in the labour and socialist movement 
in Europe today. It represents in all its theoretical pomp and circum-
stance an obscurantist refuge and a crucial failure of nerve on the part 
of the contemporary socialist intellectual. Where are those who dare 
to think? 
.. F(X)TnOTE13 
1. TIm.t B~con should hCive cho:::;en thls nnutlcf.ll ll.JIalo/:Y :is no r.;ere 
coincidence. He took an active p~irt in p1FtnnhlG r:TJd ucirninist( )'inE 
HIe colonial and plundering cy.ploi ts of the P·.neli [)h State at the 
start of the seventeenth century and pcrson::dly drew up an 
ex tensi ve plan for the coloni zati on of the province of Connnut:;ht 
in Ireland. The expansion of ~1glish influence and control, both 
mili t~y and economic, was the material background of these voyaecs 
of discovery. The r:lpid development of State sponsored cO~;;I'leI'cial 
capi talism provided the material context for the 'freeing of the 
human spirit' entailed in both the new science and navigations. 
2. Francis Bacon: Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, 
Divine and Human, Collected "Jorks, Vol. 1, London, 176S, p.1S. 
QUESTIONS OF METHOD 
"Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring 
out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation 
the connection of the social and political structure with 
production." 
MaPX: German Ideology 
17. 
In this essay my aim is not to write a comprehensive history of trad-
itional i.e. egological epistemology from its emergence in the classical 
period to its final dissolution in the phenomenological and irrationalist 
philosophies of the end of the nineteenth century. Empiricist histories 
of philosophical ideas provide us with a resource but not a method. Rather, 
the aim is to delineate the common structure underlying this epistemic history; 
a structure of a discursive nature, which conditions the developmental changes 
in classical epistemology and constrains them within a limiting terrain. 
This patterning of classical epistemology takes the form of an unfolding in 
historical time of an essential syncrony - the structure of egological 
discourse. This unfolding howeyer does not follow the simple teleological 
path of an increasingly refined reason. Neither does it correspond to the 
methodical progression of logical implication and axiomatic archtectonic. 
Its major dynamic occurs rather off stage in the realm of historic materiality. 
These changes of real historical moment will be articulated in the re-
. patterning of the discursive structure of philosophical Imowledge. 
As Althusser has noted: 
"the whole history of Western philosophy" (what I have called 
egological philosophy) "is dominated not by the 'problem of 
Imowledge', but by the ideological solution, i.e. the solution 
imposed in advance by practical, religiOUS, ethical and 
political 'interests' foreign to the reality of the Imowledge, 
which this 'problem' had to receive."1 R.C., p. 53. 
The philosophical question or set of questions around which classical 
epist~ology is organized, is in fact pre-empted by its historically required 
ideological answer. The problem is formulated to allow a solution essentially 
dictated by ideological exigencies and interests outside of the process of 
knowledge. The philosophical question recognizes itself in its ideologically 
mirrored answer. This ideological answer is represented in and through the 
specific form of epistemological discourse, just as in a play, action taJd ng 
18. 
place off stage is represented by the narrative and expressive activities of 
the actors and by means of a variety of formal devices becomes central to 
the ongoing plot of the play. That is to say these historical material 
changes are represented, and not merely reflected, in epistemological dis-
course. They remain refracted through the specific and formal properties of 
this philosophical discourse. 
The structural history of classical epistemology, i.e. the history of a 
structure, its emergence, development and dissolution and its theoretical 
effects is part of a larger area of study. It is only wi thin the wider 
historical and structural analysis of bourgeois culture at large and individ-
ualism as a key moment wi thin this, that the relationship of the historical-
material and philosophic discourse can be traced concretely. As Adorno and 
Goldman have noted the abstruse egological structure of traditional epist-
emology becomes more intelligible as a product of its time when placed along-
side the other major theoretical emanations of bourgeois individualism, 
namely the political philosophy of social contract and classical political 
economy. These constellations of bourgeois theoretical reflection, to which 
we might add the practical discourses of child centered pedagogy and 
utilitarian jurisprudence, are illuminated from a common source that lies 
beyond them in the very objective market structure of capitalist society. 
And yet, despite the brilliant insights of Marx and after him Adorno, 
Goldman, and Korsch, a sociology of bourgeois culture ,and in particular of 
bourgeois philosophical knowledge,remains to be written. Marx after his 
early philosophical phase clearly had other more pressing preoccupations. 
Adorno who noted that 
"the general! ty of the transcendental subj ect is that of the 
functional context of society, of a whole that coalesces from 
individual spontaneities and qualities, delimits them in turn 
by the level ling barter principle and virtual.ly' deletes them 
as helplessly dependent on the whole. 1t2 
was unable to develop this insight. The relationship between the appearance 
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and centrality of the category of the transcendental subject in traditional 
epistemology and the universal domination of mankind by the exchange value 
under capitalism is hinted at in 'Negative Dialectics' but remains unexplored. 
Adorno notes: 
"The process of abstraction - which philosophy transfigures, and which 
it ascribes to the knowing subject alone - is taking place in the 
factual barter society."3 
But in the end he recoils from the implications of such an analysis. 
Dialectics he declares is not a Sociology of Knowledge. The relationship 
of the two remains unexplored and Critical Theory strives to inherit, in a 
dialectical but seamless continuity, classical thought. 
Goldman in turns tells us that 
"It was thus inevitable that the development of a market economy, 
starting as early as the thirteenth century should progressively 
transform western thought.,,4 
and again 
"It seems self-evident that there is a close relation between the 
development of the market economy, in which every individual 
appears as the autonomous source of his decisions and actions, 
and the evolution of these different philosophical visions of the 
world, all of which treat the individual's consciousness as the 
absolute origin of his knowledge and action. rr5 
Goldman's sketch for a structural analysis of enlightenment philosophy 
and its materialist foundations remains a cameo. The archaeology of classical 
thought remains unexplored, despite an attempt to plot what he calls the 
"inner structure of movement" which lies beyond the division of the movement 
into separate currents in the consciousness of the enlightenment philosoph e s. 
This structure becomes in fact defined as the contrasting and negative image 
in terM5 
of dialectical materialist thought rather than being investigated.\of its 
own internal density and processual moments. In turn the relationship 
between theoretical discourse and material life remains unexplored, both 
substantively in an account of this historical period and also as a represent-
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ative relation which must be thought at the level of theory if materialist 
epistemology is to be refined. Goldman like Adorno seems more at home in 
the field of Sociology of Art and Culture than in that of a Sociology of 
Philosophical Knowledge. Both of them seem reluctant to bring the relativ-
ising impetus of the sociology of knowledge to bear in the analysis of 
philosophical and epistemological thought. For both of them, dialectic 
materialist thought is the heir to enlightenment philosophy. They are 
reluctant to despoil the objectivity and truth of this heritage. 
And besides, epistemological discourse is obtusely abstract and all 
but opaque to its historical and material foundations. However within a 
Sociology of Culture the representative nexus between material life and 
symbolic practice, so obscurred by the abstract and formal refractory structure 
of epistemology, is rendered indefinitely more apparent by the very express-
ivity of art and literature and by its iconic form. 
More recently Marxist theory of knowledge has further retreated from 
the task of a materialist sociology of philosophical knowledge. Althusser 
reacting against earlier supposedly cruder and reductionist theory of ideology, 
which see philosophy and theoretical ideology in general as a mere expressive 
epiphenomenon of economic forces, accredits 'theoretical practice' with a 
high degree of 'specificity' and 'autonomy' with regards other instances of 
the social formation. In so doing he makes a virtue out of our ignorance 
of the concrete and conjunctural relations between philosophical knowledge 
and material life. Or perhaps, he just acknowledges, however obliquely, 
the difficulty of the task. 
Althusser turns instead to the description of the internal structuration 
of philosophical knowledge and to the theorization of the concepts necessar,y 
in such a description. 'Science' is characterized in terms of the metaphor 
of production. Scientific practice is seen as a complex of definite processes 
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of production of Imowledge, the unifying principle of which is a common 
conceptual field and set of discrete methods. This metaphor serves to 
challenge the whole atomistic and abstracted conception of knowledge. In 
turn, it stresses, although it neither demarcates nor delineates, the 
historical, epistemic and indeed institutional and technological situatedness 
of scientific practice. These factors are held to condition the very 
possibility of that practice. He notes: 
"the 'thought' we are discussing here is not a faculty of a trans-
cendental subject or absolute consciousness confronted by the real 
world as matter; nor is this thought a faculty of a psychological 
subject, although human individuals are its agents. This thought 
is the historically constituted system of an apparatus of thought, 
founded on and articulated to natural and social reality. It is 
defined by the system of real conditions which make it, if I dare 
use the phrase, a determinate mode of production of knowledges. 
As such, it is constituted by a structure which combines the type 
of object (raw material) on which it labours, the theoretical 
means of production available (its theory, its method and its 
technique, experimental or otherwise) and the historical relations 
(both theoretical, ideological and social) in which it produces. ,,6 
The key concept at work in Althusser's epistemology is that of problematic. 
The problematic is a structuration of concepts around a few key terms which 
may be absent from the actual discourse they condition, but are present in 
the very range of questions and enquiries delimited within a theoretical 
discourse. Problematics like all structures have determinate boundaries 
and are divided from each other by an epistemological break which incommen-
surably divides them from other bodies of theory. The term, unlike the 
concept of a paradigm, with which it is often equated, stresses that 
structurations of Imowledge are not merely the ossified product of scientific 
practice but rather the active mechanism by which scientific practice operates 
and hence are the epistemic conditions of that practice. We must, argues 
AI thusser, understand how this sp,ecific machine operates and its conditions 
of existence. 
However, Althusser's epistemological intervention remains, as in the case 
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of most materialist epistemology to date, a mere proglomen~to the as yet 
untackled substantive study of scientific and philosophic knowledge practices 
and their relationship to other social practices, economic, political and 
ideological at a specific historical conjuncture. Only the latter type of 
study, it might be argued, can realise the grand designs of Althusser's 
critique of traditional epistemology and search for the basis of a materialist 
epistemology. Pregnant with promise Marxist epistemology wallows, with spec-
ulati ve pleasure, in its own anticipation - incorrigibly philosophical. It 
remains an intervention. 
In practice Althusser distills his essential epistemology from a single 
source, namely a 'symptomatic reading' of Marx's own texts. 7 Whether a 
general criteria of scientificity and set of tools for the structural analysis 
of theoretical discourse can be forged from an analysis of such a specific 
and highly idiosyncratic corpus of intellectual work must remain doubtful. 
However Althusser, a good rationalist at heart, turns his back on the empirical 
content of a materialist history of sciences and philosophy; the baby goes 
out with the empiricist bathwater. His major concern becomes the search for 
a unilateral distinction, of a patently non-materialist form, between science 
and ideology. The analysis of an epistemological break in Marx's own 
theorizing, which was Althusser's point of departure, becomes part of a 
general philosophical enquiry, of a decidedly rationalist and universalistic 
nature, into the conditions for any discourse in general achieving the 
status of scientifici ty. What begins as an exercise in a materialist 
analysis of the conditions of existence of a specific discourse, namely 
Marx's political economy, is inflated in a speculative and idealistic 
manner to produce the gross insubstantiality of a formal and universalistic 
epistemological theory. The structural analysis of Marx's theoretical 
discourse is expected to provide the basis for a single and absolute 
opposition of science and ideology. Althusser believes 
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he needs to establish and defend this opposition in its absolute form in 
order to establish indubitably the scientificity of Marxism. The 'sympto-
matic reading' of Marx becomes the occasion for the construction of a 
general and abstract concept of science and for the explication of an a-
historical relationship between science and ideology. Indeed Althusser 
goes as far as to deny ideology the right to a history. In true rationalist 
fashion he ascribes to ideology a formal essence which is trans-historical. 8 
In turn this general concept of science and non-historical conception 
of scientificity is employed to validate the scientificity of Marxist 
theory. Althusser constructs, through his reading of Marx, a general con-
cept of science. Marxism as a special case is then remeasured against this 
criteria of scientificity and can be judged to fall within the fold of 
scientific respectability. We smell the cartesian rat of a damning 
circularity. 
Materialist epistemology and the structural analysis of knowledge becomes 
reduced to the search for the formal demarcation of science and ideology. 
The two problematics addressed by Althusser are those which demarcate science 
and ideology. The structural analysis of philosophy and classical epist-
emology in particular, is confined to a few remants on the subject-object 
opposition as being the basic form of epistemology in this period (Althusser 
calls this polarity the empiricist conception of knowledge). The structure 
identified is located within the general and non-historical problematic of 
ideology. The major motivation of the analysis becomes the damning of 
classical philosophy as ideology and the establishment of the mature Marx's 
scientificity by the demonstration of his epistemic distance fram this 
philosophic structura tion. The possibility of a concrete and conjunctural 
structural analysis of philosophical knowledge and its historical and material 
conditions of existence is sacrificed in the dream of the absolute. 
For Althusser's contemporaries Lecourt,9 Clavelin10 and Foucault11 
this sacrifice is too much. Each in their own way has come to believe that 
wi thin the circumscribing materiality of history it is possible to analyse 
the structural systematicity and discursive objectivity of discrete s,ystems 
of scientific knowledge and philosophic theory. Increasingly a materialist 
epistemology is emerging as a tentative synthesis between a concrete history 
of scientific practices and a semiotic study of scientific and 
other theoretical discourses. This synthesis is accomplished within the 
theoretical ambit of historical materialism, the historical science of social 
formations and their determining modes of production. 
The moments of this synthesis as yet retain their identity. The science 
of history and the theory of semiotics, the epistemic grounding of these 
moments, retain their specific methods and perspectives. With the development 
of a theory of semiotics i.e. a theory of discursive practice, originally 
derivative of the science of linguistics but increasingly differentiating 
itself as it develops its own specific concepts and methods, it has become 
possible to theoretise the specificity and relative autonomy of the production 
of knowledge s • 
For Michel Foucault an adequate history of scientific and philosophical 
knowledges must involve both the study of discursive relations and depend-
encies and of non-discursive or material relations involving the whole play 
of economic, political and social changes. Yet Foucault is aware that it is 
an easier task to isolate the criteria of formation which "permits us to 
12 individualize a discourse such as political economy or general grammar" 
and of transformation which define "the conditions which have been effective 
together at a very precise moment of time, in order that its objects, its 
operations, its concepts and its theoretical options could be formed,,,1) than 
to establish the criteria of correlation that not only situate an individual-
ized discourse among other types of discourse (e.g. classical epistemology 
amongst political economy, social philosophy, pedagogy) but in "the non-
discursive context in which it functions (institutions, social relations, 
economic and political conjuncture)." 1 4 
Foucault's project,as Sartre caustically commented is i1to introduce , 
discontinui ty and the constraint of a system into the history of mind." 
Discourses such as political economy or general grammar can be individualized 
not on the basis of the unity of an object, nor because of possessing a formal 
structure or an internal conceptual coherence; nor because they follow a 
fundamental philosophical choice. Rather, discourses gain their discrete 
identity from rules of formation which form and link their specific objects, 
concepts, methods and theoretical options in a specific system or 'play of 
dependencies'. Foucault wishes to substitute this notion of structural 
determination, "the whole play of dependencies", for the primary and linear 
notion of determination invoked in the concept of cause. Like Althusser he 
is concerned with the specificity of various sectors of historical reality 
economic, scientific, institutional, or popular ideology. He recognises in 
historical study "an ever increaSing number of strata, and the need to 
distinguish them, the specificity of their time and chronologies, types of 
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events at quite different levels, individualization. of different series". 
He sees the central problem of historical research as constituting these 
series, fixing their boundaries and revealing the structural relations specific 
to them and the law of transformation governing these and beyond this describing 
the relations between these different strata or series of historical reality. 
This latter task, the constituting of "series of series" or tableSof interrelated 
sectors of historical reality, Foucault sees as the major one of what he calls 
'general history'. Such a history must "determine what form of relation may 
be legitimately described between these different series; what vertical 
system they are capable of forming; what interplay of correlation and 
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dominance exists between them.,,15 He criticizes classical history for 
attempting to give a total description of historical reality which explains 
all phenomena by reference to a central dominating principle, meaning or 
cause. A general history on the contrary by suspending the search for a 
single prime cause, principle or telos of historical change "would deploy the 
space of a dispersion" within which sectors of historical reality could be 
described in their concrete inter-relations. He hopes that by "suspending 
the indefinitely extended privilege of the cause", to "render apparent the 
. 16 polymorphous cluster of correlations." 
Such a suspension however does not remove the obligation to concretely 
describe and effectively theoretise the relations, correlative and determin-
ative, between the discursiverand non-discursive or material. It in fact 
increases the obligation to do so. Foucault acknowledges that the discontinui~ 
he seeks as the organizing demarcation of knowledges is "a play of specific 
transformations different from another (each one having its conditions, its 
rules, its level) and linked among themselves to schemes of dependence.,,17 
He distinguishes within this play of dependencies, three different types or 
levels of systemic interplay. 
1. 'Intra-discursive dependencies' are those between the theoretical 
objects, operations and concepts of a single discursive formation; 
the grammatical network which in linking these elements together 
in a particular manner renders a specific discourse possible. The 
structural analysis of classical theories of language portrayed 
schematically on p 114. is made at this level. 
2. 'Interdiscursive dependencies' are those between different discursive 
formations. Foucault gives as examples of these relations the 
correlations between natural history, economics and grammar and 18 
theory of representation that he traces in "The Order of Things". 
The relations between traditional epistemology and the classical 
theory of representation plotted in chapters two and three of this 
work would also fall under this heading. 
3. 'Extra discursive dependencies' are those between transformations 
within discourse and structural changes or transformations which 
have been produced beyond discourse in the material world. As 
examples of these relations he gives the correlations studied in 
'Madness and Civilization'19 and in 'The Birth of the Clinic'20 
between medical discourse and the pl~ of economic, political and 
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social changes which defines the institutional context within which 
medical and penal practice operates in this period. With the 
exception of a few conjectural comments about the pragmatic motives 
of universal language planners, no such extra discursive depend-
encies are traced in my text. Nor can they be traced in our current 
state of knowledge about the historical and conjunctural relations 
between bourgeois culture and in particular, science and philosophy 
and material life within the capitalist social formation. Moreover' 
as Althusser's theory of levels and asserted autonomy of theoretical 
practice implicitly acknowledges, they cannot even be thought at the 
level of theory. 
Although Foucault addresses himself to these extradiscursive dependencies 
in the two books on medical discourse in the course of a concrete historical 
analysis of changing conceptions of madness and clinical practice, he is 
unable to theor Jise these relations in his methodological reflections. 
Foucault's work although it involves an unacknowledged historical and hermeneutic 
methodological dimension alongside the structuralist component strives to 
achieve a degree of formalization of specific discourses. In so doing he 
must of necessity, invoke and explicate general principles of formal analysis 
which can be applied to any discourse whatsoever. Just as with structuralist 
method, with which his work uneasily co-exists, he is forced to refine from 
the raw materials of his substantive discursive studies a set of formal 
principles of analysis, in order to rescue the history of ideas from a crass 
empiricism. 
Foucault believes that his archaeology of knowledge can free the empir-
icist history of science and ideas from its uncertain methodological status. 
It can demarcate the domain of the historical study of knowledges. It can 
define the nature of its investigative object. And it can clarify the 
relationShip between this slice of historical knowledge and other areas of 
historical analysis. In place of the uncertainties and inconsistencies of 
traditional history of ideas, Fbucault wishes to substitute the analysis 
of discourse itself, "in its condition of formation, in the series of its 
modifications, and in the play of its dependencies and correlations. n21 From 
the methodological standpoint of an archaeology of knowledge, discourse for 
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the first time would "appear in a describable relationShip with the ensemble 
of other practices".22 However to defend the validity of this substitution 
Foucault is forced to explicate at some length and with a burdening degree 
of generality and formal,ization, the methodological basis of his contextual 
method. This too easily drives his beleagured methodological craft into 
the sheltered haven of a purely discursive and even solely semiotic analysis. 
For it is in the realm of the intra or inter-discursive that the operations 
of transformation, implication and correlation addressed by his archaeology, 
can achieve their highest degree of theorization. 
Indeed he is able to achieve a degree of formalization of transformations 
and dependancies at the purely discursive level. This discursive field and 
its relations he defines as having a specific status not reducible to the 
order of linguistic construction or of formal axiomatic systems. The dis-
cursive field is constituted by 
"the difference between what one could say correctly at one period 
(according to the rules of grammar and those of logic) and what is 
actually said."23 
This is to say the discursive field demarcates the limits and forms of 
what he expressed and understood in a specific domain at a particular period. 
The model of linguistic study with its distinction between langue and parole, 
structure and utterance serves to illustrate the relationship between dis-
cursive field and statement. But Foucault stresses that although analogous, what 
he is analysing in discourse is not merely a system of language. The laws of 
exi.stence of statements "the conditions of their singular emergence" are not 
merely semiotic. He insists that his archaeological enquiry is not concerned 
with codes nor with formal rules of construction between discursive events 
or statements and between statements and other previo~s or simultaneous non-
discursive events. The rules of formation he seeks are to account for the 
actual historical existence of statements and not merely for their formal 
possibility within the rules of grammar which govern the linguistically 
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possible. The'statement' for Foucault is not merely a linguistic proposition 
governed by a determinate syntax and having a definite referent, it also, and 
primarily/is a historically located event whose specific conditions of exist-
ence can be sought. Archaeology addresses itself to the complex totality of 
events correlated to a set of statements or archive in a specific period. 
It seeks in discourse its multiple conditions of existence. Yet if the 
archaeology is not to founder on the methodological indeterminancy of a 
general history and dissipate itself in the specificity and particularity 
of the conjunctural relationships between knowledge and other social,economic 
and ideological practices,then its theoretical reflections seemingly must 
centre on the purely discursive. With the shining example of a fully fledged 
science of linguistics at hand and the possibility of a general science of semiotic 
in the offing, the concentration of the theoretical focus of the new discipline 
on the purely discursive seems justified. 
At the intra-discursive level24 he points to two different types of 
transformation: 
(1) Those that occur within the overall structure of a given dis-
cursive formation. These he calls 'derivations', in so far 
these involve logical or quasi logical structural changes 
wi thin a given structure, which represent the unfolding of 
the formation guided by its own internal 'logical' dynamic. 
Amongst these logical and structural transformations he lists 
changes by deduction or implication, changes by generalization, 
changes by limitation, changes by exclusion and inclusion. 
All of these have a quasi-logical nature and are conceived of 
as the syntactical rules of transformation which 'generate' 
the specific epistemic development of a particular discursive 
formation. As quasi logical they can bear some measure of 
formalization, 
Foucault distinguishes secondly those structural changes which 
affect the discursive formation themselves as a whole. These 
changes "of a type superior to the preceeding ones"( l1J ) he 
calls "mutations" indicating that these transformations are total 
changes in the discursive areas themselves. Of particular 
interest is the displacement of the boundaries which define the 
choice of objects, methods and theoretical options within a 
discursive formation. Other important changes he isolates are 
the role of the subject as a constitutive category in the dis-
course and in the functioning of language with respect to 
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objects within the formation. The changes in the discursive 
formation of phenomenological philosophy traced at some 
length in the succeeding chapters would fall under Foucault's 
heading of 'mutations'. 
As well as these two types of transformations at the intra-discursive 
level, he characterizes another type of transformation which operates at the 
level of inter-discursive dependencies. These transformations in turn are 
of a type 'superior' to the two previous others listed (1) and (2). [The 
notion of superiority invoked here by Foucault is far from clear. We can 
only assume he, means more important in their structural consequences and 
hence in their explanatory significance . Foucault in common with structur-
alist theory in general tends to ontologize explanatory categories and 
confuse the real object with the object of structuralist knowledge production.] 
They are changes which "affect simultaneously several discursive formations". 
Foucault introduces the term 'episteme' to refer to constellations of dis-
courses which their mode of being and determinate structure render possible 
within a wider epistemic field. He stresses the episteme is not "a sort of 
grand underlying theory" rather he sees it as "a space of dispersion" or 
open field of discursive relationships within which particular formations, 
mathematics, biology, etc., develop their specific structure and have their 
individual histories. The episteme he declares "is not a general stage of 
reason" akin to a Weltanscha'Vung, rather "it is a complex relationship of 
successive displacements". 25 It is a simultaneous play of dependencies and 
transformations between discrete discursive formations within a common but 
open epistemic field indicated in turn by these specific relationships but 
not contained by them. It is in other words neither the lowest cammon 
denominator of these formations nor their highest multiple, but rather the 
terrain wi thin which they have their being. The structuration of philosophical 
knowledge plotted in this study and referred to as egological and conversational 
discourses could be classified as regional instances of different epistemes. 
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This third type of discursive change peculiar to the episteme itself 
Foucault refers to as 'redistribution' He outlines several different 
forms of 'epistemic redistributions'. Amongst these are the reversal of 
the hierarchical order obtaining between several discursive formations. 
The example he gives is the reversal of hierarchical order in the nineteenth 
century between the analysis of language and biology. In this study the new 
primacy afforded to Sociology and particularly Sociology of Knowledge vis-a-
vis Philosophy, in the conversational paradigm would serve as another 
illustration of this redistributional transformation. Another form of 
redistribution is the change in the nature of the directional role afforded 
to a specific discursive formation, at a particular time, within a certain 
episteme. In the twentieth century in the conversational paradigm there is 
a "metaphorical importation" of a certain number of key concepts of Sociology 
into the discourse of other areas e.g. social interaction, institution, 
culture, socialization. 
Foucault insists that his intention is not to establish an exhaustive 
typology of these transformations, derivations, mutations and redistributions 
but to "offer as the content of the monotonous and empty concept of "change" 
a play of specified modifications. ,,26 His aim in his archaeology of 
Imowledge, which he hopes can replace the empiricist history of "ideas" or of 
"sciences", is not merely to give a formal list of types of structural trans-
fonnations in lmowledges but to offer a descriptive analysis of the different 
transfonnations occuring in specific discursive formations at particul.ar 
historical periods. 
And yet Foucault is able to achieve a high level of formalization of 
the transformational dynamics conditioning the possibility and development 
of theoretical discourses. He is indeed forced to do so if he is to illustrate 
to us, the specificity and indeed superiority of his "archaeology" vis-a-vis 
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the empiricist history of ideas. To establish this specificity and 
superiority he must engage the history of ideas not only in metaphysical 
debate (about the role of the cognitive subject and of categories of teleology 
and causality in the history of knowledges) but also in a debate about method. 
To do so he must, in a post facto manner, explicate the methodological basis 
of his own work in various substantive areas of scientific discourse. It 
seems unlikely that the substantive studies are an application of a method-
ology · the principles of which are formulated in 'The Archaeology of 
Knowledge'. It is much more likely that L'archeologie represents a retro-
spective attempt to explicate a systematic methodology to cover a set of 
independent contextual procedures. For instance it is not at all certain 
that Foucault is employing the same methodological tools when he,on the one 
hand1describes changes in social institutions (the birth of the clinic or 
appearance of the modern prison) and when he plots the transformations taking 
place at the level of systematic or theoretical discourse. The methodology 
contextually employed in the analysis of statements i.e. discursive objects 
is not immediately relevant to the historical and conjunctural ana~sis of 
fully material institutions such as prisons and the asylum. The latter social 
realities are not in essence changes between ways of speaking and of enunciat-
ing knowledge but more fundamentally changes in social and institutional 
practices which condition the emergence of new and quite decidedly material 
things. 
However despite some success in the formalization of the structural and 
transformational process at play in the appearance and development of 
scientific discourses, Foucault is unable or unwilling to introduce this 
same measure of formalization or theorisation into the realm of extra-
discursive dependencies. These extradiscursive dependencies, the indellible 
imprint of material life on discourse, are studied in their discrete specificity 
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and conjunctural concreteness in 'Madness and Civilization' and in 'The 
Birth of the Clinic'. Indeed in his latest substantive study on puniShment,27 
his materialist and historical interests become uppermost amongst his 
interests. He sees the grasping of the nature of extra-discursive depend-
encies as being the key to understanding the basis of power relations in 
modern society. Yet, he defines history i.e. the adequate history of ideas 
and their social milieu, as not only the descriptive analysis of these trans-
formations but also as their structural theorization. But when he attempts 
to theoretise these extra-discursive dependencies, with the tools of semiotic 
analYSis, he comes unstuck. 
Or does he? In truth he shrinks from the task, as well he might. The 
substantive study in which he achieves the most formalized 'structuralist' 
analysis of a set of discursive formations and in which he tackles the most 
abstract knowledge domains, namely 'Th~ Order of Things' is precisely the one 
in which there is no real mention of extra-discursive transformationJand 
dependencies. Conversely the studies with greatest historical and contextual 
research and plotting of specific conjunctural and extra-discursive depend-
encies (often they strike us as almost recounted coincidencies) are those with 
the lowest degree of formalization of the discursive structures and trans-
formations at work viz the two studies of medical discourse. Foucault in 
his own strategy of analysis seems to implicitly acImowledge the contrasting 
and indeed conflicting methodological demands of,on the one hand, the 
structural analysis of knowledge as a series of sign systems and,on the other, 
the materialist science of history. The former strives for generality and 
for the formalization of discursive relations which entails their reduction 
to an essential synchrony. Change must be telescoped into the simul tanei ty 
of transformation within a structure or mutation of it. The latter however 
a1 though in its method it !!J!iY.. depart from an a priOri theoretical vision of an 
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economy determinant in the last instance, soon gets drawn into the particul-
arity of history and committed to the substantive and descriptive analysis 
of specific historical conjunctures and dynamics. Structure, must be 
elastically stretched into historical time and given body in historical 
particularity. 
In Foucault's archaeology the tension between semiotic enquiry and 
general history remains. The former moment remains centred on a dynamic 
which leads it to strive for a measure of generalization and formalization 
in its method'. A general history, on the other hand, retains its concern 
With the particular, concrete and conjunctural. Foucault's project can be 
seen as the search for a synthesis of these two moments. This he seeks 
within the ambit of a materialist history of knowledges of a non-reductionist 
type. He speaks of "opening up the field of a general history in which one 
could describe the singularity of practices, the play of their relations, 
the form of their dependencies.,,28 Furthermore "it is in the space of this 
general history that the historical analySis of discursive practices could 
be circumscribed as a discipline.,,29 The concept of general history invoked 
here remains unclear. Foucault has rejected the totalising and a prioristic 
economic or idealist reductions of a global history,but with no adequate 
theory of history to take its place he is unable to theorize the terms of 
the relation between a structural history of knowledge and the general history 
which would be its condition. In turn he is unable' or unwilling to theorize 
the terms that could facilitate a synthesis of semiotic and historical method. 
Foucault seems to recognize the difficulty in achieving this theofization. 
The problem is not approached thematically in his work but rather is addressed 
elliptically in the context of his substantive studies of particu1ar dis cur si ve 
formations and their material dependencies. Foucault's project and his method 
becomes increasing~ a substantive, historical one. The relations and 
35. 
dependencies he seeks to trace between discursive and material practices 
(whether economic, political or ideological) are more and more histOrically 
specific and conjunctural ones and not the incidental empirical reassurances 
sought by a global history (whether idealist or economistic in form) self 
assured about its own truth. Nor are these relations the abstract and 
eternal ones sought by Althusserian structuralist epistemology or philosophy 
of signification. 
For Foucault the methodological synthesis of discursive and historical 
analysis and the emergence of a theoretically coherent and self-sufficient 
archaeology of knowledge will be forged by substantive studies rather than 
by abstract reflection. 
Moreover Foucault's substantive studies remain,despite the structural 
theoretical anticipation motivating his work,interpretative and sadly con-
jectural, as indeed the best work in the Marxist tradition has been. His 
work like that of Lukacs, Adorno and Goldman before him,owes as much to the 
sensitivity and insight of its author than to any coherence or adequacy of 
method. 
Foucault's thematic attempt at an explicit methodological synthesis of 
semiotic and historical analysis in an archaeology which addresses itself 
to the structural interplay of discursive and material practices clearly 
fails. It is doubtful whether the method explicated in the theoretically 
reflex:i. ve texts (primarily "The Archaeology of Knowledge) is actually 
employed in the substantive studies. What is the archaeological method 
without Foucault's analytical insight, encylopaedic knowledge, and rationalist 
sophistication? Has he founded the basis of a new discipline with a distinctive 
method which will survive him as .an autonomous set of tools of analysis? 
The substantive studies ~ throw light on the concrete interplay of discursive 
and material practices at a specific historical conjuncture. They ~ suggest 
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a new way of writing history sensitive both to the structural properties of 
knowledge discourses and to the material context of their production. How-
ever, they do not permit any general theorization of this interplay of 
dependencies wi thin a given social formation. Foucault is not offering us 
a systematic sociology of bourgeois culture. 
However Foucault has in his work demarcated a new area of study - the 
historical and structural analysis of knowledge domains. His archaeological 
project involves a clear perception of the need for a historical analysis 
of the multiple conditions of existence, material and discursive, of epistemic 
formations and of the need to think at the level of theory the terms of this 
methodology. His work however also recognizes, if only implicitly, the 
difficulties in focusing on the interplay of discursive and materialist 
dependencies and in forging a new historical methodology composed of semiotic 
and historical materialist elements. His substantive studies themselves 
display in their differing foci of interest and dissimiliar contextual 
methodologies the still autonomous directions of the semiotic and historical 
study of knowledge. Those studies which achieve a degree of formalization 
of inter and intra discursive relations, leave untouched the relation of 
these structures to material practices (The Order of Things is not a 
Sociology of Bourgeois intellectual thought). Conversely, thdse studies 
which sensitively address the particularity of the extra discursive depend-
encies of specific discourses do not serve as a structural formalization of 
those discourses and their systems of formation. 
Foucault continues .to develop the two moments of a materialist epistemology, 
the discursive and the historical, alongside each other. He bows to our 
inevitable lack of substantive historical knowledge and of theoretical tools, 
at the present time, to forge the methodological basis of an adequate 
Sociology of bourgeois intellectual culture. The archaeology remains an 
anticipation. 
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In the meantime I would argue following Foucault's example that we 
need more studies of both sorts - the concrete-historical and the 
structural-discursive. 
The study reported here is of the latter type. Its theoretical object 
is that discursive domain first demarcated by Althusser and defined with 
greater methodological clarity by Foucault. 30 However this demarcation and 
the defense of the specificity of the discursive as a theoretical object 
does not remove in any way the necessity for a comprehensive historical and 
sociological analysis, of a material~st nature, of bourgeois intellectual 
culture in general and classical epistemology in particular. My own study 
concentrates on a macro-analysis of the discursive structure of classical 
epistemology and its dissolution in an age of sociological reason. 
--------------------------- ------
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~ original motive for this study was my dissatisfaction as a philosopher 
trained in the analytic tradition, and interested in sociological theory, 
with the dismal lack of critical self reflection in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. 
In particular I was concerned with its unwillingness to trace the method-
ological implications for philosophy of the new contiguity of philosophic 
method and social theory since the 1930's. It was this dissatisfaction with 
a philosophical tradition unconscious of its O'WIl domain assumptions in a 
period of supposedly philosophical revolution (ordinary language philosophy) 
and uncognizant of the historical density and si tuatedness of philosophic 
method that led me (and a generation of other philosophy students who educated 
themselves) in the first instance to look beyond the analytic tradition to 
its contemporary continental counterparts • (Phenomenology, marxism and 
critical theory). These continental schools despite their terminological 
obscurantism seemed at least to exist in a situaticn of fruitful symbiosis 
with the social sciences. 
However what my comparative studies seemed to indicate increasingly to 
me was a series of continuities at the 'deepest level' (the notion of discur-
sive structure was not yet available to me) between the traditions of ordinary 
language philosophy, existential phenomenology, pragmatist and neo-marxist 
philosophy since the 1920' s. These continuities seemed to be based on the newly 
ascribed centrality of a sociologically informed conception of man, language 
and science in philosophical reasoning. This system of continuities based 
on a pervading sociologistic influence on the content of philosophic analysis 
seemed in tum to sharply contrast with the rigidly individualist form of a 
claSSical epistemology which stretched from Descartes to Husserl and the 
young Wi ttgenstein. In fact these continuities were defined as a system by 
32 that contrast and by the incommensurability of the philosophic visions involved. 
This perception of a historically situated rupture in classical epistemology 
led in turn to a n eN interest on '/IJY part in the historical and structural 
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analysis of systems of philosophical thought, and for a search for the 
theoretical and methodological tools with which to tackle such a study.33 
Furthermore it was clear that such studies could no longer be s~ply 
.., relegated to the specialized area of the history of ideas safely isolated 
~from ~logy, the heartland ofp)rilosOPhic~_ knO~=~dlJ'.34 Rather it 
( seemed that historical and cultural studies of systems of philosophical 
ideas, in so far as they introduced the dynamism, flux and density of 
historical process and the specificity and relativity of cultural forms into 
the eternal immutable world of philosophical ideas, had a direct import for 
issues about philosophical method, for epistemology and for the philosophies 
of science and signification. Clearly philosophic method in an age of 
sociological reason and historical method must examine its foundations, 
theoretical and material, historical and structural. 
This essay represents an attempt to introduce analytic philosophic 
method to the joys of critical self reflection, of a structuralist nature, 
from a materialist perspective. 
As such, the structural analysis of the egological and conversational 
paradigms plotted here is motivated by a desire to inform and intervene in 
current epistemological practice, rather than to give an exhaustive account 
of the rules of formation and "transformation of these discursive fields or 
on the other hand to provide an accurate descriptive chronology of the 
development of epistemology from Descartes to the present day. The topics 
chosen for in d~th substantive analysis, (a) the ideal language schemes 
of the classical period and (b) the phenomenological movement in the 
twentieth century, are resources which facilitate the plotting of the deeper 
discursi ve structures at play during this entire historico-epistemic period. 
The choice of topics is in one sense arbitrary. Qui te obviously these 
movements are o~ two moments in the history of western epistemological 
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thought and we could as easily have chosen other important ones e.g. 
Viennese positivism or the hermeneutic historicism of Dilth;r, Rickert and 
the Marburg neo-Kantians. The essays on Kant and Marx and Nietzsche as 
well as the general comments on analytic and Marxist philosophy since the 
1920's do try to ·broaden the base of the structural analysis of the egological 
and conversational paradigms. In another sense however, the choice of textual 
topics is not arbitrary. These moments, the utopias of the universal language 
planners and Husserl' s shattered dream of an apodictic gJaosology, display in 
their clearest form the essential structures at play in egological and con-
versational discourse. Furthermore these moments are not merely illustrative, 
an expression of these structural forms, they are to be understood as the 
concrete effect of the interplay of these discursive structures and their 
material dependencies. 
Philosophical movements, schools, individuals, texts, and theories are 
in the end not the theoretical object of our analysis. They in themselves 
do not define the underlying structures of continuity and discontinuity at 
play in a specific historical period. They are themselves conditioned in their 
very possibility by these discursive deep structures. Their unity as a set 
of statements is provided not by their conscious organization by various 
scholars into theory, text, school or movement but by the discursive field 
within which they have their meaning and displacement. One is led, as 
Foucault has concluded "to the proj ect of a pure description of discursive 
events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form wi thin it. ,,35 
The theories, texts and movements studied, constitute for our structural 
analysis a cross section or sample of a population of discursive statements or 
events distributed in the space of a particular epistemic field indicated, 
but not exhausted, by these statements. The discursive events studied here, 
the emergence of the conversational paradigm in philosophical discourse in 
the 1920 I S represents a regional instance or effect of a series of more 
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profound discursive transformations which have heralded the rupture from 
classical thought and the emergence of the modern episteme. 
Of course much philosophical work must be done to clear the conceptual 
rubble which stands in the way of our thinking the terms of an adequate 
materialist epistemology. This means of course the critique of traditional 
epistemology, its naive positivism and its teleology. It means the 
expurging of the outmoded categories of that epistemology - the subject _ 
object gh~ology, the a-historical conception of scientific practice and of 
systems of verification, and the atomistic and accumulative model of 
scientific knowledge. It also means as Althusser and Foucault suggested the 
critique of reductionist theories of ideology and the creation of the con-
ceptual tools with which to theorize and substantively analyse the specificity 
of the epistemic and its articulation with other material practices. 
In turn it necessitates a rethinking of the relationship between philosophy 
and history.36 One of the consequences of this is the restoring of the 
centrality of the history of ideas, now of a structuralist and non teleological 
form, after its recent suppression by both analytical and phenomenological 
" ",I II I . philosophy. A philosopher's mistakes and problems can no longer, be simply ev4 uqteJ ~ 
, theoretical propositions on some standard of timeless verification. 
The conditions of production of philosophical knowledge cannot be traced 
to the isolated consciousness of an unlocated thinker, nor to the invariant 
conventions of scientific practice and procedures of verification of an 
ideal (and a-historical) 'community' of scientific investigators. The 
structures, discursi ve and material, which determine the possibility of 
philosophical formuJ.ations (problems, issues or solutions) lie beyond the 
'constitutive consciousnesses of individuals and beyond the rubrics of 
positivist philosophy of science. 
Materialist epistemology seeks to objecti~ reconstruct, both 
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historically and semiotically, the structures of discourse and their con-
ditions of existence, epistemic and material, which have conditioned 
philosopher's 'problems' and 'mistakes'. 
Philosophical problems are then to be seen as the effects of epistemic 
structures rather than as the muses or tribulations of individual philosophers. 
This point is illustrated at some length in my consideration of the problem of 
'other minds' as flowing directly from the egological structure of classical 
epistemology. Many of the mutations which take place in the nineteenth 
century in classical epistemology from Hegel's dialectical excesses to 
Husserl's transcendental reveries represent an attempt to grapple with the 
solipsistic consequences of egological epistemology but within the terms of 
that discourse. Their philosophical problem becomes the containment of a 
problem. Similarly in the twentieth century in an age of sociological reason, 
the major philosophical problem perhaps has been that of the relativisI'l of 
truth and lmowledge. This problem both in its epistemological and moral 
dimension has been thrown up by the new precedence of the social and historical 
in philosophical thought. 
Philosophical problems are then conditioned by the structure of the 
discourse wi thin which they are fC:>I"mulated. The structure of this discourse 
demarcates the limits of what can be said intelligible within a theoretical 
domain - the boundaries of philosophic sense in a given historico-epistemic 
period. 
However there is another mode of effectivity of structures at the dis-
cursive level which can be isolated. The understanding of its operation can 
illuminate the nature of many philosophical problems. This is best referred 
to as the 'problem of residue'. Philosophical problems are not only over-
determined by the historically specific discourse within which they are 
located, (I locate in this study two such discourses, the egological and 
conversational) they are also conditioned by terminological and indeed con-
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ceptual residues from other preceeding discourses. 
In a period where both Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science (Kuhn,37 
Feyerabend38 ) and French epistemology of science (Bache1ard,39 Canguilheim40 
and Foucault) stress the discontinuities within scientific theory, we should 
not loose sight of the accumulative, and residual continuities between 
'paradigms' or 'discourses'. The desire to oppose teleological and 'pro-
gressive accumulative' accounts of the historical development of 'science' 
should not lead to an a-priori rejection of the possibility of continuity 
between discourses in toto. The issue of continuity between discourses, 
its measure and its mode, is an empirical and theoretical issue to be settled 
by substantive historical and discursive analysis. For as Althusser's 
concept of problematic reminds,us the discontinuities between discourses are 
essentially those of structural reorganization and rearrangement of often 
the same terms around a few changed key concepts. As A1 thusser points out 
the discontinuities between Ricardo'S and Marx's labour theories of value 
a ... ~ of this form. Similarly the rupture between transcendental and exist-
ential phenomenology traced here is of a form where certain basic terms are 
continuous in both bodies of theory (subject, object, self, intentionality, 
consciousness) yet these terms derive a new meaning in their novel config-
uration wi thin the existential rupture with traditional phenomenology, 
around a set of new key concepts (the other, historicity, existence, the concrete), 
A set of terms may then exist in continuity between a number of histor-
ically divided and theoretically incommensurable discourses. These tenus 
however can only obtain their definitive meaning in a specific period within 
the structural configuration of one particular discourse. In other words 
only wi thin the structures of a specific discursive field can they become 
concepts fully 
endowed with sense and operative in knowledge production. 
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On the other hand, terms inherited by a discourse from a preceeding 
one embody a certain residual meaning which has its origin not in the con-
ceptual configuration of the contemporary discourse but .in that of its 
predecessor. 
Specific epistemic effects can be traced within a philosophic discourse 
as the result of carrying over the terms and categories of the previous 
supplanted discourse in a situation where new concepts and terms to think 
the required relations are not readily at hand. This problem of residue is 
illustrated in this study in the tribulation of analytic philosophy of 
language (since the 1930's) coming to terms with its conversational or socio-
epistemological basis. The foundations and form of linguistic analysis 
moves from an 'ideal language project' i.e. an eJological notion of language 
analysis as the establishment of a logico-syntactic framework and universal 
object language, to the descriptive analysis of the use of ordinary language 
in social context but the terminology and concepts of positivist theory are 
carried over in the surface discourse of ordinary language philosophy. Here 
these residues make mischief. They sow confusion in for example the hope-
lessly confused notion of an 'informal logical' structure of ordinary language. 
Similarly Marx,as Althusser has reminded us,constantly has to grapple with 
the residue of the Hegelian idealist problematic in his own materialist dis-
course, a problem not solved by a sudden ( self-conscious) epistemological 
break with his 'erstwhile philosophical consciousness'. 
These modes of effectivity of epistemic structure, namely that of 
synchronous overdetermination and that of residue operate essentially below 
the level of consciousness of individual philosophers or the schools and 
traditions to which they adhere. 
This study aims to address these epistemic structures and their modes 
of effectivity both substantively, in the empirical analysis of classical 
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epistemology and its dissolution, and also analytically, in a theoretical 
reflection which might illuminate the foundations of philosophic method in 
an age of sociological reason. 
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PART I 
Traditionally the history of philosophical ideas has demarcated the 
classical period, stretching from the enlightenment to the onset of romant-
icism into the competing schools of rationalism and empiricism. The 
development of modern philosophy is schematised as the tale of the careers 
of these two schools; their differences, conflict, interaction and synthesis. 
However the language of their texts, the actual rhetoric of Descartes, Locke, 
Leibnitz and Hume speaks to us of a submerged unity at the level of dis-
coursive structure more than of a fundamental difference. Structural analysis 
of thought must plunge beneath the surface ripples and disturbance ohthe 
shimmering surface of classical thought to the murky depths whose currents 
and eddys, though hidden from immediate sight, remain determinant of that 
thought in the first and last instance. In the deep structure of ego-logicism 
we have located precisely such a current, operative in classical thought, 
but never rendered thematic. In our treatment of the notion of self in 
classical philosophy, whether in the rationalist empiricist or critical idealist 
traditions, we have located a unity - epistemic egoism; i.e. the abstraction 
of the process of the production of knowledge from its social context and 
its reduction to the cognitive gaze of a solitary/if absolute,cognizing agent 
towards an objectified and represented world. 
The topic of language also affords us an excellent resource to plot the 
discursive structure of the egological paradigm. This structure is not given 
directly in the self-understanding of classical philosophy but rather is a 
condition of its very possibility. MOreover, the resonances of this structure 
still echo today in our philosophical thought on self, cognition and language, 
replaced in their centrality by a sociologistic ontology but retaining a 
residual effectivity and directional pull. 
The study of language in the years considered here 1630-1 800 was con-
ducted before the emergence of a discrete science of linguistics. The question 
of language t to which the ablest philosophical minds of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries addressed themselves, was not merely a matter of invest-
igating the syntax, inflectional forms, phonology and etyuplogy of particular 
languages. Rather, it involved questions of wider significance, issues about 
the relationship of language and thought, of sign systems and the pursuit of 
knowledge; issues about the origins of our ideas and of language as an 
institution; issues indeed about the role of an improved language in 
fostering human communication, religious toleration and political enlighten-
ment. As Hans 'Arsleff tells us: 
"Before the middle of the nineteenth century, language study was 
a mixture of philosophy and philology, and its history must be 
written in those terms.'" 
The philosophy which occupied Locke and the founding members of the Royal 
Society, Mersenne, Descartes and the grammarians of Port Royal, Leibnitz, 
and later Condillace, Turgot, de Gerando and the Ideologues was pr0perly 
philosophical in its scale, aims and method. As such this discourse shares, 
as we shall see, the structural features of classical philosophy in general. 
The history of linguistics having freed itself from a positivist-tel~logical 
" 
reading of the history of science in which "all earlier study of language 
is seen as a rather malicious conspiracy against the future and the present 
enlightenment, and history gains attention only as a sort of inverted self-
2 flattery, " is free to depthen its analysis by supplementing an empirical 
history of ideas with a rigorous archeology of philosophical knowledge. 
Such an archaeology must address itself to the specific structural role 
of the classical theory of representation and language in the maintenance and 
development of the ego-logical edifice. It must investigate the crucial 
mediative role of the binary-correspondence theory of the sign and accompanying 
conception of the 'translational' relationship between language and thought, 
in linking the constitutive categories of classical bourgeois philosophy -
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absolute cognitive subjectivity and reified ontological objectivity. Since 
Descartes' metaphysical reflections, which rightly are held to mark a rupture 
with post Renaissance thought and the onset of philosophical modernity, 
reality becomes defined for the first time as the objectivity of a represent-
ation. Truth in turn is grasped as residing in the clarity and distinctness of 
our ideas, and as the certainty of representation. The structure of 
representation unfolds at one end to an objectified world of things. Ideally 
our signs are completely transparent to this world, they deliver us to it. 
Representation unfolds at the other end, of course, to the subject itself. 
The cognitive self is the site of the representational nexus of signs and the 
world in so far as its consciousness is the point of origin and organization 
of our ideas. Moreover its agency is the basis of the certitude of our 
representations and hence of the objectivity of the world itself. The 
patterned objectivity of the world derives that objectivity no longer from 
its own brute facticity but rather from its clear and distinct representation 
by and for the cognitive subject. This representation is given in and through 
the analytic activity of the subj ect and by means of the very grids of analysis 
which can decompose thought into its constituent parts, with their evident 
simplicity and certitude, and combine these again in a rational calculus to 
generate the complexity of the e:xperiental world. By means of the analytic 
grid of Signs, representation can achieve clarity and distinctness, and can 
in fact represent. By means of analysis and its significations, i. e. both 
original signs and a calculus of their rational combination, the world as 
objective being can be explicated. 
"He who would impose names on reasonable things must first 
introduce into that Chaos the form, beauty and order of an ideal 
world existing in the mind, by a sort of logical creation." 3 
Signs in tum are the means by which analysis can proceed, and by which 
thought can be coded, decomposed, combined and communicated. Language then 
is the vehicle ot analysis, a pure instrument allowing thought to appear to 
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itself as ordered and certain. M. Foucault writes of classical thought: 
"The constitution of the sign is thus inseparable from analysis. 
Indeed, it is the result of it, since without analysis the sign 
could become apparent. But it also is the instrument of analysis, 
since once defined and isolated it can be applied to further 
impressions; and in relation to them it plays the role of a grid, 
as it were. Because the mind analys es, the sign appears. Because 
the mind has signs at its disposal, analysis never ceases. "4 
In the epistemic discourse which is ego-logical thought, the category 
of analYSiS, as the condition and limit of representation, binds together 
the constitutive subject and object poles of that discourse. Although these 
poles reciprocally sustain each other within ego-logical discoursefthey do 
pull in opposing directions and the possible gulf in the relationship of 
cognitive self and objective world constantly threatens. Analysis so far 
as it involves a characterization of thought as consisting of the operations 
of a universal mind performed upon ideas, whether simple or complex, in 
which signs are employed, ties representation to universal features of the 
mind organised in cognitive self-hood. On the other hand analysis as the 
highest expression of universal reason and the condition of clarity, dis-
tinctness, and certainty, underwrites and guarantees the objectivity of 
representation; its very representativity. Because of the power and 
certainty (an axiomatic certainty) of analysis, the object of representation, 
that which appears in and through representation, can now claim the highest 
ontological status. It can claim to be objectively what is. 
The category of analysis, embodying both cognitive process and instru-
ment i. e. the analytic grid or calculus of signs, moulds classical thought 
into the Janus figure of ego-logical thought. Ricoeur captures this moment 
of creation. 
"It is at this point - where the problem of certainty and represent-
ation coincide, that the cogito appears. ( ) with objectivity 
there arises subjectivity, in the sense that this certain Being of 
the object is the counterpart of the position of the subject. Thus, 
we have at the same time, the position of the subject, and the 
proposition of representation.nS 
5h. 
Accompanying and expressing at the level of metaphor this ascending 
constellation of absolute subjectivity, analytic representation and object-
ified world, is the notion of cognition as vision. The knowledge process 
is graphicized as a guided searching vision of an attending subject The 
world in turn, is seen as a picture, ontologically distinct and removed from 
the seeing subject, but objectively there to be seen. Representation, signs 
and their language moreover facilitate this seeing. They are perfectly 
transparent to what they represent as the microscope or reportary grid is 
to what it can render visible and can order. 
Our major concern in this work is to trace the rupture in European 
philosophic thought in the twentieth century which occurs when the structural 
basis of philosophical knowledge moves from an egological discourse to a 
discourse organized around the epistemological primacy of man's sociality 
viz. a conversational discourse. However our analysis of the ego-logical 
episteme might also usefully be prosecuted by its comparison with its pre-
ceeding epistemic formation and by an analysis of the epistemic rupture 
between these two incommensurable discourses. Such an analysis however is 
beyond the scope of this present work. Fortunately however, this has already 
been attempted in the area of language study which particularly interests us 
by Michel Foucault in his monumental study of the structure of classical 
thought 'The order of things'. A brief summary of Foucault's analysis of 
pre-classical or Renaissance thought would serve to illuminate the central 
problems and responses of the emerging ego-logical paradigm and hence help 
us to dissect its structure and limits. 
(ii) The Emergence of the Classical Theory of 
Representation and its Epistemic Foundations 
Foucault reports that language appears to the sixteenth century not as 
an arbitrary system of Signs, rationally combined, as it is to be perceived 
by both rationalists and empiricists in the seventeenth century. Rather, 
language appears as part of the world it represents. He writes -
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"l'he great metaphor of the book that one opens, that one pores 
over and reads in order to know nature, is merely the reverse 
and invisible side of another transference and a much deeper one, 
which forces language to reside in the world among the plants, 
the herbs, the stones and the animals.,,6 
That is for the medievals and post-renaissance thinkers the names of 
things were lodged in the very things they designated. Signs functioned 
as ciphers to interpret Being. They could function as such only in so far 
as they possessed similitude with respect to what they designated. The 
power of designation lay in the form of similitude and hence the archtype 
of the sign waS the natural sign, in which that resemblance of signifier 
and signified clearly demonstrated itself . Within the form of similitude 
the intermediary link between signifier and signified, their conjuncture 
and the major condition of knowledge, was interpretation. 
"Knowledge therefore consisted in relating one form of language 
to another form of language; in restoring the great plain of words 
and things; in making everything speak. The function proper to 
knowledge is not merely seeing or demonstrating but interpreting."? 
For the medievals language is a prehistoric and natural system of signs 
spoken in things, a vast web of resemblances at one with the great chain of 
being. However with the emergence of the classical episteme, with its 
egological structure, "the profound kinship of language with the world was 
thus dissolved." 
Language's intimate link in this great chain of being and murmering 
resemblance s is broken.: 
The classical episteme is heralded by the Cartesian critique of 
resemblance and by the Hobbesian profound distrust of ordinary language 
and the linguistic sophistry of the schoolmen. 
For Descartes, 
"Whenever men notice some similarity between two things they are 
wont to ascribe to each, even in those respects in which the two 
differ, what they have found to be true of the 0 ther • ,,8 
and for Hobbes, 
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"For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; 
but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority 
of an Aristotle, a Cicero or a Thomas, or any other doctor what-
soever, if but a man. "9 
Both the critique of resemblance and the growing sense of unease in 
the vagaries of ordinary language appear with the emergence the new organ-
izing principle of representation and knowledge in the classical episteme __ 
analysis. The analytic method had of course its origin in the mathematical 
science of geometry so admired by Hobbes and Descartes, in the extension of 
this axiomatic method to algebra and calculus, and in the application of 
analytical calculi in the formalization of classical mechanics. However 
analysis as a mode of being of knowledge during the classical period pervades 
much deeper into the terrain of general thought. Descartes specification of 
philosophic method as consisting -
"entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards 
which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any 
truth. We shall comply with it exactly if we reduce involved and 
obscure propositions step by step to those that are simpler, and 
then starting with the intuitive apprehenSion of all those that 
are absolutely simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all 
others by precisely similar steps. ", 0 
tokens the emerging centrality and universality of analysis in the structur-
ation of classical knowledge in general. To distinguish between this general 
and fUndamental trend in the classical episteme and more transient attempt 
to apply an analytical-mechanical model to certain fields of knowledge such as 
physiology or to mathematicize specific areas of existing empirical knowledge 
e.g. astronomy, Foucault invokes the term mathesis to refer to this search 
for a universal science of measurement and order. There is a search for a 
universal calculus through which ideas, language and the very world of things 
could be decomposed into their elementary and clear and distinct foms and 
the relations between these primar,y elements firmly established, their com-
bination represented, and order imposed upon the flux of the experiental world. 
This search for a universal science of order, through which knowledge can be 
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analysed, ordered and eventually axiomatised, was to fire Descartes 'Rules' 
and 'principles'. It was equally as present in Locke and Hume' s enquiries 
into the genetic structure of human cognition. For the scientists and 
philosophers of the Royal Society it was a guiding ideal. For Leibni tz such 
a science with its appropriate character or nomenclature was the prime in-
strument of thought and would lead man with the inexorability of mathematical 
logic to absolute truth. 
The emergence of analysis as the organizational mode of classical 
knowledge, gives rise to a search for objective systemicity in knowledge, a 
geometric 
, 
archtectonic of knowledge. 
~ 
This itself in turn is intimately 
related to the location of cognitive process and certitude in the agency of a 
solitary if absoluteepistemic subjectivity. However in this egological frame-
work things and the words become separated from one another in the rupture 
of the subject. As Koyr(has roted, western thought since Descartes has 
become characterized by its anthropocentrism. In egological discourse 
however, man is conceptualized as transcendental cognizer rather than as an 
embodied agent in a concrete social and historical context. Accordingly, man 
as a language user becomes a rent in the unity of language and the world. As 
a disembodied and individualized agent of pure cognition, man as an analytic 
subject, confronts the materiality of the world and language. Analysis draws 
language into the disembodied realm of immateriality, the res cogni tans that 
man has become. Classical philosophy of language both reflects this 
abstraction and reduction of man and reinforces it. The ideal universal 
language becomes the correlate of the absolutised cognitive ego, its syntax 
the universal structures of that mind and its character the mapping of that 
mind's universal ideas. 
Foucault's analysis captures the emergence of these dualisms which 
appear in knowledge. Language once one with the world is sucked, in the move 
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towards cognitive subjectivity, into the realm of res cogitans; its reality, 
its meaning is located there. Its relationship to res extensa, the world of 
things becomes problematic. In turn, the organic corporeal nature of language 
i.e. its very languageness becomes obscured. 
For both empiricists and rationalists thought consists in operations 
performed upon ideas. Ideas whether they derive from sensation or are given 
in intuition are classified as either simple or complex. All complex ideas 
are in principle reducible to simples through analytic practice. 
Hume notes: 
"First when we analys e our thoughts or ideas, however compounded 
or sublime, we always find they resolve themselves into such 
simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment.,,11 
The meanings of words are functions of the simple or complex ideas for which 
they stand as names. The underlying structure of language reflects the 
universal and atomistic structure of thought and its combinations. Within 
this model the formal or grammatical properties of language are devices for 
establishing a word order which facilitates an ordered representation of 
thought and its structure. Grammar has no autonomous semantic function, and 
language has no being save that of being the pure representation of thought. 
A word 'means' the idea it denotes and correspondingly a grammatical sentence 
"is merely a succession of such meanings so ordered as to represent a rational 
succession of ideas.,,12 As Stephen Land has shown13 there is a structural 
relationShip between the 
(1 ) atomistic features of this model of language in which the 
meaning of ordinary language sta tements is seen to be a 
function of the meanings of the individual words of which 
they are comprised and its 
reductionist tendency to reduce words to their function in 
the denotation of ideas and deny any semantic function and 
autonomy to syntax. Language becomes the mere translation 
and coding of thought. This translational function becomes, 
in the classical period, the essence of language, an ability -
"to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make 
them stand as marks for the ideas wi thin his own mind, whereby 
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they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's 
mind be conveyed from one to another."14 
Within this translational model, signs take on their essentially binary 
form later formalized by de Saussure. 
On the one hand,words lose their traditional intimacy with things with 
the emergence of the cognitive mediation of the analytic subject. On the 
other handJin the search for a symbolic logic of pure representation which 
can again penetrate to the heart of things, the very organic and corporeal 
nature of language itself becomes obscured and obliterated. Language becomes 
pure function and ceases to have an autonomous being. 
The system of signs dominant during the post-renaissance period is 
essentially ternary. The significant and signified are linked through the 
intermediary form of similitude. It is in this conjuncture that the power 
of Signification lies. 
si~nificant ~ 
conjuncture (similitude) 
~ 
signified 
However as we have said the Classical period is heralded by the 
Cartesian critique of resemblance and by the empiricist profound distrust 
of ordinary language and scholastic rhetoric. Both the attack on similitude 
and the new stress on the arbitrary and purely conventional basis of language 
undermine the post-renaissance organization of the sign. Analysis dissolves 
the form of similitude and the characteri zation of the sign as natural. From 
the seventeenth century we see the emergence of a binar.y system of signs in 
whioh the signifioant directly designates the signified. 
signifioant = 
1 
conventional 
sign 
designates 
signified 
This relationship is most olearly visible in the translation model of language 
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dominant at the time. This model characterized by its atomistic and reduc-
tionist approach to meaning, shapes language and the theory of representation 
to the contours of the epistemological dualism$of egological thought. Words 
and language are conceived of as a pure representation, a translation of 
thought and particular ideas. Ideas themselves stand in binary opposition 
to the material world of things and with varying degrees of clarity and 
distinctness represent that world. The secondary binary organization of the 
linguistic sign is over-determined by the initial dualism of cognizing subject 
and objective world and the primary representational relationship of ideas and 
reali ty. Wi thin this primary representational relationship of ideas and 
material reality, and its binary organizational form, rooted in the fundamental 
dualisms of egological thought, develops the notion of the linguistic sign, 
character or word, as the translational or secondary representation of thought 
to its object. Language is grasped as pure transparency representing directly 
thoughts own appropriation of the world of things which it gains by means of 
the agency of the analytic, cognitive subject. 
However with the dissolution of the post-renaissance ternary organisa-
tion of signs based on the conjuncture of significant and signified, in the 
similitude of sign and its object, the relationship of signification itself 
becomes essentially problematic. The problem of meaning emerges. AnalysiS, 
the mode of intellectual cognition in the classical episteme, which is itself 
born of the upsurge of the absolute cognizing subject, gives rise to the 
recurrent problems of egological philosophy of language centered around the 
relationship of language and the world. These problems in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries cluster around the twin themes of the relation between 
thought and language and that between language and society. In the nlneteenth 
and early twentieth century they center on a renewed interest in the relation-
. 
ship between the theory of language and scientific method, meaning and 
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verification; problems whose framing within the grammar of egological 
discourse prevents their solution. 
The relationship between analysis and the sign, i.e. between a theory 
of mind and a philosophy of language, a relationship which is central to 
egological thought will be traced at some length in the following pages. 
Two major forms of this relationship can be isolated. 
(1) Firstly, the sign system of ordinary language as the reflection 
of the universal properties of the mind. This assumption runs 
as a central core throughout egological philosophy of language. 
We shall examine two key traditions in which it is paramount _ 
that of Universal Grammar in the rationalist camp and that of 
the search for Origins which came to dominate empiricist studies. 
These two traditions depart from a common axis which portrays 
all minds as sharing fundamental and universal structural or 
organizational characteristics which are translated directly in 
the form and function of language. 
(2) Secondly the sign and language as the instrument of analysis 
and knowledge, the establishment of order in ideational space. 
In the first instance our interest is in the ideal language 
project initiated by both rationalist and empiricist thinkers 
by the middle of the seventeenth century. In these universal 
language schemes, the gravitional centre of egological philosophy 
of language, ordinary language is abandoned as a tool for 
scientific and philosophical analysis in favour of a rigorously 
constructed analytic language, an ars characteristica. In the 
second instance our attention focuses on the epistemic effect 
of the prolonged search for a perfected analytic language -
namely a rethinking of the relationship between thought and 
language. This is first present in the troubled deliberations 
of the Ideologues on the role of signs in thinking. Wi th the 
increasing weight being given to the constitutive function of 
language with regard to thought the previous purity of ling-
uistic representation becomes clouded as language emerges with 
an autonomy and organic density which marks the slow erosion and 
dissolution of the classical theory of representation. Beginning 
with Herder and Monboddo and developing under the nineteenth 
century romantics, there is a livening reinterest in the diversity 
of natural languages. The view appears that each language bears 
with it a distinct weltanshauung and that language differences 
can lead to differences in mental processes. In the sociologistic 
relativism and philosophical scepticism of the romantics, 
language·as-being is reborn. 
However, whether language, characterized in the form of universal grammar, 
nativist or empiricist in its genesis, is regarded as the reflection of thought 
or whether language studies regard the major task as the construction of a 
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rational ideal language to serve as a tool of analysis of thought, the 
central fact remains that the relationship of meaning between significant 
and signi.fied has become problematic. This is manifested in this very 
search for a theory of representation. There is a search for the very 
certainty of the relationship between words and objects which had previously 
been shattered, in its remaissance form, by the new epistemic commitment of 
language theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the ideal 
language project. The beginning of the search for a universal character 
with a philosophical or conceptual foundation is heralded by the contemporary 
crisis in the theory of representation indicated by the critique of resemblance 
and distrust of scholastic rhetoric. The renaissance organization of the sign 
had crumbled, eroded by the new centrality of analytic cognition. For now 
on Language, if it is to represent, must conform in its character and s.yntax, 
to the principles of analysi c; • In turn the construction of universal language 
schemes becomes the vehicle by which the emergent classical theory of 
representation can be demarcated and explicated. The ideal language project 
both demarcates egological thoughts rupture .from the renaissance episteme 
and indicates the gro ping search .for a new theory of representation to 
replace this. This search is to lead to an abstraction of language from its 
situated social context and a simultaneous reduction of language and meaning 
to the pure functional representivity of another realm of experience - the 
cognitive experience and agency o.f the analytic subject. The task of 
language becomes to represent the autonomous ideas and experience of the 
cogito in an ordered grid of universal denotations which can "in the last 
analysis deliver us .from language by delivering us to things." 
This ideal of a language of pure representivity is to haunt Em-opean 
philosophic thought from Leibnitz to Wittgenstein. Its spell will not be 
broken (and then only partially) until the structure of egological discourse 
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itself begins to crumble under the sociologistic assault of the conversational 
paradigm. 
Yet paradoxically for the early egological theorists, although analysis 
had broken the bond between words and things through its dissolution of 
conjuncture and the hierarchy of analogies, this did not immediately present 
itself in the consciousness of the period as the problem of signification 
as it did to egological thought in the nineteenth century. The problem of 
how signs have meaning, for which an answer might be sought in the nineteenth 
century by recourse to the signifying intentionality of transcendental con-
sciousness, as in Husser~'s case, or in the psychologism of Saussure, or in the 
logism of Frege and Russell, is not in fact for the seventeenth century 
a consciously grasped problem. For the early classicists signs presented 
themselves as transparent to that which they signified and as containing 
thiR relationship as .the essence of them. As Merleau Ponty says, 
"The word possesses no virtue of its own; there is no power 
hidden in it It is a pure sign standing for a pure signi-
fication. The person speaking is coding his thought. He 
replaces his thought with a visible or sonorous pattern which 
is nothing but sounds in air or ink spots on the paper. 
Thought understands itself and is self-sufficient.,,15 
Thought organized around cognitive subjectivity is assured of its own 
reflexivity and intelligibility. Language merely represents thought exter-
nally as thought represents itself internally in the cognitive agency of the 
subject. 
Thus in a curious way for egological thought language as being ceases 
to exist. Its essence always lies beyond itself in what it represents. It 
becomes pure representation and as such reducible in its meaning to the 
realm it represents whether this be ideas or states of affairs. As such 
the 'problem' of signification which is increasingly in the nineteenth 
century to haunt egological philosophy of language is in the seventeenth 
century still obscured by the very held transparency of signs. In the 
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classical period language is conceived of as pure representation perfectly 
transparent to its object of representation. As a system of arbitrary signs 
it can be abstracted from its situated social context, reduced and system-
atized to a logical form so that it can more adequately represent the syntax 
of mental process. The search for logical form which has its genesis in the 
structure of the mind may be conducted in terms of the enunciation of 
principles of Universal Grammar. It may be explicated in terms of the 
construction of an ideal combinatory language, the ars characteristica. On 
the other hand it may be seen to involve a search for the Erimal origins of 
language in man's basic cognitive processes. These three major directions 
of classical philosophy of language however depart from a common axis - the 
egological. They depart from three common axioms. 
(1) That the underlying structure of language reflects the 
universal structure of thought. 
(2) That the universal structure of thought is organized 
around cognitive self-hood. 
(3) That the link between words and things, signs and 
signified is mediated in and through the ideational 
experience of the cognitive subject. 
Language then for the classical period becomes abstracted from its own 
materiality as a historically formedJhuman,means of communication. In turn 
it becomes anchored to an autonomous and primary realm of mind whose ideational 
structure and content it is its task to represent. It becomes subject to 
the general programme of mathesis -the reduction of things into their 
simplest elements and then the demonstration of how these m~ be combined 
to generate the perceived complexity of things. From now on egological 
thought is to be inspired with the vision of an ideal transparent language 
which is capable of naming what is arbi trary and also representing that set 
.. 
to complex operations which generates all possible combinations of simples. 
The ideal transparent language is to become the vehicle for a pure anaqsis 
of thought and the world. 
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"Analysis in general, like algebra in particular, it was recognized, 
operated through and was rendered possible by a system of signs. Leibnitz 
indicates his interest in a universal science of orde~ and recognition of 
the centrality of a universal language to facilitate such an analysis. 
"Algebra which we rightly hold in such esteem, is only a part 
of this general device. Yet algebra accomplished this much _ 
that we cannot err even if we wish and that truth can be 
grasped as if pictured on paper with the aid of a machine. I 
have come to understand that everything of thi s kind which 
algebra proves is only due to a higher science,. which I now 
usually call a combinatorial characteristic.,,10 
This 'higher science', hinted at by Leibnitz, a general science of 
order in the realm of ideas, words and things is to be the determinate form 
of classical thought for the next one hundred and fifty years. Central to 
this analytical project,and seen by classical thought as a condition of it, 
is the search for a universal characteristic. This alone among languages 
can represent univocally our elementary ideas and their combination in the 
complexity of material life. From Mersenne and Descartes to the Ideologues 
and Monboddo in England, the dream of an ideal universal language perfectly 
. transparent to the world of ordered ideas and things haunted western thought. 
Perhaps no other philosophical ideal has ever held such tremendous sway over 
so many first rate minds, philosophers and scientists, empiricists and 
rationalists, at any other period in modern thought, than this dream. 
These dreamers of the absolute indicate the supreme confidence of the 
scientific and analytic rationality of the period. Robert Boyle writes to 
Samuel Hartli b in 1 647. 
"Since our arithmetical characters are understood by all the 
nations of Europe, the same way, though every several people 
express that comprehension with its own particular language I 
conceive no impossibility that opposes the doing that in words, 
that we see already done in numbers.,,17 
Leibnitz in turn displays an optimism with regards the possibility of a 
un! versal language scheme that stretches our credulity. 
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"Nothing more is necessary to establish the characteristic 
which I am attempting, at least to a point sufficient to build 
the grammar of this wonderful language and a dictionary for 
the most frequent cases, or what amounts to the same thing, 
nothing is more necessary to set up the characteristic number 
for all ideas than to develop a philosophical and mathematical 
course of studies, as it is called, based on a certain new 
method which I can set forth, and containing nothing more 
difficult than other courses of study, or more remote from use 
and understanding, or more alien to the usual way of writing. 
Nor would it require more work than is already being spent on 
a number of courses, or encyclopedias as they are called. I 
think that a few selected men could finish the matter in five 
years. It would take them only to however, to work out by an 
infallible calculus the doctrines most useful for life, that 
is, those of morality amd metaphysics. rr18 
But these hopes and dreams are not those of cranks or mystics. These 
dreamers when listed present a catalogue of the finest and most respected 
scientific minds of the 17th and 18th centuries, Descartes, Mersenne and 
Leibnitz, of course, but also in England, Newton, Seth Ward, Robert Boyle, 
Robert Hooke, Christopher Wren. And in the eighteenth century Condillac 
Destutt de Tracy, Maine de Biran but also .Turgot and Adam Smith. 
That the search for a universal language should be such a cause celebre 
within classical thought is symptomatic. 
(iW The Ideal Lan~age Proj ect 
The planning and construction of universal language schemes had been 
a constant pre-occupation with savants throughout the seventeenth centur,y 
many years before the combinatorial and philosophical schemes of Leibnitz 
and the members and associates of the Royal Society (John Wilkins, George 
Dalgarno, Seth Ward, Francis Lodwick). Indeed there were various material 
motives which induced men to search for a universal language which might 
serve as an international means of communication. This period marks a 
rapid extension of commercial capitalism in Europe and a corresponding 
expansion of trade and communication between merchants of various countries. 
Again with the constant development of colonialism as a world force, trade 
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and communication with Africa and Asia was also expanding. In the absence 
of any international means of communication merchants were forced to study 
a mul tiplici ty of foreign languages, not only the common national languages 
of Europe but also Eastern languages whose grammar and lexicon remained 
largely undocumented. Within this context there began a serious search for 
a character which if universally adopted as the means of commercial communica-
tion would lessen the difficulties of foreign language learning. Cave Beck 
whose own universal language scheme 'The Universal Character, by which All 
the Nations in the World may Understand One Anothers Conceptions, Reading Out 
of One Common Writing Their Own Mother Tongues' was published in London in 
1657 noted that such a character would be of commercial use. 
"This last Century of years much hath been the discourse and 
e~ectation of learned men, concerning the finding out of a 
Universal Character, which if happily contrived, so as to 
avoid all Equivocal words, Anomalous variations and super-
fluous Synonomas ( ) would such advantage mankind in their 
civil commerce and be a singular means of propagating all 
sorts of learning and true Religion in the world. "19 
With a pragmatism characteristic of the philosophising of the period he 
noted that such a language would, 
"save the charges of hiring Interpreters. ,,20 
Beck in the former passage indicates two other prevalent motivations 
operative in the search for a universal language - religious and educational 
zeal. Besides serving the linguistic requirements of miSsj pnaries, a 
universal character was sought to enable communication between the various 
refugees who had fled the religious persecutions in Europe and who might 
find the acquisition of a multiplicity of vernacular languages cumbersome. 
Two of the most enthusiastic proponents of the universal character were 
indeed such religious refugees. Jan Comenius, the Moravian philosopher, 
educationalist and wanderer, visited Paris, the Netherlands, and London 
propogating the virtues of such a character. His influence on the Fellows of 
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the Royal Society may have been decisive in orienting these thinkers 
towards a more properly philosophical universal character based on a prior 
ordering of concepts according to genus, species and difference, as envis-
aged by Descartes and Mersenne. Francis Lodwick although bi-lingual 
himself, was born of religious refugee parents, fled from Brabant in the 
wake of the Duke of Alva persecutions. Lodwick though .either a university 
academic nor a full member of the Royal Society (he was a merchant by trade) 
was to be in the forefront of English schemes for a philosophical language. 
He was perhaps the first in England to argue that the form of any universal 
character designed to solve problems of communication, would have to involve 
a systematic classification and symbolisation of concepts i.e. a properly 
philosophical language guided by the principles of analysis. 
Throughout the seventeenth century there had been a general decline 
in the use of Latin as a universal language. In England and Germany it was 
largely for religious reasons that both divine and secular writers choose 
to use the vernacular for the first time. In particular the Purl tans in 
England campaigned against the learning and use of Latin as a general means 
of communication. Latin for them of course was intimately associated with 
the power of the Roman Catholic church. The focus of the Puritan campaign 
was education and in particular pedagogy. 
, 
Comenius, himself a considerable authority on language teaching as 
well as a leading exponent of the new realist philosophy and naturalistic 
pedagogy was to write -
"the only study of the Latin tongue •••• draines up above a quarter 
of a competent age: and if so large a space be wasted in the 
initiation of a meer verbalist; how many ages will be requisite 
to the perfection of a realist. 1f 21 
Instead of the Latin based curriculum he urged that 
"The study of languages, especially in youth, should be joined 
to that of objects, that our acquaintance with the objective 
world and with language, that is to say, our knowledge of facts 
and our power to express them may progress side by- side. "22 
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As this quote from Comenius shows the campaign against Latin as a 
possible universal language went deeper than merely Puritan prejudice and 
distrust. Latin was seen as the language of scholastic opaqueness, the 
medium of verbal sophistry and 'meer words'. That Hobbes, Locke, and 
Descartes chose to write in the vernacular with the resulting difficulties 
of dissemination and translation of their work is indicative of the change 
in intellectual life during this period. The scholastic learning of the 
universities was under attack from the new rationalism with its commitment 
to scientific 'and mathematical method and more generally to 'real studies'. 
A concomitant of this new interest in the world of things was, an 'aversion 
and contempt for the empty study of words'. The critique of Latin and 
scholasticism, its implicit metaphysic, was accompanied by the search for 
a more scientific medium of communication a 'real character'. From the 
middle of the seventeenth century there had been, particularly in England, 
a renewed concern with scientific nomenclature. There was a concerted 
attempt usually associated with the Royal Society to standardise nomen-
clature in various sciences which had previously been a matter for the 
idiosyncratic choices of individual scholars. Many of the English scientists 
among them Boyle, Ray and Petty felt that the study of reality was impeded 
by the complexity of the Latin inflectional system. In tum it was felt 
that Latin was a cumbersome medium for scientific communication between 
scholars of various countries. English Latiri speakers were often at a dis-
advantage in conversation with European speakers as the Latin spoken in the 
country had developed a dialect not easily understood by European speakers. 
However the major rejection of Latin as a universal scientific language was 
largely due to it being seen to have embodied within it in a profound 
scholastic opaqueness. 
In La tin and in ordinary language generally it was felt by realists that 
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"the basic qualities of things are not revealed either by the 
habit of speech or by the reciprocal harmony between things 
and names. For since their words are not exactly commensurate 
with things, they are unable to form concepts in exact fitness 
to the things (of which they speak). And so for all the noise 
of doctrines we scarcely advance an inch in the study of wisdom 
because we speak words, and not things. "23 
In the 'Via Lucis'Comenius proceeded to propose the invention of an 
ideal universal and philosophical language in which there were precisely 
as many names as objects which they denoted and in which each name would 
denote the qualities of its real referent. The search for a real character 
which would rescue thought from the obscurity of Latin and ordinary language 
by delivering it to the world of things soon captured the imagination of 
philosophers and scientists in England and on the Continent. Only such a 
philosophical language with its real character it was held, could solve 
the problems of ambiguity and imprecision which blunted the effectiveness 
of natural language as an instrument of scientific reason. This real char-
acter, first hinted at by Francis Bacon, viz. real in so far as it 
represented 'res' i.e. things, it was hoped would provide "a truer des-
cription of things as an easy and quick entrance to the things themselves.,,24 
The new character was regarded as superior to both Latin and other 
existing vernacular languages. It was held that it would be simpler, more 
rational and systematic, briefer and thus easier to learn, master and 
employ than a cumbersome irregular Latin grammar. The real character it 
was also held, had a mnemonic value and hlnce its proclaimed importance in 
language learning and education generally.25 
However the unabated enthusiasm of philosophers, scientists and 
educationalists in the 17th century for schemes of universal language, based 
on a real character which would represent directly objects in the world or 
ideas common to all men, involved more than a search for merely an alter-
nati ve linguistic medium of communication. The search for a universal 
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philosophical language is,I have said}symptomatic. It is symptomatic of 
the radical discontinuity of claSSical thought with the knowledge of the 
medieval and post-renaissance age. This radical discontinuity is marked 
by the appearance of analysis as the new organizational basis for knowledge. 
The search for a universal philosophical language is a symptom of the crisis 
in the theory of representation brought about by this new mode of being of 
knowledge. This crisis is reflected in the critique of similitude and in 
the 17th century's profound distrust in the vagaries of ordinary language. 
With the universal language project classical philosophy articulates this 
crisis in its theory of representation. Indeed in these language schemes 
representation itself becomes an object of analysis. With the emergence 
of analYSiS, and its categorial structure of cognizing subject and reified 
object world, the naivety of the post renaissance sense of representation 
based on the endless chain of similitudes within the plenitude of being is 
rendered problematic. Analysis and cognitive self-hood have ruptured this 
pleni tude. This rupture in turn gives rise to a search for a new basis 
for representation and language and for one compatible with and embodying 
the analytical organization of knowledge. Within the general science of 
mathesis and its application to linguistic representation in the universal 
language, a consciously formulated theory of representation appears for 
the first time. Analysis by making representation its object in turn makes 
its own epistemic principles of order and combination the very condition 
of representation. Language is idealized as pure representation, signs as 
transparent to what they represent and syntax as pure analysis. The 
'languageness' of language, its organic being, is obliterated in this 
reduction of language to the pure function of analytic representation. The 
theory of linguistic representation appears., but only to be immediately 
dis sol ved by the demands of analytic reason. Wi thin the analytic task that 
language must shoulder if it is in fact to adequately represent, language 
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has no being. It is pure function, pure transparency, unembodied significa-
tion. Such a system of signs in which each real character would stand for 
a primitive real object or simple idea and the combinatorial syntax of the 
language mirror the relations of simples in the experienced complexity of 
thought and the world, would in fact be a major instrument of scientific 
analysis. Leibnitz with characteristic optimism goes as far as to declare, 
"that nothing more effective can be conceived for perfecting 
the human mind and that if this basis (ars characteristica) 
for philosophising is accepted, there will come a time and it 
will be soon, when we shall have as certain Imowledge of God 
and the mind as we now have of figures and numbers and when 
the invention of machines will be no more difficult than the 
construction of geometric problems."26 
With the application of a mathematically modelled combinatorial syntax 
to a character which directly in its symbols represented primitive ideas and 
objects,a universal language might be formed which could allow man to ascend 
to metaphysical and moral truth through the same inexorable logical steps 
followed in mathematical reason. The new reformed language would, Comenius 
believed, enable~ the 
"discovery not only of language, but of thought, and, what is 
more of the truth of things themselves at the same time.,,27 
From the middle of the seventeenth century universal language schemes, 
which up to that time had as much been motivated by the search for efficient 
memory devices, shorthands, and schemes for language translation, than by 
philosophical ideals, increasingly became guided by the analytic proj ect of 
constructing a universal mathesis of thought, of language and of reality 
itself. 
Descartes's famous letter to Mersenne28 in which he critizes the 
universal language scheme proposed by the latter for being insufficiently 
analytical and philosophical, marks the beginning of a period in which a 
un! versal language was expected not only to provide an improved set of 
conventions for representing by means of an improved character,. but also 
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to mirror in its character and combinational syntax the very order inherent 
in ideas and the world. The universal language then, would have to capture 
in its symbols and syntax, the ordered classification of ideas and natural 
objects which science and philosophy~guided by the analytic method,could 
provide. In this way language itself could come to mirror the whole of 
human knowledge and furthermore function as a tool, a calculus of reason, 
for the axiomatic development of knowledge. 
For Descartes and classical thought generally, language is representative 
only in so far as it is transparent to its object - ideas, the locus of a 
more primary form of representation. Ideas possess their own intrinsic and 
autonomous rational order, a mathesis which it is the task of language to 
di vine and represent. However as Descartes realizes this is a demanding 
• task and ordinary language In its current institutional form is often unequal 
to it. Often in ordinary language a certain opaqueness enters the represent-
ative link of signs and their objects to cloud the pure reflection of ideas 
which is the essence of representative signification -
"LXXIV on account of using language, we associate all our con-
cepts with the words we use to express them, and commit them 
to memory only along with those words. Later on we remember 
the words more readily than the realities; and we hardly 
ever have such a distinct conception of any reality that we 
abstract it from any conception of words; most men's thoughts 
are concerned with words rather than realities. Any very often 
people assent to words they do not understand, because they 
think they did once, or think they got them from others who did 
understand them properly.,,29 
Here Descartes expresses, very much along the lines of Hobbes before 
him and Locke after him, a profound distrust of ordinary language as a 
medium of representation. Or<tinary language is not to be trusted because 
it possesses a certain autonomy with regards to the ideas it represents. 
Ordinar,y language shaped by and for common usuage maintains a level of 
materiality which renders its signs somewhat opaque to that signified. 
Ordinar,y language easily becomes mere words with no clear designation. 
74. 
For Descartes this opaqueness and threatening autonomy of ordinary language 
with regards ideas has its source in the very corporality of the language 
of everyday usuage. The significations of ordinary language, Descartes 
argues, remain fixated with immediate sensory images rather than with 
designating abstract but clear and distinct ideas. Ordinary language then 
is not the embodiment of genuine thought i.e. analytic cognition, and thus 
cannot truly represent. It signifies merely res extensa the corporeal and 
sensible, experienced with immediacy but with no clarity or distinctiveness. 
Just as "many people cannot even now conceive of any substance but is 
imaginable, corporeal and sensible", 30 similarly ordinary language remains 
limited in its epistemic utility by the immediacy and superficiality of the 
images it seeks to embody in its significations. As such it remains opaque 
to its proper object - ideas, in all their analytical clarity and distinctness. 
It is from this radical disjunction of image and idea, yet another 
dualism emerging in the wake of the eruption of the analytic subject, that 
the search for a language which will truly represent ideas,rather than 
merely embody confused, unanalysed images, begins. The ideal language project, 
in its rationalist mode, first mooted in Descartes's correspondence with 
Mersenne, departs from the analytical critique of imagery and distrust of 
ordinar,y language. It constitutes itself as the reassertion of analysis over 
analogous representation and mind over corporali ty. Moreover, the critique 
of imager,y is fundamental more generally to the development of egological 
thought. For in its attack on sensationalism as a basis for representation 
and knowledge it creates an epistemic space for the theorization of the 
constructive and constitutive a~ects of reflection and thought. This ~ace 
recognized by locke and also by Hume, even if only in his denial of it,in his 
attack on causal categories, will be filled by the critical idealism of Kant. 
This space is bounded at one extreme by a pole of absolute cognitive subject-
ivity. It is bounded at the other by the opposing pole of objective systeaicity. 
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Leibnitz's philosophy of language centered on his ideal language project 
is not merely illustrative of this process of the development of a critique 
of reason,it is an essential moment in it. 
Descartes rebukes the empiricists (in this case Hobbes) who 
"will have the term idea mean only the images of material things, 
formed by means of corporeal phantasy. "31 
and affirms the reference of the term idea as "whatever the mind is directly 
aware of. ,,32 The mind is afforded a status as an analytic and reflecting 
subject over and above its function as the receiver of sense experience. 
Wi thin 'thought' then is appearing the dualism of experiential and analytic 
subject, later formalized as empirical and transcendental ego. Similarly 
wi thin primary representation is appearing the dualism of image and idea 
and within secondary representation the distinction of natural and ideal 
language. Leibnitz writes 
"The thought of the ego which informs me of sensible objects, and 
of my own action resulting from there, adds something to the 
objects of the senses. To think a colour and to observe that one 
thinks it, are two very different thoughts, as different as the 
colour is from the ego which thinks it. ,,33 
That is to say for Leibnitz, the analytic subject is the perpetual 
commentator on sensory experience and it is only after this reflective comment 
that thought can form with all the clarity and distinctiveness of the idea. 
Leibnitz again notes 
"If the idea were the fom of thought it would come into exist-
ence and would cease with the actual thoughts which correspond 
to it; but being its object it might exist anterior to it and 
after thoughts."34 
Ideas .~ rather than the images of the receiving senses are the proper 
objects of the cognizing ego. Leibnitz goes as tar as to rigidly distinguish 
between conceptual ideas and sensory based thought and in so doing prepares 
the way for the more radical distinctions of Kant and Critical Idealism. 
"I distinguish only between ideas and thoughts, for we have 
always all pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses; 
but all thoughts always correspond to some sensation."35 
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Ideas then rather than mere thou ghts i. e. images, are the primary 
representation of reality. Language if it is to be adequate i.e. function 
as pure representation must be transparent to ideas. But ordinary language 
like common man's cognition deals with images, the sensible. Thus what is 
required argues Leibnitz, is a form of secondary representation, a cho~t~ , 
which can adequately represent ideas - a perfectly rational and universal 
character. 
For Leibnitz the model for such a semiotic/which is both the product 
of analysis and in turn its tool, is mathematical calculus. He seeks a 
language "whose signs or characters would play the same role as the signs 
of arithmetic for numbers and those of algebra for quantities in general. ,,36 
Truth in scientific propositions is to be attained as in mathematical or 
logical truth by the valid concatenation of signs in chains of deductive 
reasoning. 
Ars characteristic a is then 
"the art of so forming and arranging characters, in so far as they 
refer to thoughts, that have among them those relations which the 
thoughts have among themselves: so that out of the ideas composing 
the idea expressing things, an expression of the things is composed 
out of characters of those things."37 
The choice of charac ters for the universal language is arbitrary. A 
system of direct primal nomination is dismissed by LeibnitzJas it was 
eventually by Mersenne, as irrelevant to universal signification. In the 
ideal language, the representative correspondence of signifier and signified 
is primarily horizontal concerned with isomorphic combination; combinatorial 
syntax is given primacy over referential semantics. 
, 
"For even though characters as such are arbitary, there is still 
in their application and connection something valid which is not 
arbitrary, namely a relationship which exists between them and 
things, and consequently, definite relations among all the 
different characters used to express the same things and this 
relationship, this connection, is the foundation of truth. ",38 
The representative relationship of correspondence must then be horizontal. 
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Characters if they are to avoid the errors embodied in words must represent 
those primary elements which are clear and distinct, i.e. those analytical 
primitives or simple natures which are the basic building blocks of the 
rational archtechtonic of our ideas. Moreover the character must be capable 
of representing the combinations of these simples which generate the com-
plexity of the experienced world of things. The characters do not directly 
designate concrete things, which are unclear notions, but rather the simples 
of which they are composed. In this way language can operate as a tool of 
knowledge to dissect and order reality. 
"1 only mean that characters must show, when they are used in 
demonstrations, some kind of connection, grouping and order 
which are also found in the object •••• "34 
This ideal language will of course be a universal one. However, as we 
have already said, this universality is not due to it involving a primary 
origin in a pre-history of natural Signification prior to the Tower of Babel. 
The signs and syntax of ars characteristica are an arbitrary heuristic 
shaped to function as the analysis and representation of thought. Philo-
sophical language owes its universality to this efficacy. This universality 
then is rather a derivative of the primary universality of ideas. The task 
of ars characteristica is to assist in the analysis of complex things, 
indicating in what manner these complex objects are composed out of simple 
ideas. In so far as it functions as a tool of analysis this language can 
be applied to the combinative nature of any or all sets of things, anywhere, 
and its analysis will hold good for all men, then it is truly universal. 
Language is to be constructed as an algori thIn with which to calculate 
and thus analyse the complextty of the world. This view of language has 
something in common with the mystical art of combinations sought by the 
Lullists and Cabalists but it is given a radically new direction in 
Leibnitz's mathematicizing of this ancient art and his tying of ars 
combinatoria to natural scientific method. Leibnitz seeks a language which 
78 . 
. 
can be the basis of Ira rational philosophy with the same incomparable 
clarity as that of arithmetic.,,40 Just as arithmetic has its numbers and 
operations, similarly this language will have its characters and syntax. 
The ideal language project will involve in its most rigorous form establish-
ing the characteristic number for all ideas. In turn it will involve a 
refining of the grammar of this language so that the marvellous complexity 
of the world can be generated. This done the empirical claims of natural 
science can be tested for their truth value not merely by empirical 
experiment but as in the case of mathematical propositions by examining 
whether they are concatenated by valid reasoning i.e. in modern terminology 
they are well-formed-formulae. 
As for the point of origin of these simple ideas, which it is language's 
task to represent, the locus of their being is for Leibnitz to be located in 
the cognition of an absolute ego. For Leibnitz this ego is indeed absolute 
for it itself is in a relationship of representation with God, the primar,y 
source of both being and representation. He writes 
nIt might be said that the soul itself is its own internal object, 
but it is in so far as it contains ideas or what corresponds to 
things; for the soul is a microcosm in which distinct ideas are 
a representation of God, and in which confused ideas are a repres-
entation of the universe. n41 
The soul or ego is then an isolated monad which accedes to a measure 
of universality and veracity in so far as its ideas are underwritten in 
their representativity by the good offices of the deity. For it is God 
alone who transcends the radical isolation of monads and whose divine and 
all-embracing cognition ensures that these autonomous and windowless 
substances can relate to the whole of which they are a part and thus to 
each other. Those monads which are rational souls or spirits are rescued 
from solipsism by the fact that their interiority is a living mirror or 
image of God and hence capable of reflecting God's knowledge 
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"spirits are also images of the divinity itself or if the author 
of nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe and of 
imitating it to some extent by means of archtectonic samples 
each spirit being like a little divinity wi thin its own sphe;e. "42 
Leibnitz is offering us here in the Monadology not only a theory of 
representation, based on theological premises but also a theory of inter-
subjectivity. The 'city of God' with God ranging over the assemblage of 
all these isolated individuals in a relation "not merely of an inventor to 
his machine (as God is related to other creatures) but also that of a prince 
to his subjects and even father to his chlldren,,43 becomes the model for 
understanding human society. An absolute subj ecti vi ty, guarantor of the 
world's objectivity becomes the condition of inter-subjectivity. Leibnitz's 
Monadology sketches in its most abstruse form the individualistic implica-
tions of egological thought. His abstract phantasy directly raises the 
problem of the solipSistic consequences of egological thought. He offers 
the only solution available within the grammar of egologicism - namely the 
postulation of an overarching transcendental subjectivity whose absolute-
ness can underwrite inter-subjectivity, as it can guarantee the veracity of 
representation. Berkeley confronted with the same solipsistic implications 
of his thought invoked this same conceptual device - an omnipotent cognizer. 
In early egological thought we witness the location of the fundamental 
point of origin of all representation and knowledge in a divine and absolute 
being who is invoked as a conceptual device to cope with particular damaging 
implications of the egological epistemological standpoint - the problemSof' 
solipsism and the obj ecti vi ty and uni versali ty of scientific knowledg~. 
In what is still an age of' faith,this divine absolute being is clearly 
distinguished,in epistemological tems ,from the cogni ti ve ego or mind. The 
latter derives its epistemological ef'f'icacy from the f'omer. In a succeeding 
age of' increasingly secular humanism, divine intervention is squeezed out 
even of' epistemologiaimatters. The cognitive ego is increasingly thematized 
BO. 
as itself being transcendental and it inherits some of the cognitive 
attributes of the Deity. It now becomes the fundamental point of origin 
of non-sensory ideas, the primal source of signification and its conscious-
ness the basis of the apodicity in knowledge. In the idealist phenomeno-
logies that arise in the nineteenth century, at its beginning that of 
Hegel's objective idealism,andfat its end in Husserl's transcendental 
epistemology, the solitary but absolute ego, through its intentional acts, 
constitutes the objective world as the correlate of its significations,just 
as God was seen to have created this best of all possible worlds. These 
epistemic transformations will take place in the emerging age of secular 
humanism. While the bourgeois pretender seizes the crown from the hands 
of the hapless pontiff and crowns himself, the old man of Koningsberg will 
place man, or at least his transcendental surrogate, at the centre of the 
epistemological universe. And yet this anthropocentrism and emergent 
bourgeois individualism develop their egological form, with all its antin-
omies and tensions, from this theological structure. 
For Leibnitz however, only God can be ascribed any cognitive autonomy. 
Language is a representation of ideas. These are in turn the object of the 
soul i.e. the cognizing and moral ego. This in turn, is a representation, 
in its form and content,of God. The essence of the ideal language and of 
representation in general is to express the divine nature of being, grasped 
clearly and distinctly by the 'rational soul' or analytic subject. 
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PART II 
i) Differences in Empiricist and Rationalist 
Approaches to Universal Language Planning 
and Synthesis in 18th Century Schemes 
From the mid century an interest in universal Ian guage as a colloquial 
medium of intercourse was overtaken and submerged in the deeper interest in 
the construction of a sign system which would reflect accurately in its 
notation the facts of nature and the order of our ideas as discovered by 
'true philosophy'. The search for a universal character is accompanied by 
a corresponding analysis and decomposition of ideas,(an intensional 
mathesis) and a differentiation, categorization and tabulation of things 
into ordered tables. Moreover, the establishment of these classifications 
of 'things and notions' according to their properties and their relations 
one with another, characterized under the schemata of genera, species and 
specific differences, was held to be a prior condition of the construction 
of an ideal universal grammar. 
For the rationalists Mersenne, Descartes, the Grammarians of Port 
Royal and later Leibni tz, the emphasis was on the strict analysis and an 
ordered classification of ideas. The most important feature of the universal 
language was its calculus of order, the combinatorial characteristic. Wi th 
a character being assigned to each clear and distinct simple idea, language 
could mirror the structure of thought and operate as an agent of its 
analysis. For the more empirically minded English planners Seth Ward, 
George Dalgarno and Jom Wilkins, the emphasis is placed more upon a categor-
ization and tabulation of observational reality than on the art of combination 
based on abstract permutational and algebraic systems. Leibn1tz was later 
• 
to criticize the schemes of Dalgarno and Wilkins, as Descartes critized 
Merserme, for not being philosophical enough. That is for not carrying the 
principles of analysis and combination of concepts beyond the classification 
of the world of things by their observable features into genus, species and 
8S. 
difference, to an ordering and corresponding representation of the few 
simple and fundamental ideas whose combination generated all other complex 
notions. Only a language whose character and syntax could represent this 
combinatorial analysis of simples could function as a true instrument of 
axiomatic knowledge. There ~ differences between empiricist and rational-
ists on the proper scheme for a universal language, here expressed in terms of 
a differing emphaSis on a real character and calculus of combinations as the. 
core element of an ideal language and later articulated, in the eighteenth 
century, as the opposing but complimentary search for the original designa-
tion of words in nature and for the universal principles of association and 
combination of ideas and signs - the universal grammar. But these differences 
only mark a differentiation within a common epistemic space. They indicate 
a conflict merely within a greater unity of discursive formation. 
Leibnitz reassures the empiricist committed to real studies: 
"No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will 
lead us away from the things themselves; on the contrary, !i 
leads us into the interior of things. For we often have 
confused notions today because the characters we use are badly 
arranged; but then, with the aid of characters, we will easily 
have the most distinct notions, for we will have at hand a 
mechanical thread of meditation, as it were, with whose aid we 
can very easily resolve any idea whatever into those of which 
it is composed."1 
Only such an analytic and combinatorial language can free us from the 
ensnarement of ordinary language and the confused ideas it encourages, and 
deliver us directly to things -
"Since the analysis of concepts thus corresponds exactly to 
the analysis of a character, we need mere~ to see the 
characters in order to have adequate notions brought to our 
mind freely and without effort. We can hope for no greater aid 
than thi s in the perfection of the mind. ,,2 
Underlying both empiricist and rationalist views of language is this 
strictly functional view of language. This is itself predicated on the 
belief of the pre-eminence of real Imowledge to which language as the 
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embodiment of 'analysis' at the level of conventional signification, can 
provide swift and easy access. 
In John Wilkins 'Real Character and Philosophical Language', 3 to which 
contributions were made by a number of the members of the Royal Society,4 
the scheme not only involved a part on what Wilkins called the Universal 
Philosophy, namely tables of classification and analysis of things and ideas, 
and one on the real character, a sign ~stem to represent these classifica-
tions, but also a section on philosophical or general grammar which could 
serve as a syntactical basis for the proposed character. 
Wilkins, on the model of the Port-Royal grammar of the time, formulates 
an idea of General Grammar based not on conventional prescriptive grammars 
of particular languages but rather on a natural grammar which contains -
"all such Grounds and Rules, as do naturally and necessarily 
belong to the Philosophy of letters and speech in the General." 
C 1 . "the function of such a grammar will be to form 
the more simple notions classified in tbe tables into complex 
propositions .-"5 
Cave Beck in England and Kircher in Europe were the last scholars of 
any standing to plan universal languages not based on the systematic 
classification and symbolisation of concepts guided by principles of 
analysis. 6 The philosophical tables of Dalgarno 7 and Wilkins, Mersenne 
and Descartes' arrangement of simple concepts and ordering of ideas, and 
Leibnitz's ratiocanative principles of analysis and synthesis, all share 
the assumption that the analysis and ordering of the object of representation, 
object or idea, is an absolute condition for a characteristic of pure 
representation. 
Within the circumscribing field of mathesis as a universal science of 
order and combination which takes as its object,representation in th~ widest 
sense, begins the search for primitives and the original designation of liOrdS. 
However, this compliments rather than contradicts the construction of an 
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combinatorial calculus or syntax. For the ability of signs to represent 
nature and reality depends no longer on the resemblance of these signs to 
features of the natural world i.e. to their similitude with what they 
represent. In the classical theory of representation signs are arbitrarily 
chosen, and language grasped as a conventional system of Signification. 
For Hobbes the arbitrariness of speech and the general conventional 
nature of language is what distinguishes human signs from animal signals. 
Human language comes about through decision about conventions, for speech, 
like civil society, is an artificial construction, not a natural growth. 
It involves a linguistic contract -
"the order of numeral words is so appointed by the common con-
sent of them who are of the same language as us (as it were by a 
certain contract necessary for human society)."8 
Locke also writes 
"Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well 
adapted to that purpose, come to be made use by men as the 
signs of their ideas: not by any natural connection that 
there is between particular articulate sounds and certain 
ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all 
men; but by a voluntary imposition whereby such a word is 
made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. "9 
Even those like Mersenne and after him Condillac in the eighteenth 
century, who were attracted to the idea of the possible discovery in anti-
quity or in the archaeology of modern speech, of a primitive natural language 
that would signif.y immediately without convention, were forced to admit the 
impossibility of this dream. 
"toutes les paroles I itant indifferentes pour signifier tout ce 
que l'on veut, il n'y a que la seule volonte qui lespuisse 
determiner a signifier une chose ~lutot qu' une autre. Quant 
awe diff.eren.es voix qui servent a expliquer les passions de 
,llame, et les douleurs, e11es sont aussi naturelles a l'homme 
qui aux autres animaux: mais puisque les paroles sont artificielles, 
elles dependent de l
'
imagination, et de 1a volonte d'un chaccm.,,10 
After all, it is the very conventionality of language which allows of 
its rational improvement in the real character and universal language. The 
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paradox emerges that language can only regain its immediate link with 
things which it possessed naturally before the Tower of Babel, through this 
rational reconstruction. The notion of an original language which from 
the Creation of the confusion of tongues at Babel had been the single 
universal language in the world still exercised a fascination for the 
seventeenth century. That fascination was in part a longing for the spirit-
ual unity held to exist in antiquity, a unity perceived to be sadly lacking 
in the religiously divided Europe of the seventeenth century. More import-
antly it was due to the orthodox belief that the original language of man 
was not only universal but had been able to signify in its natural characters 
the true nature of things. It was held that in this original language names 
had conveyed something of the essence of the things signified. 
In the seventeenth century however it was believed that only a rational 
reconstruction of language on analytic lines could restore the representative 
link between words and things. Boyle in his letter to Hartlib notes 
"If the design of the Real Character take effect , it will in 
good part make amends to mankind for what their pride lost 
them at the tower of Babel.,,11 
In the imaginar,y commonwealths portrayed in English Puritan literature 
and in the strange discovered lands stumbled upon in seventeenth centur.y 
French fictional voyages the reconstructed universal language is sketched 
as existing in its natural form. 12 
For the classical period then in contradistinction to the post-
renaissance era, language is conventional and signs arbitrary in their 
constitution. The primal link between words and things can only be restored 
by the analytic representation a reconstructed universal character can afford. 
Leibnitz gets to the heart of the matter. 
"Yet I notice that, if characters can be used for rationisation, 
there is in them a kind of complex mutual relation or order which 
fi ts the' things; if not in the single words at least in their 
combination and infection, although it even better if found in 
the single words themselves. Though it varies, this order some-
how corresponds in all languages. This fact gives me hope of 
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escaping the difficulty. For although characters are arbitrary 
their use and connection have something which is not arbitrary , 
namely a definite analogy between characters and things, and the 
relations which different characters expressing the same thing 
have to each other." 1 3 
It is in so far as signs in a language function as a grid of analysis to 
order reality, that words can regain their intimate connection with things. 
Leibnitz on the other hand also played with the possibility of the design-
ing of a set of root characters which would emblematically represent their 
objects. However this notion, also mooted by Mersenne and Lodwick, totally 
rejected the idea that contemporary ordinary language had ~ 'natural' 
signification. While it was accepted that a language in which spoken sounds 
tokened things and ideas directly was the most perfect it was held that 
such a language would of necessity have to be invented and constructed on 
analytical lines. In this search for symbols which would denote the qualities 
of the thing signified onomatope ic words held a particular fascination. 
These words were held to be partly natural and partly conventional and hence 
perhaps to hold the key in the relationship of the two orders which was seen 
as the essence of any ~dequate representational schema. Another tack was 
the search for radical words or substantives which in their very form bore 
the imprint of nature. Elias Ashmole, one of the earliest Fellows of the 
Royal Society and one who: combined the callings of scientist 
and mystic, noted -
"we may consider that the useful radical words, if numbered, 
would not swell beyond our Memories fathom, specially if well 
ordered and digested by the judicious direction of an able 
and general Linguist; and such a one that rightly understands 
the first and true impressions, which Nature hath stamped upon 
the things they would have signified by the Form. 1114 
In the eighteenth century this search for origins, i.e. for the original 
designation of words, was given a'new impetus with the increasing influence 
'of Lockean empiricism in language study. Locke's interest in the genesis 
of ideas by sensation was generalised by Condillac to the origin of language. 
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A literal base for language development was sought in an original sense 
data language. In the wild cries and primitive gestures of savage man were 
sought the foundation of a system of direct representation of things. In 
these 'cris naturel' which were held to give direct expression of man's 
wants, desires and fears were sought the origins of human signification. 
Human language it was claimed developed by means of metaphorical extension 
and generalisation from this primitive language of action and the emotions. 
For Condillac, Giambattista Vico and the English cleric Warburton, in early 
societies metaphor was the essential mechanism of linguistic growth. How-
ever in turn this structural role of metaphor in the formation and develop-
ment of primitive natural language was seen as one of the reasons for the 
ambigui ty and imprecision of contemporary vernaculars. For Blackwell like 
Warburton, the Original language is highly suspect -
"It is certain that the primitive parts of the Language reputed 
Original, are many of them rough, undeclined, impersonal Mono-
syllables; expressi ve commonly of the highest Passions, and 
most striking Objects that present themselves in solitary savage 
life. 
From this Deduction, it is plain that any Language, formed as 
above described, must be full of metaphor; and that Metaphor 
of the boldest, daring and most natural kind: for Words taken 
wholly from rough Nature, and invested under some Passion, as 
Terror, Range or Want (which readily extort sounds from men) 
would be expreSSive of that Fanaticism and Dread, which is 
incident to Creatures Ii ving wild and defenceless: We must 
imagine their Speech to be broken, unequal and boisterous; one 
Word or sound, according to its Analogy to different Ideas, 
would stand for them all; a Quality we often mistake for 
Strength and ExpreSSion, which is a real Defect. ,,15 
For Condillac too the origin of language is in a primordial non-
arbitrary language of action and cries. However this language can exercise 
no active control over the mind. Its signs are merely involuntar,v reactions 
to psychological states. Perceptual thought likewise is tied to the immediacy 
of sensation. Such thought is instantaneous, without succession in time and 
without rationcative order. It is only with the institution of a language 
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of arbitrary signs, that thought can be patterned, analysed and ordered in 
discourse. It is only in such an arbitrary language with a rationally 
reconstructed character and syntax of combinations, that thought can be 
decomposed into its constituent and elementary ideas and become knowledge. 
( 
For Condillac speech is "une methode analytique", an essential condition 
of rational reflection, 
"nous pouvons nous en rendre compte; nous pouvons par consequent, 
apprendre a conduire notre reflexion. Penser devient donc un art, 
et cet art est l'art de parler."16 
For Condillac and after him the Ideologues, the search for origins of 
language remains motivated by the key forces in classical theory of represent-
ation - namely 
(a) the critique of contemporary ordinary language, and 
(b) the search for an ideal analytical language which can 
deliver thought to things. Through misplaced analogy 
and metaphor modern languages have become ambiguous, 
the initial resemblances of words and things have 
become blurred. Words no longer stand directly for 
ideas; a deSignation originally established in the 
language of action, but lost in the admixture and 
adulteration of modern European tongues. However this 
fracture can only be prepared by a rational recon-
struction of arbitrary language. Only through an ideal 
philosophical language cognizant of the genetic 
principles of original language but following also the 
canons of analytical method can words again come to 
speak directly of ideas and things. Such a sign system 
would indicate not only the derivation of our ideas in 
sensation in a character of original deSignations but 
also facUi tate the analysis of the combination of these 
simples in complex ideas. In Condillac' s system 'simple 
sensations' replace the simple ideas of Descartes, 
Mersenne and Leibnitz as the analytical units whose 
combination and representation can provide a universal 
mathesis with which to explicate the nature of the world. 
In the eighteenth century the empiricist search for 
origins remains accompanied and indeed circumscribed by 
this proj ect of a universal mathesis of signs. 
As Foucault notes: 
"To our eyes, this search for origins and this calculus of com-
binations appear incompatible, and we are only too ready to 
interpret them as an ambiguity in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century thought. II17 
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We are too ready also to apply the labels empiricism and rationalism to 
this duality and see in it two radically distinct and conflicting modes 
of understanding. In reality however the design of a combinatorial 
calculus and the search for the 'elementary within a system that is artif-
icial' compliment and sustain each other within a common project - the 
discovery/construction of an ideal universal analytical language. This 
language,through the constitution of tables of things and ideas~would 
represent the embodiment of existing Imowledge. In turn as an ars combin-
atoria it would facilitate the development of Imowledge. Within the grids 
of analysis which it is designed to represent,thought can be decomposed 
into its Simplest elements and the genesis of these in animal sensation 
traced. Only a rationally constructed system of artificial symbols, a real 
character of primitives and their combination by a series of logical 
operations, could return language to its original direct relationship to 
things. 
Early Egological Thought, Universal Grammar and Mind 
As we have said for the classical period language is transparent to 
what it represents. For both the rationalists and empiricists, that which 
is represented is the universe of ideas or primary representations located 
in the dyadic interaction of a cognizing subject with an objectified world. 
Language as such is its function - the representation of representation. 
The locus of language as a sign system always lies beyond itself in the 
primary representation of thought. Its essence is defined by its function 
as the articulation of thought. As such its form is the reflection of the 
form of thought. And it is this form which lends significance to the actual 
content of spoken language. Uni Versal grammar was the first of the three 
major directions of classical theory of language (the other two being ars 
characteristica and the empiricist search for origins) to postulate a 
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connection between language and thought. It held that discourse is the 
image of thought "La. parole est un tableau de nos pensees." And as 
thought is governed by laws of reason, then discourse itself must embody 
and illustrate the laws of reason. The object of grammar is the enunciation 
of thought through its articulation in discourse. 
That thought itself was primarily a representative domain and the 
primary representative one is clearly visible in this passage from Descartes' 
Third Meditation -
"For the 'representative mode of existence belongs to ideas from 
their very nature; and in the same way actual existence belongs 
to the causes of ideas, from their very nature - at least this is 
true of the first and principle causes. And though one idea may 
originate from another, an infinite regress here is impossible, 
we must at last get back to some primary idea whose cause as it 
were, an archtype, containing actually any reality whatever that 
occurs in the idea representatively •••• "18 
Descartes in this passage adheres to a causal theory of representation. 
Hobbes likewise holds to a causal theory of representation,though to an 
empiricist version of it. For him,ideas, in the form of sensation and 
imagery, have a representative function with regards the things and states 
which give rise to them. This representative function is however circum-
scribed by the causal nexus of the sentient mind and the object world. 
"That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto uS of 
that notion, agitation or alteration, which the object worketh 
in the brain or spirits J or some internal substance of the head. "19 
For both rationalists and empiricists then ideas, native or sensate, 
have a primary representative function. This primacy has its riots in the 
postulated causal form of representation. Moreover this primary nexus 
of cognitive self and objectified world is the foundation for all fUrther 
signification. Locke puts it so -
"Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those 
impressions objects themselves make on our minds, b.Y the proper 
inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, 
all the words in the world, made use of to explain or define any 
of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it 
stands for." 20 
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S:iJnple ideas are the primary form of representation and it is only 
II 
when we have our minds stored with them and know the names for them, then 
we are in a condition to define and by definition to understand the names 
II 
of complex ideas that are made up of them. Locke in this section of his 
essay attacks Descartes for confusing and conflating the idea of the cause 
of sensory experience with that experience itself. However throughout the 
text he registers agreement with the rationalists on one central issue _ 
the representative nature of ideas. For both empiricists and rationalist 
ideas functioned so as to represent the objectified world to the cognitive 
subject. Words signify ideas and not things directly. For those things 
can only be known directly and with certainty via the cognitive agency of 
the thinking subject and through the ideas that subject has of them. For 
words are sounds arbitrarily chosen to stand for certain designata. However 
these objects of representation whether real objects, qualities or relations 
must be designata with which we are directly acquainted. And of course the 
only things we can know so int:iJnately are of course our own ideas, whether 
originating from sense and reflection,or whether native. Language can 
itself only represent via the primary egological representative function 
of ideas. Locke reminds us, 
"A man cannot make his own words the signs either of qualities 
in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof 
he has none in his own, for words, in their primary or immediate 
signification, stand for nothing but the ideas of him that uses 
them. "21 
For egological thought knowledge is only hinged to the world through 
the representative ideas the mind, organised in cognitive subjectivity, 
has of objects. Human knowledge of reality is mediated by the analytic 
subject's representative ideas of the world. 
In each tradition language as a secondary form of representation, 
arbi trary and indirect, departs alWayS from this primary relation of the 
epistemological subject and the world, within which it constitutes itself' 
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as discourse. Within the structure of egological thought,a theory of 
language emerges predicated upon a particular philosophy of mind and self. 
In the classical period before the emergence of a distinctive and 
thematic theory of Signification, the measure of significance is represent-
ativity. Just as the science which analyses the structure of thought is 
logic, so that which analyses that of secondary representation is grammar. 
And just as logic is by its very nature universal, in so far as it strives 
to conjoin thought and reality, so grammar must be universal in so far as 
its task is the conjuncture of thought and discourse. General, or universal 
grammar then, is the analysis of linguistic representation, in so far as 
this is conceived of as a uniform and universal set of relations into which 
words can enter, these corresponding to the ex ingencies of thought. In 
the eighteenth century a further science will be added to the study of logic 
and general grammar - that of ideology. However this science of ideas, 
their origin and intensional structure, which in the hands of Destutt de 
Tracy, de Gerando and Maine de Biran,will address the inter-relation of 
signs and thought,will remain fixated by the ideal of language as a pure 
translation of thought. Ideology remains the legitimate and faithful 
child of the union of universal grammar and the empiricist search for 
origins. 
(ii) General Grammar 
However for the linguists of Port Royal, grammar cannot be just reduced 
to logic. The move towards a systematic ~p1ication of a logic to the 
theory of language finds its beginning with Leibnitz. For the grammar-
ians of Port Royal,grammar occupies an intennediate space between thought 
and the mere written or vocal signifier. Grammar is the mode of articulation 
of thought as it strives to express itself in discourse. 
The grammarians task was seen as one of discovering the universal 
principles of human thought that lie behind the apparent profusion of form 
of particular vernacular languages. If the grammarian employed a comparative 
method it was with the purpose of discovering the universal prinCiples which 
undergirded all language, universal principles whose existence was guaranteed 
by the belief that human reason itself was universal. General grammar does 
not attempt to define the laws governing all languages by inductive general-
ization from the detailed study of various particular languages. Rather, 
each language is examined as an exemplification of the general structures 
by which thought is articulated. The universality of general grammar resides 
in the correspondence of its governing principles with the universal structure 
of our minds and the necessary combination of our ideas. Thus the fact that 
Latin and French are practically the only particular language that figure in 
the analysis is regarded as no great obstacle to the method. For other 
languages must in essence conform to the universal grammatical principles 
located in these languages in so far as these principles embody a common 
human mentality. As Horne Tooke was to comment - "it was general reasoning 
a priori that led me to the particular instances; not particular instances 
to the general reasoning." 22 Nicholas Beauzee commenting on the Port Royal 
Grarmnar published in 1 660 wrote~ 
"Grammar, whose object is the enunciation of thought by means 
of the spoken or written word, admits two sorts of principles. 
The first are immutably true and universally applicable, they 
depend on the nature of thought itself, they follow its analysis 
and are merely its result; the second contain only a hypothetical 
truth which is dependant on the fortuitous, arbitrary and change-
able conventions which have given rise to the different idioms. 
The first constitutes general grammar, whilst the second are the 
object of the various particular grammars. 
GENERAL GRAMMAR is thus the reasoned science of the immutable and 
general principles of spoken or written language in any language 
whatsoever. 
A PARTICULAR GRAMMAR is the art of applying the arbitrary and 
customar,y institutions of a particular language to the general 
principles of language, spoken or written. 
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GENERAL GRAMMAR is a science becuase it has no object other than 
the reasoned speculation of the general and immutable principles 
of language. 
A PARTICULAR GRAMMAR is an art, because it is concerned with the 
practical application of the arbitrary and customary institutions 
of a particular language to the general principles of language. 
The science of grammar is anterior to all languages because its 
princjples suppose only the possibility of (actual) languages and 
because they are the same as those which direct man as a creature 
of reason in his intellectual operations; in a word, their truth 
is eternal. 
The art of grammar, on the contrary, is subsequent to (actual) 
languages because the uses of language must exist before they can 
be artifi'cially related to the general principles of language and 
because the analogous system of which this art consists can only 
be the result of observation made from these pre-existing uses.,,23 
This rigid distinction between general and particular grammar is of 
course predicated upon the Cartesian philosophy of mind. General grammar is 
the essence of significant symbolization in that it is the enunciation of 
thought; its forms those of the primary mode of representation; its 
generality and immutability that of the absolute and, hence universal 
cognizing ego. 
The linguistic principles explicated in Claude Lancelot's and Antoine 
Arnauld's "Grarnmaire generale et raisonee" , despite a concern for the under-
lying mental structure of language, do not address themselves to a concrete 
. 
analysis of syntax. The major object of the GrammaL:Ce is the rational 
e~lanation of parts of speech and grammatical categories such as tense, 
gender and case. The syntactical properties of particular languages are 
not themselves seen as having any semantic function. These merely serve to 
bring words conveniently together in a semantic order which is determined 
by more fundamental and universal structures of discourse. Grammatical 
categories must be governed by the laws of the mind, for language is the 
creation of the mind. Thus each part of speech functions with a special 
purpose wi thin this rational archtechtonic. Pronouns, for example, are 
rationally explained as having been invented in order to save repeating the 
same noun when it occurred several times in the same context. But no 
account is given of the specific form of pronoun insertion in particular 
languages and the accompanying rules of person, case and gender agreement. 
These features of the 'invention' of pronouns are regarded as merely incid-
ental to their rational function. 
Universal grammar because it approaches language from the standpoint 
of its inherent rationality involves no conception of a historical and 
developmental dimension to language. The governing principles of universal 
rationali ty commit language to an absolute and eternal syncrony. Drawn 
into the a-temporality of res cogitans, the historical and development 
characteristics of language are committed to the realm of the purely accid-
ental together with the other irregularities and redundancies which lead 
to the vagaries of particular grammars and languages. 
For Port Royal Grammar the various functions of language are determined 
by the three basic operations of the mind - conception, judgement and reason. 
The operations of conception and judgement are expressed in the nature of 
the categories of grammar and embodied with content in the proposition. The 
third operation of reason is performed logically on whole propositions as 
a syllogistic process. 
The essence of grammar then is entirely located in the realm of res 
cogitans. Indeed the rigid distinction between General and Particular 
grammar replicates the fundamental dualisms of Cartesian philosophy and 
egological thought generally. Similarly the rigid distinction between 
human language and animal sign systems replicates the rigid demarcations 
of the dualistic ontology of the period. 
For language is not mere characters or sounds, which it was recognized 
do var,y nationally and regionally and which are subject to various accidents, 
rather language in its essence as pure representativity is a 'deep structure' 
of articulated thought. Without this cognitive and creative foundation in 
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universal cognition organized around the knowing subject, words would sink 
back into the wild cries of animal communication. Descartes notes -
"For it is a very remarkable thing that there are no men so dull 
and stupid, not even lunatics, that they cannot arrange various 
words and form a sentence to make their thoughts understood, but 
no other animal however perfect or well bred, can do the like. 
This does not come from their lacking organs; for magpies and 
parrots can utter words like ourselves, and yet they cannot talk 
like us, that is with any sign of being aware of what they say 
And we must not confuse words with natural movements, the expression 
of emotion which can be imitated by machines. "24 
Again for Locke and the empiricists,human language is radically 
different from animal signing,and this difference resides in its cognitive 
component and translational function with regards the realm of ideas which 
is afforded a primary and autonomous status. 
"Man, therefore, had by nature his organs so fashioned as to be 
fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this 
was not enough to produce language; for parrots and several 
other birds will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct 
enough, which yet by no means are capable of language. 
Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary 
that he should be able to use sounds as signs of internal con-
ception, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within 
his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and 
the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another."2S 
Human language is radically distinct from animal signing in that it 
is not only expressive but also representative. It alone can represent, in 
an arbitrary manner, thought - the defining characteristic of man. In turn 
natural language's differentiating specificity as a sign system is a proof 
of man's radically specific mentality vis-a-vis animals. 
The core of this rational 'deep structure' of language is the elementar,y 
proposition. This is in essence the first murmuring in discourse of judge-
ment, one of the three major operations of the mind. The proposition 
represents in its form and content the manner in which concepts are combined 
in judgement. As such it is the root source of significance within discourse, 
its essential and most elementaI7 form. If removed or reduced it would 
I 
I 
I 
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restore discourse to the dislocated gestures of animality; there would be 
a dissolution of significance and a rupture between sign and signified, 
just as ideas robbed of their representative and referential function would 
turn back on themselves, in the infinite regress to solipsism Descartes 
feared. 
The proposition is then the discursive expression of the judgement, 
which itself is the principle operation of the mind. The essence of the 
proposition is that it affirms via the verb what it represents in the 
judgement. As such it establishes that correspondence with thought which 
is at the heart of classical theories of representation. Verbs are analyzed 
as functioning as a copula between subject and predicate (the other two 
major elements of the proposition) asserting an existential judgement. As 
such,the key verb from which all others are derived is that which asserts 
an existential judgement - the verb to be. Port Royal Grammar affords this 
verb substantive etre a particular autonomy. It is the only true verb 
which by its union with adjectival ideas creates all other verbs. The verb 
with its root in the substantive 'to be' affirms a relationship between 
subject and predicate and hence represents cognitive judgement. As such 
the verb is the necessary condition for language to represent. The verb 
as copula establishes within the proposition the relationship of attribution 
which links the predicate to its subject. At the same time through affirma-
tion it establishes the representative link between this internal structure 
and the very structure of thought captured in the judgement. The corres-
pondence then is not the vertical point by point, word to thing atomistic 
correspondence of a theory of designation and the noun. It is rather a 
horizontal correspondence akin ~ an isomorphism, combinative rather than 
nominative,and necessarily so it language is to function as analysis and 
untold as Imowledge. For language structured in and through the proposition, 
, 
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must be capable of making statements about the world. This it can only do 
if it can represent the cognitive judgements of the epistemic subject. The 
analytic task of language is to express these analytic judgements, to impose 
order on space and not merely name the contingently associated elements of 
the universe. Hobbes notes, 
"In every proposition three things are to be considered vi z the 
two names which are subject and the predicate, and their copula-
tion; both which names raise in our mind the thought of one and 
the same thing; but the copulation makes us think of the cause 
for which those names were imposed on that thing. 1126 
Empiricists as well as rationalists demanded that language must not 
only name but explicate the cause of attribution. Language must be harnessed 
to the twin principles of the structural organization of classical knowledge _ 
analysis and order. 
(ii) Intensional Mathesis 
Again, the correspondence of discourse and thought must be combinative 
and isomorphic rather than atomistic and nominative. Language if it consisted 
of merely the atomistic designation of particulars would lose its generality 
and analytic power before the multiplicity of the proper noun; it would 
dissipate its power to represent. 
Locke whose theor,y of language tends to a more nominative and atomistic 
form than that of the Port Royal grammarians is clearly aware of the problem. 
Despite an empiricist ontology which stresses the primacy of particulars he 
notes that 'The far greatest part of words that make all languages are 
general terms. ,27 Moreover. he adduces reasons for this occurrence; reasons 
which demonstrate the extent of the common ground he shared with rationalist 
philosophy of lan guage. 
"First, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a 
distinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words 
depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas 
and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the 
application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct 
ideas ot the things, and retain also the particular name that 
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belongs to everyone, with its peculiar appropriation to that 
idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame 
and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we 
meet with. ,,28 
Language if it is to represent adequately must conform to the structur-
ation of ideas. The infinite designation of particulars, even if it were 
pOSSible, would, Locke notes, be useless. 
"because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men 
would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not 
serve them to communicate their thoughts."29 
For Locke the most important dynamic at work in thought is that of 
generalization and analysis. Language as a system of secondary represent-
ation must also embody this dynamic in its system of signification,if it is 
to function as a tool of knowledge. He argues, 
"yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of 
any great use for the improvement of knowledge, which, though 
founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views, 
to which things reduced into sorts, under general names, are 
properly subservient."30 
Similarly for Descartes, language if it is to represent adequately, 
must reflect in its combinative structure the general and analytic features 
of thought. For Descartes as for his correspondent on the subject of 
universal language scheme Mersenne, the model for such a combinative structure 
was that of mathematical calculus. Any invehted language would have to 
involve "the establishment of order among all the thoughts which can enter the 
human mind, in the same way as there is one established naturally among 
numbers. ,,31 The power of language to represent resides in its transparency 
to the structure of ideation. The construction of an ideal language Descartes 
believed would depend on the existence of a "true Philosophy" which could 
order and classify thought into its simples and their combinations. Language 
would map this archtechtonic of all possible basic concepts and their com-
binations. As such its structure must be capable of mirroring the general 
and analytic features of conceptual thought. 
, . 
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The 'proposition' then is the basic discursive unit capable of 
capturing the analytic density of thought. As a linguistic assertion it 
embodies in its form a cogni ti ve judgement involving general concepts. 
Analysis unfolds in discourse in and through the proposition. 
The proposition is the essential object of general grammar. Moreover 
it is to remain the primary focus of linguistic analysis throughout the 
development and erosion of the egological paradigm. This centrality is 
threatened with the development of nineteenth century romanticism which 
seeks to harness language to national 'genius' and poetic expression. 
However it gains new life with the emergence of logical positivism and it 
is not formally challenged within this analytic tradition until the socio-
logistic assault of John Austin and Wittginstein. The career of the pro-
position as the central category of linguistic analysis charts the develop-
ment and erosion of the translational theory of language which characterizes 
egological thought. This centrality is not effectively displaced until the 
relationship of language and mind is rethought from the conversational 
standpoint. 
However for the grammarians of Port Royal and their followers, a 
proposition is not a sentence. Its generality and its representative power 
is not that of actual historical contingent linguistic utterance rather, 
as we have seen, it is derived from its intimate correspondence to,and 
reflection of thought. In essence the proposition is implicit only in 
discourse. It is not expressed directly there in the concrete form of 
language, only represented in the mind. The proposition must be given 
substance and issue forth fully clothed into ordinar,y language. It must 
be transformed into the particular sentence of natural languages if these 
are to function as a public medium for the communication of ideas. Language, 
tor ego-logical thought, is precisely this articulation or translation ot 
thought into a public medium tor communication. It is this translational 
104. 
function which gives human language its specificity, a~d words their sense. 
This function is the limit of the sense of words for men. As Locke tells 
us "Their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and 
they can be signs of nothing else.,,32 
The purpose of the syntax of ordinary language is to facilitate this 
translational function, to allow thought to body forth. The study of syntax 
and linguistic form centres around this problem of articulation. 
Two distinct approaches can again be traced to this problem of articul-
ation. These can be categorized under the general headings outlined above _ 
combinative and nominative. 
(a) The former seeks to relate propositions to sentences by a 
transformation of the structure of the former to produce 
the latter in all the variety of different languages. 
Chomsky summarizes this approach -
"A sentence has an inner mental aspect (a deep structure that 
conveys its meaning) and an outer, physical aspect as a sound 
sequence. Its surface analysis into phrases may not indicate 
the significant connections of the deep structure by any formal 
mark or by the actual arrangement of words. The deep structure 
is however represented in the mind as the physical utterance is 
produced. The deep structure consists of a system of proposit-
ions, organized in various ways. The elementar,y propositions 
that constitute the deep structure are of the subject-predicate 
form with simple subjects and predicates (i.e. categories instead 
of more complex phrases). Many of these elementar,y objects can 
be independently realised as sentences. It is not true, in 
general that the elementary judgements constituting the deep 
structure are affirmed when the sentence that it underlies is 
produced. To actually produce a sentence from the deep structure 
that conveys the thought that it e~resses, it is necessary to 
apply rules of transformation that rearrange, replace, or delete 
i tams of the sentence. Some of these are obligatory, further 
ones optional. Thus Dieu qui est invisible a cree Ie monde qui 
est visible is distinguished from its paraphrase, Dieu invisible 
a cree Ie monde visible, by an optional deletion operation, but 
the transformation that substitutes a relative pronoun for the 
noun and proposes the pronoun is obligatory. "33 
Chomsky in his sketch of Port Royal grammar may be too ready to 
read into this corpus his own transformational linguistic 
problematic and dissect the grammar with his own well worn con-
ceptual tools. However this portrayal of Grammaire General 
captures the essence of that movement. The elementary proposition 
is the bearer of meaning in language in so far as it is the first 
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murmuring in discourse of judgement, the primary operation of the 
mind. The relationship between the elementary proposition and 
the sentence in which it is embedded is one of transformation 
of form. It is a pure syntactical transformation that produces 
the various significances available in natural language. However 
in line with the general translational nature of General Grammar 
this transformational syntax is denied any specific semantic 
function. Meaning is entirely on the side of mind and is buried 
in the structure of the proposition and its designation of basic 
ideas. As we have said for General Grammar and the classical 
theory of language, grammatical categories were considered as 
reflections of mental faculties and regarded as of semantic 
significance only in so far as they embodied mental structures. 
The function of the formal structures of language is to represent 
the ordering and succession of ideas. The essence of grammar is 
exhausted,in this function of the mind's combination of simple 
ideas into complex ones and their rational connection in asserted 
jUdgements. However this combinative-representative function of 
grammar is regarded as a fundamental aspect of language even if 
it is given a secondary place to the nominative-representative 
function of the designation of ideas. Even Locke who adopts the most 
atomistic and purely nominative approach to language is forced to note 
( ) in his discussion of Particles, 
"Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a 
great many others that are made use of to signify the connection 
that the mind gives to ideas or propOSitions, one with another. 
The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only 
need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also to 
show or intimate some particular action of its onw at that time 
relating to those ideas. n34 
Locke follows Hobbes and Arnauld and Lancelot in the belief that 
verbs function in propositions as a copula between subject and 
predicate affirming a cognitive judgement and that all verbs have 
their basis in the existential substantive to be - nis and is not 
are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. "35 
(b) Primacy of the Noun 
The latter approach, the nominative, pursues the relation of corres-
pondence with thought by an articulation of the content of the 
proposition to produce the sentence. Central to this is a theory 
of the noun and designation. The proposition is not merely a 
structure mirroring the fom of judgement but opens out into a con-
tent, the elements of which, nouns and their adjectives designate 
the content of primary representation - ideas. For the classical 
period and indeed within egological thought generally, the essence 
of language is its ability to name. Discourse can only express the 
content of ideation because sentences are made up of words that 
name and hence classify and order that content. The noun is then 
for egological thought the primary grammatical category. It was 
generally assumed by both rationalists and empiricists that the 
primary purpose of language was to name or signify ideas. Thus it 
was argued that if the invention of one part of speech proceeded 
others then this original part of speech must have been the noun. 
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Moreover the asserted primacy of the sUbstantive noun was 
accompanied by a search for the hidden nominal function held 
to lie buried in connectives, conjunctions and prepositions. 
These particles as Locke commented refer not to particular 
ideas of objects but rather to "the connection that the mind 
gives to ideas or propositions one with another."36 
Similarly the grammarians of Port Royal argued that particles 
must have a certain representative content, since they 
indicate the manner "in which objects are linked together, and 
in which they are connected in our representations."3? Instead 
of nouns "they have taken the place of those gestures by which 
men indicated them or simulated their connections and their 
succession. "38 Hence these words too are dormant names whose 
object of reference analysis can uncover. 
For Locke the noun is basic because it alone speaks of the origin 
of language in primitive acts of designation of sensory experiences. 
"And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we 
should find, in all Languages, the Names, which stand for Things 
that fall under our Senses, to have had their first rise from 
sensible Ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what 
kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their 
Minds, who were the first Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, 
even in the naming of Things, unawares suggested to Men the 
Originals and Principles of all their knowledge, whilst, to give 
Names, that might make known to others any Operation~ they felt 
in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their 
Senses, they were fain to borrow Words from ordinary known Ideas 
of Sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to 
conceive these Operations they experimented in themselves, which 
made no outward sensible Appearances; and then when they had 
got known and agreed Names, to signif,y those internal Operations 
of their own Minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make 
known by Words, all their other Ideas; since they could consist 
of nothing, but either of outward sensible perceptions, or of 
the inward Operations of their Minds about them. "39 
Locke here tentatively sketches a theor,y of the origin of language 
and the basis of signification which will be taken up in the 
eighteenth century by Condillac and developed so that the search 
for origins later becomes synonomous with the explication of the 
theory of signification. The distant origin of language is 
sought in the primaeval period when signs functioned as pure 
representation. The noun is the basic building block in Locke'S 
genetic nominalist theory of language and the means by which 
nature, mediated by the cognitive agency of the epistemic subject, 
speaks to us. 
And yet, as we have seen, Locke is wary of the multiplicity of 
the proper noun and the myriad of particulars in the world. 
Language must function as a tool of analysis and Imowledge. Hence 
in its significations it must strive for generality and classif-
ication. General names are then the most important type of noun 
because they designate general ideas. In this way "one word was 
made to mark a multitude of particular e:dstences."40 
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Within the classical theory of language, in general, the theory 
of designation and the noun aims to avoid the endless multi-
plicity of things and names. Designation is primarily taxonomic 
a relation of representation between a noun which functions as 
a designating genius to a species of particular ideas. 
Thus on the one hand there emerges around the egological structure 
of classical thought a preliminary sketch for a structural semantics. For 
both rationalism and empiricism, despite the ideational atomism of the 
latter, language as a taxonomy of names must map the pre-existing and 
autonomous structure of thought. Thought can be analysed into its basic 
elements simple natures or ideas, which can be grasped clearly and dis-
tinctly. It can then be conjoined to form complex ideas. The semantic 
component of language if it is to achieve the ideal of pure representativity, 
must map the contours of this ideational landscape. For language if it is 
to represent, must correspond to the structure of a thought which is 
sufficient unto itself. 
"Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not 
particularly for this or that thing, but for sorts and ranks 
of things, it will be necessary to consider in the next place 
what the sorts and kinds or, if you rather like the Latin 
names, what the species and genera of things are, wherein they 
consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they 
ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the 
right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of 
language, and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the 
inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification -
of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any 
clearness or order concerning knowledge, which, being conversant 
about propOSitions, and those most commonly universal ones, has 
greater connection with words than perhaps is expected. ,,41 
Locke may have had in his mind here the classificatory schemes of the 
members of the Royal Society and the systems of real characters based on 
these schemes. The entire order of ideas, from simple elements to complex 
combinations must be covered by a corresponding grid of language which 
Signifies the various levels and points of formation of this intensional 
mathesis. Descartes summarises the demands made on the theory of designation 
and the noun by the governing principles of this analytical and binary 
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theory of representation. A philosophical language must depend on the 
True Philosophy. 
"Car il est impossible autrement de denombrer toutes les pen sees 
des hommes, et de les mettre par ordre, ny seulement de les 
distinguer en sorte qu'elles soient claires et simples, qui est 
a mon advis Ie plus grand secret qu'on puis~e avoir pour acquerir 
la bonne science. Et si quelqu 'un avai t bien explique quelles 
sont les idees simples qui sont en l'imagination des hommes, 
desquelles se compose tout a qu'ils pensent, et que cela fust 
receu par tout Ie mond, j'oserais esperer ensuite une langue 
universelle fort aisee a aprendre a prononcer, et a ecrire, et 
ce qui est Ie principal, qui aiderait au jugement, luy 
representant si distinctement toutes choses, qu'illuy serait 
presque j,mpossible de se tromper."42 
The search for a nominative taxonomy or structural semantic which can 
map the intensional mathesis uncovered by 'true Philosophy' is most easily 
witnessed in the universal characters and ideal language projects based 
on a priori ordering and classification of concepts. The schemes of Wilkins 
and Dalgarno and to a lesser extent Lodwick are based on such a philosophical 
language. In Wilkins tables, the drawing up of which was contributed to by 
several members of the Royal Society, objects and ideas are categorized 
into forty classes or broadly based genera groups to which mames are 
assigned. These 'genera' consist of both transcendentals categorized on 
an Aristotelian basis 'substance quantity, quality, action and relation) 
and groups categorized according to divisions in the natural world (metal, 
herb, fish, etc.). Each genus is then subdivided into groups called 
'differences'. To each genus is assigned, as we have said, a name in the 
form of a real character. Differences are represented by a modification 
to the real character designating the genus. The difference in tum is 
subdivided into 'species' and the latter represented by an alternative set 
of modifications of the genus character stem. Wilkins f symbolization 
facilitates the representation of some 4,000 separate items both natural 
objects and forces/and abstract concepts. B,y the addition of a series of 
hooks and loops to the basic characters and their species and difference 
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modifications Wilkins denotes adjectival and adverbial forms, plural and 
affinity,or opposition. In this way each sign both directly represents 
and defines a particular idea or object and indicates its connection with 
other related concepts and things. Each modification of the basic characters 
demarcates a more specific category of ideas and objects and leads event-
ually to particulars. Wilkins real character clearly then represents an 
attempt to realize the ideal of a nominative system of signification which 
can map the structure of thought through the creation of a vocabulary of 
signs based on a structural semantic. 
(iV.) Knowledge and Being 
However the tying of designation and the noun to an intensional 
mathesis must be accompanied by an attempt to root that realm of ideas in 
the world and thus forge a direct link between words and things. In the 
eighteenth century, with the increasing influence of Lockean empiricism, 
this is to mean the prolonged search for the origins of designation in 
primitive man's ideational activity. However in the seventeenth centur,y, 
for the rationalist grammarians of Port Royal, the demand is that ideas 
must be related not only internally to each other but also have extension 
to the real world. Port Royal grammer, infused with the spirit of Cartesian 
realism, draws a clear distinction between the intension and extension of 
an idea. 
"The comprehension (intension) of an idea is the constituent 
parts which make up the idea, none of which can be removed 
without destroying the idea. For example the idea of a triangle 
is made up of the idea of having three sides, the idea of having 
three angles and the idea of having angles who se sum is equal 
to two right angles and so on. 
The extension of an idea is the objects to which the word express-
ing the idea can be app1ied~ The objects which belong to the 
extension of an idea are called the inferiors of that idea, which 
e 
with respect to them is called the sup'nor. Thus the general 
idea of a triangle has in its extensio"n triangles of all kinds 
whatsoever. n43 
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Here, over two hundred years before Frege, egological thought finds 
it necessary to distinguish between sense and reference in order to defend 
the binary form of the sign, the translational theory of language, and the 
correspondence theory of truth. Egological thought demands of language 
that primarily it should name and refer; this referential capacity is the 
basis of languages' representativity. Anything which clouds the trans-
parency of language to what it names,and threatens the representative nexus 
of words and things must be guarded against. For classical thought this 
means denying the historicity and materiality of language; particular 
languages, their grammar and histories are ignored and attention focussed 
on general grammar and the universal and rational deep structure of language; 
in turn, the formal syntactical properties are denied any semantic function; 
the function of language is reduced to that or purely nomination. 
Hence within the intensional mathesis of thought there is a growing 
interest not only in the origins of deSignation, which might throw light 
on primal link of words and things, but also an interest in the importance 
of the those ideas called substantives. These elements of thought, though 
reducible to constituent more simple ones for the purposes of knowledge, 
represent bodies as they are experienced as a whole in material extension. 
Descartes, despite the primacy he gives to analytic method distinguishes 
its object from reality as experienced -
"In the first place we must think differently when we regard 
things from the point of view of our knowledge and when we are 
talking about them as they are in reality." The object of 
analysis may have epistemological primacy, due to its clari ty 
and distinctiveness, but that of experience has the more central 
place in representation. He notes -
"I can see no inequality among ideas taken merely as certa:in 
states of consciousness, all of them seem to originate from 
myself in the same way; but in so far as one represents one 
object and another another, there are obviously great differences. 
For indubitab~, the ideas that manifest substances to me are 
something more, have, so to say, a greater amount of represent-
at! ves, reali ty, than those which merely represent states or 
accidents.,,44 
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And just as at the level of primary representation one can distinguish 
substantive ideas similarly at the level of secondary or linguistic 
representation one can distinguish between nouns which designate these 
substances and adjtc~Val nouns which designate accidents or states. For 
general grammar "words that signify things are called substantival nouns 
such as earth, sun. Those that signify manners, while at the same time 
indicating the subject with which the manner agree, are called adjectival 
nouns such as good, just, round. ,,45 
The status of the substantive and the concept of substance becomes 
the Achilles heel of early classical philosophy in the ego-logical mode. 
Confronted with these categories and the scholastic realism which under-
writes them, the limitations of classical epistemology become apparent. The 
duality of knowledge and being, hinted at by Descartes and developed by 
Locke as a theme in his discussion of nominal and real essence, threatens 
the very nature of representation. For representation, idea or word, must 
be faithful to what it represents, things or ideas, yet conform to the 
structures of analysis. But the eruption of the analytic subject on the 
surface of knowledge production shatters the original similitude of sign 
and signified. It replaces the hierarchy of anologies with the grids of 
analytic order of both the classification of concepts and of their represent-
ation in the symbolic calculus of an ideal rational language. 
Ego-logical thought is committed by the logic of its own discourse to 
turn its back on being, in favour of knowledge, and to reorganise ontology 
around the new primacy of the cogito. Similarly representation must take 
this epistemological turn and found itself on the central mediation of 
the cognitive subject and its ideational and analytic activity. In turn 
the scholastic doctrine and substance must be e~ised from classical. 
epistemology. 
Locke attempts to do this. He clearly saw Descartes continued use 
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of the category as an unnecessary and confusing residue from scholastic 
thought. Locke clearly distinguishes between the real essence and nominal 
essence of a thing. By real essence he means "that real constitution of 
anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined 
in and are constantly found to co_exist.,,46 These real essences for Locke 
err on the side of being and are unknowable, for only their appearances 
are manifest to us in sense perception. Moreover as Locke points out, when 
we use the term essence, generally we are not doing so in reference to these 
unknowable entities, but rather in reference to the classifications under 
which we order reality. "That essence" he tells us, "in the ordinary use 
of the word, relates to sorts and that it is considered in particular beings 
no further than as they are ranked into sorts.,,47 It is in other words a 
nominal essence. Moreover substances are classified and sorted into cate-
gories not on the basis of their real essence, as this ontological information 
is not available but rather by their nominal essences. 
"For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the 
sort, signifies. It is impossible therefore that anything 
should determine the sorts of things which we rank under 
general names but that idea which that name is designed as a 
mark for, which is that, as has been shown, which we call the 
nominal essence. "48 . 
Locke tightens the tresses that bind the classical theory of represent-
ation within the structure of egologicism. The essence of a thing becomes 
de facto the general idea under which is can be classified in the analytic 
activity of the subject. It is this general idea or nominal essence which 
is designated by the noun substantive. The noun substantive does not 
deSignate essential attributes of substance independent of the mind. Rather 
it designates the minds representative ideas of things and the classifications 
the analytic subject, in reflection, imposes upon its experience. Substance 
and the substantive are no longer ontologically given but now fairly and 
squarely on the side of knowledge. For Locke argues, we classify and name 
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substances by their nominal and not by their real essence/and this nominal 
essence is the product of the analytic agency of the mind. It is to the 
mind we must look if we are to understand the notion of essence, and not 
to nature. Though "nature makes many particular things, which do agree 
one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably too in their 
internal frame and constitution." However, "it is men who, taking occasion 
from the qualities they find united in them and wherein they observe often 
several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in order to their 
naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs; under which individuals, 
according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be 
ranked as under ensigns: so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; 
this is a man, that a drill; and in thiS, I think, consists the whole 
business of genus and species. ,,49 Similarly, it is to mind that we must 
look if we are to grasp the functioning of language. For the task of 
language is to represent the ordered classification of things. This, only 
the mind can afford. The noun substantive as name does not then reach out 
directly to nature and designate particular real substances (if it were to 
do so it would lose its power of generality) rather it designates an import~~t 
pode in the intensional mathesis produced by the cognitive agengy of the 
solitaEY if absolute epistemic self. Language then is a secondar.y form of repre-
sentationwhich because it is arbitrar.y in its character,can have no direct 
link with the world of things. However due to its institutional and possible 
rational character it can adequately represent those ideas which analyze 
and order the flux of material experience. Its ability to represent is 
always circumscribed by this primary relation of the epistemological 
subject and the world. It is only within this primary epistemological 
relation that it constitutes itself as discourse. For it is only within 
this ideational correspondence that it can lose its own materiality, 
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historical density and autonomous expressiority and become pure represent-
ation. 
Yet, when ego-logical thought turns its back on being, both of substance 
and of language, although it solves the immediate problems of its own 
coherence as dictated by the twin prinCiples of analysis and order, it 
opens up a vast new problem - the relation of knowledge and being. This 
problem of course is later to crystalize within critical idealism as that 
of the relationship of cognitive system and nature. But not before it had 
first appeared in the cogitation of the ideologues in the form of the 
thorny question of the relationship of signs and thought. 
Ego-logical thought having centred knowledge on the solitary subject 
and its indubitable agencY,is faced with a pressing problem - namely to 
assess the contribution of our cognitive and representational apparatus 
in the constitution of an objective world experience by us. 
(v) Egologicism and the Structure of 
Classical Theory of Language 
The structure of the classical theory of language can now be represented 
schematically and its relationship to the ego-logical philosophy of mind 
withinegological discourse traced. 
The egological philosophy of mind with its thematized dualism of 
universal mind and contingent world gives rise to the rigid distinction 
between and consequent strong classification and framing of, General and 
Particular Grammar. The detailed study of vernacular grammar for their 
own sake is not developed in any depth,for such an activity can make no 
real sense within the parameters of egological thoug~t with its universal 
theory of mind and translational .conception of linguistic representation. 
Within Universal Grammar, which is conceived of as the structural 
articulation of thought in discourse, the correspondence between discourse 
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and thought is sought through two contrasting paths. The combinative 
addresses itself to the horizontal correspondence of form between language 
and thought, expressing and formalizing itself in the theory of the pro-
position. The nominative path addresses itself in turn to the vertical 
word to thing correspondence of propositional content. It expresses and 
formalizes itself in the theories of the noun, conjunction and preposition. 
However the general axioms of egological philosophy of mind assert 
themselves again at this juncture to ensure that nomination does not entail 
a surrender to the variety and particularity of the world and the multi-
plicity of the proper noun,but remains faithful to the principles of analysis 
and order. Thus within the theory of the noun we find a recursive application 
of the combinative/nominative choice. The former path leads to what we would 
now call a structural semantics but which for the classical period involved 
an ordering and classification of concepts in an intensional mathesis. The 
latter path which leads to the isolation of substantives - those naming 
signs which designate substances experienced in the real world. 
The substantive in turn becomes the lynchpin of the classical system 
of representation and the focus between the opposing tendencies of the 
classical theory - the construction of a calculus of semantic combinations 
and the search for the origins of language and the primi ti ve designations 
of the linguistic system. The substantive with one face directed towards 
the internal structure of ideas and the other directed towards the real 
world of substance and particulars/becomes the focal point where classical 
thought attempts to reconcile its differences and address itself to the 
emerging problems of the relationship of knowledge and being. Two paths 
open out from the substantive. These reflect these tensions within the 
classical theory. The combinative direction links the substantive firmly 
to the plotting of an intensional mathesis. The substantive becomes merely 
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a mode in this structure of ideas, reducible to simpler terms but in its 
form designating a particular and useful classification of things. The 
nominative direction, on the other hand, in its pursuit of an initial 
designative link between the noun and the things it names, commits classical 
thought to the search for origins. 
The search for origins for its part may attempt to drive classical 
theory further in a nominative and genetic direction towards a theory of 
primal derivation which descends below the level of individual words and 
indeed syllables in the pursuit of a rudimentary form of nomination 
conditioned by man's original contact with nature and his fellow man. This 
direction inevitably carries itself beyond the limit of egological discourse 
into a consideration of etymological questions which drag the pristine 
thought of the classical period into the mire of historical accident and 
cultural specificity. These conditions of discourse cannot be thought 
within egologicism. However the major direction which the search for origins 
in fact takes, is not a step towards embodying history and culture in 
language but rather towards throwing light on the conditions necessary for the 
contemporary manufacture of an ideal philosophical language. 
Similarly the other developments within the structure of classical 
theory are motiveted by, and in turn lead to, the search for an ideal 
language. The theory of the proposition and judgement is developed in 
the direction of a logic. Yet increasingly throughout the eighteenth 
century grammar is afforded an autonomy and specificity vis-a-vis logic. 
The grammatical theory of articulation (or general grammar) in turn becomes 
a major contributing influence on universal language schemes. 
Likewise true philosophy's search for an ordered classification of 
ideas, in an intensional mathesis which can be clearly represented by a 
combinatorial characteristic becomes another of the foundations of the 
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Ideal Language Project. The various directions of classical theory of 
language, general grammar, ars combinatoria and the search for origins, 
converge then in the project of an ideal philosophical language of pure 
representation. The egological philosophy of mind and its correlate the 
Ideal Language Project become the two poles of a discursive field within 
which the possibilities and developments of the classical theory of 
language occur. 
Egologicism is then the epistemic condition for the possibility of 
the classical 'theory of representation. This theory with its binary 
specification of the Sign, translational view of the relationship of 
language and mind and motivating ideal of a perfected character transparent 
to the cogitation of a universal cognitive subject, draws its constitutive 
elements from egological discourse and traces its possibilities within 
the parameters of this system of thought. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE STRUCTURE OF KANT'S 
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE 
lI'!'he Cogi to is not an innocent statement. II 
AdoPno: Negative DiaZectics 
122. 
(i) Kant and the two epistemological traditions 
The elevation of the cognizing subject to the absolute status of a 
solitary epistemological self, a monad from which the world can be unfolded 
has its origins in Descartes egologicism. For Descartes the certainty of 
, 
the self expressed in the cogito becomes the astiomatic foundation of all 
knowledge of the world given a little help from God as guarantor, of the 
veracity of ego's ideas. Moreover the empirical tradition is not fundament-
ally different in its egological approach to epistemology. In the latter, 
the epistemological direction is reversed and sense receiving subject rather 
than an idea generating subject is the basis of the epistemological enquiry. 
The metaphors and psychologies change; Descartes geometry with his innate 
genius is replaced by Locke's tabula rasa. The conception that knowledge and 
truth, possessing an objective and an absol,ute status respectively, can be 
approached and grasped by a cognizing ego through the correspondence of its 
ideas with a real worldJremains however common to both. 
In the egoism which is the fundamental dynamic in Hobbes and Locke's 
social philosophies we catch a glimpse of the ideological underpinnings of 
egological thought. We witness early bourgeois life in earnest self 
reflection. 
Kant emerges as the inheritor of the two philosophic traditions and as 
their synthesizer. Moreover it is in his critical philosophy that we find 
the most rigorous explication of the principle of epistemic egoisim, its 
transcendental grounding, and its location as foundation of the coherence of 
our world of sensory experience and ultimately of scientific objectivity and 
truth. 
In Kant's transcendental idealism the empiricist and rationalist traditions 
come together, not in a mist of qftcticism but in a genuine attempt at coherent 
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synthesis. Paradoxically Kant achieves this synthesis and systematically 
interrelates the two sources of knowledge, sensation and thought which are 
the respective objects of empiricist and rationalist epistemologies, by 
showing the radical diver~ity of sense and thought. For Kant unlike 
Descartes and Locke there are two distinct sources of human knowledge -
sensibility and understanding. Earlier epistemology had tended to confuse 
and conflate these, motivated by either empiricist or rationalist reduction-
ist aims. In both Descartes and Locke the notion of 'idea' conflates sensory 
experience and intellectual process, assimilating one to another: the 
directional pull depending on the rationalist or empiricist point of depart-
ure. However from the outset Kant clearly distinguishes between the two 
sources of knowledge. Through sense, objects are given to us, but through 
understanding they are thought. Sensibility is the source of our taw data 
about the objective external world. Sensibility is the point of contact with 
the brute facticity of the real world. It is Kant believes caused by the 
external substance, the "thing in i tself'~ which is the ground of its sensory 
appearances. However this raw data given in sensory experience is processed 
and operated on by understanding - a cognitive faculty not given in 
experience. 
"Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields us 
intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the under-
j. 
standing arise concepts". 
The two aspects of cognition are then radically diverse and distinct, 
yet they are interrelated. Objective knowledge is rendered possible precisely 
in this interrelation and inter-dependence. 
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"To neither of these powers maya preference be given over the other. 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no 
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
2: 
without concepts are blind". 
To utilise the computer analogy again, raw data must be processed and 
organized, but the procesS.ual algorithms must have data to process and 
operate upon. The correct functioning of the computer as on artificial 
intelligence requires that data input and algorithm operation operate in 
conjunction. 
For Kant it is only in the union of sensibility and understanding that 
objective knowledge is possible: 
"Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only 
when they are employed in conjunction. When we separate them, we have 
intuitions without concepts or concepts without intuitions - in both cases, 
representatives which we are not in a position to apply to any determinate 
:3 
object". 
To employ the concepts of understanding without reference to sensory 
data i.e. non-empirically or transcendentally, in a searching for a non-
experienta1 content is invalid. Such attempts generate the antinomies and 
whir 10gogs of metaphysics. On the other hand raw sensory experience alone, 
can yield no knowledge. It alone, is a manifold of contingency and flux, 
without form, without even discrete objects and related events. 
"The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. 
Only through their union can knowledge arise. But that is no reason for 
confounding the contribution of either with that of the other; rather it is 
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a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the 
4: 
other". 
In Kant then, the fundamental diversity and opposition of subject and 
the world, characteristic of egologicism is replicated in the radical 
diversity of our sources of knowledge. The one is located in the conceptual 
cognition of a transcendental subjectivity. The other points via sensibility 
to the external world of substance. Yet in this diversity and opposition 
there is a fundamental interrelating within cognition itself. Within 
r 
subjectivity itself, is established the conditions of valid objecivity. 
Within man as an absolute cognitive agent is inbuilt a fundamental orientation 
to the world. It is however an orientation uninformed by the fundamentality 
6. 
of man's orientation to his fellow man, society and history. 
For Kant then, there are two elements in knowledge, sensory experience 
and thought. Both elements are modes of consciousness of cognizing selves. 
However these modes of consciQusness and the selves around which they gain 
their identity must be clearly distinguished. In sensation we are passive 
receivers of sensory experience which is given to us from an external source. 
However in thought we actively operate on the content of our seJory 
1\ 
experience to give it form, discrete identity, and eventually in scientific 
explanation - a causal explanation. 
Thus for Kant even our naive experience of the world given in sensation, 
is structured by cognitive elements not given in the manifold of sense, only 
through which the world impinges upon us. Every object we perceive is in 
space and time, but these structu~es are not contingently given in 
experience. Rather they are the prior condition for perceiving any object 
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what-so-ever. They are the universal and prior forms of external sensib-
ility. The status of these universal and necessary forms of sensation Kant 
thinks can be best clarified by examining clearly judgements embodying one 
of them, space, in a specific area of knowledge which 
spatial figures as it object: geometry 0 7. Kant attempts 
takes space and 
to show that all 
geometrical knowledge consists of universal and necessary judgements about 
space. The propositions of geometry he argues are clearly formal ones which 
can be arrived at without the sensory reference to particular triangles, 
circles,parallel lines in the real world. On the other hand however, they 
are not merely analytical propositions whose truth is given internal to 
them in the meaning of their own terms. No amount of analysis of the idea of 
a straight line will yield the knowledge that two straight lines cannot 
enclose a space. The meaning of the term straight line will not yield the 
conclusion of the proposition as it would in an analytic proposition. The 
proposition holds by virtue of its reference to states of affairs in real or 
imaginary space and not merely by the meaning of its own terms. 
But if these universal and necessary propositions flow neither from 
our sensory experience of the spatial world nor from the meaning of the 
terms in them, then what is their basis? How are they possible? How are 
9. 
synthetic a priori prepositions possible? 
This question is not for Kant of a form which demands an exhaustive 
enquiry into the conditions of possibility and of existence of that body of 
concepts through which we synthesise experience but which are not given in 
individual experience. Such existential enquiries into the possibility of 
the categories of the intellect and forms of sensibility would not begin 
until the sociality of the self, co,nition and language had been grasped as 
a determinin, factor in man's representational activities. Kant's searching 
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question to which he and his time can only give a metaphysical reply coupled 
in terms of the cognitive activity of an absolute subjectivity, would not 
be readdressed until almost one hundred years later. It was so by Marx, 
Durkheim and Nietzsche, with varying degrees of explicitness but from the 
common perspective of the emerging sociologistic interpretation of language 
and cognition. 
For Kant however and the egological thought of his period, the question 
"How are synthetic a priori concepts possible?" i.e. how is it possible to 
have and use concepts which are above sensory experience, in the sense of not 
being derived from it, yet contain more than the empty tautology of analytic 
statements is a question solely about the origin and cognitive function of these 
for the subject of cognition. Egologicism can enquire no further. 
Kant's answer of course is that the mystery of the origin of these concepts 
is to be understood precisely in terms of the revealing of their function as 
q. 
synthesisers of the raw data of sensory experience. For this process of 
synthesis is the primary function of the understanding. Synthetic a priori 
concepts are the tools which enable this process of: 
"Putting different representations togother and of grasping what is 
manifold in them in one act of knowledge". For Kant concepts are essentially 
to be understood in terms of their function in cognition; they enable us to 
make judgements of sensory synthesis and intellectual understanding. As 
such Kant stresses not the propositional nature of concepts, i.e. that they 
in combination in propositions make assertions of a discursive nature, 
rather he stresses the activity aspect of concepts. Concepts have their being 
in the judgemental activity in which they are employed. His epistemology 
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explains what concepts are by explaining their operation and function in 
judgements. Judgements for Kant are not represented as statements in a 
discourse, as they were to be later interpreted by neo-positivism, rather 
~ 
theYAgrasped as the activity of a cognizing subject. They are invariably 
located at a transcendental subject pole. The notion of cognitivity activity 
as the fundamental reading of 'concept' is itself tainted with the perceptual 
metaphor of cognition characteristic of egologicism. Activity is read as a 
visual act engaged in by a gazing subject. It is in no way conceived of as 
an interplay of discursive practices. Representation has no independent 
discursive existence from the representing subject. 
Concepts then are to be understood in terms of their function in 
judgement. Judgements in turn have their origin in the transcendental 
subjectivity of the absolute cognitive ego. 
Take for example Kant's account of our concept of space already ~uded 
to above. For Kant space is the very condition of the appearance to us of 
external objects. It is impossible to conceive of an object existing except 
in space. Yet we can imagine space without there being an object in it or 
occupying it. Therefore argues Kant our cognition of space and its concept, 
is not given in the world of sensibility but is the prior condition of our 
cognition of objects. But as our cognition of external objects is perhaps 
the most fundamental form of experience, and certainly it is the objective 
experience on which natural science depends, then the cognition of space, and 
the concept by means of which this ju~ment is possible, is the condition of 
all external experience and prior (logically) to it. Space, then is not 
something external to us passively received through the senses. Rather, it 
~ 
is a synthesising form of our minds. Nor is space as a concept merely an 
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item in a discourse related semiotically to other concepts and deriving its 
meaning from this interplay of discursive relations. This understanding of 
the nature of concepts and representation is a modern one unknown in a 
period when language had no density and concepts no autonomy from the cognizing 
self. 
It is the human mind, its identity ensured by a transcendental ego, which 
spaces things. Things do not impose space upon our minds. Concepts and 
their discursive structure also cannot mediate between the mind and the world, 
for concepts are the cognizing self in operation. The concept of space and 
also that of time, which Kant shows is the other universal and necessary form 
of sensation, is grasped as essentially a judgemental activity. Hence it is 
11. 
to be traced to the cognitivity activity of a transcendental ego. 
The 'origin' then of the synthetic a priori forms of sensibility and also, 
as Kant proceeds to show of the categories of the intellect is the nature of 
the human mind itselfo The origin and 'possibility' of the categories is the 
minds own cognitive activity as a transcendental source and absolute subject-
ivity. 
In analytic philosophy's reading of Kant the philosopher in his rumin-
ation on the foundations of geometry is pictured as 'discovering' the existence 
of synthetic a priori concepts. It is as a result of this substantive 
discovery that the doctrines of the categories and forms of sensibility were 
developed as an explanatory framework for his 'discovery'. In this reading 
Kant is presented as what analytic philosophy would like to claim him as -
a good empiricist - and hence suitable Source of paternity. 
However clearly as we shall see the 'fact' of synthetic a priori judgements 
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and the explanatory framework of transcendental idealism are a response to 
the fundamental ontological problem in egologicism - the relationship of 
ego and the world~of isolated subjectivity and objective facticity. With 
Kant, egological philosophy takes an an~opomorphic turn. No longer will 
the Deity be called upon to bridge the ontological gap between cognising 
subject and world. For Kant man himself, as a cognitive agent, has a fund-
mental orientation to the objective world. It is because the minds we 
have actually are as they are, that we do in fact experience the world 
objectively as we do. 
Thus subjectivity and objectivity become logically related in the very 
structures of consciousness. Man himself is the condition of objectivity. 
But for Kant and the egological discourse which conditions his texts, it is 
not man as an embodied and socially and historically situated agent who is 
the condition of this objectivity. Rather its condition is the universal and 
necessary , cognitive judgemen~of an absolute subjectivity. This 
transcendental subjectivity becomes, as we shall see, the supreme agent of 
cognition and guaranter of objectivity. Since Kant's transcendental 
deduction the dichotomy of subject and object has been the abstract form of 
all our knowledge. Subject and object become polar opposites, structurally 
related only in so far as the form of thought of the cognizing subjectivity is 
the form of the object and the source of all scientific objectivity. 
Subsequently of course the naturalistic basis of Kant doctrine of the 
categories would be eroded. Post quantum physics dispensed with the concept 
of causality with little heart searching. Developments in the mathematical 
descriptions of space and time have displayed a theoretical pluralism which 
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undermined Kant's hypostatising of Euclidian geometry. The sciencJs own 
theoretical and methodological development have driven a cart and horse 
throught Kant's archaic table of categories. Scientific theory and meth-
odology has since Kant forged its own epistemological path. Kant remains 
the last philosophical figure with an intimate concern for the theory of 
scientific knowledge and method who attributes to philosophy a sovereign 
role in relation to science. As Habermas has shown: 
"The critique of knowledge was still conceived in reference to a system 
of cognitive faculties that included practical reason and reflective judge-
ment as naturally as critique itself, that is a theoretical reason that can 
dialectically ascertain not only its limits but also its own idea. The 
comprehensive rationality of reason that becomes transparent to itself has 
1'21. 
not yet shrunk to a set of methodological principles". 
After Kant the analysis of science as a form of knowledge is increasingly 
, 
replaced by philosophy of sciences restricted and prescriptive and under-
standing of scientific methodology. This restricts itself to the 'pseudo-
, :13. 
normative regulation of established research. 
Philosophy meanwhile having taken the transcendental turn and grasped 
the nettle of subjectivity retreats into the interiority of pure thought -
to reason estranged from the world. The epistemological project of early ego-
logicism is replaced with the phenomenological self reflection of mind. 
And yet even this divergence and the radical diversity of transcendental 
epistemology and positivist philosophy of scientific methodology is traced 
within a common epistemic domain.' The form of knowledge represented in each 
area remains structured around the submerged subject-object axis of egologicism. 
The metaphor of perception continues for both accounts to dominate the 
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representation of cognition. As such the knowledge process demands in its 
form an isolated subject as its agent and a verified world as its object. 
Positivism will overlay the perceptual metaphor with its emerging interest in 
instrumental controlo Phenomenology will impute to the perceiving subject a 
constituting intentionality. Both however explicate their theories of 
knowledge within the common parameters of egologicism. For both the object-
ivity of phenomena, whether naively given in the real world or the product of 
a transcendent~l subjectivity, will take epistemological precedence over the 
phenomenanof intersubjectivity. 
(ii) Kant and the Self 
The chief characteristic of Kant's thought in the transcendental 
deduction of the logical conditions, or forms of objective experience is the 
idea that we conceive of all our experience as unified, as connected as 
interrelated, in so far as we conceive of the whole realm of objective 
'scientific' knowledge as the experience of a transcendental self or ego whose 
forms of 'sensibility', time and space, and whose categories of the intellect 
act on that same ego's experience to form the sort of objective judgements we 
call scientific. The transcendental deduction reveals the knowable world, 
the world of empirical science, as the realm of the possible experience of 
this transcendental self which is the form of any possible objective experience. 
This sole absolute ego to which we refer any objective experience is not a 
substantive, a knowable metaphysical entity but merely a formal condition or 
presupposition of a critical epistemology. For Kant then there is an 
intimate connection between the isolation of a transcendnetal self in or 
behind experience and the possibility of objective knowledge. This pure ego 
is the ultimate grounds of possibility of scientific objectivity. 
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Let us outline in further detail the centrality of the pure epistemol-
ogical self in Kant's cn tical philosophy. One of the cornerstones of 
Kant's critical philosophy is his sharp distinction between the sensory and 
intellectual aspects of cognition. The senses passively receive a manifold 
of representations which are unconnected (hence Hume's diatribe in causality). 
Since intuition is merely the passive reception of sense-data, the combina-
tion of a manifold to produce a knowledge of objects cannot be given with 
the manifold. Thus for Kant the unification of sense-impressions is an act 
of the understanding, furthermore, without this synthetic unification of a 
manifold it is impossible to know objects qua objects, as discrete particulars 
we can form objective judgements about. 
If a manifold of sense-data is combined into an object by the synthesizing 
activity of an understanding then it must be an object thought by the same 
consciousness as that consciousness to which the sense-data is given. Thus 
the possibility of knowing objects qua objects rests on the possibility of 
the faculties of sensibility and understanding being united in a single con-
sciousness. It presupposes a unity of thought and perception in a single 
self-conscious subject. 14 This relation between the manifold of sense-data 
and the subject Kant refers to as 'Synthetical Unity of Pure Apperception' 15 
and expresses the basic idea that any thought or sense content must belong to 
a common pure subject, that their interaction in forming objective knowledge 
must be in a single consciousness. 16 This transcendental ego is a formal 
condition for objective experience. The 'I think' must be capable, Kant 
says of accompanying ill our representations, there can be no i t without an 
I, no object with a (pure) subject: 
"The 'I think' must accompany all JIGT representations, for otherwise 
something would be represented in me which could not be thought, in other 
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words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in 
j~ 
relation to me, nothing". This epistemological ego does not exist sensibly 
for consciousness but rather is the condition for the unity of consciousness, 
the unity of sensibility and understanding: 
"But this representation, I think, is an act of spontaneity; that is to 
say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call pure 
apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; a primitive apperception, 
because it is a self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the 
representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and 
unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me". 1& 
It is important to note that Kant distinguishes the ego of pure appercep-
tion from the empirical ego which is an object of thought, the former is not 
given in experience but is the very condition of objective experience, it is 
a transcendental ego. The empirical ego is a phenomena, the object of study 
of psychology, the pure ego is no phenomenon it is the absolute knower. 
"I do not know myself through being conscious of myself as thinking, but 
only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as being in various 
particular states. The object is not the consciousness of the determining 
self, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my inner intuition". 
The determining self who is the agent of all our judgements is not then 
in our experience but the transcendental condition of that experience, the 
limit of my world. The determining self is the boundary condition of the 
world. It is only the determinable self or empirical ego which is the object 
or topic of our Judgements. 
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It follows then that we can have no knowledge of this transcendental 
or determining self. For it is a non-substantive formal condition of all 
cognition and not an object of knowledge. It is 'merely' a transcendental 
condition of objective experience. 
"Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations 
to be thoughts, and in it therefore all our perceptions must be found; but 
beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject 
l~ 
in itself". From this Kant argues the 'I think' with its transcendental form 
can never be the object of knowledge of rational psychology. Descartes 
'cogito', the self and its states which remain with certitude when our belief 
in the world is subjected to methodical doubt, and which rational psychology 
claims as its privileged object of knowledge, is never the virtual subject of 
cognition, merely that's subject's object. The Cartesian cogito is an 
empirical ego, a known identity of mental states, which presupposes a pure 
subject of knowledge as the formal condition of its appearance. Kant argues 
that rational psychology confuses and conflates these distinct selves. 
"The unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories is here 
mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of 
substance is then applied to it. But this unity is only unity in thought, 
by which alone no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of 
substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied. 
~. 
Consequently, this subject cannot be known". 
Kant then rigidly distinguishes the Cartesian cogito from his own 
concept of the 'I think' which accompanies all representation. The former 
Kant argues is an empirical ego, a set of mental states and object in and for 
consciousness possessing,as in Descartes' idea of the self, a specific 
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substance. The latter however is the hidden subject which is presupposed 
in the Cartesian experiental ego so that in fact it might become an object 
of knowledge. Kant probes here the fundamental flaw of Cartesian egology. 
Descartes indubitable self-hood which is to be the axiomatic foundation of 
all certain knowledge, itself presupposes a reflective act as the condition 
for the appearance of the cogi to. And as such it in fact presupposes a 
reflecting agent to whom the cogito appears in reflection. This reflecting 
agent for Kant is represented as the 'I think', a transcendental subjectivity.22 
Wi thin the philosophical grammar of egologicism, the absolutising of 
the cognitive ego and its transcendental turn is the only conceptual means 
available for addressing the fundamental ontological problem of reflection. 
The self appears as an object in consciousness but presupposes a subject of 
consciousness. This subject is not however given in consciousness, it is 
its condition for objective cognition. What then is the origin of this 
transcendental reflection? Kant can only address the problem from the 
standpoint of the isolated but absolute self-consciousness of pure ~perception 
and not from the situatedness of the ego in a transcendent social and histor-
ical world of concrete others. As such Kant drives critical epistemology in 
its search for apodictic uni versali ty into the recesses of egology, into 
the corner pockets of transcendental subjectivity.23 
It will require a radically different philosophical optic, provided by 
a sociologistically informed epistemology, to restore the self to the real 
material world. Only with the advent of the sociological realism implicit 
in a materialist epistemology did it become possible to grasp that the 
consti tuti va medium of the empirical self is that real world, its social 
relations and human social interactions. The Kantian transcendental condition 
tor the appearance of the self-as-known will be replaced, as we shall see, by 
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the concrete analysis of the role of the other, social interaction, and 
social relations in the emergence of self-identity. 
Kant however trapped in the discourse of his time cannot think this 
'conversational' solution to the ontological problem of reflection. He can 
only drive the isolated self back on itself in a strategic withdrawal to the 
surer defences of an absolute cognizing subjectivity. From this strengthened 
egological rampart the material world can again be surveyed, confronted and 
thought. 
The transcendental turn of critical epistemology is of course Q symptom 
t 
of egologys unthinking of the social materiality of intersubjectivity. This 
unthinking will lead philosophy in the nineteenth century into a rambling maze 
with no exit to the real world. 
However in this sealed discourse, which struggles with itself, within its 
own limits, 'intersubjectivity' will in fact be present. But only in its 
haunting absence. This present absence will condition the form of egologicism 
as it struggles to appro~ate the material world. 
(iii') Objecti vi ty, the transcendental ego, and inter-subjecti vi ty 
In Kant the intimate connection between the theoretical device of a 
transcendental ego and the promise of objectivity is plotted through the 
exploitation of a recurrent series of distinctions - pure and empirical 
apperception, judgements of experience and judgements of perception, empirical 
consciousness of intuition and consciousness in general. The possibility of 
a"pure science of Nature" the chief characteristc of which is the universality 
and necessity of its laws i.e. they are judgements which hold good not only 
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for us-but- for everybody, requires as its epistemological foundation a more 
powerful subject than that of the sense receiving empirical ego of the 
empiricists. What is required is a transcendental subject of absolute status 
possessing, not merely empirical consciousness whose 'reality' is psycholog-
istic and hence subjective but 'consciousness in general' whose 'reality' 
is transcendental and objective. 
"The condition of universal validity (and hence objective validity as 
Kant accepts these as equivalent terms) of empirical judgements never rests 
upon empirical, or in short, sensuous conditions, but upon a pure concept of 
the under standing. ,,24 
and again: 
"Quite another judgement is required before perception can become 
(objective) experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept 
which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, 
connects empirical consciousness of intuition in consciousness in general 
and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgements." 25 
The objectivity of judgements then depends on representations being 
referred to and united in 'consciousness in general'. Though Kant is anxious 
not to reity the notion of 'consciousness in general' into group mind or an 
absolute or divine mind, explicating the idea of a transcendental consciousness 
in terms of the rules of synthesis for any consciousness whatever, it is 
clear that in Kants system the intersubj ecti vi ty of scientific judgements 
rests not on an investigation of man's sociality nor the relationship of 
man's SOCiality to epistemological practice, but rather on a recourse to 
the notion of an absolute tegnizing self. Judgements are intersubjective 
because they are objective (the latter being a more powerfUl 
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concept for Kant) and objective in so far as they are referred to an absolute 
transcendental consciousness. 
However it is clear that Kant's transcendental analytic is the major 
epistemic source of the idea of an absolute epistemological self central to 
nineteenth century German Idealism. This is so precisely because the 
absolutizing of the transcendental ego is the only conceptual means of dealing 
with the phenomena of intersubjectivity and of constituting the objectivity 
of phenomena. Intersubjectivity can only be explicated in terms of that 
universal objectivity which has its condition and origin in the cognitive 
activity of an absolute consciousness. 
The objectivity of phenomena takes epistemological precedence over the 
phenomena of intersubjectivity. 
Kanfs 'Critique of Pure Reason' banishes the 'determining' self from 
the concrete experiental world. For the first time in egological philosophy 
there appears a clear demarcation between psychology, whether rational or 
empiricist, and critical epistemology. Kant consciously demarcates their 
discrete objects and distinguishes their appropiate methodologies. This 
parsinomy is conditioned by its effectivity. 
Kant stands deliberately against the dominant historical tradition in 
egological thought in which the sciences of philosophy and psychology, if 
they are demarcated at all are still seen as addressing themselves to the 
same object domain - consciousness. Within this epistemological tradition 
the two epistemic areas have been confused and conflated. Kant had become 
aware that the conflation and the psychological reductionism prevalent 
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particularly in the empiricist tradition, had led to a sensualism. In Hume's 
hands this clearly, in turn, gave rise to scepticism. For, if all cognition 
both personal and scientific is limited to the sensory experience and reflection 
of an empirical ego, then the structured and objective cognition of Newtonian 
science centered on spatial, temporal and causal interpretation of empirical 
contingency becomes impossible. 
The concept of causality becomes the theoretical site for the manifestation 
of the underlying and recurrent structural crisis of egologicism. The crisis 
itself runs much deeper. There is an essential ontological problem of the 
gap between the subject and object poles of egologicism; between the concepts 
of self and the world. Neither rationalism nor empiricism can relate 
individual consciousness to the physical world in such a way that it can give 
a secure epistemological foundation for scientific practice. 
Scientific practice as conceived in philosophical reflection in this age 
of mechanistic explanation requires judgement of causal necessity and of 
universal validity. These can not be found in the sensory experience of an 
empirical ego. 
As we have seen Kant~ 'solution' to this crisis in egological thought was 
to focus on the trans-empirical element in all knowledge. Through his transc-
endental deduction he traces the source of our structured and objective 
cognition of the world to the very structure of our minds. The world given 
in sensibility appears as a flux of contingency, its objectivity is rather 
given in the judgements which cognition formally organized in transcendental 
self-hood makes prior to sensory experience. These synthetic a priori 
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judgements, the primary and pre-experiental organizational framework of 
cognition, in turn structures both our perceptual experience and its inter-
pretation and explanation in scientific discourse. Kant's '~opernican 
Revolution" in philosophy, relocates the source of scientific objectivity 
in the subjects cognitive activity and in the validity of this. No longer 
was objective judgement and scientific truth that which is translucent in 
its correspondence to an external objective reality. Rather, that which 
is objectively real owes that objectivity to the valid cognitive judgement 
which conditioned it. Within this radically new theory of representation 
our ideas are not the dull copies of objects and states in the real world, 
but rather in essence the activity and tools of cognitive functioning of an 
absolute subjectivity. The world has been anchored to the subject. 
The result of KanIs 'revolution' is to tilt the egological see-saw 
dangerously towards the subject pole. It is because of this imbalance in 
the axis of egological epistemology that he is forced to distinguish so 
rigidly between the transcendental ego with its sure consciousness and 
the empirical ego with its sensible experience. For empiricists like Berkeley, 
it was not necessary to invoke the notion of a transcendental subjectivity. 
The immanence and contingency of the empirical ego's experience could be 
compensated for by the omnipotent cognition of God. Again as we have seen for 
Descartes, God is a transcendent epistemological presence both source and 
guarantee of the clarity and distinctness of our ideas. God underwrites res 
cogitans. For Leibnitz he ensures the intersubjectivity of isolated 
monads. Here there is no necessity for a transcendental ego to guarantee 
the validity of the empirical sells cOJnition. God suffices. 
With Locke's sensationalism and Hume's subsequent development of this 
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to its sceptical conclusions, egological philosophy was becoming increasingly 
secularized and anthropomorphized. This tendency had of course always been 
present in egologicism since Descartes had centered his epistemological 
universe on the cogito and ruptured the plenum of being of earth, water, 
fire and air, spirits, creatures and Deity, characteristic of medieval 
thought. In the works of Descartes, Berkeley and Leibnitz we witness the 
residue of that scholastic tradition. But now for them God is invoked to 
restore the vent in the plenum of being caused by the appearance of the 
sensate and reflective self; a self which shatters the unity of being, but 
which remains trapped in its own immanence. 
With Kant this Qnthropomorpic tendency increases. God is no longer 
called upon to lend his weight to supporting the egological epistemic edifice. 
Finalism and teleology have been banished from natural philosophy's explanatory 
schema in favour of mechanistic explanation. The philosophic task Kant sees 
as validating the interpretative and explanatory basis of scientific cognition 
by reference not to the attributes of the deity but rather to the properties 
of the human mind. However as we have said, if the mind is to do the 
epistemological work required of it by Kant, namely to function as the source 
of the universal and objective judgements characteristic of natural science, 
then it requires a principle of unity and a foundation more powerful than the 
sense receiving empirical ego of the empiricists. What is required is a litt~ 
of the epistemological omnipotence formerly credited to the Deity. What is 
required is a transcendental subject of absolute status; the divinely 
omnipotent in man - a transcendental ego. For Kant the" ontological gap 
between subject and the world is to be bridged by building into man as a 
cognizer a pure consciousness, whose identity is traced to a transcendental 
ego and which is revalatory of being. Man in so far as he partakes in 
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transcendental self-hood has a positive orientation and objectively valid 
cognition of the world. For Kant this pure consciousness was the source 
of the form of universal and valid cognition. Its synthetic transcendental 
categories of the intellect and forms of sensibility however act on the 
matter of sensibility, the so-called manifold of sense. Kant like Aristotle 
from whom he largely derives his list of transcendental categories, clearly 
distinguishes between the form and content of experience. The forms of 
knowledge, which alone can guarantee objectively valid and universal judge-
ment, are the products of our minds and derive from nothing external. 
However the given factor or matter of knowledge, sensation, which is shaped 
by the forms of sensibility and categories of the intellect, does have an 
external source. Kant believed there must be an external cause of our 
sensation. A thing in itself, the ground or cause of appearances, is thus 
postulated. There must be, he argues, a transcendental object which underlies 
appearances. Kant's mechanism seems to drive him into the position of search-
ing for an external cause for our sensation. Every event must have a cause 
so he must postulate the existence of an existent which is the origin of 
sensory qualities. Just as this epistemology drives his critique towards 
an absolutized subject pole, so his crude o~tology in its craving to be 
anchored in the crude facticity of the world pulls egology towards a reified 
object pole. 
Kant struggles to avoid the tension which the introduction of the thing-
in-itself has wrought in his critique. But in this concept he has postulated 
the existence of things which are 'real in themselves'. That is, their 
reality in no depends on our structured knowledge of them. Despite the fact 
that they are more than mere representations, they cannot however be known. 
The limits which Kant sets for valid knowledge render his own notion of things 
with reality in themselves as a senseless notion. 
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Kant is aware of the contradiction. He is anxious not to substantivize 
this 'thing in itself', explicating the notion not in terms of an essence 
within an object's appearances but rather as a formal ground or condition 
underlying appearances. 
"The transcendental object which underlies appearance is not matter but 
an unknown ground of the appearances which supply to us the empir.ical concept 
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of matter". The emphasis is on the causal role of the thing in itself, rather 
than on its nature as an existent. That nature of course is unknowable any-
way. But even this causal attribution is nonsense. The thing in itself cannot 
be the cause of appearances because 'cause' is a category of our m1nds, and 
categories do not apply to the thing in itself. This is outside experience 
which the limit of applicability of our categories. Moreover to say that 
the 'thing in itself' is 'real in itself' is to apply the category of 
existence to it. This again in Kant's criti~al epistemology is quite inadmis-
sible. The whole notion of an unknowable existent is completely self-
contradictory within Kant's 'system'. 
And yet this self-contradiction tokens an even more fundamental tension 
within the epistemic structure of egologicism. Since Descartes, philosophy 
in its search for the apodictic had become primarily an epistemological 
project. This project had sought its certitude in the examination of indiv-
idual cognition and self-consciousness. Visual perception provided the 
dominant metaphor for modelling t~e process of cognition. Perception is seen 
as a faculty located in an individual subject of cognition directed in an 
immediated focus on a world of objects. As such, it serves as an image for 
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a theory of cognition which represents knowledge as the experience, empirical 
or rational, of a self of an external given world. Knowledge is the privil-
eged perception of a subject who 'sees' the essential attributes of the real 
world. 
However in this epistemological orientation, knowledge appropriates the 
world only through the cognition of the individual self. Scepticism, the 
negative image of the egological search for certainity, always threatens. 
The brute facticity of the world threatens to elude the limited immanent 
consciousness of the cognizing self. The very identity of this self is 
threatened in the immanence and contingency of consciousness. Even within 
the definitive epistemological direction taken by egological philosophy, there 
remains the silent longing for the unity of schofastic ontology, for the 
plenum of being. 
In Kant's transcendental idealism the contradictions, come to a head. 
His critique addresses itself to the fundamental ontological gap within 
egologicism between the subject and the world. This gap is the effect of 
the appearance in the plenum of being of a solitary cognizing self which in 
its analysis draws the world around it and organizes it in its consciousness, 
get captures only aspects, instances, of that chain of being. The critique 
promises a solution in locating in the mind itself, organized transcendental 
self-hood, the objective orientation to the world. Within the nature of 
cognition itself, is sought the basis of mons appropiation of the external 
world. 
And yet pradoxically the very conditions of this crucial mediation of 
self and world within consciousness lie outside of consciousness, beyond 
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knowledge. They are, the formal conditions of transcendental subjectivity, 
the 'I think', and transcendental objectivity, the 'thing in itself'. Both 
for Kant are necessary conditions for knowledge, but themselves unknowable. 
Both are beyond the limits of the egological world, yet determine it in 
its very possibility. 
The 'I think', is the grounds of transcendental cognition while the 
'thing in itself' that of appearances. Each however is now beyond the limits 
of what can be known and sensibly talked about within egological thought. 
Determining subject and real object are forced to the outer edges of 
philosophical knowledge; at once absent in the critical sense of that 
discourse, yet present as its very condition. Forced off the stage they 
silently wait in the wings. The plot and its remaining characters however, 
still remain orchestrated around them and their forced absence. 
Kant's transcendental deduction leads then to an even more extreme form 
of dualism then the Cartesian ortology. Mind and the world are conjoined 
within consciousness but only to be segregated finally and totally in so far 
as their determining poles are pushed beyond possible knowledge and excluded 
totally from the world. Kant bequeathes philosophy a discourse in which 
transcendental subjectivity and transcendental objectivity confront each 
other in a totalising stance. Each strives to annex the world of conscious 
experience and destroy the other as a transcendent pole of determination of 
the world. Egological thought is unable since Kant to relate self and 
objectivity materially within the world. Each pole seeks a transcendental 
grounding in absolute subjectivity or brute facticity outside of material 
experience. In fact it is forced to do so in so far as experience is 
centered on and limited to the consciousness of an individual self. In 
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this rarified non-social grasping of self, cognition, and reality, the 
world must be unpacked from the individuated monad, whether spiritual or 
substantial. The sources of the unity of conscious experience and self-
hood, of the universality of scientific cognition and inter-subjectivity 
of truth and of the objectivity of phenomena must be located in the essence 
of these mon~qs. The phenomenon of inter-subjectivity remains a derived 
and not a constituting aspect of reality. 
Thus unwittingly Kant re-opens the door to dualism. But now it is 
to a dualism of absolute polar opposites unmediated by knowledge. The 
mediation of self and world, subject and object is no longer possible 
within the concrete world. Instead the self organized in an absolute 
transcendental subjectivity must annex the world, incorporate it within 
its privileged consciousness, and destroy its transcendence. Or the ~orld} 
an estranged and inert set of objects and states,must engulf the conscious 
self, annihilating it in its brute facticity. The former option is 
developed in a phenomenology of mind, the latter in a positivist theory 
of scientific method embracing a phenomenalist epistemology. 
Objective idealism inherits Kant's transcendental dualism. The object-
ive remove of the world and its brute facticity which had almost been 
subdued by reason, escapes in Kant's doctrine of the 'thing in itself' to 
confront the subject yet again. Yet now the escape is total. The thing 
in itself, that which is the cause of sensation but which is not given in 
it, is an unknowable substance. It is not in space and time, it in itself 
cannot be sensed, the categories cannot be applied to it. It is completely 
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unknowable for it is entirely inconceivable. Kant bequeathed to his 
philosophic successors this dualistic conundrum; a conceptual fabric 
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woven despite all the genius of its craftsman from the warp and weft of 
egologicism and constrained within its antinomies. In hindsight we smile 
at Kant's confidence that his critique represents a solution to the 
epistemological problems of egologicismo 
"I have found a way of guarding against all those errors which 
have hitherto set reason, in its empirical employment, at variance 
with itself. I have not evaded its questions by pleading the 
insufficiency of human reason. On the contrary, I have specified 
these questions exhaustively, according to principles; and after 
locating the point at which, through misunderstanding, reason 
comes into conflict with itself, I have ·solved them to its 
complete satisfaction". 21Q. 
Paradoxically Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' which was to serve as 
a prologemena to any future metaphysic and to act as a purgative to 
casuistry and speculation, was itself to give rise to a renewed upsurge of 
metaphysical speculation. For the German idealism which succeeded Kant 
was to conceive of its task as tackling the legacy of egological problems 
Kant had left behind him. This task, as we shall see is precisely the 
one Husserl sees himself addressing. 
Moreover German idealism's assault 0& the absolute, its search for 
the identity of reason and experience and unity of subject and object was 
to be tackled with the very implements of ascent manufactured by Kant 
himself. The objective idealism of Hegel, Fichte and Schelling seized on 
the ideas of universality and necessity as properties of the a priori 
cognition of a transcendental ego. The conception of a 'thing in itself' 
on the other hand was seen as being self-contradictory and quite gratuitous. 
Accordingly it is quickly dismissed. However the removal of this object 
polarity, whi~h cannot exist validly within Kant epistemology but which 
is credited with a determining function, produces specific effects on the 
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structure of critical idealism. 
For Kant the forms of objective knowledge, space, time and the 
categories of the intellect are the product of our minds and not derived 
from the external world. However this idealism is tempered by Kant's 
argument that these forms can only validly operate on sensibiliQ. The 
given factor of knowledge, its matter which is formed by the empty 
categories is sensation. This has however an external source. However, 
as we have seen, the postulation of an external source of sensation, a 
thing in itself is self-contradictory and untenable within Kant's 
epistemology. German idealism was 'forced' to the conclusion that the 
given matter of knowledge does not come from any external source. It is 
argued that this matter like its form is also the product of mind. Thus 
the whole object of knowledge and correspondingly the whole universe itself 
is a product of mind, albeit an absolute spirit. 
The subject is freed to rampage within the parameters of egological 
discourse and runs amok. Experience is no longer grounded in an external 
world. Instead just like the forms, experience itself is seen to be a 
product of the mind. Reality itself, in toto, is a mere correlate of an 
absolute mind. The subject cut adrift from its fragile egological 
grounding in the refractory objectivity of the natural world, devours the 
world in an orgy of absolute idealism. The scenario for this drama has 
followed a pre-given script. It characters and plot, and its text, are 
formed from the determining elements of an egological discourse. 
It is only in hindsight from another standpoint, within another 
discourse and way of representing the world, that we can appreciate the 
intrigues, machinations and permeations of possible plot at play in this 
drama. It is only from a conversational perspective conditioned by a social 
theory of cognition and being, that we can now trace the shifting balance 
of the egological axis as its fulcrum moves one way or another, towards 
object or subject pole. 
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(iv) CO;·;CLUS IONS 
In post Kantian German idealism we witness the elevation of the 
cognizing subject to the absolute status of a solitary but universal a-social 
epistemological self. This absolute agent transcends both the phenomenal 
and social worlds. 
This conception of a pure ego or self, with an absolute status in 
turn has a number of important implications for the structure of egolog-
icism. 
(a) It leads to objectivist-realist notions of knowledge and 
truth which reify both. For what is known a priori by the 
pure ego is true for all, for its experience is absolute. 
The coherence of our experience is as it is by virtue of 
the fact that it is to be defined as the experience of one 
transcendental ego. This ego is not merely the intellectual 
observer of the moment but the egological pole of all 
objective experience. In so far as we as individuals are 
conscious, possess objective knowledge and seek truth, we do 
so in virtQe of the fact that this single unity is the same 
for all men. The principle of the transcendental ego 
provides the basis of the rationale of objectivity in 
phenomena, and of a truth transcendent of human inter-subj-
ectivity and interest. 
(b) It leads to an absolutism which neglects the social found-
ations of the self, 'knowledge' and 'truth'. In a transc-
enlental egology, the notion of the absoluteness of the 
ego, is the only conceptual means of bridging the gap bet-
ween ego s and of dealing with the phenomena of intersubj-
ectivity. Such an absolutism leads to an idealism like 
Hegel's, where the epistemological self takes the form of 
the world spirit in an effort to deal with the sociality 
of consciousness. In the idealisms of Fichte, Schelling 
and Hegel the concept of the transcendental self becomes that 
of the absolute. The impoverished transcendental ego must be 
so enriched so as to become not merely individual but social. 
Given the primary of the concept of a pure ego in critical 
philosophy; post Kantian idealism must engage in somersaults 
not to mention dialectical processes to come to terms with 
sociality. It does eventually in Hegel's weighty system, 
but as an idealism still centered on an absolute self, albeit 
reliant on others for its self-consciousness. In this 
system truth as the end of, and knowledge as the means of, 
the dialectical process of self-realizations of spirit, remain 
absolute. 
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(c) It leads to the emergence of the problem of how we can have 
Imowledge of others. We shall see how Husserl's adoption of 
the transcendental/empirical ego distinction leads to the 
problem of solipsism. Suffice it to say here that for 
those who deny the possibility of a pure ego and assert the 
sociality of the self, solipsism does not present itself as 
a problem. 
Kantian critical philosophy, and as we shall see Husserl's transcend-
ental phenomenology, seek to approach our knowledge of reality from the 
perspective of a solitary if absolute cognizing subject. As such, they 
ignore the status of the mind as a social consciousness situated in the 
materiality of history. 
The major aim of this study is to document how subsequent philosophic 
movements which emerged from the ruins of egological philosophy, whether 
in its phenomenological or positivist-phenomenalist form, converge on a 
common point. They converge on a common acceptance on the essentially 
social nature of self, cognition and language and pursue their disparities 
from a standpoint which denies the primacy of epistemic egoism and asserts 
instead the primacy of an inter-subjective approach to reality and knowledge. 
The subsequent philosophic movements of existential phenomenology, marxism, 
pragnatism and ordinary language philosophy, all abandon the egological 
pursuit of the radical and apodictic for the concrete and social. They 
converge on what I have called a conversational paradigm for the analysis 
of self, language and cognition. A new discourse appears wi thin which the 
topics of self, cognition and language are addressed. The unifying 
principle of this philosophic discourse is a sociological realism. 
The concept of self is one of those key notions in the history of 
philosophy whose 'progress' if studied closely reveals the deep structural 
shifts and ruptures in philosophic discourse. Its changes of meaning token 
fundamental breaks in the continui ty of philosophic discourse. Though 
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philosophy represents itself as a process of continual accumulation and 
refinement of conceptual apparatus, willing only to accept its own 
self-conscious demarcations into schools and traditions, in the changing 
meaning of its concepts we clearly ~ witness a series of discursive 
ruptures below the level of consciousness and reflection operative in 
philosophy itself. Classical philosophy by which I mean philosophy in 
the ego1ogica1 mode cannot stand the idea of a theory of its discursive 
practice outside its own conscious analytic activities. It reacts to 
this idea with the same vehemence as a humanist to the probing investig-
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ations of psycho-analysis. It abhors being reminded of the existence of 
its own unconscious. 
Nor can it, facilitate such a theory of discursive practice which might 
render explicit the conditions of possibility, epistemic, ideological and 
material, of its own texts. The ego1ogica1 paradigm is bounded by a 
theory of representation which can accredit no autonomy to the structures 
of representation itself. Language for classical philosophy, organized 
around its ego1ogica1 problematic, has no being, in itself. It is 
exhausted by its representative function. The dominant theory of represent-
ation embodies an ideal of a language perfectly transparent to the world 
of things. The word has no being of its own, discourse no autonomy. It 
exists only as a pure sign coding the pre-given thought of a thinking 
subject directed at a signified objective world of things. Thought under-
stands itself. In language it is merely rendered visible for other 
thinking subjects. Language is the perfect instrument of thought, in so 
far as it is perfectly transparent to the signified world of things. 
Within egological philosophy as we shall see language has no organic 
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life. It is completely harnessed to the pre-given primacy of the cognitive 
activities of the subject (empiricist or rational) as it attempts to grasp 
the objective facticity of the world in a knowing act. Thus for classical 
philosophy a theory of discourse which can address the organic life of 
language practice, its history its material and ideological conditions of 
possibility is entirely unthinkable. For language can have no autonomy, 
no history, life or agency separate from that of the solitary but absolute 
cognizing subject. Semiology is here entirely subsumed by critical epist-
emology. 
In the pure representativity of language which is immediately present 
to consciousness, discourse can have no structure except that derived 
directly from the mind (a universal grammar) or fabricated by the mind as 
an instrument of knowledge (ars characteristica). As such classical 
philosophy can ha've no conception of discursive analysis which focuses on 
the interplay between what is said in discourse and what remains unsaid 
but determinant. It cannot grasp in its axiology of knowledge, boundary 
conditions of its own situated intelligibility. Conditions which are 
absent from discourse 'but condition its very possibility. 
Nor will the radical reflection of a phenomological kind remedy this 
oversight. For this radical enquiry into the foundations of various 
discourse can never lead beyond its own starting point - the transcendental 
subject. Yet the conditions of possibility of discourse are not given in 
consciousness. They are before and beyond the consciousness they afford. 
Theyare conditions given in the materiality, a social and historical 
materiality, of the world and communicational practice. 
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The conditions of discourse are not simply theoretical. For 
theoretical practice is like any other level of human practice, a socially 
and historically situated activity. Language and theoretical practice are 
then social activities. To claim ~o is not merely to engage in a ritual-
istic genef1ection to their obvious inter-subjectivity but rather to 
think through the implications of that essential sociality - at the level 
of epistemological method and ontological commitment. The thinking on 
and over this ground, with all its initial fragility and frequent relapse 
to ego10gica1 security, is what characterizes philosophy in the twentieth 
century. 
And yet, social and historical conditions do not exhaust the objective 
condi tions of existence of particular discourses. To reduce di scursille. 
relations to social and historical ones would again be to obliterate the 
autonomy of language with its specific materiality. Language again would 
become as with ego10gica1 semioties transparent to the world. Though now 
the world would be that of social and historical structure and process, 
rather than world of mentalities or inert objects and states of affairs. 
Moreover such a reduction would for a conversationalist philosophy of 
discursive practice be quite self-defeating. For having reduced all 
theoretical practice in one re1ativising thrust, to the epi-phenomena1 
articulation of social and historical materiality, it would be unable to 
underwrite the validity of its own knowledge practices in analysing that 
materiality. Such a reduction would be self-defeating. The central 
problem within epistemology in the conversational mode has become how to 
theorize certain social relations as constitutive of science and other 
discursive practices but maintain a non-reductive and hence non-
relativist account of their relationship. 
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Historical conditions do not exhaust the objective conditions of 
possibility of particular sciences and other discursive practices. 
Theoretical paactice has a degree of autonomy with regards the material 
determinants of historical process. Which is merely to say that it is 
specifically theoretical practice with its own distinguishing character-
istics and ~ economic or political practice. It is governed then by 
epistemic dynamics and structures which cannot be reduced to those of 
other levels of social formation - economy, polity etc. As such epist-
emology must draw on the resource of a theory of discourse. That is an 
objective analysis which can formalize the structure of thought systems 
in their distinct systematicities. Kuhn's unclear notion of a 'paradigm' 
is inadequate as an analysis of the structuration of scientific knowledges. 
It must be replaced by a rigorous semiotic study of specific areas of 
discourse. 
Thus our analysis of classical philosophy as a discrete discourse 
which we have named the egological is made from another epistemic position 
- the conversational. This discourse provides a vantage point from which 
to survey classical philosophy as an articulation within a specific 
discursive system. More particularly this discourse with its central focus 
on the sociality of self, cognition and language embodies a theory of 
representation which can facilitate an adequate theory of discourse. 
Epistemology then, both method and critique, is internal to these two 
discourses the egological and conversational. Discourse analysis such 
as we now can practice is only possible in so far as with the destruction 
of the subject-object axis, perceptual metaphor of perception, and of the 
reciprocal s~~try between an absolutized subjectivity and reified 
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objectivity, a sociologically informed philosophical practice has recast 
the theory or representation - in a materialist mode. 
, , 
It is precisely in a concept like self that we can 'see', from our 
current epistemic standpoint and with the help of the analytic methods it 
affords, the mutations and ruptures in philosophy as a theory of represent-
ation. It is precisely because of the egological structure of classical 
philosophic discourse that debates about the self are so central to 
clarifying the limits of that discourse as set by the theory of represent-
ativi ty. 
The debate about the status of the self, its transcendentalism or 
sociality is the focal point for an underlying rupture within philosophic 
thought and the appearance of a radically new theory of representation of 
a materialist type. Debate on the self is by implication a debate on the 
status of knowledge and truth; on its absoluteness and objectivity or its 
material and intersubjective nature. A transcendental idealism such as 
Kant's (or for that matter Hegel's or Husserl's) has at its core an 
egological conception of self underwritten in turn by an egological theory 
of representation. 
An assault on the transcendentality and absoluteness of the self, from 
the material standpoint, is also an assault on the claimed transcendental 
universality of knowledge and truth. The solitary but absolute epist-
emological self is a central pillar supporting the magnificent edifice of 
egologicism. Its removal in the sociologistic assault renders the entire 
structure of egological discourse highly unstable. 
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In turn, as we shall see, the sociological realism central to the 
four dominant traditions of this century existential-phenomenology, 
pragmatism, ordinary language philosophy and marxism has at its core, 
a social or conversational theory of the self. 
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CHPPTER FIVE 
THE PHENOMENON OF INTER-SUBJECTIVITY 
AND 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF PHENQ\1ENA 
"To know what these conceptions which we have not made ourselves 
are really made of, it does not suffice to interrogate our own 
consciousnesses; we must look outside of ourselves, it is 
history we must observe, there is a whole science which must be 
formed, a complex science which can advance but slowly and by 
collecti ve labour, •••.• " 
Durkheim: EZ,ementar'1J FOlmS of the ReZ,igous Life 
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THE PHENOMENON OF lNTERSUBJECTIVITY AND 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF PHTI~OMENA 
Kant emerges, as we have said, as the inheritor of the two major 
philosophic traditions within egological thought, the empirical and 
the rationalist. He is the historical agent of their synthesis. His 
critical philosophy maps the outer limits of a discourse within which 
empiricist and rationalist moments can be situated. His transcendental 
analysis delineates, with a precision and finality hitherto unachieved, 
the limiting structure of this egological discourse. It isolates the 
major conceptual elements of this structure; the dyadic opposition of 
absolute subjectivity and reified transcendental object; the location 
of the source of objectivity in that subject's activity; and the 
reduction of the human subject to the absolute but impotent transcend-
ental surrogate. The interaction of man and the world, natural or 
social, is reduced to the mediation within critical idealist epistem-
ology of transcendental cognizer and objectified world. Within this 
egological structure, which orders the world around the cognitive gaze 
of the absolute subject, there can be no real difference between 
empiricist or rationalist positions. Kant announces to us 
"The transcendental idealist is an empirical realist." 
Having dissolved the fundamental Cartesian opposition of subject and 
object by a Copernican turn which locates the objectivity of the object 
in an expanded and exalted subjectivity, egological philosophy moves 
inevitabl.1 towards its identitarian conclusion. For, having located the 
objectivity and po~itiv.ity of things in the subject's cognitive activity, 
it is obvious that we should conclude, as did Hegel, that the object !! 
the subject. The object's material intransigence which Kant reluctantly 
1 b4· 
acknowledges in his paradoxical notion of a 'thing in itself' is declared 
a taboo for the subject. Eventually this negative resistance of the 
object is incorporated within the subject as an estranged aspect of that 
subject's identity. The externality of the natural world becomes the 
negative image of the ideal world, - spirit in self estranmment. The 
" 
mat eri ali ty of the social and historical world is reduced to the 
progress of an absolute historical subject. In Hegel's hands Kant's 
transcendental subjectivity extends its agency beyond the purely 
epistemological to the arenas of histo~ and politics. Absolute spirit 
finds its highest stage of historical embodiment and progress for Hegel 
in the Prussian autocratic State. 
However the gross inflation of the transcendental subject is 
accompanied by a corresponding emasculating of the active and constitutive 
role of the empirical subject, the historically situated human being. 
As Adorno noted "The centristic identity of the I is acquired at the 
expense of what idealism will then attribute to it.,,1 The subject is 
increasingly smitten with the paralysis of idealist retreat from the 
material world. To achieve the status of pure functionality ascribed 
to it by critical epistemology, able to confront the materiality of 
the world and reduce it to the passivity of a Kantian object, the subject 
becomes reduced to just its categorial performance. It becomes merely 
its pure function and is diluted to the point of ' mere universality' in 
order to validate its judgements as objective for all subjects. In 
cutting itself loose from the material object world it drifts from its 
own sense of be:ing, its materiality. It shrinks to a being of abstract 
reason and concrete impotence. The dyadic axis of egological thought 
becomes inherently unstable and threatens to disintegrate as· each pole 
defines the other as a moment "Of itself. This disintegration is 
obvious in the case of German Idealist philosophy where subj ecti vi ty 
having dissolved the materiality of the liOrld in its categorial gaze 
simultaneously affirms the subject as the one and only absolute sub-
stanc~ which contains the object as an element or moment within it. 2 
However it is just as present in the positivistic reification of the 
object world and nihilation of subjective aspects of cognition before 
the brute facticity of the world. 3 
The egological paradigm is characterised by a dualistic ontology, 
subjects and objects. The dualism is only mediated by a recourse to 
epistemological premises. For rationalism this in vol ved the retreat 
to the sanctity of a solitary epistemological self, in whose absolute-
ness the objectivity of the experienced world finds its origin. For 
empiricism the subject is enveloped by the world, in so far as it is a 
sense receiving self. We see in transcendental phenomenology and in 
phenomenalism, respectively, the logical development of rationalism 
and empiricism, a reduction of ontology to epistemology. However this 
reduction remains predicated on a dualistic ontology, so that the 
central problematic of the paradigm becomes the pursuit of absolute 
grounds for our knowledge, the pursuit of objectivity and universality. 
Thus critical rationalism locates the basis of the objectivity, univer-
sality of our knowledge, in the cognitive activity of an absolute 
transcendental ego. Empiricism on the other hand seeks that basis in 
the correspondence of our ideas with an external reality, the object-
ivity somehow is in the world. The logical conclusions of either 
doctrine are the same. Either one's theorising can move to the subject 
pole or the object pole. In the case of the former, empiricism will 
result in an idealism, a subjective idealism like Berkeley's. Rational-
ism will result also in an idealism but as its reduction is transcendental 
not psychologistic, it will be an 0 bj ecti ve idealism such as Hegel's. 
On the other hand, a move towards the object pole will herald for 
empiricism an 0 bj ecti ve realism remarkably similar to the rationalist 
objective idealism, and for rationalism a subjective realism of the same 
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epistemological character as subjective idealism. Or to put this in 
a different way the philosophic theory that is produced within empiric-
ism by lopping off the subjectivity of the epistemological observer 
(i) is also that produced by rationalism by reducing the objective 
world to the cognitive activity of a supreme subjectjeach produces a 
world without concrete man. Both positivism, the methodology based on 
objective realism j 
(i) 
World = 
removed 
(ii) 
subjectivity 
= 
expanded 
and transcendentalism~the mystic based on objective idealism,are de-
humanising, they banish man as a concrete subject from the world. 
Within egological philosophical discourse the central concern 
becomes the pursuit of the grounds of objectivity (what Husserl was 
later to call the apodictic) via the phenomenological cross-examination 
of the subject and its consciousness. Epistemological enquiry after 
Kant increasingly reduces objectivity, the hall-mark of scientific 
rationality, to the subject's cognitive activity. For transcendental 
idealism, which culminates in Husserl's methodological prescriptions, 
the epistemological subject is a pure one, transcendent with regards 
the mundane world yet trapped in its immanence. For the naturalistic 
empiricism which finds its clearest expreSSion in Mach's sensationalism 
and its neo-positivist development, the subject's consciousness is 
exhausted by its empirical sensations. Sensationalism however, despite 
the claim that its data is derived immediately from the object, con-
stitutes the cognitive process as one of abstraction b.Y the subject of 
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materi~ or data from the object. This sensory data is then processed 
by the. subject and organized into a set of objectively valid results 
by the process of scientific cognition. Later positivists were to 
address themselves to the process by which immediate subjective exper-
ience or data could be transformed into the inter-subjectively valid 
judgements of science. Having denied themselves recourse to the trans-
cendental turn preferred by Idealism they explicated, as a seemingly 
viable alternative, the basis of an ideal logico-philosophical language. 
0) Wi ttgenstein' s 'Positivism' 
Positivist epistemology directs its attention to the construction 
of an ideal language which in its undefined descriptive terms refers 
only to objects of direct experience and states of affairs empirically 
given and verifiable, and the syntax of which, modelled as it is on 
formal logic, allows the production of only well-formed-formulae possess-
ing a definite truth function. By restricting the form of this artificial 
language to a strictly referential semantic and rigorous extensional 
logical syntax, it was thought possible to create a language with 
sufficient constraints to prevent the expression of metaphysical state-
ments wi thin it. The aim became to explicate standards of linguistic 
precision and parsinomy derived from a philosophical analysis of the 
norms held to govern the development of mathematics and physical science 
and in particular the form of their propositions. 
Viennese positivism had added to the classical empiricist principle 
of direct acquaintance as the foundation of knowledge, the demands for 
inter-subjective verification of scientific propositions. This it did 
with little or no perception of the contrasting epistemological foundations 
of these principles (the former based on the empirical ego's perception, 
the latter on the conventions of a community of investigators). Moreover 
it supplemented these with a new concern for the refonn of language. 
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This latter project it was hoped could also reconcile the subjective 
foundation of knowledge in sensory experience,with its intersubjective 
verification. 
There emerges in positivist circles at the beginning of the 
twentieth centur,y a profound distrust in natural language as an instru-
ment of philosophic method which is strangely aKin to that unease we 
witnessed in philosophic thought in the seventeenth century; a coin-
cidence which is symptomatic of an underlying fPistemic unity. For 
neo-positivism, the fact that natural languages allow the formation of 
sentences of an unclear or meaningless type which are perfectly per-
missible within the rules of natural grammar, indicates the inadequacy 
of grammatical syntax as the rules of formation of a scientific language. 
However if grammatical syntax is replaced with a logical order within 
which questions of linguistic meaning are reduced to those of referential 
truth conditions of basic propositions and to questions of the trans-
mission of truth functions in formal systems, then pseudo statements 
which have an acceptable grammatical form but no real meaning ?Would not 
arise. Again the dream is familiar. We have encountered it before in 
the Leibnitzian search for a mathesis universalise 
In the early work of Wittgenstein as represented in his Tractatus,4 
we witness empiricism struggling to overcome the immanence of the 
sensate self. Language or rather an ideal language,is afforded a direct 
representative relationship with the world unmediated by the empirical 
ego. Wittgenstein like his contemporary Husserl is resolute in his 
opposition to the psychologocism which had become so central to empiricist 
epistemology. However like Husserl he can only deliver his critique of 
psychologism and the reductionism and relativism implied by it, from 
the transcendental standpoint. In the wake of their assault on primacy 
of the empirical ego comes their joint retreat to the transcendental 
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limits of a philosophical or transcendental ego. 
'Analytical philosophers today in their analysis of the Tractatus 
tend to ignore Wittgenstein's metaphysical remarks on the philosophical 
self. Anxious to legitimise their own current methodological prede-
lictions, they selectively approach his early work. 5 And,concerned to 
assert a continuity between his early and later work (an interpretation 
which belies their own ignorance of the discursive foundations of current 
ordinary language philosophy) they focus precisely on those elements of 
the early work which, superficially at least, present us with such a 
continuity ,- the new centrality of language to cognition, the concern with 
unearthing the rules governing the possibility of meaning in language. 6 
As such they are unable to grasp Wittgenstein's early work as the end 
(a glorious finale) rather than the beginning of a philosophic tradition. 
Accordingly they fail to evaluate the depth of the rupture which occurs 
when Wittgenstein having explored from within, the ver,y limits of 
egological philosophy in the course of his critique of pure language, 
breaks from that problematic in an anthropological turn which seeks a 
conversational basis for the analysis of language, self and cognition. 
Wittgenstein's rupture with the egological ~roblematic,and logical 
empiricism in particular,is of course the appearance in analytical 
philosophical rumination of a much deeper fracture in European philos-
ophical thought. The second half of the 1920's ,sees not only Wittgenstein 
moving towards socio-interactional approach to language analysis (meaning 
as use) but parallel and seemingly independent similar developments in 
Mead's symbolic interactionist approach to language and the self in the 
Pragmatist tradition (Mind, Self and Society, 1925), in Volosinov's 
rethinking in the Marxist tradition of the possibility of a materialist 
theory of language (Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 1927) and in 
Heideigger 's growing concern with language as a constituting element of 
marls being. 
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The closeness in interests and similarity in theme in these seminal 
theorists is simply astoniShing and at first inspection inexplicable. 
Here lies a watershed in the development of European philosophy of which 
we mow little. 
All we can say in our present state of historical knowledge about 
the period is that this convergence of interest and theme represents not 
a common point of arrival or shared novel platform but rather a common 
rejection of a philosophic discourse perceived to be outmoded - the ego-
logical. The failure of ordinary language philosophers to perceive this 
rupture again reflects their unconsciousness of the sociologistic found-
ations of their current philosophical practices. I shall return to this 
issue in the final chapter of this work. 
The Tractatus involves the application of a set of formal or symbolic 
logical tools to the analysis of the conditions for a language having 
meaning. Chief amongst these logical tools is the so called Thesis of 
Extensionality. Wittgenstein's sentential logic derived from develop-
ments in the theory of truth functions allows complex sentences to be 
constructed out of elementary propOSitions by means of formal connectives. 
The virtue of Wittgenstein's logic is that following Scheffler'S proof 
he can derive even these connectives (of conjunction, disjunction, 
implication, etc.) from the basic logical operation of negation. 
Wittgenstein applies the Thesis of Extensionality to language in 
order to devine beneath the vagaries of ordinary language and its 
grammatical forms an ideal pictorial language infused with the scientist's 
love for things rather than mere words. Complex propositions are always 
truth functions of more basic ones. However these elementary propositions, 
if language is to say anything materi~, must directly refer to or picture 
states of affairs in the world. Logic itself produces only tautologies 
and can tell us nothing about the world. The meaning of propositions 
must be ultimately in the reference of their constituent elementary 
proposi tiona. He argues after the tradition of Ars combinatoria -
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"It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring 
us to elementary propositions which consist of names in 
inunediate combination.,,7 
and again -
"The proposition is a truth function of elementary propos-
itions (The elementary proposition is a truth function of 
itself) • ,,8 
For Wittgenstein we picture facts to ourselves via the medium or sign-
ificatory system of language. Indeed as he says 
'~e use the perceptible sign of ~ proposition (spoken or 
written, etc. as a projection of a possible situation."9 
The sense of a proposition then lies in the possibility of it picturing 
a state of affairs or configuration of facts in the real world. 
"A proposition is a picture of reality. 
A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.,,10 
However propositions of an intentional form which ascribe states 
or dispositions to psychological subjects 
e.g. John believes that it is raining 
do not picture or directly refer to states of affairs, i.e. configuration 
of facts about relations of objects in space and time. But argues 
Wittgenstein this pictorial correspondence circumscribes the real meaning 
of propositions. In the intentional proposition above whereas the latter 
phrase or proposi tion "it is raining" certainly indicates a state of 
affairs which mayor may not exist in the world and whose existence can 
be empirically verified, the first phrase or proposition 'refering' to 
a psychological disposition of John, a psychological agent,cannot be 
verified. No object or state of affairs can be isolated in the world, 
by properly scientific means, which corresponds to a belief or psychological 
disposition. Thus argues Wittgenstein psychological statesor agentj cannot 
be referred to meaning.tu.liy in language. Statements which do include 
such reference are thus/in principle, meaningless. 
Their form however S!!l be reduced to their underlying real proposi-
tional structure which removes ~ reference to an ~irical subject. 
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This subjective ascription is replaced with a comment on the meaning 
of the sentence sign. That is, he admits that in intentional propos-
itions such as 'A believes that P is the case' it indeed looks as if 
the proposition P stands in some sort of relation to an object A, in 
the form of an empirical subject. However he insists that this super-
ficial form and the psychologism in the theory of knowledge to which it 
can lead, must be replaced by a deeper analysis of the proposition in 
terms of constituent terms which will allow of no such psychological 
entities. 
He asserts -
"It is clear, however that 'A believes that P', 'A has the 
thought P' and 'A says P' are of the form '''P'' says P': 
and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an 
object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the 
correlation of their objects."11 
Language, its combinatorial syntax covered by a extensional logic, 
is reduced in its semantic component to its capacity to depict a world 
of facts. This depicting faculty of language does not recognize a 
special kind of fact - the realm of psychological dispositions, in which 
a subject as an element of a fact has a relationship to a state of 
affairs which is also part of that factual situation as e.g. in the 
proposition 
L-(John) (believes) (that it is raining)J 
Wittgenstein nowhere e~licitly subj~cts intentional statements to 
the verification principle and indeed his objections to psychologism 
seem to go deeper than mere positivist doubts about the scientificity 
of psychology. It is as a result of his decomposition of in ten tional 
propositions to self-referring statements still governed by the refer-
ential semantics of the elementary proposi tiorts pictorial correspondence 
that he concludes: 
"This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul -
the subject, etc. - as is conceived in the superficial 
psychology of the present day. ", 2 . 
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His o~jections like those of Frege who lambasted the early work of 
Husse+l on the foundations of mathematics for its psychologism, reside 
rather in a logical argument for the necessary universe of discourse 
and order in the world that must obtain if language is to in fact . k 
representative. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that Wittgenstein's 
severing of psychology from philosophy proper led to an enquiry into 
the conditions for establishing the scientificity of psychology. This 
in turn led to the application of p~sicalistic criteria of inter-
subjective verification, the demand for physical observable entities 
to be the proper object of a scientific psychology, and accordingly a 
behaviourist theory of mind. Later analytical philosophy, struggling 
to reconcile the subjective dimension of primary experience with the 
inter-subjective requirements of the verification principle, sought a 
resolution of this tension in a formally constructed scientific language 
in which the basic descriptive terms refer to a behaviouristic inter-
t t o f b . . 13 pre a 10n 0 aS1C exper1ence. The empirical control of constructed 
ideal languages is catered for by an objectivist description of verbal 
behaviour. 
Wittgenstein's work lies outside this major trend in logical 
empiricism associated with the work of Carnap and later Nage114 and 
Goodman. 15 For him it would seem the Tractatus is the end of a 
philosophical era not the beginning. Nowhere in his early work do we 
see him clearly embracing the verification principle. His notion of 
the elementar,y proposition is not presented in terms of observational 
statements as logical empiricism would interpret it. Such psychologism 
as I have already suggested was particularly uncongenial to Wittgenstein 
cOming as he did from a German logico-philosophical tradition more than 
wary of such reductionism. For Wi ttgenstein the existence of elementary 
propOSitions, the basic building blocks of a language that could repres-
ent the world, is asserted on purely logical grounds. That is he argued 
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that the character of inference and indeed of meaning itself demands 
th~t there Should be elementaFj propositions. The logical character 
of sense demands that simple names and simple objects should be the 
elements of representation. Only with these elements is it possible 
to establish definite meaning, and hence for Wittgenstein, sense at all. 
For Wittgenstein representation must have this strict binary-correspond-
ence form of sign-name and basic object if it is to allow the speaking 
of sense, "what can be said at all" the author tells us, "can be said 
clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. ,,16 
Wittgenstein sets logical limits to what must be the elements of 
representation, as Leibnitz in the Monadology (to which the Tractatus 
bears more than a passing resemblance) sets logical limits to basic 
ontology within egological discourse. Wittgenstein lies at the end of 
that great tradition which stretches from Leibnitz, through the Ideologues 
to Frege and Russell which seeks an ideal combinatorial language which 
can deliver the mind to the world of things. This tradition recognizes 
the arbitrary nature of human language but seeks to uncover behind the 
conventions of language use an inner logic of combination intrinsic to 
the nature of signification itself. We can note with amazement the simil-
arity of Wittgenstein's judgement -
"Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this 
much is not arbitrar.y - that when we have determined one thing 
arbitrarily, something else is necessarIly the case (this 
derives from the essence of notation)".17 
wi th Leibni tz conclusions in his "Dialogue on the Connection between 
Things and Words." (See page 7".) The Tractatus represents the last 
great attempt to sketch the form of this project within the structure 
of egological discourse. The book attempts to eJCPlore the limits of 
egological thought through an analysis of the logical or transcendental 
conditions which would have to obtain if the binary correspondence theory 
of representation, so central to egologicism, is to hold. It is a last 
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exploration of the epistemic terrain of egological discourse before it 
implodes finally and irrevocably. 
By recourse to an ideal language based on a strict referential 
semantic and sentential logical syntax, Wittgenstein short circuits 
the empirical ego - objective datum relation of classical empiricism. 
Now the object gives itself up to scientific cognition directly through a 
language which depicts states of affairs in the world and not the 
psychological dispositions of an empirical subject. The empirical ego 
and its immanence had become an embarrassnent for pOSitivism, but an 
unavoidable one. For German non-positivist philosophy whether in its 
neo-Kantian or Phenomenological traditions the major concern becomes 
d 
the search for~more sure epistemological foundation than the immanence 
of the empirical or psychological self. Both "Wittgenstein" and 
"Husserl" in their separate and distinctive ways are the culmination of 
this search which is conducted within the already fragmenting structure 
of egological discourse. Their work marks its final dissolution. 
In Wittgenstein's early work the unity of experience is no longer 
sought in the empirical subject, as in classical empiricism, but in a 
language which represents configuration of facts in the world. Language's 
or rather the ideal language's facility to name the elemental and 
represent the structure of the complex in the world becomes the new 
principle of synthesis. The object world of scientific cognition and 
communication becomes that pictured in and through pure language. 
Indeed for Wittgenstein language, in its universal form as a 
structural depiction or mapping of the objective world of things, becomes 
in turn the limits of my world. Wi ttgenstein reworks the Schopenhauerian 
themeS of the 'world as idea' and of my categorial cognition as being 
its l1m1t, within his new concern for language. In so far as language 
in its representative form maps the world for me then it indeed becomes 
the limits of my world. The world is apprehended by me in and through 
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a language with a universal form. This language is the condition and 
the limit of the world appearing to me in thought i.e. as idea. 
Thought is no longer the 'property' of an empirical ego, 'located' in 
the psychological subject's mind. Instead thought is the correct 
functioning of pure language 
"A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought. 
A thought is a proposition with a sense."18 
However this decentering of cognition is for Wittgenstein only a midpoint 
a reduction on the way to the isolation of a transcendental organization 
of cognition centered on an absolute self. He notes _ 
"there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about 
the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self 
into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world' . "19 
The subj ect to which pure language gives this understanding is not an 
empirical one representable in language (Wittgenstein has shown this 
to be a linguistic illusion), rather it is a transcendental one at the 
limits of my world. 
"The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is 
a limit of the wor1d. 1t20 
The decision about the sense or nonsense of propositions is not left 
to the psychological judgement of the empirical subject nor as yet 
entrusted to a community of speakers playing various language games 
governed by distinct rules related to specific social forms of life,but 
rather to the judgements of the transcendental subject of ideal language. 
These judgements show themselves in the logical form of the sentences. 
The Tractatus can be seen as a critique of pure language which 
runs parallel to Kant's earlier transcendental deductions and which 
remains confined within the same limits. Though to be sure like Kant, 
Wittgenstein explores the ver,y limits of egological discourse and in 
particular the binary theory 6f representation. 
The origin of the synthesis of the manifold of experience is noW 
language itself. Wi ttgenstein pushes Kant's ca tegorial analysis back 
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a further step to the very language and logical structure which afford 
the cognitive' appropriation of the world by the subject. Pure language 
with its logical form provides the structural scaffolding of our cog-
nition rather than the categories of sensation and the intellect. 21 
Wittgenstein's position in the Tractatus seems somewhat similar 
to Cassi~er's neo-Kantian philosophy of symbolic forms. 22 Each lays a 
similar stress on language as the synthetic condition of cognition. 
However neither thinker, despite taking a new interest in language as 
a transcendental condition of objective cognition, breaks with the 
egologicis~ of the critical idealist tradition. For Wittgenstein object-
ive cognition is now seen to rest on language,but on a pure language 
transparent to a world of independent facts and which legitimates the 
possibility of a transcendental subject. Wittgenstein's transcendental 
analysis of semantics ends up postulating, as with Kant, the existence 
of a transcendental self as the limit of the world-as-idea. Having 
assailed the empirical subject, and with no access to the resource of 
a social self and communicational activity as the principle of cognitive 
unity, he is forced by his o'Wll transcendental logic to invoke a subject 
of pure language structurally equivalent to Kant's ego of pure apper-
ception. 
And yet this subject is a nothingness. It has neither agency nor 
potency. Its being shrinks to the non-existence of a mere limit. 
Sartre was later to sketch the metaphysics of this transcendental realism. 
Wittgenstein could only note that: 
"Solipsism when i ts implications are followed out strictly, 
coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks 
to a point without extension, and there remains the reality 
co-ordinated with it."23 
With Wittgenstein positivism has turned full circle and returned to the 
identitarian fold. Reversing Kant's route Wittgenstein declares that 
the empirical realist is a transcendental idealist. 
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The new concern of positivism with language as a scientific tool, 
and Wittgenstein' s own grasp of the epistemic finitude bestowed by 
linguistic structures are insufficient developments in themselves to 
take the young philosopher beyond the limits of an egological epist-
emology: though they certainly take him very close. These new concerns 
remain undeveloped insights. The full meaning of the linguistic 
strictures of understanding did not and could not appear to Wittgenstein 
until he had abandoned the empiricist problematic, taken the anthro-
pological turn and begun the reinvestigation of the semantic properties 
of ordinary language. 
Oi) Positivism and Sociologicism 
Husserl accurately saw the continuities and identities in egological 
epistemology. He claims not only. the rationalists Descartes and Kant 
as his phenomenological predecessors but also Berkeley and Burne. 
However,despite their common points of departure, empiricism and 
idealism arrive at the same paradoxes by different routes. Each tradition 
sees itself as seeking radically different origins for scientific 
objectivity. For Kant and critical idealism, as we have seen the grounds 
of the objectivity of phenomena are traced to the cognitive activity, 
in its categorial form, of an absolute transcendental ego. Objectivity 
is in essence constituted. Kant's treatment of the objectivity of 
phenomena is conducted in his transcendental analysis of the grounds of 
universality and objectivity of judgements. Similarly as we shall see, 
for Husserl, the truth or falsity of propositions is reduced to the 
validity or invalidity, of an act of judgjng or of what Husserl calls 
'intentionality.' The apodictic givenness of the object he believes 
can be completely established .within the structure of the cognitive act 
itself. 
For the empiricists however the conclusion that objectivity is 
subjectively constituted is unpalatable. Its defining quality is rather 
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its i~dependence from the cognitive activity of the ego. Empiricism 
is however reluctantly forced to admit the mediation of the sensate ego 
as the only valid access to the world of objects. The hope is somehow 
that the ego will be swallowed up by the brute facticity of the world 
and accurately deliver 1in its sensory experience, that world to scientific 
cognition. The objectivity is somehow massively there in the world. 
But, on the other hand, epistemological empiricism if it is not to 
condemn itself to the scepticism which results from making the immanence ~ 
the empirical subject the limit of cognition, must either invoke a deity 
as a foil to the sensate self's solipsism or settle for an uncertain 
vacillation between nominalism and the naeve realism applauded b,y Dr. 
Johnson and later G.E. Moore. Positivism after Frege, as we have seen, 
seeks to combine these last two possibilities and demand that language 
should accurately reflect in its propositions,states of affairs in the 
given world. Alongside positivism flourish those philosophies which 
promise a metaphysics of the object, organicism, vitalism, Durkheimian 
sociologism and last~ existentialism. For these as for positivism, 
objectivity resides somewhere internal to the world, external to man 
in objects of cognition. 
It is useful to distinguish between these two conceptions of object-
ivity viz. (a) objectivity as a property of judgements, (b) objectivity 
as a property of objects of cognition, in order to trace the dispersions 
within egological thought which occur around the rival schools of 
phenomenology and positivism. These dispersions however, as I have 
suggested, follow a structural symmetry in their divergence. 
Moreover the above distinction aids our understanding of 
(1) the epistemic origin of the conception of objectivity, 
characteristic of positivistic sociology. This movement 
I will argue, regards 0 bj ecti vi ty as a property of the 
objects of scientific cognition, in this case the 
facticity of society. 
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(2) Secondly it helps us grasp why positivistic sociology, 
the first formal expression of sociologism, though a 
moment in the transition to conversational discourse, 
is so unwittingly. It fails to reflect theoretically 
on its rupture with egological discourse and is incap-
able of evaluating the positivism it so readily embraces; 
a positivism which is a m!taphysical residue of a previous 
epistemic formation. 
(3) Lastly we can understand to some degree why the critique 
of positivism as metaphysics emerged, and sociologism 
established itself as the discursive foundation of a new 
philosophical paradigm not within sociology itself, but 
rather in a philosophical discourse. This discourse 
departs from an assault on the notion of transcendental 
ego or absolute spirit but remains concerned with object-
ivity as a constituted phenomena. Scientific objectivity 
is no longer seen as the accomplishment of a transcendental 
ego through its intentional acts or as simply given in the 
externality of the object but rather theorized as the 
product of a series of materially based social and 
communicational practices which found any science. 
That positivist Sociology indeed regarded objectivity as a property 
of the object of cognition of the sociologist is amply confirmed in 
Durkheim's methodological directive to treat social facts as things. 24 
The objectivity is somehow in the world, the empirically given social world. 
Particularly, it is in the characteristics of externality and coerciveness 
Durkheim ascribes to society. For~aive empiricist the objectivity of 
phenomena resides in their externality to human consciousness and influence. 
For empiricism this brute externality is the only prop against the slow 
f 
slide to idealism entailed by the immanence of the sensate subjects 
immediate eJq)erience. Similarly for Durkheim the objectivity of social 
structure and hence of the science which makes it its object, resides 
in its externality to human cognition and indeed action. It resides as 
Gouldner has caustically commented in its inhumanity. 25 For the natural 
scientist the externality and resistance are of a world £ram which man is 
supposedly absent and which stand in abstentia of human agency. The 
social scientist's externality and coerciveness are features of a world 
in which man is very much present and in which man stands against man, 
or class against class. As such, Durkheim's objectivist methodology is 
181 . 
predicated not on a novel materialist epistemology, as it might be, 
bnt rather on'a resigned recognition of man's historically situated 
condition of alienation. The jargon of positivist objectivity expresses 
the fetishization of social relations within the capitalist social 
formation. 
A fundamental epistemological enquiry wlrich departs from a recog-
nition of the centrality of social reality to the 'objective world' and 
to the scientific practices which try to comprehend it, eludes Durkheim. 
His embracing of a variant of the objectivity of social science which 
by confusing and conflating the thought object of Sociology, the dis-
tinctively social, and the real object it addresses, concrete social 
relations, ends up reifYing both social relations and scientific practice. 
The desired properties of one privileged scientific object (the material 
extended objects of mechanistic natural science) are then read into 
social relations themselves - they are seen as things. 
Durkheim's confusion is characteristic of an empiricism which as 
Althusser reminds us,constantly confuses and conflates the knowledge 
or theoretical object of a science and its real object, that is the 
concrete sector of reality it addresses. 2,6 Finpiricism makes a virtue out 
of this confusion under the name of realism. In an age of mechanistic 
Physics this confusion is understandable enough. 
In the post-quantum et'a of autonomous theorizing it is i"'ros!.lbl~ tu mtl.I\tAill. 
of . for the social sciencesA th',SconfUsion 
- the fetishization of social relations in sociological 
theory -, have been disastrous. Blindfolded by its positivist metaphysic, 
Sociology became inc.p.able of the degree of theoretical reflexivity 
which could allow it to play its full part in the dissolution of 
egological thought and subsequent emergence of an epistemology sociologized. 
Sociology was seemingly taken by surprise by its own arrival. It simply 
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did not grasp the import of the discovery or rather rediscovery of the 
social and historical nature of human reality. It did not grasp the 
essential restructuration of knowledge taking place around the emergence of the 
new epistemological centrality of man as a concrete embodied and socially 
situated agent. For as Foucault has reminded us "the threshold of our 
modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to 
the study of man, but rather by the constitution of an empirico-
transcendental doublet which was called man." It was left to Marx and 
Nietzsche to isolate the form of this 'empirico-transcendental doublet' 
in their ~alysis of the formative role of labour (material production) 
and language in the human species. And the task fell originally to them, 
to connect the philosophical task with a radical relfection on man's 
finitude as an agent within historically located systems of production 
and language. It is in the reflective analysis of this concrete mode of 
human being, circumscribed by labour and language, that a philosophical 
foundation for the objectivity of knowledge has been sought. Neither 
Durkheim's methodological prescriptions nor the Neo-Kantian reflections 
of Weber27 and Simme128, which represent classical Sociology at its most 
philosophically reflective, managed to trace the full implication of the 
sociologistic standpoint for our thinking in the areas of epistemology 
and the theory of scientific knowledges. Durkheim' s search for a 
'third way' beyond empiricism and idealism,29 Simmel' s Kantian inspired 
enquiry into the s,ynthetic categories of sociality, and Weber's attempt 
to think the relationship between the positive natural sciences and 
the hermeneutic cultural sciences, all indicate a lively philosophical 
interest within classical Sociology. However none of these enquiries 
despite their novel tone and proclamations of the necessity of a 
rethinking of classical philosophical questions in the light of the 
emergence of sociological science, were capable of breaki ng .tUlly with 
the egological problematic and in particular i ts positivist variant. 
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Their· .embracing of the positivist metaphysic, in an attempt to establish 
the sOientificity of the sociological enterprise, effectively blinkered 
them to the radical philosophical import of the new ontological primacy 
of the social. 
In Durkheim's case, as we have seen, the importation of positivism 
into the structure of SOCiological reason leads to a reification of 
social relations and a fetishization of scientific objectivity which 
underwrites sociological method with a deeply conservative political 
ideology of social order. 
His work is motivated with the desire to replace the idols history 
has corrupted with a new object of worship and principle of stasis and 
order - society, a reality sui generis. He searches for the principles 
of social order in an age of revolution. And this search also informs 
his epistemology. He gladly embraces the positivist metaphysics of 
the object, with,its thesis of an intrinsic order and coherence in the 
object world. 
Although the Abso.lute has been partly relativised in the function-
alist analysis of society and culture, it retains its supra-individual 
quali ties. It remains a reality 'sui generis', a jealous God and 
objective facticity above the individual confronting and coercing him. 
Durkheim doesn't nihilate Kant, he merely stands him on his head and 
transfers the objectivity of the transcendental categories, epistemological 
and moral, to the collective consciousness and its functional structure. 
This becomes a reified inter-subj ecti ve ego. Thus Durkheim' s moral 
order account of social synthesis does not accept the nihilistic 
implications of the conversational terrain it has entered unwittingly. 
It shrinks from what Foucault has called an' analytic of finitude' .30 
lnstead it mer~ relocates the rationale of scientific and moral 
objectivity, previously found at the transcendental egological level, 
at the reilied societal level. 
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'To be fair to Durkheim it should be noted that in his later work 
viz. "Elementary Forms of Religious Life" - he develops his interest 
in the constitutive aspects of objective knowledge in his attempt to 
account for the development of spatial and temporal classifications 
among non-literate peoples. He suggests that the basic forms of space and 
time in such societies closely reflect the social organisation of the society 
in question. However even this analysis of jUdgements and the origin of 
their 'objectivity' remains predicated on the postulate of the given 
objectivity of the social order as the object of scientific cognition. 
For the individual, (and it is the categorical organisation of the 
empirical not transcendental ego Durkheim is analYSing), possesses the 
faculty of objective judgement only in so far as he is a fully social-
ised member of the social order. The objectivity of his judgements is 
derived from that of society, (a reality sui generis) in so far as he 
is a structural isomorphism of the former. As such it is not socially 
constituted but a merely internalised object world, interiorized via 
the socialisation process. The reification of society is accompanied 
by an account of the individual as a personality system structurally 
isomorphic with the social system of which he is a part. The person-
ality in its non-egotistic form is conceived as an internalized repres-
entation (an interiorized social being) of the social system. 
Durkheimian positivism engages in an investigation of social 
process but fails to achieve the reflective moment and to realise the 
ontological primacy of the concretely inter-subjectiv'lty. Thus it 
generates, as a result of the residues of egological epistemic structure 
within it, a series of new dichotomies at the ontological level -
individual and society, egotistical and social being. Durkheim fails 
to come to terms with the individualism of either classical political 
economy or that of classical egological epistemology. Ch the other 
hand, unable or unwi J J 1 ng to radically evaluate the epistemological 
implications of his own sociologicism and think the terms of Sociology's 
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discrete scientificity, Durkheim remains trapped within the positivist 
f~tish of the object. He clings to the apron strings of empiricist 
respectability. His sociologicism shatters the tyranny of the trans-
cendental subjectivity of idealism but replaces it with that of the 
object, or internalized object, (society in man). The constitutive 
power of the ego is lost. Durkheim's homo sociologicus inherits the 
impotence of 'L 'homme machine' of French materialist philosophy. As 
Merleau-Ponty notes, Durkheim, "although he energetically called 
attention to the study of the SOCial, he may have stripped it of its 
most interesting features by advising that it be treated "like a thing"." 
It was Durkheim's genius to realize the eminent sociality of the 
synthetic categories of the intellect. He traces the course of their 
supposed necessity and universality to the nature of society as a set 
of collective representations which expresses communal realities and 
sentiments. He never in fact develops his anthropology of knowledge 
towards a consideration of the structure of thought and knowledge in 
advanced literate societies. However he sees his analysis of primitive 
representations as clearly indicating the social determinants of the 
structure of all cognition. Hence he sees the emergence of a sociolog-
ical theory of knowledge as promising to plot a mediating course between 
empiricism and idealism. However, the infinite possibilities entailed 
by sociological realism and the emergence of anepistemology sociologized, 
slip from Durkheim in so far as he remains naievely fixated with the 
object and under the sway of positivism. Durkheim indeed stands Kant 
on his head. But he proceeds to a positivism uninformed by the radical 
implications of that inversion. In so doing he preserves the kerne~ 
of egological idealism - the subject-object couplet. Both at the 
intui t1 ve level and at the methodological Durkheim replaces the old 
Kantian dualism of subject and object with the new dualism of individual 
and society. Coercion replaces logical necessity. A doctrine of social 
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order replaces that of natural coherence and order. 
Since Kant's transcendental deduction the absolute dichotomy of 
subject and object has been the abstract form of all 'knowledge' within 
egological discourse. Subject and object becomes polar opposites, 
structurally inter-connected in so far as the form of thought centered 
on a constituting subjectivity is the form of the object and the source 
of all objectivity. The fundamental problematic of the Kantian revision 
of empiricism is expressed, as we have noted, in the question "How are 
synthetic a priori judgements possible?" That is, how is it possible 
to have an~ use concepts which are above sensory experience, in the 
sense of not being derived from it, yet contain more than the empty 
tautology of analytic statements. 
Durkheim attempts to answer this question by indicating the social 
origin of the collective categories and representations of primitive 
people. Collective representations like other social forms are more than 
the sum of indi vidual experiences, yet are binding on the individual and 
his percepts. They are thus prior to individual experience 10 gically 
and ontogenetically yet condition and structure that experience. As 
they are capable of change they have a clearly synthetic status. However 
Durkheim fails to proceed to ask the next obvious question later posed 
by Simmel - "How is society possible?,,)1 He does not go beyond an 
acknowledgement of the social origins of the categories of the intellect 
to an enquiry of the social constitution of these. Durkheim's positivism 
prevents him from such an enquiry. Social structure and culture is a 
given, the necessary given facticity which ensures the objectivity and 
sCientificity of sociology. For Durkheim to render problematic that 
facticity is to throw sociological method into chaos and subject it to 
the threat of psych,ological reductionism or worse, philosophical idealism. 
The objectivity of phenomena must take epistemological procedence over 
the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity. Durkheim is unwilling to trace 
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the radical implications of his sociological theory of knowledge for an 
understanding of all scientific practice, natural and social, and for 
the meaning of the terms 'objectivity', 'truth', and 'knowledge'. 
Nietzche takes Durkheim's sociologtcism the necessary step nearer which 
shifts the analysis of the grounds of objectivity from a transcendental 
to a socio-relational footing. In doing so he takes sociologism more 
seriously than Durkheim, who is reluctant to apply his anthropology of 
knowledge reflexively to positivist science itself and Sociology in 
particular. Nietzche rephrases the Kantian question and asks "Why is 
the belief in such judgements (synthetic a priori) necessary?,,32 The 
concern becomes, given the apparent 'necessity' of the categories which 
dominate all our intellectual life to including our scientific discourse, 
to enquire after the source of this necessity. Durkheim was unwilling 
to bring the relativising impetus of his anthropology of knowledge to 
bear on sociological science itself and the positivist categories which 
undergird it. Nietzche realised,in a way that only Marx before him had 
grasped, that social theory could no longer expect an outmoded philosophy 
to provide its epistemological foundations. For social theory the 
phenomenon of inter-sub.i ecti vi ty must take epistc!·mological precedence over 
the objectivity of phenomena. Synthetic a priOri judgements must be 
believed necessar,y just in order that the entire conceptual structure 
we have may be preserved. They represent, as Quine has called it, a web 
of public belief. They are :ilnmune from doubt only in so far as they 
have this fundamental position within socially constituted conceptual 
schemes. However in so far as they are merely conventions supporting 
other more expendable cognitive conventions, they are cultural and 
theoretico-ideological imperitatives not transcendental categories. 
The formal details of this sociologically informed epistemology 
were to be worked out much later by the neo-pragmatists - the attack 
on the analytic/synthetiC distinction, the denial of theor.rindependent 
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observation and facts, the rejection of atomistic and progressive 
m~del.of scientific verification, accumulation and change. 33 
More recently a historical and structuralist dimension has been 
added to this formal critique of positivist and dogmatic empiricist 
epistemology in the work of Kuhn, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and of 
Canauilheim, Foucault and ~ourt in the continental. 
The writings of the latter theorists have taken the historical and 
structural analysis of scientific knowledges beyond the teleological 
,-
historicism of weltanschauung philo sophy. In turn like its more formal-
istic neo-pragmatist equivalent, (which it now must surely illuminate 
with a historical method and perspective so lacking in evolutionary 
pragmatism) it has rethought the categories of traditional epistemology -
the subject-object axis, the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions and a priori and a posteriori truth, the concepts of 
synthesis and the transcendental. In turn it demands their replacement 
with others that ££ take cognizance of the historicity of knowledge 
structures and the sociality of scientific activity. It searches for 
categories which can represent the historical density of, and in the end, 
discontinuity in, the structuration of knowledge; a search for the 
structurally necessary within an essential historical contingency; a 
search for the transcendental limits of sernio-Iogical possibility within 
a given period. Foucault with characteristic incisiveness, has given 
the name the 'historical a priori' to this novel epistemological 
category - the self evident ground or condition (and limit) of our 
thought in a specific historical period, which is itself correlated with 
other historical processes. 
However the basic insights which rendered these developments possible 
remain those of Marx and Nietzche. They precociously wrestled social 
theor.y free from its stranglehold by egological philosopny in its 
idealist or positivist variants. Marx's theor.y of labour as social praxis 
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and Nietzche's reflections on language and mentality are perhaps the 
first-appearances in philosophical knowledge of that new mode of 
theorizing based on a recognition of the precedence of historical and 
sociological reason which we have designated the conversational episteme. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MARX AND NI ETZSCHE IS MATER I ALI SM 
193. 
Harx's philosophical reflections on the sciences of 
- . 
history and political economy and Nietzsche's on that of 
philology demarcate the e@erging variants of conversational 
discourse. Both are concerned with the social constitution 
of the objective human world and with the self-generative 
acts of the human species which are the constitutive elements 
of that world. For Nietzsche it is in the processes of 
communication and the structure of language that we are to 
grasp the world as an objective realm of human practice. 
(i) Marx 
For Marx however the social constitution of the 
objective world has its origins in socially organized labour. 
1 As early as his Theses on Feuerbach Marx had steered a 
novel course between the Scylla of transcendental idealism 
and the Charybdis of naturalistic or deterministic materialism. 
He founds a radically new epistemology based on the centrality 
of human practical activity. The mediation of the human 
subject and the natural object, the nexus sought by classical 
epistemology, is now seen to occur by means of the system of 
of social labour. In turn the new centrality afforded to 
human productive life, and the social relations under which it 
is organized, challenges the rigid demarcation of reality into 
a subjective-consciousness realm and an objective - material 
realm so typical of classical epistemology whether in its 
dualist or identitarian moments. 
Here already in this Th~ses on Feuerbach Marx's motive in 
speaking of man as an objective practico-social being is, 
2 
as Habermas reminds us , not merely anthropological but primarily 
(. 
epistemological. Objective reality is for Marx, no longer 
to be comprehended as a brute facticity ontologically in oppositb 
194. 
to the subject, as it was in all previous deterministic 
. 
materialism. Instead, it is to be grasped in the form of 
sensous h t ' 't 3 uman ac ~v~ y. This practical action has a subjective 
aspect. It is conducted freely by human subjects albeit within 
a definite system of social organization in turn historically 
located. It has also however an objective aspect, for this 
praxis carried out by sensous/objective beings shapes the world 
as objective for us. Reality appears to the human subject 
as objective in and through his labour on the world4 • Marx 
continues to use the organizational categories of Kantian 
critical epistemology, subject, object, synthesis, but gives 
their meaning a radical twist within his materialist epistemology. 
The egological problematic disintegrates under this pressure. 
And the previous duality and fundamental idealism of the 
subj ect-obj ect couplet is di.ssol ved in the materialist ru?ture. 
The epistemolo9i,al subject of objective constitution 
or synthesis is no longer an absolutised and isolated 
transcendental consciousness but instead the sensous,human-
species which reproduces its human life under natural and 
historically given conditions, by means of its socially organized 
labour. 'Synthesis', for Marx, takes place in the medium 
of concrete human practice and labour in particular, rather than 
in abstract cognition as postulated by critical idealism. 
Labour becomes for Marx not only a fundamental anthropological 
category but also an epistemological one. For human labour . 
replaces the pure activity of an abstract consciousness as 
synthesiser of the manifold of sensory experience and as the 
epistemological basis of the objectivity of phenomena. In 
Marx's conversational theory the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity, 
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grasped as material production, takes epistemological 
precedence over the objectivity of phenomena. 
By the time he composed his theses on Feuerbach Harx had 
already moved beyond the philosophical anthropology of the 
P . , t 5 h' h ar~s manuscr~p s w ~c were still largely influenced by the 
Feuerbachian naturalist prublematic. The earlier manuscripts 
conceptualized inter~subjectivity in terms of a species 
subject that exists in am through its productive life -
'For labour, life activity, productive life 
itself, appears to man in the first place 
merely as a means of satisfying a need - the need 
to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive 
life is the life of the species. It is life 
engendering life. The whole character of a 
species - its species character - is contained 
in the character of its life activity; '6. 
The conception of inter-subjectivity employed here, though 
stressing the active and practical dimension of human 
subjectivity and of man's species being, remains essentialist, 
anthropological and fundamentally a-historical 7 • The 
objective world created by man's labour, through which nature 
appears as his work and his reality, is still here seen as 
the objectification of an essential being possessed by man 
as a species. Although this process of objectification is 
seen to occur in a historical dimension, - the self generation 
of the species through history - the human essence or species 
being is still viewed as beyond history, an undetermined essence. 
This essence or 'species' being' has not yet been conceived 
of as historically formed and specific, 'the ensemble of social 
relations', as it becomes known in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach. 
8 
The thests on Feuerbach and the German Ideology render 
the concept of intersubjectivity as a central epistemological 
category. 
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Inter-subjectivity is no longer conceived in terms of species 
being but rather as human practical activity9. The object 
world is no longer the objectification of a universal human 
essence but concretely constituted by man's historically 
located and determined praxis. The notion of 'Man' is then 
an abstraction and often when employed by philosophy, a 
mystification. Marx attacks German idealism for dealing 
II • 
with the metaphysical category "Man" instead of real historical 
I 
man II • 
10 
Productive life, he argues, is carried out by 
historically different sorts of men at different periods who 
have specific needs, characteristics and material problems. 
These needs, characteristics and problems which define what 
man is in a specific period are determined by the objective 
historical conditions under which men live, and by the social 
relations through which they organize their interaction with 
nature in material production. 
"This sum of productiv~ forces capital funds and social 
forms 11 argues Marx I'which every individual and generation finds 
in existence as something given, is the real basis of what 
the philosophers have conceived as 'substance', and 'essence of 
11 
man', and what they have deified and attacked;" • 
Accordingly 'consciousness' loses its centrality as the 
prime concept in epistemology, as the prima causa of 
egologicism. By 1859 in his contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economyl2 Marx was able to conclude with a finality, 
that, 
'It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their 
consciousness'.l3 
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However clearly it was his earlier materialist insights 
in historiography, plotted in the German Ideology, and the 
tracing of the implications of a materialist approach to 
history for epistemology that provided the foundation for 
the triumphant certainty of the Preface. 
work he insists that 
'Consciousness is therefore, from the 
In the earlier 
very beginning a social product, and remains 
so as long as men exist at all'.l4 
As such consciousness itself must be treated historically, 
as materially conditioned, as an effect. Indeed only after 
considering the historical evolution of man as a social 
being formed by a productive life which both provides the 
means for the satisfaction of human needs and in turn generates 
new needs and social relations in the development of the 
productive forces of social labour, can we locate the emergence 
of consciousness. 
'From the start the "spirit" is afflicted with the 
curse of being "burdened" with matter, which makes 
its appearance in the form of agitated layers of 
air, sounds, in short, language. Language is 
as old as consciousness, language is practical 
consciousness that exists also for other men, 
and for that reason alone it really exists for 
me personally as well; language, like consciousness, 
only arises from the need, the necessity, of 
intercourse with other men'.lS 
It is in understanding the role of language as a form 
of social activity in the formation of consciousness that we 
can goncretely grasp the sociality of consciousness and finally 
je~ison the eschatological centrality of consciousness to 
epistemology. Marx's precocious insights on language and 
consciousness are to lie buried and dormant in materialist 
16 
thought for eighty years until they are set free by Vo1osinov 
in the 1920's and eventually developed into a materialist 
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psychology of cognitive development by Vygotsky17. 
199. 
The conception of inter-subjectivity as social praxis 
is intermediate between the earlier anthropological notion 
of species being and the later rendering of the inter-subjective 
in terms of the economic and social categories of material 
d t ' 18 pro uc ~on. 
In the mature work, the noti~n of social praxis is 
narrowed down to that of productive labour within a determinate 
mode of economic production. The concept becomes part of 
the larger theoretical configuration of a materialist political 
economy. 'Its philosophical nuances become redundant. 
However as the Introduction to the Grundrisse shows,19 the 
epistemological and methodological foundations of social 
science in general and political economy in particular remain 
a central concern of the mature Marx. He retains a lively 
interest in settling old scores with philosophical idealism 
and with gauging his relationship to the Hegelian dialectical 
method as a means of clarifying the nature of a properly 
materialist dialectic. He strives to extract the positivist 
aspects of Hegel's dialectic tIt must be turned right side 
up again if you would discover the rational kernel within the 
mystical shell,.20 The phenomenon of inter-subjectivity 
in turn looses its previous epistemological focus. Instead it is 
explicated in terms of the determinate structure of material 
production and in particular, in terms of the social relations 
under which is organized in a specific system of socialized 
labour, in a particular historical period, becomes the form 
of inter-subjectivity which provides the basis of the 'synthesis' 
of man and~e natural world. 
'When we consider bourgeois society in the 
long view and as a whole, then the final 
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result of the process of social production 
always appears as the society itself i.e. 
the human being itself in its social relations. 
Everything that has a fixed, such as the 
product etc. appears as merely a moment, a 
vanishing moment, in this movement. The 
direct production process itself here appears 
only as a moment. The conditions and 
objectifications of the process are themselves 
equally moments of it, and its only subjects 
are the individuals, but individuals in 
mutual relationships, which they equally 
reproduce and produce anew. The constant 
process of their own movement, in which 
they renew themselves even as thev renew 
the world of wealth they create,.2l 
For Marx,w~rk in any historically given society always takes 
the form of social labour. And it is through such socially 
organized labour that humans appropriate natural reality 
and render it objective for them. Thus the theoretical 
basis for the inter-subjective epistemological mediation of the 
subject man and the natural world as object is the mode of 
economic production and the social relations of production 
which structure it. 
'The starting point naturally, is individuals producing 
in society - and therefore the socially determined production 
of individuals,.22 In his critique of classical political 
economy Marx lambasts the Robinson Crusoe conceptions of 
human labour 'The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, 
with whom Smith and Ricardo begin,.23 
He sees this extreme individualism in eighteenth century 
economic theory as an ideological effect of that historical 
period 'Only in the eighteenth century in "civil society", do 
the various forms of social connectedness confront the 
individual as a mere means towards his private purposes as 
23 
external necessity'. Marx demands that political economy 
must depart from an epistemoloqical acceptance of the priority 
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of a concrete inter-subjectivity or sociality centered on 
-
material production. 'Production by an isolated individual 
outside society', he insists • - is as much of an absurdity 
as is the development of language without individuals living 
together and talking to each other,.25 
Marx's critique of individualism in political economy is 
indebted to his earlier epistemological critique of idealism 
delivered in the middle period of his work (1846-1857). 
In his early critique of German classical philosophy and 
Hegel's dialectical idealism in particular, Marx had forged 
theoretical tools of great use in the later economic studies. 
In the course of his philosophical critique Marx had explicated 
the starting point of a materialist epistemology and the 
outlines of a new methodology for the historical sciences. 
A new centrality had been afforded to the material and 
productive life of concrete human subjects in historical 
development. 
Indeed it is perhaps because of these philosophical 
roots and the perceived need to free social science from these 
choking tendrils, that Marx's critique of political economy 
as a social theory is so much more trenchant, and in the end 
theoretically radical and methodologically convincing, than 
Durkheim's attacks in his Division of Labour on the individualism 
and social contractualism of Spencer's lassez-faire sociology. 
However Marx's later work clearly develops and refines 
the critique of idealist philosophy whether in its 
trascendental or naturalist variants. It does so by clarifying 
the notion of inter-subjectivity so centrally at play in 
his early theorising and by knitting it together with a powerful 
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buttery of other economic and historiographic concepts in 
a comprehensive political economy, with a firm methodological 
basis. The transformation of Marx's ~asic sociologistic 
insight from a precocious speculation within a philosophical 
anthropology (inter-subjectivity as 'species being') to 
constituting a central theoretical pillar of a materialist 
political economy (inter-subjectivity as social relations 
of production) marks the emergence of a radically new 
organization of social scientific and philosophic knowledge. 26 
An epistemic groundwork is been being laid here which 
demarcates the appropriate direction for the human sciences to 
follow if they are to achieve scientificity, and which opens 
up a theoretical horizon of almost limitless possibilities. 
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(ii) .Nietzsche 
Nietzsche's rupture from egological thought is in its 
own way as radical as that of Marx and yet at the same time 
more bewildering due to its unsystematic and idiosyncratic 
form. It is on the basis of a philosophical reflection on 
language as a social activity and limit to cognition, rather 
than on labour and its social structure that Nietzsche 
mounts his assault on classical metaphysics and its 
egological structure. 
Nietzs~he the young Professor of Philo!o,y ,was heir 
to a German tradition of linguistic study which since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century had,at the methodological 
level,broken with the absolute rationalism of classical 
'linguisticsj and embraced a historico-organic method of 
research. German scholars in particular came to understand 
that language was in a state of constant flux and that it 
had a history which could illuminate the study of its genesis, 
development, and differentiation. The insight that 'history' 
applied to things other than wars, dynasties and states was 
a radically new one and one that demarcates the scientific 
and philosophic discourses of the nineteenth century from 
the rationalist and mech anistic organization of knowledge 
in the classical period. 
As early as 1814 27 Rask . had emphasised the necessity 
methodically examining the total structure of a language 
rather than isolated elements and in particular words as 
atomistic units of meaning. He stresses the comparative 
of 
analysis of grammar in a historical dimension. Similarly 
Grimm a few years later formally announces the break with the 
204. 
classical mode of analysis and its absolute rationalism. 
'I am hostile to notions of universal logic in 
grammar. They apparently lend themselves to 
exactness and solidarity of definition but 
impede observation, which is to me the S)ul 
of linguistic science'.28 
However we should not in a a forteriori manner over 
stress the discontinuity between the epistemic base of the 
historico-organic research method of the nineteenth century 
and that of the classical period. 
Comparative and historical method remains motivated by 
the central themes of the old discourse. There is here a 
question of residue. Chief amongst these residual themes is 
a continued search for grigins and for a primal language which 
displays its pattern of representation more clearly than 
modern forms. 
Not only does Bopp (1833)29 attempt an analysis of the 
composi tion of v-Tords, but, after isolating the inflectional 
elements, he attempts to trace them back eventually to their 
original form and meaning. This takes the familiar form of 
a search for some form of the existential verb 'to be' behind 
that of other verbs. S~milarly for Schleicher, Hegel's 
disciple, the comparative method was motivated by a search 
for a primitive or original language. He accepted that this 
might not be the first language of mankind, there was he 
acknowledged no way of ascertaining that, however the search 
was on for the oldest ancestor of a given family of languages. 
The discovery of an original Indo-European language, the 
abiding interest of nineteenth century comparative linguistics 
was motivated by a metaphyscial urge residual~inherited from 
the classical episterne. The method of comparative analysis 
yields as its analyandum a dialect free mother language, 
abstracted as a lowest cammon denominator 
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from the compared series of related languages. For if 
such a'language is reconstructed only from samenesses in 
linguistic structure it will possess no variants. Each 
language of the family is thus seen to 'bear independent 
witness' to the forms of the parent. Correspondences among 
the related language, i.e., their common features, verify 
the existence and form of the postulated parent language. 
Beneath this thinly disguised methodological circularity lies 
that same profound metaphysical desire to isolate the primal 
sign(which-in its very form reveals the essence of representation) 
~~nd in classical philosophy of language. 
Nietz~~he is,as I have said,the inheritor of a German 
philogical tradition that is hesitatingly and painfully 
(a pain only mitigated by a certain positivistic optimism) 
breaking from the metaphysical surities of the classical 
period. The break occurs largely at the level of method, viz 
the move towards the historico-comparative method and 
recognition of the systemic organic nature of language. The 
deeper epistemic structure of this new method remains, as 
we have seen, adulterated with metaphyscial residues of the 
previous episteme. 
Nietzsche becomes the first philologist to engage in a 
radical philosophical reflection on the new historicism of 
linguistic method and to come to terms with these egological 
residues. Instead of the true, rational, orderly, permanent 
or genign universe, of classical thought he offers us 'change, 
becoming, plurality, opposition, contradiction and war,.30 
TO think unhistorically he cites as the 'age old custom among 
philosophers,.31 He demands, in a way not too dissimilar 
from Marx, that thought and in particular 
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philosophical discourse IllUst come to grips vli th the centrali ty 
of History to Being. Only the nineteenth century he believes 
has recognized the 'faculty' of historical understanding" 
'as its sixth sense'. This 'historical sense' he defines as 
'the capacity for divining quickly the order of 
rank of the valuations according to which a 
people, a community, or an individual has 
lived,. the "divining instinct" for the 
relation of the authority of the valuation~ 
to the authority of the operating forces'. 2 
Nietzsche in his reflections on historical understanding 
which finds expression in his genealogy of morals gropes 
towards a Sociology of Know ledge. v/hich would have traumatic 
consequences for classical epistemology, involving as it 
would a total revolution in our thinking about logic, science 
and morality. 
But where to start? 
Nietzsche however, gives us little positive direction 
how philosophy is to be reconstituted after its break with 
classical thought. His preferred philosophical tool is 
the hammer rather than the trovTel and mortar of the 
Kantian system builder. Nietzsche abjures such systematising, 
interpreting it as a psychological craving for some final 
ontological security.33 
Moreover he declines to see his task as the systematic 
critique by refutation of philosophical claims. For as he 
claims, to refute one system is not often to accept explicitly 
or implicitly another. He confines his critique of classical 
philosophy to an undermining of its claimS.34 
A central technique i~ this destructive assault is an 
interpretation of philosophical themes and problems as the 
effect of linquistic structures. This approach has to us 
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in a po~t-Wittgensteinian philosophical age, a distinctively 
modern' "ring about it. However for Nietzsche, to afford a 
central primacy to language in the consideration of philosophical 
problems has a series of profound implications which extend 
way beyond the limits of possible innovations in the surface 
level techniques of philosophical analysis. The acceptance 
of the primacy of language entails for him, the necessity 
of grasping the sociality of consciousness and the historical 
origins and determinations of OUr thought, including of course 
that realm "vie regard as so sacred, inviolable and immutable -
our morality.35 Indeed it neans a rethinking of the nature 
of science in a situation whence scientific 'truth' is seen 
to have pragmatic and historical dimensions and scientific 
theories an interpretative rather than explanatory form. 
Language then allows us a way in, or rather out of the maze 
of egological metaphysics. 
Armed vii th the scimitar of a reflexive philology 
Nietzsche goes straight for the jugular vein of egologicism 
- the sUbject-object couplet and conception of the objectivity 
of phenomena based on this structure. For Nietzsche the idea 
of a philosophical subject behind thought occupying a 
radically different realm from the material world is an 
illusion. But it is an understandable illusion. For it 
is to be understood as a consequence of the very subject-
predicate grammatical form of Indo-European languages. 'One 
believed in the soul as one believed in grammar and the 
grammatical subject. vIe used to say that "I" is the condition 
"think", the predicate which conditions - thinking, being an 
activity for which a subject, as cause, must be thought~.36 
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day. 'This continuity of tradition based on a common 
egological structure he traces to the very grammatical form 
of Indo-European language. 
, 
'The wonderful family resemblance of all 
Indian, Greek, and German philosophising 
is easily enough explained. In fact, 
where there is affinity of language, owing 
to the common philosophy of grammar - I mean 
o\,Ting to the unconscious domination and 
guidance of similar grammatical functions -
it cannot but be that everything is prepared 
at the outset for a similar development and 
succession of philosophical systems; just as 
the way seems barred against certain other 
possibilities of world interpretation. t 39 
It is the spell of these grammatical functions, themselves 
the product of forms of social life, that so infuses classical 
epistemology and sends it on its egological course. For 
from the concept of the cognitive self is derived, argues 
Nietzsche, the other pole of the egological equation, the 
reifieu object or thing in itself. Or to be more accurate 
these two concepts,absolute subject and reified object are 
dyadic mirror reflections of each other. 
'Reason believes in the ego, in the ego 
as substance, as a being, and projects 
this belief in ego-substance onto all 
things. It first creates thereby the 
concept of a thing ••• Being, which is 
construed as cause, is thought into 
things, and shoved under them: the 
concept of 'being' follows and is derived 
from the concept of the ego'.40 
From the ascription of an ego to consciousness and 
substantivization and privatization of thought into a 
separate realm, ,res cogi tans, comes that impetus to 
substantivize and objectivize our experience and cast it in 
an ont.ological mould radic,ally distinct and autonomous from 
human concrete life. The organizational principle of res 
extensa, its intrinsic order or objectivity must be internal. 
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For Nietzsche the ascription of a transcendental subject, 
'the synthetic term I' to consciousness and its contents is 
to be interpreted as a metaphysical consequence or generalisation 
from a linguistic habit. He unpacks the hidden assumptions 
embodied in the Cartesian axiom cogito ergo sum, \'lhich 
announces that in consciousness itself selfhood can be grasped 
with immediate certainity. He insists the cogito is not 
such a simple and innocent statement, for it simple assumes 
too much -
'~vhen 'I analyse the process that is expressed 
in the sentence "I think", I find a wh;le 
series of daring assertions, the arguementative 
proof of which would be difficult, perhaps 
impossible: , for instance, that it is I who 
thinks, that there necessarily must be something 
that thinks, that thinking is an activity and 
operation on the part of a being who is thought 
of as a cause, that there is an lego", and 
finally, that it is already determined what is 
to be designated by thinking - that I know what 
thinking is'.37 
Nietzsche insists that this 'one', the 'famous old ego' 
is merely a supposition or assertion and not by any means 
an immediate phenomenological certainty. The ego belongs 
to an interpretation of the process of thinking and not to 
the process itself. It is then an inference which follows 
the conventions of a particular grammar. Thinking is 
understood as an activity, and because according to our grammar 
every activity requires an agency that acts, we conclude that there 
38 
must exist an agent or ego in or behind the thinking process. 
This inference and the related on postulating an autonomous 
world of facts or thinqs in themselves which can be apprehended 
in an unsullied way by the interpretative structures of human 
cognition, Nietzs±e sees as the core of a classical Socratian 
epistemoloqy which stretches from the Greeks to his present 
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to itself a substance or thing in itself. This in a 
par~llel way to the soul organizes a realm from which man 
as a concrete cognitive agent is necessarily absent, trapped 
as he is in res cogitans. 
We can, Nietzsche believes,within the labrinths of 
metaphysics reverse the direction of our illusions vIi thin 
this egological equation. The self as a concept within 
this egological discourse, can be seen as derived from the 
physicalist conception of matter as organized in indestructable, 
impenetrable atoms. Though this concept has lost its major 
currency in physics it 'still leads a dangerous after life 
in places where no one suspects'. The notion that the soul 
is something indestructible, indivisible and eternal has 
been a central Christian doctrine~ Nietzsche demands this 
myth be expelled from science. The monadology which lurks 
beneath the surface of both our physics and our psychological 
and cultural sciences, so that each comes to mirror the other 
in a mutual reflection of their common atomism, must be 
shattered. 
With the assault on one pole of the egological dyad the 
whole structure of this discourse becomes unstable. First the 
notion of causality falls. For Nietzsche the concept of 
causality has its roots in a belief in a subject who effects 
objects. Causality he sees like Hurne as a human interpretation 
of a situation of contingency between two events and not as 
an event or entity which itself occurs in nature. He insists 
'One should make use of "cause" and "effect" as pure concepts 
only, thatis to say, as conventional fictions for the purposes 
of deSignation and communication, not for explanation. 
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It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, 
relativity, constraint, number, lavl, freedom, motive and 
purpose. And if this sign vlorld is thought into things 
as though they were something in themselves, vie act once 
again as we have always done - mythologically,.4l Thus the 
category of cause is not in the world. But neither is it 
a category of the intellect, synthetic and a'priori, as 
Kant saw it. It is rather a human communicational convention 
with an historical and linguistic basis through which we 
interpret and make sense of the world in a certain way. The 
concept of cause like the other so called categories of the 
intellect must be grasped as what they in fact really are, 
namely an invention of 'signs and formulas, with the 
help of which we may reduce the swirling complexity to a 
42 purposeful, useful scheme'. He proceeds to undermine the 
transcendental basis of Kants categorial analysis with a 
pragmatist and sociologistic analysis of our conceptual 
archtectonic which clearly prefigures the recent work of 
Quine and Rescher and proceeds from a more radical 
epistemological stance than the reluctant coherence theories 
of the latter philosophers. He demands that -
'it is high time to replace the Kantian 
question 'how are synthetic judgements a 
priori possible?' with another question: 
'why is belief in such judgements necessary?' 
- that is to say it is time to grasp that for 
the purpose of preserving beings such as 
ourselves, such judgements must be believed 
to be true, although they might of course 
still be false judgements! Or more clearly, 
crudely and basically: synthetic jUdgements 
a priori should not 'be possible' at all 
: we have no right to them, in our mouths they 
are nothing but false jUdgements. But belief in 
their truth is, of course, necessary as foreground 
belief and ocular evidence belonging to the 
perspective optics of life'. 
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Kants naivete consists in taking an anthropocentric 
cognitive idiosyncracy, shaped by biology and society, as 
the measure of the objectivity of things. For Nietzsche 
the categorial synthesis and accomplished objectivity of 
phenomena must be seen as in essence as a significatory 
dimension of the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity. 
After the uncovering of the myth of the subject and the 
subsequent collapse of the concept of causality and its 
transcendental-categorial fortification the rout of the 
egological camp is unavoidable. Nietzsche rampages through 
the structure of egological discourse. Its cherished 
beliefs fall in a domino fashion before him. He declares -
'If we no longer believe in the effecting 
subject, the belief in the effecting thing 
collapses, as well as the reciprocal action 
of cause and effect between those phenomena 
that we call things. 
The thing in ttself (ding an sich) also 
collapses: - for this is basically the 
conception of the Subject-in-itself. 
Once we understand that the subject 
is an invention, the opposition 
between thing in itself and appearance 
becomes untenable - so the concept 
of appearance collapses. 
When the subject is given up, so is the 
object it works upon. If we give up 
the belief in subject and object, then 
the concept of substance goes too - and 
as a consequence, all those other modifications 
e.g. material, 'mental', hypothetical entities, 
the eternity and immutability of substance, etc. 
lie are free from substantialism'. 44 
To free philosophy from substantialism and the 'huge 
stupidity' of the belief in the concept of subject and 
predicate, becomes Nietzsche's task. With the erosion of the 
subject-object axis further sacred beliefs of e90l09ica1 
epistemology face the philosophical hammer of Nietzsche's 
iconoclasm. 
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The holy of holies,our concept of man himself comes under 
fire. For just as our world conceptions like cause, effect, 
substance, the object in itself, the subject for itself are 
anthropological projections and interpretations and not things, 
similarly 'man' as a concept is derived from this erroneously 
reified discourse and can be seen 'himself' as an anthropomorphic 
projection. Like the self, ego or soul, the 'man' of 
philosophical anthropology is an inferred entity. He is 
a residuum or substance posited in a speculative way as 
constituting the organizing pole or agent of material social 
life. Nietzsche's philosophical psychology like Marx's 
materialist conception of history has clearly gone beyond the 
popular philosophical anthropology of the period. The new 
recognition by Marx and Nietzsche of the organic determination 
of human life and consciousness by the material objectivities 
of labour, life and language spells the death of man as 
a monadic absolute substance. Nietzsche announces 'God 
is dead'. However parodying the trans formative method of the 
great philosophical anthropologist Feuerbach, he is in fact 
declaring the end of man. God is dead, substance, soul 
and ego are myths, agency and teleology illusions. Humanity 
is trapped in the finitude of material life and the human 
essence dissolves in the flux of history and life. 
Again with the undermining of the concept of substance 
and the related notions of causality, explanation and absolute 
truth the philosophy of science must be rethought. 
Nietzsche argues in a precocious anticipation of post-
quantum philosophy of science that the role of scientific 
theory in the natural,as well as the social sciences is int~-· 
pretative rather than explanatory. The' notion that scientific 
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theory "is primarily explanatory, he holds, has been due to 
the-dominance of our belief in the concept of causality and 
the postulated symmetry of explanation and prediction which 
is derived from this belief. It is also due, he claims, 
to a naive belief in the senses, vlhich common sense believes 
can deliver us impartially to the facts and truth of a 
situation. He rails against this crude empiricism 
'It is perhaps just dawning on five or 
six minds that natural philosophy is only a 
world-exposition and world-arrangement (according 
to us, if I may say so!) and not a world explanation; 
but in so far as it is based on belief in the 
senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long 
time to come must be regarded as more - namely, 
as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers 
of its OWn: this operates fascinatingly, 
persuasively and convincingly upon an age with 
fundamentally plebian tastes. What is clear, 
vlhat is "explained"? Only that which can be 
seen and felt - one must pursue every problem 
thus far'. 45 
His critique of empiricism and indeed its ideological 
twin, transcendentalism, remains polemical and speculative, 
daring and iconoclastic, but unsystematic and formally 
undeveloped. However my concern here is not with evaluating 
the coherence or veracity of his portentious claims. Let 
history do that. Rather it is in treating Nietzsche's 
inspired madness as we must approach Marx's work in this study, 
as a symptom, an index, of a subterranean rift occurring in 
Western philosophical thought. This rupture with the classical 
episteme and its egological problematic effects a radical 
discontinuity between this traditional gsnology and an 
epistemology which departs from the new centrality of man~ 
material life, in its concrete historicity and constitutive 
sociality. Nietzsche and Marx theorize on one side of this 
chasm. They can sketch the limits of egologicism from the 
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outside - from the conversational standpoint. The young 
Wittgeristein 'arid indeed Durkheim despite his own sociologism, 
can only trace towards these limits from within egological 
discourse itself. Philosophic thought in the twentieth 
century is an attempt to think the terms, theorize the concepts 
and categories, with which to grasp the import of this rupture, 
trace its implications for epistemology, ontology and ethics, 
and come to terms with egological discourse and its contemporary 
residues. 
To return to Nietzsche: what, we may ask, is left, 
vlhat holds after his genealogical analysis and subsequent 
undermining of the structure of egological discourse? ~.vhat 
constructive insights has Nietzsche passed on to us 'new 
philosophers'. For as Nietzsche himself notes, it is 'no 
small indignity to philosophy to have it decreed, as is so 
welcome nowadays that uphilosophy itself" is criticism and 
critical science - and nothing else whatever!,.46 
Well, to be able to mount his critique of the substantialism 
which pervades egological discourse Nietzsche had to remove 
the major prop which supported the whole edifice. It was 
necessary to desubstantialize language itself: to expurge 
from the theory of signification the binary-correspondence 
form which sends us looking for a particular substantive 
object of reference for every word, and binds representation 
to the rock of the cognizing subject. These linguistic 
reflections in turn led him to reinterpretation of 
consciousness and the self, from the linguistic and hence social 
standpoint. Finally, a synthesis of the new historicism with 
a profound sociologistic scepticism which purged the for.mer 
theme of its teleological tendencies, led to a sketch for a 
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materialist epistemology, albeit of a decidely irrationalist 
. 
character: Nietzsche's promised 'science of the origins of 
thought'. 
Let us now quickly sketch these claims and in so doing 
perhaps knit together some of the topics earlier treated 
in this study, namely those of language, self and cognition. 
Nietzsche saW his philosophical task as an attempt to 
dissolve the habitual hold on thought which the language we 
use imposes. In his discussion of the categories of the 
intellect as we have seen, he strives to trace the necessity 
of these forms to their central role in supporting the conceptual 
edifice through which we interpret the world. This structure 
in turn is largely forced upon us by the grammatical rules 
our language follow. For Nietzsche every word embodies a 
preconceived judgment and language ?s a whole, that is as a 
organic system of grammatical functions, captures and gives 
expression to particular world views. Language is the 
subterranean. source of philosophical mythology. Through 
the intermediate medium of cammon sense, the unconscious 
metaphysics of language sediments itself in philosophical 
discourse proper. 
Moreover our reflections on language, in the philosophy 
of grammar compound and reinforce these metaphysical confusions 
reflecting as they do the substantialization of signification 
itself. 
The importance of language for the development of mankind 
and human knowledge lies of course in the fact that through 
our symbol system we can appropiate the concrete world -
'through language men erect a world of their 
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own alongside the real world, a position they 
hold to be so fixed that from it they hope 
to hoist the other vlorld off its hinges and 
make themselves master of it'.47 
However, argues Nietzsche, man no sooner creates language 
than he proceeds in his philosophy of language and epistemology 
to confuse and conflate language with the real world -
'Man really thought that in language he had 
knowledge of the world. The language-maker 
was not modest enough to realize that he 
had only given designations to things. 
Instead, he believed that he had expressed 
through \tlords the highest knowledge of 
things' .48 
This error involves an erroneous theory of representation 
which seeks as the referent of every sign a thing, substance 
or particular (what we call today the 'Fido' theory of meaning) • 
We view representation as possessing essentially a binary 
structure in which signs derive their meaning from their 
direct correspondence with objects (real or ideal, but certainly 
substantial) • Thus when we confront words and concepts I 
we assume that something substantial must exist as their 
referent. Our theory of representation forces upon us the 
fiction of a world of permanent objects, causa sui. 
with exasperation -
'Language, at its origin, belongs to an age of 
the most rudimentary form of psychology. We 
enter a realm of gross fetishism when we 
He notes 
become conscious of the fundamental presuppositions 
of the metaphysics of language or, in plain 
words, of reason ••• I am afraid we shall not get 
rid of God until we get rid of grammar'.49 
The doctrine of substance in general, and of thinking 
substance or 'ego' and material substance or 'thing in 
itself' in particular, owes its origins to this erroneous 
theory of representation. In turn this theory of the sign reflects 
and reproduces this epistemological doctrine. Classical 
218. 
theory· ·of knovlledge is trapped wi thin the 'mirror recognition 
structtire' 01 our theory of representation. Our philosophy 
of language reflects in turn the structure of Indo-European 
language rather than fundamental eternal truths. 
Language then, Nietzsche insists, is not governed by 
a system of representation which delivers us directly to 
a world of things. For 'things' themselves, that is 
identified and classified objects in the world are the product 
of the interpretative facilities language endows us with. 
Language then does not reveal or correspond to the truth 
rather it sustains illusions. It is an interpretative optic 
which always medi~tes and distorts our cognition of the 
world. Language is then essentially. metaphorical. In its 
allusions it provides a necessary interpretative grid for 
ordering and hence, making sense of the world. 
Nietzsche's philosophical reflections depart from a 
renewed interest by German philology during the nineteenth 
century with language as a natural organic system with a 
cultural specificity and historical origin. Language had 
ceased to be viewed as a pure calculi of representation 
transparent to the world, as indeed we have seen it was so 
grasped in the classical period. The grammar of a language 
is now held to have its own internal density. It has a 
historical background and specific culturally situated set of 
relations of similarity and difference with other languages 
(analysed in the comparative analysis of inflectional systems). 
It no longer merely reflects universal features of the mind 
organized in absolute cognitive selfhood. The word can now 
only represent by means of its place within a grammatical 
system whose organic density always intervenes between pure 
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sign and objective referent. It is of course this new 
pe~vading avlareness of the organic density of language and 
the perception of its material effectivity in the structure 
of semantic significance, sharpened by the empirical 
discoveries of Rask, Bopp, Schlegel, that led to that profound 
distrust in ordin&ry language displayed by positivist thought 
at the turn of the twentieth century. Natural grammar, with 
its historical variations and cultural idiosyncrac~es was 
all but opaque to the structure of the world sought by either 
positivism 'or phenomenology. It could no longer be seen 
as the reflected structure or logic of a universal rationality 
nor the result of the dull imprint of a sensed world. The 
new organic life, objectivity and autonomous expressivity 
afforded to language by romantic philology threatened the 
binary-correspondence form of the sign, so central to egological 
discourse. Positivism began yet again the search for an 
improved or ideal syntax and language, based on logic, and 
on the formalization of the structure of signification within 
the limiting constraints of the positivist organization of 
knowledge; an ideal language to circumvent the~aqueness 
of ordinary language. The development of symbolic logic 
provided the model of a syntax of pure inference free from 
the mire of natural grammar. In turn the empiricist principle -
of verification gave the binary-correspondence conception of 
the sign a new lease of life. Once again the locus of 
language is placed outside of itself - in the reified world 
of positivist knowledge which it is its task to represent. 
The being of language is contracted to the point of a pure 
representat~on of a world known directly and pre-linguistically 
by science. Such a science is, as Wittgenstein grasped, 
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thoroughly egological in its epistemological structure. 
Nietzsche more comprehensively divined the intimate 
structural relations between the classical theory of 
representation and the positivist image of science. Just 
as the metaphysical illusions of Loth physical science and 
speculative psychology could be traced to the form of our 
language, and the false ontologising it leads us into, so 
similarly the binary-correspondence theory of the sign and 
the positivist-empiricist conception of truth and knowledge 
can be traced to the same Source. 
In his philosophy of nihilism, Nietzsche, the 'old 
philologist', tackles both the egological theory of the sign 
and the corresponding positivist conception of science and 
knowledge. Indeed as Danto suggests his nihilism can be 
viewed as a highly dramatised rejection of the CorreEpondence 
Theory of truth which underlies both these epistemic 
structures. 
Nietzsche accepts as fallacious the belief that there 
exists an objective structure and logic to the world 
independent to human cognitive and practical activity towards 
the material world. Similarly he rejects the notion of 
truth as a criteria postulating a necessary relations~ip of 
correspondence between a proposition and a factual state of 
affairs. Indeed he rejects both the view of language and 
of facticity implied in this correspondence theory. 
For him as a philologist, language has its own organ1c 
life related to other aspects of human material life. Its 
signif1cation represent the world not literally, but metaphor1cally 
in a structure at the one time SUbject to the vicissitudes of 
grammar and the pragmatic demands of life itself. Language 
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can never be transparent to its object of representation, 
formed as it 'is,as a system of signification at the interstices 
of culture and history, human need and grammatical 
idiosyncracy. Language possesses a density and autonomous 
expressivity (Herder had invoked the notion of the 'genius' 
of a language, its cultural spirit) which prevents it from 
being purely literal. Like all metaphors the sentences 
of a language, models reality through an interpretation 
rather than through an exact pictorial isomorph. Through 
the metaphorical interpretation which language affords, 
common sense appropriates the world. The world of common 
sense which Nietzsche notes is also the bedrock of philosophy 
and natural science, (he prefigures Husserl's speculations 
on the Lebenswelt) has no independent facti city other than 
our collective fantasies. 
'We have, through millenia, gazed into the 
world with blind inclinations, passions, and 
fears; with moral, religious and aesthetic 
demands; and have so walled in the bad 
manners of illogical thought that the world 
has become amazingly variegated, fearsome, rich 
in spirit and meaning. It has acquired colour, 
but 'Vle were the colorists. The human intel.lect 
has allowed the world of appearance to appear, 
and exported its erroneous presuppositions 
into reality'.~O 
It is in more modern terms, a socially constructed' 
reality. Its facts, sUbstantivized objects and forces are 
interpretative procedures by mea~s of which we order the world. 
Nor is science afforded any surer epistemological basis 
and privileged access to truth by Nietzsche. Its propos1tions, 
concepts and theories also remain interpretative. Its facts 
remained predicated on the selective.perceptions of common 
sense. There is no immediate access to the natural world. 
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Only through the interpretative optic of the concepts of 
a science and their taken for granted common sense basis can 
we come to grips with reality_ Accordingly objectivlty 
resides neither in the privileged jUdgements of a transcendental 
observer nor in mere giveness of empirical objects of 
cognition but rather in a breadth of perspective. He warns: 
'Let us, from now on, be on our guard against 
the hallowed philosopher's myth of a "pure, will-
less, painless, time-less knower"; let us 
beware of the tentacles of such contradictory 
notions as "pure reason", "absolute knovlledge" 
"absolute intelligence". AI! these concepts 
presuppose an eye such as no living being can 
imagine, an eye required to have no 
direction, to abrogate its active and lnter-
pretative powers - precisely those powers that 
alone make of seeing, seeing something. The 
more emotions we allow to speak ln a given 
matter, the more differ~nt eyes we can put 
on in order to view a given spectacle, the 
more complete will be our conception of it, 
the greater our "objectivity".51 
Here is a theory of perspectivism somewhat similar to 
that later popularized by Karl Mannheim, Nietzsche attacks 
the empiricist - ideology of cognition as the pure vision 
of a factual essence by a privileged absolute observer. He 
does so on the basis of his transformation of the classical 
theory of representation. He seeks to transform semiotics 
from the metaphysical search for an isomorphlc relationship 
between words and things, mediated through the cognition 
of an absolute subject to instead, the science of human 
signifying activity. ThiS involves for him a rejection ot 
the classica~ idea of grammar and linguistic for.m as the 
reflection of universal mind. He regrets also the corresponding 
positivist notion of meaning as an entity or relationship 
existing in the world itself or in languages relationship to 
the world independent of human practical activity. Instead 
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ne argues, linguistic forms and indeed scientific syntax, 
have the meaning they do because they are used by man. The 
guarantee of their validity is to be found only in their use. 
The meaning and value of every linguistic sign is embodied in 
the history and ethnography of the society in which it 
figures. This for Nietzsche is the true meaning of an 
empiricist theory of signification, not the vUlgar sensationalism 
of Locke and Hurne which remains thoroughly egological. 52 
With the transformation in the theory of representation 
goes, as we have seen, the expurging of the constitutive 
categories of the classical theory - the absolute signifying 
subject; the reified object world and the perfectly transparent 
sign. The triple foundations of the classical theory with 
their egological structure are revealed as fictions. 
Moreover for Nietzsche consciousness itself, as a 
concept, must be purged of its egological taint. He strongly 
denies the central axiom of egologicism, namely, that we have 
immediate access to the workings of our own minds and have 
52 indubitable knowledge of ourselves as cognitive agents. 
In fact like Sartre after him, he denies that our knowledge 
of ourselves is any more certain than our knowledge of others. 
It is only as Sartre would have said. more intimate. 
Consciousness for Nietzsche does not define the 
essence of man as it did for Descartes. He believes that 
it developed late,as a faculty in the evolution of the 
human species. He is aware that many sensory-motor skills 
operate more effectively without the hesitating reflection, 
of self-consciousness. The. functional and evolutionary 
explanation of the emergence of reflective consciousness. 
I 
11es for Nietzsche, as it did for Marx, in a grasping of the 
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role of social life and communicational practices in t~e 
formation of consciousness. 
Marx in his German Ideology insists 
'Language is as old as consciousness, 
language ~ practical consciousness that 
exists also for other men, and for that 
reason alone it really exists from the 
need, the necessity, of intercourse 
with other men. Where there exists a 
relationship, it exists for me~ the 
animal does not enter into "relations" 
with anything, it does not enter into any 
relation at all. For the animal, its 
relation to others does not exist as a 
relation. Consciousness is therefore, 
from the beginning a social product, and 
remain~ so as long as men exist, at 
all' .5L: 
Similarly for Nietzsche consciousness is to be understood 
not as an essential attribute of the indivldual qua 
individual but rather in terms of the relations between 
individuals. These social relations and the communicational 
practices which facilitate them predate individual consciousness 
and indeed are its condition. 
'The fundamental mistake is to think of 
consciousness as an individual attribute, and 
the highest form of individual existence, 
rather than understanding it as a tool in 
the collective life'.SS 
Consciousness is then primarily a means of communication 
and has a conversational rather than egological ontological 
basis. 'It is developed in social intercourse and with 
regards to social interests,.S6 
The reflective capacities which egological epistemology 
ascribes implici tly to the cogi to and vlhich are the unexamined 
foundation of the Cartesian axiology must be grasped as the 
product of the social and communicational capacities of man. 
Reflective consciousness has a social rather than private and 
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transcendental origin. 57 Like Marx, Nietzsche sees the 
a-social individual postulated by enlightenment thought as 
the starting point of both epistemolosical and social theory, 
as a fiction and indeed an ideological conspiracy by 
bourgeois thought (he does not use these terms) against 
concrete human life. For Nietzsche the capacity for 
reflection and the appearance of the self as a knowledge 
object for consciousness are both dependent on the social 
attitude the individual adopts towards himself. Language 
facilitates this social attitude and develops it.. He 
notes in a perception which in a striking way anticipates 
George Herbert Mead's later observations -
'the development of language goes hand 
in hand with the development of consciousness 
It is only as a social animal that man 
becomes conscious of himself I ,58 
There is then no separate primary world of res cogitans 
as rationalism postulates. Nor any immediate experience 
as held by empiricism. Nor is there a language of 
private mentalistic concepts which refers to consciousness and 
its 'contents', Both the psychical and physical world are 
talked about and thus formed as interpretative product, 
in a public communal language tied to human practica~ life. 
He states 
'My motion is that consciousness does not 
belong to the individual existence of men, 
but to what is the community - and herd-nature 
and consequently that each of us, with the 
best will in the world of understanding himself 
as individually as possible, of "knowing himself" 
will always bring into consciousness the non 
individual and the average'.599 
Danto draws our attention to the close har.mony between 
Nietzsche's views on language and consciousness and those 
of contemporary analytical philosophy of language. Nietzsche's 
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critique of the egological formulation of consciousness 
and· language circumscribes an area of discussion later 
addressed at some length in ~vi ttgenstein I s attack in his 
philosophical Investigations, on the possibility of a 
private language and in Strawson's 'discove:y of the social~ty 
of the self in his analysis of the logical geograph? of our 
1 t 1 · t· 60 anguage 0 persona ascr~p ~on • Marx, of course, also 
anticipates the 'originality' of recent analytical 
pnilosoph~es cLaim to have revealed by 'log~cal analysis' 
the necessarily social nature of our 1anguage. He s~mply 
notes that production by an isolated ~ndividual outside 
society - 'is as much of an absurdity as is the development 
of language without individuals living together and taDing to 
61 each other'. Such 'harmonies', 'influences' or 
'anticipat~ons' indicate a profound structural continuity in 
western philosophical thought in the twentieth century: an 
essentially sociologistic or conversational epistemic basis 
to philosophical thought, which emerges as philosophic method 
comes to term with sociolOgical reason. Nietzsche's 
precocious insights, like those of Marx, are an early index 
of the deep changes taking place in the organization of our 
knowledge at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth. Post-war analytical philosophy despite 
its pretensions of supreme originality (gained by an active 
suppression of the history of philosophy and social theory) is 
merely the effect of these deep structural changes. 
Marx and Nietzsche's critical work indicates and gives 
expression for the first time to a rupture in the historical 
development of epistemology. Language, self and cognition 
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for so long explicated v.lithin an egological problematic 
\tThich absolutised the self, reified the world, and nullified 
the autonomy of language and interpretative dimensions of 
cognition, now are to be viewed from the social standpoint 
as human, all too human', processes and accomplishments. 
Man could no longer be treated as a transcendental surrogate 
nor a natural object, a 'L'homrne machine', but as a self-
generating species formed within the finitude of material life. 
Marx's speculations on language and consciousness and 
on the role of symbolic interaction in the development of~e 
historical practice of social grou~and classes remain 
undeveloped, to be explored by later theorists such as 
Lukacs and Goldman. Nietzsche's investigations of the 
form of concrete human life rarely proceed further than 
the curious vitalism invoked in his notion of a driving 
'will to power' behind man; they avlai t the appearance of a 
proper science of the psyche such as Freud was to develop-
And yet each of them has broken from egological discourse 
in his OWn way. Each offers us a blinding critique of that 
discursive formation and reveals it as a fiction. Each 
grapples with the epistemic implications of the new centrality 
of sociality and material practice to understanding human 
reality. 
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CHAPTER SEIDJ 
PHILOSOPHY AS A RIGORClJS SCIENCE: 
HUSSERL AND THE CRISIS IN EGOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
"To close your ears to even the best counter-argument once 
the decision has been taken: sign of a strong character. 
Thus an occasional will to stupidity." 
Nietzsohe: Beyond Good and EViL 
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(ij Husserl: main themes - a scientific basis for philosophy 
The"ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science1 haunts 
Husserl's writings. He is acutely conscious of the rapid 
advances made by various of the natural sciences towards the twin 
epistemological ideals of a unified riJorous methodology and 
progressive accumulatior. of publicly validated results. He is 
also aware as an analyst of European culture, of the increasing 
domination of European thought at the turn of the twentieth 
century by the scientific Weltanschauung. The discipline of 
Philosophy, which Husserl wishes to give a firm foundation in 
his phenomenological method, is one in a state of acute crisis. 
Philosophy is seemingly threatened in its very existence by the 
rise of the positive sciences which have robbed it of much of 
its earlier prestige. Philosophy pro~~tes itself before science 
in facile imitation. Or worse, according to Husserl, it turns 
its back on this new rationality and returns to earlier idealist 
positions and irrationalities. 
For Husserl however, philosophy will not attain the scientific 
status, which has so far eluded it in its long history, by a 
formal mimicry of the methodological fiats and theoretical 
practices of the natural sciences. It will do so rather by 
demarcating its own discrete methodology and specific object. 
Thus he argues, a scientific philosophy will not be found in the 
prevalent 'naturalism' or naive scientism of his day. This 
approach claims the status of a scientific philosophy merely 
by virtue of its proclamation of the need for a scientific 
base to philosophy. Such a base will it is hoped be provided 
by importing wholesale the principles and procedures of the success' 
ful natural sciences. Husserl stands in the face of this 
philosophical torrent which seeks to reduce epistemology to the 
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philosophy of scientific method. 2 For him the goal of a 
rigorous science of philosophy is in no way to be confused 
or conflated with a positivist philosophy of science which 
seeks to drag philosophical knowledge and method before a 
tribunal of idealized scientific practice. 
Husserl identifies as the core of this naturalism, and 
the positivism which is its philoscphical eXpression, the 
doctrine of physicalism: only that which is physical and hence 
capable of being experienced directly, is credited with reality. 
As a philosopher with a background in mathematics and logic, 
Husserl is well aWare of the difficulties the physicalist thesis 
has in demarcating the existential status of mathematical and 
logical objects. Indeed he employs his knowledge of the 
structure and foundation of these formal sciences to both 
lambast the naive empiricism of positivist philosophy and to 
defend his own phenomenological science of ideal essences. 3 
The major object however of Husserl's assault on the 
naturalistic reduction of the philo~ophical·task is the psycho-
psychical psychology of his day as represented in the work of 
Wilhem Wundt. Much o£ Husserl's early work is directed at 
distinguishing the scienc~s of psychology and philosophy (in its 
phenomenological form). After the publication of 'Logical 
~~~~~,,4 ' ~ ani examination of the intuitive foundations of formal 
logic, he had to defend phenomenology strenuously from the charge 
of psychologismS and from its frequent reduction to a sub-domain 
of empirical psychology. This charge particularly galled 
Husserl, as he had himself, in his earlier work, expended 
considerable time and effort in attacking the prevalent psycho-
logistic approach to logical and mathematical meta studies. 
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Husserl insists, as categorically as Kant before him, 
. 
that phenomenology is 'as little identifiable with psychology 
as is geometry with natural science'. Like Kant he strives 
to rescue for epistemology a realm safe from the immanence 
and contingency of empirical experience. There is, he asserts 
a fundamental difference between psychology and phenomenological 
philosophy, which is in no way bridged by the fact that both 
deal with 'consciousness, with all types of experience, vIi th 
acts and their correlates'. Though as he points out in 
exasperation; 'in view of the prevailing habits of thoughtt it 
demands no small effort to see this,.6 
Husserl like Kant clearly perceived that egological 
philosophy (Husserl is the first to use the title egology for 
his philosophy) could only be freed from the solipsistic and 
sceptical consequences of the psychologistic empiricism of 
Berkeley and Hume by positing as the condition of objective 
cognition a pure or transcendental self. The isolation of this 
syr~thesing cognitive agent was more than compensated for by its 
postulated absolute and universal nature. 
For Husserl the fundamental difference between phenomenology 
and psychology is not that they address different concrete 
objects. In fact they both treat of consciousnesst though 
psychology attempts to reduce it to a series of parallel 
determining physical states of the body. Rather the difference 
is one of 'ways of looking at things'. psychology 'looks at' 
consciousness and other psychic processes from within the 
'natural standpoint'. That is from a philosophically 
unsophisticated stance which takes for granted many features of 
the reality addressed within it. Huss:l traces our cognition 
A 
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from this stance -
'1 find continually present and standing over 
against me the one spatio-temporal fact world 
to which I myself belong, as do all other men 
found in it and related in the same way to it. 
This 'fact world', as the word already tells 
us, I find to be out there and also take it 
just as it gives itself to me as some thing that 
exists out there'.7 
All natural science, including psychology, operates from 
within this natural standpoint, simply assuming that the material 
investigated, whether natural or psychic is simply given in the 
world, just there. Psychology like all natural sciences is 
'naive in regard to its point of departure'. Its method is 
based on an implicit ontology which gives physical extended 
substance an absolute though unjustified existential pre-eminence. 
Psychology does not investigate the contents of consciousness 
in their own right - that is as intentional objects !£E conscious-
ness, about which questions of material existence, independent 
of cognition, are irrelevant. It interprets the objects of 
consciousness through the naive rp.alist grid of the natural 
standpoint; from the outside in. The objects of consciousness 
are not investigated as they appear in their essence to conscious-
ness. Psychology, like all the sciences which operate from 
within the natural standpoint is a science of outer facts, of 
describable and contingent relations between material or psychic 
entities. In Wundt's hands indeed, as Husserl notes, the 
psychical is treated as a mere parallel epiphenomenon of the 
physical. Husserl regards this reductionism as a deplorable 
consequence of the spell of naturalism over the science of 
psychology. 
However even non-reductionist psychology addresses itself 
to consciousness and its autonomous acts remain trapped within 
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the natural standpoint. For as an empirical science the 
psychical events it descriDes are still seen as belonging to 
nature and as belonging to an embodied or 'brute' consciousness. 
As Husserl notes: 
'To eliminate the relation to nature \lould 
deprive the psychical of its character as an 
objectively and temporally determinable fact 
of nature, in short of its character as a 
psychological fact'.S 
Psychology, in so far as its judgements involve the 
existential positing of a physical nature as part of a self-
evident pre-datum to its own theorizing, remains within the 
natural standpoint. 
A phenomenology of consciousness on the other hand does 
not deal with this empirical consciousness existentially 
situated in a material world. It deals with neither facts 
nor experience, nor with what is normally referred to as 'reality'. 
Phenomenology is concerned with pure consciousness, the 
consciousness of a transcendental ego which has been purified 
by means of the phenomenological procedure of methodological 
/ doubt (the epoche) and rid of its naturalistic and other mundane 
pre-suppositions. The theoretical object of this pure conscious-
ness is the essential and necessary features of cognized 
phenomena. Phenomenological science is a science of non-empirical, 
ideal essences revealed or intuited by a pure consciousness whose 
cognitive vision is unhampered by the mask of mundane and 
naturalistic thought. Natural science, physical or psychical, 
in its empirical 'real' descriptions penetrates only the outer 
aspects of the phenomena it studies: Phenomenological science, 
with its philosophically refined vision, aims to penetrate to 
the heart of those phenomena given to consciousness. This it 
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promises to do not by an exhaustive empirical or even causal 
analysis of the phenomena studied but oy an investigation of 
consciousness itself as the medium ~n which Being is revealed. 
Within the psychologistic logic of empiricism, phenomena, the 
object of positive science, can only exist vis a vis a sensing 
consciousness which perceives them. Thns it seems to Husserl 
as it did to Kant, that the grounds of objectivity of phenomena 
and universality of scientific cognition should be sought in 
the nature of human cognition itself. Husserl's phenomenology 
follows the prevailing and paradoxical trend in egological 
epistemology which reduces objectivity more and more to the 
activity of the subject. As Adorno has noted: 
'Once the object becomes an object of cognition 
its physical side is spiritualized from the 
outset by translation into epistemology by a 
reduction of the sort which in the end, in 
general was methodologically prescribed by the 
phenomenology of Husserl' .10 
After the phenomenoligical reduction the object indeed 
does become spiritualized. It becomes the intentional object 
constituted by and for a transcencen~al ego - the absolute 
subjective pole of all objectivity. The cognizing self in 
turn becomes, after the reduction, disembodied and privatized 
and even with its newly ascribed universality and absoluteness, 
rendered increasingly impotent in the real world. Phenomenology 
in its search for the apodictic attempts ~o expel the living 
and socially situated subject from consciousness and meaning 
production. It replaces it with an absolute consciousness to 
which the object world is revealed and~oowhich it ultimately 
is dependant for its objectivity. Husserl's evocation of a 
trascendental ego, as the absolute subject for which the world 
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has being, is the last and most elaborate attempt to master 
the. object vlorld from the standpoint of the subject and to 
deal with the consequences for epistemology of the systematic 
unthinking of the social being of the self. 
For Husserl, objectivity is given only in the cognitive 
t f · 11 ac s 0 a pure conSC1ousneSS. Validity is tied to transcendental 
subjectivity_ The apodictic giveness of the object is 
to be completely established within the structure of the 
cognitive act itself. Whereas Descartes made the cogito 
an axiom, o,r indubitable principle, from which all other knowledge 
can be derived, Husserl treats the cogito as an active constituting 
agent and the cogitaturn as the objective correlate of the 
cogito. Being is revealed in the very structure of our knowing 
acts or at least in our phenomenological reflection on these. 
The Husserlian ego claims the synthetic powers of Kant's 'I 
think' but rejects the formal limitations Kant places upon 
transcendental consciousness. Kant's categorial intellect does 
not advance beyond purely formal judgements. Moreover, Husserl 
believes the distinction between form and content has dualistic 
consequences - the postulation of a realm of being, the 'thing 
in itself' to which consciousness and hence knowledge can have 
no access. Husserl argues critical epistemology must drop its 
talk of things-in-themselves, since what things essentially 
!!! is adequately revealed in consciousness itself. The task 
of a transcendental phenomenology is the investigation of the 
manner in which phenomena appear to us in consciousness. This 
inevitably, for Husserl, is to be accomplished by a reflective 
analysis of the cognitive or intentional acts of an absolute 
or transcendental subject at the heart of consciousness. It is 
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to this ego that the world, as intentional phenomena, appears, 
-
in and through its meaning endowing acts. The world of 
objective being becomes the correlate (noema) of an absolute 
cognitive subject. It is posited through the meaning 
constituting (noesis) of this transcendental ego. Husserl 
writes 
'the real world exists, but in respect of 
essence is relative to transcendental 
subjectivity, and in such a way that it 
can have its meaning as existing reality 
only as the intentional meaning product. of 
a transcendental subjectivity. But 
that first attains its full meaning when 
the phenomenological disclosure of the 
transcendental ego is so far advanced 
that the experience of fellow subjects 
implicit in it has won its reduction to 
transcendental experience l • l2 
The objectivity of phenomena is guaranteed by the apodictic 
cognition of a transcendental subjectivity, rather than by its 
inter-subjective verification by a community of investigators. 
For the eidetic structures which Husserl defines as the object 
of valid cognition are revealed exclusively to pure consciousness. 
After the transcendental phenomenological reduction which for 
Husserl becomes the condition for an eidetic analysis, II 
ami, notes Husserl, Ino longer a human ego in the universal 
existentially posited world, but exclusively a subject for which 
the world has being l • l3 
The world in its objective essence is to be grasped as 
unities of meaning constituted by a sense giving consciousness. 
The intentional· object is no longer conceived as in Brentano's 
'realism', as the pre-existing, extra-conscious referent to 
which the intending act refers, but as something given ~ and 
through the acts of consciousness themselves. Husserl attacks 
the objectivism of modern naturalistic philosophy which seeks 
2h1 • 
to locate the source of objectivity naively in the dull 
tacticity of the world. He applauds Kant for having exposed 
this naivety and in his Copernican revolution placed man at 
the centre of cognition. However for both Kant and Husserl, 
it is not man as a practico-social agent, who is placed at 
the centre of objective cognition but his transcendental 
surrogate - pure consciousness. Husserl's man is a particularly 
bloodless, sexless, privatized spirit, 'a purely theoretical 
spectator', only rescued from solipsism by its theoretical 
inflation to an absolute pure spirit. 
'The universality of the absolute spirit embraces all 
being in an absolute historicity, into which nature fits as 
d t f · 't' 14 a pro uc 0 sp~r~ • 
Transcendental phenomenology stressed the need in its 
reductive method, to set aside questions of the material 
existence of the objects under investigation. The constitution 
of meaning replaces the concern with the existence or non-
existence of objects. However the objectivism of positivist 
philosophy is replaced with the subjectivism of phenomenology. 
Neither philosophy grasps man objectively i.e. as a practico-
social agent, as both subject and object of history. Both 
positivism and phenomenology form a symmetry of paradoxes. within 
a common epistemic structure. 
For Husserl the move away from the naively accepted 
natural world is accompanied by the corresponding move towards 
transcendental subjectivity_ The transcendental ego, and the 
transcendental ego alone, becomes the agent of meaning 
constitutiQn. For this pure subject is what is left, as an 
apodictically given essence, when the whole existent world, 
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including ourselves as embodied and socialized agents is 
brackete~ and naive belief in its existence suspended. 
Husserl's mtt~opological turn remains constrained within the. 
stranglehold of egological discourse. 
Husserl adds to the ego logy of Cartesian rationalism the 
transcendental and constitutive dimension that Kant had given 
the cogito. For Descartes and Kant however the enquiry into 
the structure of cognition is motivated by the search for the 
conditions of possibility of the natural sciences. Kant 
locates, as we have seen, the objectivity of phenomena in the 
synthesing judgements of the human mind. His major framework 
of analysis is provided by problems of objectivity and 
explanation which, as Hume had revealed faced the natural 
sciences in an age of empiricism. Descartes 'Discourse on 
Method' is primarily intended as an essay in the philosophy 
of natural scientific method. 
However in the twentieth century, in the face of the 
onslaught from positivism, Husserl is able to achieve an 
explicit synthesis of the egological and transcendental themes 
and revive the flagging fortunes of egologicism only by shifting 
the focus of the transcendental analytic from the epistemological 
foundations of the natural sciences to those of the human sciences. 
Whether Husserl is aware of it or not, the epistemic ground 
beneath him is shifting. Husserl despite his encyclopaedic 
pretensions has not the intimate experience of the natural 
sciences that Descartes or even Kant had. He writes within a 
Ger.man idealist tradition in which the rupture between the 
positive sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften is already a 
fait accompli dominating philosophical developments. Critical 
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philosophy driven before the chilling blasts of positivism 
is forced towards the terrain of anthropology or philosophy 
of human being. This path has already been roughly tramped 
by the historical and cultural sciences and given a crude form 
in the historicist and Weltanschauung reflections of these 
sciences. It had yet to find coherent philosophical expression. 
Husserl struggles to contain this anthropological turn within 
the limits of egologicis~. 
He recognizes the importance of 'history in the broadest 
sense for the philosopher' and the centrality of cultural 
enquiry for philosophy. But he seeks to subordinate these 
dimensions to a phenomenological theory of essences. This 
alone can provide an adequate foundation for the Geisteswissen-
schaften. lS Husserl savagely attacks historicism's 
pretensions that it constitutes a theory of knowledge, albeit 
sceptical in form. 
and 
'The science of history, or simply empirical 
humanistic science in general, can of itself 
decide nothing, either in a positive or in a 
negative sense, as to whether a distinction 
is to be made between art as a cultural 
formation of valid art, between historical 
and valid law, and finally between historical 
and valid philosophy'.l6 
'Consequently, just as historical science 
can advance nothing relevant against the 
possibility of an absolute (i.e. scientific) 
metaphysics or any other philosophy'.l7 
However, despite his rejection of historical scepticism 
he remains unable to think through the implications of the 
development of a materialist i.e. non-hi~toricist theory of 
history for epistemology. Fixated as he is with the 
transcendental'constitution of being, he is incapable of 
reflecting philosophically on the eroduction of knowledge 
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under discrete historically given conditions of existence, 
History~emains always an external 'contextual' set of relations 
to the development of knowledge and not an intrinsic set of 
conditions for its actual production. 
He accordingly looks to philosophy, as an absolute science 
to provide an apodictic foundation for an empirical discipline 
whose epistemological legitimation necessarily lies outside of 
itself. This is achieved by effectively reducing the science 
of history to its historicist ideological echo and by treating 
history as the philosophy of the spirit and its progress. 
'the discovery of the common spirit is just 
as significant as the discovery of nature. 
In fact, a deeper penetration into the 
spirit offers the philosopher a more 
original and hence more fundamental research 
material than does penetration into nature. 
For the realm of phenomenology, as a theory 
of essence, extends immediately from the 
individual spirit over the whole area of the 
general spirit ( ) I would say that it 
is the phenomenological theory of essence 
alone that is capable of providing a 18 
foundation for a philosophy of the spirit'. 
Neither history nor sociality are to be given any 
autonomy by Husserl. They are to be roped to the cognitive 
activity of an absolute spirit, shorn of their materialist 
epistemological implications, and broken in under a strict 
phenomenological orthodoxy_ 
Husserl announces 
'It is. my conviction that intentional phenomenology 
has for the first time made spirit as spirit 
the field of systematic, scientific experience, 
thus effecting a total transformation of the task 
of knowledge'.l9 
What the historical and cultural sciences have lacked to 
date, argues Husserl, is this philosophical foundation. They 
have aped the naive objectivism of the natural sciences but 
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failed to generate a coherent groundwork for their multi-
var-ious methods. Moreover in their self-proclaimed 
demarcation from natural science and in their 'dispute for 
equal rights', they have failed to grasp that the cultural 
sciences address a more embracing reality than the natural 
sciences and indeed are a condition oE the latter. 
'The spirit and in fact only the spirit is 
a being in itself and for itself; it is 
autonomous and is capable of being handled 
in a genuinely rational, genuinely and 
thoroughly scientific way only in this autonomy. 
In regard to nature and scientific truth 
conoerning it, however, the natural sciences 
give merely the appearance of having brought 
nature to a point where for itself it is 
rationally known. For true nature in its 
proper scientific sense is a product of the 
spirit that investigates nature, and thus 
the science of nature presupposes the 
science of spirit. The spirit is essentially 
qualified to exercise self-knowledge, and 
as scientific self-knowledge, and that over 
and over again'.20 
Husserl in his rejection of naturalism seems to be moving 
towards an anthropologising of epistemology. However as 
in all philosophical anthropology (Husserl's has a distinct 
'-
Hegelian flavour), man is conceived only in abstract, 
essentialist terms. Phenomenology promises us an analytic 
of human existence, but in fact reduces that being to the 
insubstantiality of a pure ego, - the theoretical observer. 
This ego, as spirit, is credited with an abstract universalit~ 
Husserl unlike Hegel gives us no account of the ontogenesis 
of this spirit. For Hegel the self-consciousness of spirit 
depends on its relation and interaction with the other, as 
metaphorically portrayed in the master-slave relation. For 
Husserl however, the ego is credited with immediate powers of 
reflection and self-consciousness. Absolute spirit is simplY 
there, a necessary starting point for all philosophizing. 
,I 
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The other is always an object for the transcendental subject. 
Intersubjectivity is guaranteed by the pure universality of 
the ego. Even nature, itself, in its objective essence, is 
to be grasped as circumscribed by spirit. Only this 
egological attitude, 
'brings about the successful institution of 
an absolutely autonomous science of spirit 
in the form of a consistent understanding of self. 
and of the world, as a spiritual accomplishment. 
Spirit is not looked upon here as part of nature 
of parallel to it; rather nature belongs to 
the sphere of spirit'.21 
Only from this egological attitude, argues Husserl, can 
we approach an analytic of human being, unencumbered by the 
objectivist illusions which dominate both the cultural and 
natural sciences and which are the source 'of what has become 
for man an unbearable unclarity regarding his own existence 
and his infinite tasks,.22 
Husserl has sensed that the new objectivity of history 
and sociality threaten the very being of 'mad as an essential 
category. Unlike Marx or Nietzsche, he can not give expression 
~ d 
to this intuition and announce, as they do, the end of man. 
Instead he resists these objectivities, the materiality of 
language, history and life within which man as such is formed. 
He retreats to the last defensive bastion of egological discourse 
the ego itself. 23 The ego must renounce the material world, 
and retreat into its own interiority, if man's essential being, 
stripped of its existential contingency is to be revealed to 
him, 'only if the spirit returns to itself from its naive 
exteriorization, clinging to itself and purely to itself, can 
it be adequate to itself,.24 
Husserl's philosophical anthropology remains an effect 
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of his egological epistemology and not a challenge to it. 
"However, phenomenological philosophy after Husserl, 
quickly departed from the transcendental egological basis and 
anti-psychologistic stance Husserl strOve to give it. The 
epistemological dimension of phenomenology Soon became 
subordinate to the philosophical anthropological interest, and 
the transcendental investigations secondary to a concrete 
analytic of the mode of human being. Phenomenology as 
Foucault tells us, 'has never been able to exorcize the 
insidious kinship, its simultaneous promising and threatening 
proximity to the empirical analysis of man,.25 Phenomenology 
after Husserl took the conversational turn; it breaks with 
Husserl's transcendental project to plot a philosophical 
anthropology of inter-personal relations and situations. 
Its rupture from egological discourse, however, remains 
partial. It remains adulterated with the residues of 
Husserl's egologicism. The cogito becomes in the later 
phenomenology of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and Schutz, 
embodied, socialized, sexualized and historicized. Yet it 
strives to maintain itself as an autonomous organizational centre 
of being in the face of the pervading dull materiality of the 
unthought. It struggles to be, in this autonomy, 'adequate to 
itself'. The self of existential phenomenology distances 
itself from the other, from history, the unconscious and .la~~uage. 
It strives to protect its own immanence. Confronted with the 
unthought it suffers nausea. This materiality is experienced 
as something which in its uncompromising resistance, otherness, 
to consciousness, challenges the primacy of the cogito. The 
epistemic individualism of egologicism is transmuted into the 
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isolated personalism of existentialism. However the 
structural dichotomy of subject and object is not breached by 
this replacement of the transcendental ego by the person 
trapped in his existential isolation. It appears only in 
different, more fantastic forms - as in Sartre's phenomenology 
of personal relations. Social phenomenology remains trapped 
within the residues of egologicism. 
We have already plotted the dominant structure within 
egological epistemology, namely, the subject-object equation, 
in which a subject (transcendental or empirical), through 
a valid knowledge act, 'sees', 'grasps', or 'reveals', the 
essence of an object given to it in the medium of consciousness. 
Husserl introduces new terms to this equation, drawing from 
an egological tradition that stretches from Descartes to Kant 
and German idealism. The concept of intBntionality serves to 
bind together the poles of the egological equation. In the 
later work this scholastic term is increasingly interpreted 
as the process of the transcendental constitution of the object 
as a unity of meaning. It serves as a teleological nexus to 
anchor the object in the constituting activity of the subject. 
Objectivity for Husserl finds its permanence and universality 
in the cognitive acts of a pure ego. As a result of the 
studied neglect of the inter-subjective dimension of scientific 
objectivity, this absolute subject becomes, in Husserl's theory, 
the sale and a priori condition for valid coqnition. Its 
being becomes the overarching condition, like the Hegelian Spirit, 
for the objective cognition of any individual empirical subject. 
The cognitive process and the activity of scientific 
enquiry continue to be synonomous for Husserl. ~o9nition .is 
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understood,as in positivism, by means of a perceptual metaphor. 
The ~m 'of phenomenological cognition becomes to guarantee 
knowledge of what is for consciousness. It seeks to make 
evident the contents of consciousness and by facilitating, 
through the phenomenological method of reduction the elimination 
of the contingent and merely factual in phenomena, to reveal 
for consciousness the essential attributes of the object. 
Husserl's critique of cognition is at the same time a theory of 
the constitution of being. The transcendental phenomenological 
analysis, having removed the naturalistic blinkers from our 
eyes, renders visible the valid constitution of the world as 
an objective meaning complex intended by a pure and absolute 
ego. Phenomenology recognizes consciousness as a 'self-contained 
system of being' and proceeds to offer us an analytic of it in 
its radical autonomy from the concrete world of concrete 
existence. And yet, Husserl himself as leader of the 
phenomenological movement, strongly desired that his philosophical 
project should be a co-operative and progressive enterprise. 
He hoped that his methodology would provide a rigorous, unified 
method for philosophy which would allow the contributions of 
other scholars. Through a unity of method, phenomenology 
could become, like any positive science, a shared and accummul-
ative project, co-operatively carried out and developed by a 
community of scholars. That is, he tacitly recognizes that 
scientific activity is an inter-subjective practice. It is so 
with regard its method, for the adoption of a common unified 
depends on concrete communication of results, concepts and 
theories amongst philosphers. Husserl recognized that the 
scientificity of philosophy rested on its ability to be an 
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accumulation of completely verified propositions. In so far 
- ' 
as these propositions must be verified by their justification 
before a tribunal of scientific peers then, the development 
of philosophy as a science will depend not only on the validity 
of phenomenological cognition for a solitary transcendental 
ego but also its justification for an inter-subjective 
scientific community governed by a unified method. There is 
of course a tension between the egological and implicit 
intersubjective requirements of valid scientific knowledge. 
Husserl is never able to resolve this tension within his 
tran~endental framework, for his explicit philosophical 
method confines epistemology to the solipsistic level. The 
core acknowledged resource of his critical epistemology is the 
reflective powers of a solitary, if absolute ego. However 
Husserl is forced by the pressing need to provide a concrete 
universality for scientific knowledge and practice to deal with 
the inter-subjective dimension of scientific cognition. 
His actual concrete propaganda and programme of philosophical 
reform is based on the tacit acceptance of the possibility of 
inter-subjectivity in general and linguistic communication and 
concrete scientific practice in particular. The project of 
philosophical reform he preaches rests on these episternic 
resources. They cannot, however, be theorized within the terms 
of his egology. 
Transcendental phenomenology in its bracketing out of 
the concrete world of common sense, with its naturalistic 
underpinnings, reduces meaning, including the significance of 
linguistic signs, to the pure, intentional, meaning endowing 
acts of a single, albeit universal cognitive subject. It seeks 
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a primal pOint of origin for meaning behind language, its 
- ' 
structures and the material context of communicational practices. 
It mirrors positivism in this systematic neglect of the being 
of language as a practico-social system of signs and practices. 
Whereas for positivism the meaning of a proposition is somehow 
in the world, or at l~ast in the isomorphic relation of 
proposition and the world, for phenomenology linguistic meaning 
is seen as constituted in its essence by the signifying act 
and intentions of a transcendental ego; the one roots meaning 
originally in the object, the other in the subject. Both 
attempt to transcend the social and pragmatic basis of 
language and in doing so end up nihilating rather than clarify-
ing the foundation of linguistic meaning. Moreover each 
strand of egological thought presupposes language and communi-
cation as a condibion of their analysis, yet each in their 
abstraction and reductionism progressively erodes the practico A 
communicational foundation of signification. 
Husserl in his search for the apodictic, suspends the 
thesis of the natural standpoint and puts in brackets of 
methodological doubt, the objectivity and facticity naively 
ascribed to the world. He seeks to replace this naive 
certainty with the indubitability of the transcendental judgement 
with its guaranteed noematic objectivity. However we may ask -
is language i.e. ordinary language, to be treated as being 
inside or outside of the brackets placed around concrete life 
experience? If it is inside, then it falls with the rest of 
the contents of the Lebenswelt and in its uninvestigated state is 
not available as a tool of analysis with which to effect the 
phenomenological reduction. If it is exempt from the reduction, 
we may ask, why is it so exempt? 
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In fact Husserl naively assumes the existence of 
. 
ordinary language as a condi~on of his phenomenological analysis. 
This is conducted and reported through the only means we have 
of describing personal experience - ordinary language. 
Language remains an unexplored presupposition of his phenomeno-
logical method. There is more to the cogito than meets the 
phenomenological eye. 
Within egological discourse the systematic neglect of 
the sociality of consciousness led to the 'problem of other 
minds', as we shall see. Similarly a neglect of the eminent 
sociality of language leads to the 'problem of meaning', i.e. 
the problem of how linguistic utterances can have meaning. 
These problems are the theoretical cul de sacs into which 
egological discourse eventually leads philosophy. 
The investigation of the common sense world and ordinary 
language once it had freed itself from both positivism and 
transcendentalism,and accepted the primacy of social process 
and communicative practice,became a pivotal one for the 
explication of the new epistemology we have called the conver-
sational. For it was these areas, the common sense world and 
ordinary language, that become in the late 1920's and 30's,the 
major concern of the four philosophic traditions. Within 
phenomenology Heidegger placed language and communication at 
the heart of being human. Scheler and Schutz began the 
investigation of the Lebenswelt as socially constituted. In 
the pragmatist tradition Mead analysed the gesture and the role 
of language in the genesis of mind. Analytical philosophy in 
turn following the lead of WittgEnstein and John Austin, 
abandoned the logist project in favour of naturalistic description 
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of language use and its socio-contextual features. Within 
Marxism, Volosinov explicated for the first 
PhilOSOPhy1langUage which firmly rooted the 
time, a materialist 
analysis of meaning 
within a sociologistic perspective, while with the renewed 
interest in the Hegelian roots of Marx's thought, the world of 
common sense, meaning and ideology became central interests 
for Marxist theory, as the work of both Lukacs and Antonio 
Gramsc '.i testify. 
The radical reflection on these investigations, as modes 
of social enquiry, became the situation and condition for a 
critique of egological thought and for the initial tentative 
explication of a conversational epistemology. 
lli) 
2S4. 
Husserl and the transcendental ego 
In his earlier work as represented oy his 'Logical 
t' t' ,26 Inves ~ga ~ons Husserl did not admit to any other ego other 
than the empirical ego. Moreover in his attack on psychologism 
in the philosophy of logic of his daY9herejected all theories 
which located epistemological judgements as the psychological 
acts of a subject at the centre of conscious experience. He 
argued that the implication of locating the theoretical 
foundation for the construction of logic in a psychology of 
knowledge, was a sceptical relativism which in tUrn undermined 
knowledge itself. However after the 'Investigations', Husserl's 
interests shifts from a descriptive phenomenology of logical 
signification to more general epistemological considerations. 
His concern becomes the elaboration of a transcendental 
philosophy. Phenomenology ceases to be the method of a limited 
epistemological enterprise in the philosophy of logic and 
becomes seen instead as the universal foundation of both 
philosophy and scientific method. Husserl in the face of the 
immanent dissolution of the classical organization of knowledge 
attempts to constrain epistemology within the decaying structure 
of egologicism. This effort involves a genuine metaphysical 
decision to both render problematic the naive ontological status 
of the world as commonly experienced (the transcendental reduction), 
and to advocate the primacy of a transcendental ego as the 
constituting agent of the sense and hence essential reality of 
the experienced world. The elements of formal ontology are 
to be regrouped and bound much more tightly to the subject -
object axis. 
In 'Ideas' (1913) Husser1 introduces this manifestly 
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egological conception of consciousness. At the core of the 
'first' ·philosophy he promises us, is the transcendental ego. 
This ego is after the phenomenological reduction, not transformed 
into a phenomenon which appear to consciousness and which is 
a candidate for methodological doubt. The pure ego is a 
phenomenological residue of reduction - an apodictic realm of 
being,exempt from the reduction. He states: 
'But if I perform the phenomenological epoche, 
the whole world of the natural setting is 
suspended, and with it, "I, the man". The 
pure experience as act with its own proper 
essence then remains as residue. But I also 
see that the apprehension of the same as human 
experience, introduces various features which 
do not need to be there, and that on the other 
side no disconnecting can remove the form of 
the cogito and cancel the "pure" subject of 
the act. The "being directed towards", "the 
being busied with", "adopting an attitude", 
"undergoing or suffering from", has this of 
necessity wrapped in its very essence, that 
it is just something "from the Ego", or in 
the reverse direction "to the Ego"~ and this 
Ego is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get 
any grip on it".27 
In 'Ideas', acts of consciousness are not only directed 
towards objects (that teleological property of consciousness 
Brentano had described by the term intentionality) but also 
stem from a primary source - the pure transcendental ego. 
Objects of consciousness, whether my own body and empirical self, 
other persons or the spatio-temporal world, are to be interpreted 
as the products of the meaning constituting activity of the 
transcendental ego. This have merely intentional existence 
for this pure ego. An analysis of such objects leads inevitably. 
to an analysis of the principles governing such constituting 
activity; from the object to the Subject. 
transcendental reduction becomes just. 
Reality after the 
'unities of meaning related to certain organisat~ons 
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of.a pure absolute consciousness which dispenses 
"meaning in certain essentially fixed ways.'28 
Husserl's task becomes the search for a presuppositionless 
science. This involves for him suspending belief in an 
external world i.e., in what he calls the thesis of the natural 
standpoint. This in turn will necessitate, he argues, a 
rejection of all theories e.g. Gallilean physics or psycho-
physical psychology which operate within this standpoint making 
implicit assumptions about the existence of a physical reality 
independent ·of ourselves and our meaning endowing capacities. 
His aim is to clarify what is involved in our relationship with 
an objective world through an analysis of the meaning structures 
of our experiences. 
In an age of growing criticism of positivist metaphysics 
we have from our conversational perspective considerable 
sympathy with Husserl's attack on naive physicalism. There is 
something decidedlymodern and progressive about Husserl's stress 
on seeing the objects of science as the product of our meaning. 
endowing capacities rather than simply given in the external 
world. Husserl's phenomenology like all idealist epistemology 
stresses the active, constitutive dimension of human reality. 
However this insight remains constrained within the egological 
limi ts of idealism .• Husserl's constituting agent is not man 
exercising his human material powers on nature in an act of 
intellectual labour and scientific production. Rather, it is 
the ethereal phantom of pure spirit or consciousness, organized 
in transcendental self-hood. The objectivity of phenomena 
becomes the spiritual accomplishment of the subject. 
In 'Ideas' and even more strongly in the 'Cartesian 
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Meditations' (1929) 'the world is not only tlfor me" but draws 
all of its being status from me". Husserl passes from a 
phenomenology "turned toward the object", (the phenomenology 
which raised Sartre from his philosophic slumber and sent him 
to Germany poste haste to study in 1935) to a phenomenology 
"turned toward the ego". His concern becomes the constituting 
activities of that transcendental ego. It is from this ego 
that the world is unfolded in transcendental constitution. 
The concept of intentionality in increasingly interpreted in 
an idealist fashion, in terms of the cognitive self-activity 
of the subject. Sartre later is to denounce this betrayal 
of phenomenology's earlier promise to be a science of objects. 
The major object of his attack will be Husserl's idealising of 
the concept of intentionality. 
The latter type of phenomenology to which Husserl turns, 
a transcendental analytic, is in essence an epistemologically 
motivated theory. The anthropological interest and indeed the 
ontological in general, is sUbordinated to this epistemological 
concern. In this he reflects the precedence given to 
epistemology, over and above ontology or. indeed ethics, within 
egological philosophic discourse. The concept of intentionality 
is interpreted as an epistemic process, hence attention is 
focused on the subject pole of intentional acts. Husserl's 
theqry moves ·irrevocably towards a monadic idealism,it is, 
29 he claims 'universal Idealism worked out as a science'. 
For the later phenomenologists Scheler, Heid·~gger, 
Sartre and Schutz, phenomenology becomes on the contrary an 
ontologically motivated theory; it becomes the analytic of 
• 
man's human being, a tool for philosophical anthropplogy. 
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For Sartre, the most persistent critic of Husserl, intentionality 
. 
is conceived of as directional process pushing away from the 
subject to the world of objects. Above all it is a teleological 
process which distances the ego from material being and reveals 
it as a nothingness, as always other than the being it aims 
at. Intentionality is seen, by him, as the bearer of the 
power of negation. Because consciousness is intentional it 
is exhausted in aiming at uhe world of being. Always other 
than its objects, it is therefore a nothing. For Sartre 
with the ego desubstantialized and removed of its constitutive 
responsibilities, attention focuses on concrete man and his 
agency. As pure consciousness is a nothing, 'man', can be 
rescued from its egological tyranny and placed back in a 
concrete and social world. This change in phenomenological 
thinking, traced in the following chapter, il".vol ves more than 
an internal conceptual redefinition and development within 
phenomenological philosophy. It represents the surfacing in 
the discourse of phenomenological philosophy of a subterranean 
rupture in European thought centered on the new centrality of 
man, as a socially and historically formed agent, to the 
organization of our knowledge. 
For Husserl however, struggling to be true to the 
egological mode of knowing, objects of consciousness are to 
be interpreted as the products of the constituting activity 
of the transcendental ego. The other, as person, and the 
spatio-temporal world have mere intentional being for a 
transcendental ego. They remain certain but secondary 
configurations of meaning invariantly constituted by that ego. 
The transcendental ego perfor.ms then within the conceptual 
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machinery of Husserl's philosophy a dual role -
a) it is the principle of the unity of consciousness; 
the Kantian principle reified and suDstantialized. 
b) it is the source of meaning endowment in the 
world as intended; the world in its sense, if 
not sUbstance is the correlate of absolute consciousness. 
'the whole being of the world consists in a certain meaning 
which pre-supposes absolute consciousness in the field from 
h ' h ' . d ' d' 30 w ~c mean~ng ~s er~ve • 
The questions asked by phenomenologists after Husserl, 
are: 
i) Does in fact the principle of the unity of the 
self lie in pure consciousness? Does not the 
transcendental turn,condemn phenomenology to an 
inescapable solipsism? Why is it not the case 
that the identity of the self lies in the object 
world we live within and in our social interaction 
with other egos? 
ii) Could the world indeed be meaningful for 
a transcendental ego? Can there be private 
concepts, intuitions and indeed systems of 
signification? 
These questions are prompted by a new concern with the 
situations, historical, social and corporeal of human existence 
the emergence within phenomenological thinking of a philosophical 
anthropology with a sociologistic foundation. 
Later phenomenology, in its existentialist and sociological 
phase, is to conclude that the transcendental ego is a 
conceptual illusion. In so far as the self does exist 
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it does so for a non-egological consciousness. It exists 
in the concrete world and is constituted not by a pure ego 
but rather by a set of real alter egos in social interaction. 
Similarly it asserts that the world gains its sense, not 
from a transcendental ego, but through the sociation and 
communicational practices of concrete h~~an agents. 
260. 
(~il Consequences of transcendentalism - other minds? 
. The outdorne of the execution of the radical transce~dental 
reduction is the emergence of the transcendental ego with a 
pure and absolute status in the doctrine of constitution and 
the general doctrine of transcendental subjectivity. The 
isolation of the transcendental ego from its life world however, 
posed for Husserl the problem of solipsism. For, other egos 
are conceived only via the intentional acts of the pure subject. 
They are only objects for this transcendental ego and not 
grasped as .constituting subjects themselves. That is they have 
no reality outside their status as intentional objects 
appearing for the consciousness of the pure ego. The absolute 
and pure nature of the transcendent ego renders the constitution 
of another constituting ego impossible. The other can never 
be grasped as a subject. Hence it is impossible to constitute 
inter-subjectivity and hence human sociation and indeed 
socialized scientific practice. Is then transcendental 
phenomenology the 'firm philosophic base' Schutz feels the 
social sciences require? 
Confronted with this difficulty Husserl's phenomenology 
is drawn between two seemingly opposed requirements; on the 
one hand it must follow the reduction through to the end in the 
search for the apodictic and maintain its belief in the 
possibility of the constitution of 'the other' by the 
transcendental ego; on the other hand it must account for the 
specificity of our experience of the other, precisely as the 
experience of a subject other than I. As we have noted, for 
the transcendental ego all that exists is and must be a 
constituted product. Thus knowledge of others is always 
knowledge of others as objects. " . t f Egos consciousness 15 no 0 
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others 'as themselves constituting subjects forming a genuine 
transcendental inter-subjective community. 
Husserl was painfully aware of this problem as his 
sustained application to it in the fifth Cartesian meditation 
shows. 31 The coherence of his theory demands that he be able 
to show how the ego does constitute the other. For the 
constitution of the world of nature and culture depends on the 
proven existence of alter egos as fellow constitutors. This 
objective realm is essentially a shared world which exists not 
only for me·but also for you. He notes: 
'It is this within the inter-subjectivity, 
which in the phenomenological reduction has 
reached empirical giveness on a transcendental 
level, and is thus itself transcendental, 
that the real world is constituted as "objective" 
as being there for everyone,.32 
Having rejected the naive realism and objectivism of 
the natural standpoint, Husserl is forced to root the 
objectivity of phenomena in the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity. 
But constrained as he is by ego logical discourse he understands 
inter-subjectivity in transcendental terms. As such 
transcendental inter-subjectivity is guaranteed eventually in 
the absolute and universal nature of thepure ego,in and for 
itself. The 'transcendental society of ourselves' is to be 
33 
unpacked from 'I, the transcendental, absolute I'. 
We can sense in his 'cartesian Meditations' a fundamental 
tension in Husserl's later work - a progressive unfolding 
movement toward the concrete world of the Lebenswelt but on the 
other hand a subordinating of these developing investigations 
of concrete levels of experience and meaning to the regressive 
and analytic movement toward the original and apodictic. This 
contradiction plagued Husserl but he was never able to resolve it. 
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Even in his last works as in 'The Crisis of the European 
Science~ and Transcendental Phenomenology,34, the move to an 
existential analysis of contemporary scientific rationality is 
subordinated to the transcendental motif. In this work, 
Husserl stresses the blindness of 'Science' to its common sense, 
taken for granted assumptions i.e., to the conceptual liteworld 
which undergirds scientific nality and its standpoint but 
never itself becomes an object of scientific investigation. 
However this ethnographic critique of the epistemological status 
of European science is located finally at the level of trans-
cendental subjectivism. Historical and cultural reality is 
seen in the end as the accomplishment of an absolute spirit. 
Of course this contradiction and resulting tension within 
Husserl's theory occurs at a level where the problem is not 
explicitly grasped and illuminated by transcendental phenomenology. 
The tension is understood by us however as a structural effect 
of Husserl's attempt to theorize the intersubjective, with its 
emerging centrality to the organization of European thought, 
within the ter.ms of egological discourse. 
Like Wittgenstein he explores the limits of egological 
di~course, but from the inside. His thought reverberates, a 
recurring echo within the hollow shell of the rapidly imploding 
sphere of egological discourse. Desperate to find a point of 
escape, it bounces endlessly within these limits. Its path of 
prOjection constantly deflected by these limits, it is driven 
back into the interiority of the egological labyrinth. 
It is left for Husserl's successors in the Phenomenoloqical 
tradition to confront the basic contradictions in his trans-
cendental position. Scheler, Heideqger, Sartre and Schutz 
plump for the concrete. Sartre leads the attack on-the notion 
of the transcendental ego. Scheler shifts attention to the 
social consbiousness from which the individual's self-conscious 
later arises. Heidegger focuses on Being rather than 
knowledge and on Dasein, being human, in the world with others. 
Schutz concerns himself not with transcendental constitution 
but with the social construction of realities. Merleau-Ponty 
anchors the cogito within the materiality of the body and 
language. 
But this movement towards the concrete is also a movement 
towards the realisation of the essentially social nature of 
the self. It involves a locating at the heart of the self of 
a fundamental dialectic with the other and a grasping that the 
negation self-other is an internal and conversational negation 
and not an external negation as monadic idealism and indeed 
pluralistic realism believe. The interaction of self and 
other has an equalizing reciprocity that can no longer be 
comprehended through the subject-object schema of egological 
discourse. The departure from the ego1ogical schema is 
heralded by a grasping within Phenomenological thought, and 
indeed contemporaneously within Pragmatist and Anglo-Saxon 
analytical philosophy of the conceptual complimentarity of the 
'problems' of 'personal identity' and 'other minds'. 
Thus for Sartre 
(1) I can only grasp myself objectively, through 
being an object for another. 
the look of the other. 
I grasp myself in and through 
(2) I can only realize my own subjectivity by grasping 
that I am other than an alterego, by negation of the other 
as a Subject. 
Similarly for Scheler, originally I am conjoined with others 
in an undifferentiated psychic stream. Only later, does my 
concept'of individuated self arise from this basic social 
consciousness. Accordingly my perception of other selves is 
no less direct than that of our OWn selves. We have a direct 
hermeneutical access to social consciousness and within this 
equal access to our own and other selves. He asserts that 
the relation between man and his fellow-men is not just a 
factual one but that our every concept of man presupposes 
society. That is,society is an ontological condition of 
human being, and this condition obtains quite independently of 
the factual existence of a concrete ego within a concrete social 
world. Sociality is then a t~anscendentar condition of our 
concept of man. 
Schutz is his later work (e.g. Thesis of Alter Ego) 35 
becomes more and more attracted to Mead's social-pragmatist 
conception of the self. For Mead, the self appears for 
consciousness as an object,but pre-supposes a subject (The 
Kantian condition) • The subject which constitutes the self, to 
which the self is an intended object is a subject outside the 
consciousness of ego. But it is not a transcendental one. 
Rather, that subject is an alter ego. This is to say the 
notion of a reflective self assumes the postulate of an alter 
ego. 'The mechanism of introspection is therefore given' 
announces Mead, 'in the social attitude which man necessarily 
36* 
assumes towards himself'. 
Thus for Mead 
(1) an individual can only know himself as an object 
through taking the role of the other. 
(2) an individual can only realize himself as a self-conscious 
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~ubject through action towards others and towards himself. 
We can detect a convergence in phenomenological pragmatist, 
and indeed analytical philosophy tovlards locating as the 
essence of self-consciousness, a dialectical relationship, a 
conversation, between ego and alter. This convergence 
deservesto be investigated by a structural analysis of the 
philosophical knowledge ~f this period. Undoubtedly it throws 
a new light on the epistemic relation between philosophy and 
sociological theory since the 1920's. Once we grasp the 
sociologistic foundation of modern philosophical thought in 
the four major traditions then clearly, the demarcation between 
the two disciplines must De rethought. And, unlike Winch's 
reductive and dismissive analysis of sociology as wayward 
philosophy, this theoretical reflection on the sociologistic 
foundation of modern philosophy must inform philosophical 
practice as well as comment on it. 
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(iV) Husserl on 'other minds' 
Husserl in the fifth Cartesian Meditation does indeed seek 
to tackle the problem of solipsism which his transcendental 
reduction inexorably leads phenomenology into. He is of 
course fully aware of the problem at the outset of his Meditations 
He asks 
'When I, the meditating I reduce myself to my 
absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological 
epoche do I not become solus ipse; and do I 
not remain that, as long as I carryon a consistent 
self-explication under the name of phenomenology'.37 
Moreover his is fully aware of the importance of an 
adequate theory to explain intersubjectivity. For him -
•••• it soon becomes evident, that the range of 
such a theory is much greater than at first seems, 
that it constitutes to the founding of a transcendental 
theory of the objective world, and, indeed, to the 
founding of such a theory in every respect, notably 
as regards objective nature. The existence-sense 
of the world and of Nature in particular, as 
Objective nature, includes after all thereness-for-
everyone. This is always cointended whereever we 
speak of objective actuality. In addition, objects 
with 'spiritual' predicates belong to the experienced 
world. These objects, in respect of their origin 
and sense, refers us to subjects, usually other 
subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality. 
Thus it is the case of all cultural objects (books, 
tools, works of any kind and So forth) which moreover 
carry with them at the same time the eXperimental 
sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, everyone 
belonging' .38 
Thus it is quite clear that Husserl recognized that 
transcendental phenomenology can only fulfill its claims to 
be a universal science if it can indeed solve the 'problem' of 
'other minds'. 
Husserl's strategy to 'solve' this 'problem' is to argue 
for the constitution of the other by analogical inference from 
my own being, the other as another 'me'. The other, he 
argues, is drawn from the sense of my own sphere of owness,. me. 
He believes one must first give sense to that sphere of me 
and ~ine in order to give sense to the other and to the world 
of the other -
'In this pre-eminent intentionality there becomes 
constituted for me the new existence sense that 
goes beyond my monadic very-owness: there becomes 
constituted an ego, not an 'I myself' but as mirrored 
in my Ego, in my monad. The second ego, however, is not 
simply there and strictly presented; rather is he 
constituted as 'alter ego' - the ego indicated as one 
moment b~9this expression being I myself in my 
owness'. 
Thus the other's body is 'grasped' an an analogue of 
my own, 
'Since, in this Nature and this world, my animate 
organism is the only body that is or can be constituted 
originally as an animate organism (a functioning organ), 
the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended 
as an animate organism, must have derived this sense 
by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organisrn ••• ,40 
The perceived characteristics of the other's body are 
paired with mine and by analogizising transfer, the other's 
body is grasped in its sense as one of a type like mine. 
Similarly the other's psyche is grasped by analogy with my own 
empirical ego. His actions, appearance~ and behaviour become 
interpreted as indexes of his psychic states just as my 
behaviour is of mine. To this cognitive process of making the 
other 'co-present' with myself through analogical apperception 
Husserl gives the title 'appresentation'. The grasping of the 
other by appresentation has, Husserl asserts its own style of 
verification and its own hermeneutic. 
II do not apperceive the other ego simply as a duplicated 
of myself and accordingly as having my original sphere 
or one completely like mine rather, as we find on 
closer examination, I apperceive him as having spatial 
modes of appearance like those I should have if I 
should go over there and be where he is. 141 
That is to say verifiable accessibility to the other depends 
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on my adoption of what SCDutz was later to call a 'reciprocity' 
. ' 42 
of perspectives' vis a vis the other. 
Husserl's analysis of the transcendental ego's constitution 
of the alter ego by appresentation may serve as an interesting 
insight into how we as empirical egos make sense, in concrete 
life, of other's actions. It may, although this was not 
Husserl's intention, be a useful approach to the analysis of 
interpersonal interaction. Indeed, it is from these insights 
that Schutz and the Ethnomethodologists respectively, take 
off in an verstehende Soziologie, once Husserl's transcendentalism 
has been quietly dropped. However the postulation of such 
cognitive processes such as appresentation by analogising 
transfer, and reciprocity of standpoints does not qualify, 
within the strictures of a pure transcendental analysis, as a 
'solution' to the 'prob1em' of intersubjectivity. 
The reasons for this are two fold and related. 
(1) Even if we accept Husser1's account of the 
constitution of the other by appresentation as credible, a 
second problem as serious emerges. The other is constituted 
only as an object forthe transcendental ego, and not as a 
constituting subject himself. Hence inter-subjectivity as 
such is not in fact constituted. 
(2) Secondly Husserl's analysis, and indeed egological 
philosophy of mind in general assumes that I can grasp my own 
ego, identify it, have knowledge of it, ascribe predicates to 
it, before I can grasp the other and predicate him. It assumes 
the pr1macy of self knowledge, as immediate and indubitable. Yet 
despite its proclaimed radicalness, it does not enquire into 
the conditions of possibility of reflection itself. It does not 
validate the particular use of language it invokes - namely 
a private language referring to private states of cons~iousncss; 
nor can it. Classical epistemology claims to take nothing 
for granted except ~ pure activity of radically doubting. 
However in reality its apodictic project is founded on a 
critical reflecting consciousness that in truth is the result 
of an ontogenetic process, a social process, of self-formation. 
critical reflection and the refined language of mental intro-
spection are the end points and highest development of this 
ontogenetic process and not ~ primitive starting point. The 
critical reflection posited by egological philospphy is as 
Habermas reminds us, 'the benificiary of a stage of reflection 
that it does not admit and therefore also cannot legitimate,.43 
Later phenomenology, and ihdeed pragmaticist and analytic thought, 
having taken the sociologistic turn, reverses the direction of 
constitution and grasps the self as a social-product. A 
radical reflection on language and cognition, from the 
conversational standpoint leads to a grasping of the derivative 
nature of self-ascription, consciousness and knowledge. As 
• 
Stra\'lson in his descriptive metaphysics is to write 'one 
can ascribe s'tatef3.~of· consciousness to oneself only if one 
can ascribe them to others,.44 Strawson is merely formalising, 
in the .' n.. discourse of analytical philosophy, the rupture 
with egologicism already accomplished by Mead, Wittgenstein, 
Volosinov .,':': . ~; and the existential phenomenologists 
by the end of the 1920's. 
What demarcates these theorists from classical philosophy 
of mind is their 'decision' to treat the self from a socio-
inteructional standpoint rather than from a transcendental or 
psycholoqistic eqoloqical position. In other words for these 
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theorists the notion of an individual, as a reflectively 
conscious being, a self-ascribing being who can converse with 
itself, only makes philosophic sense when located as a derived 
subset of ego - alter conversations. 
As Marleau-Ponty asks 
'I make the other in my own image but how can there be 
, 45 for me an image of myself • 
Descartes 'cogito', Leibnitz's 'monad', Kant's 'I think', 
Husserl's 'transcendental ego' and indeed Wittgenstein's 
'philosophical self', all rest on th characteristic of the 
self to be reflexive. However, as we have said, none of these 
thinkers, structured as their enquiries are by egological 
discourse, aSks(or can aSk)what the logical and material conditions 
for such a reflexivity indeed are. Reflexiv,i ty as a phenomenon 
remains outside the scope of their transcendental investigations. 
In so far as it is addressed, it as a mere given attribute 
essentially bestowed upon subjectivity, and not as the end 
product of a process of self-formation. 
For Husserl phenomenological method proceeds entirely 
through acts of reflection and this ability to reflect i~ for him 
unproblematical -
'Living in the cogito we have not got the 
cogitatio consciously before us as an intentional 
object, but it can at any time become this; to 
its essence belongs in principle the possibility 
of a reflexive directing of the mental glance 
towards itself, naturally in the for.m of a new 46 
cogitatio and by way of a simply apprehension!. 
This phenomoloqical knowledge can only be attained from 
stepping back from the lived dur~e, in an act of reflection. 
Husserl believes that it is possible to isolate in the ontological 
structure of reflection essentially two aspects of the ego 
embodied in the one cognition - I, now the observer and I, 
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there the person who is observed. For conversational discourse 
this-bifurcation of reflection is traced to the external 
communication of two discrete cognizing individuals and the 
material structures which condition this. However for 
monadic idealism no such explanation is possible. It becomes 
necessary to posit as Fink, Husserl's disciple does, that 
'reflection on the transcendental ego, itself implies a third 
ego, a reflecting spectator that looks upon the believing 
in the world, in the actuality of its living operation without 
t ' , 't' 47 co-opera ~ng ~n ~ • But if we uncover a third transcendental 
ego, a theoretical transcendental ego, a theoretical spectator, 
then why not a fourth and a fifth? It becomes clear that 
monadic idealism in coping with the phenomena of reflexivity 
lands itself in a position of infinite regress. 
The insight, of the theorists in the 1920's who broke 
from the egological problematic was that the phenomena of 
reflexivity can only be adequately grasped from the social 
or conversational standpoint. 
'How can an individual get outside himself~(experientally) 
asks Mead in,'Mind, Self and Society', 'in such a way as to 
become an object to himself?' 
This he concludes, 
'is to be found by referring to the process of social conduct 
or activity in which the given person or individual is implicated,.48 
49 More starkly Sartre declares, 'I am an other' • A 
conversational philosophy of mind demands that we must abandon 
the asymetry of the I - other relationship, which results from 
monadic idealism's absolutising,of the subject, in favour of 
the 'objectifying equalization' implied by the dialectical 
reciprocity involved in communicational interaction. 'It is 
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equalization', writes Ricoeur 'in the sense that reciprocity 
. . 
abolished the privilege of the single ego, and it is an object-
ification in the sense that this reciprocity brings it about 
that there are only others, I am an other among others,.50 
The self appears in consciousness as an object, in an 
act of reflection. Such an act pre-supposes a subject. 
However this subject is never present to consciousness. For 
the conversational theory the subject which constitutes the self. 
to which the self is an intended object, is a subject outside 
of the consciousness of ego. It is not, however a transcendental 
one, rather the subject is a 'real' alter ego, This is to say 
the notion of a reflective self assumes the posulate of an 
alter ego. Reflection is given in and through man's social 
attitude to himself. The other is no longer merely, an object 
for me as absolute pure ego-
'He is', insists Sartre, 'the excentric limit which 
contributes to the constitution of my being,.51 
We can represent the respective postulates concerning 
ego-alter relations with the egological and conversational 
philosophy of mind. 
For Husserl and egologicism 
AmA-JAmB 
A = ego 
B - alter 
m - model 
~ - condition of 
i.e. Ego's model or knowledge of alter is derived from my 
knowledge of my own ego by means of analogous inference. 
For the conversational theory of self 
(AmB) and (BmA) i AmA 
i.e. The social interaction of ego and alter is antecedent to 
ego's self-conscious and a condition of it. This proposition 
can be decomposed into three related postulates 
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(A) AmB ~ AmA 
·One can ascribe predicates to, or have a model of, one's 
self, only if one can ascribe predicates to, have models 
of others. Strawson has outlined the basic logical form of 
this implication -
(1) I can only ascriba predicates to myself on the 
basis of identification and reidentification of some thing or 
object to which they can be ascribed - look to the object 
(2) that thing which is identified is a person, an 
other. Fori only an object which has a body as well as a mind 
is a candidate for reidentification - the object is in the 
world. 
(3) thus by using the personal pronoun one draws along 
with it the 'entire conceptual scheme' for the use of ascriptive 
language'. In short one presupposes the concept of a person, 
of an embodied, cognizing other. 'The concept of a person 
i 1 . 11 . t h f . d' . d 1 . , 52 s og~ca y pr~or 0 t at 0 an ~n ~v~ ua consc~ousness • 
- the object is another. 
(B) BmA eo) AmA 
Furthermore the condition of my being able to grasp 
myself as an object and ascribe predicates to myself as a person, 
is that I can adopt a social attitude to myself. I am able to 
do this by taking the role of the other vis a vis myself. The 
other, both as particular and concrete, and as a generalized 
social attitude is the subject to whom I appear and as such the 
condition of my emergent self-consciousness and objectivity. 
(C) Am (BmA) ~ AmA 
My primal relationship to the other is not that he is an 
object for me (with all the difficulties this epistemic 
relationship raises for the constitution of intersubjectivity), 
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but rather that I am an object for him. My self identity 
is mediated through the other's (particular or generalized) 
perception of me. The other's appearing as an object of 
knowledge for me is a secondary relation to the ontological 
relation of my being for others. 
These three propositions, (A), (B), (C), demarcate the 
articulated specificity of the conversational philosophy of 
mind and theory of the self. This theoretical set of statements 
or discursive events marks the ~ appearance, in philosophic 
discourse, of that profound reorganization of the mode of being 
of knowledge based on the centrality of the social. It is 
these discursive events, dispersed across the four major 
European traditions of philosophy that effectively individualizes 
philosophy since the 1920's and demarcates it from egological 
epistemology. 
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THE BREAK FROM EGOLOGICISM 
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CHAPTER 8 
This conversational philosophy of mind and self is accompanied and 
sustained by a radically new way of viewing language and of conceiving 
the relation between the linguistic and the cognitive. The concrete 
phenomenology of inter-personal relations sketched by Sartre is soon 
guided by Merleau-Ponty, working in the same tradition, towards a 
theorization of the role of language as the condition of possibility of 
both social relations and ordered thought. I Mead, Vo~snov, and 
A 
Wittgenstein, from the very start made their analysis of linguistic 
behaviour the occasion for that series of radical reflections on mind, 
self and society which we have demarcated as conversational discourse. 
Heideigger writing in a later period in his philosophic life when 
language is in the forefront of his ontological considerations seizes 
upon the metaphor. In the midst of a review of a poem by Holderlin he 
declares -
"We - mankind - are a conversation. The being of men is 
founded in language. But this only becomes actual in con-
versation. Nevertheless the latter is not merely a manner 
in which language is put into effect, rather it is only as 
conversation that language is essential. What we usually 
mean by language , namely, a stock of words and syntactical 
rules, is only a threshold of language. But now what is 
meant by 'a conversation'? Plainly, the act of speaking 
with others about something. Then speaking also brings 
about the process of coming together. "1 
Sartre, although he has broken irrevocably from Husserl's egologicism, 
remains fixated with the terms of that discourse despite having dispensed 
with its conceptual foundation. His phenomenology of inter-personal 
relations challenges the epistemological primacy and ontological 
absoluteness of the cognitive ego, but it continues to be theorized in 
terms of the subject-object nexus of egological discourse. There is in 
his early work an insufficient and inadequate characterization of the 
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social"relations which provide both the form and content of ego-alter 
inter-~ction. He continues to rework the egological central metaphor 
of cognition and consciousness, as vision. In his analysis of the 
~ in 'Being and Nothingness' he reverses the direction of the 
intentionality involved, investigating the ontological structure of the 
experience of being looked at. This concrete phenomenology of inter-
personal relations effectively challenges the egologistic conception of 
self. However it replaces it with a philosophical anthropology of the 
person; the existential isolated person. A vast epistemic space which 
has opened up with the breaking through the barriers of egologicism, 
is prematurely foreclosed and saturated with the dense vapours of meta-
physics. Sartre's existentialism remains a residue. 
For Mead, Volosinov, Wittgenstein and later Merleau-Ponty, the 
theorization of the social cannot be restricted to a phenomenology of 
inter-personal relations. Such relations they see as only possible 
within the medium of a pre-existing set of communicational and other 
social practices. The "other" is no longer seen merely as my opponent 
in a necessary struggle between ego and alter, between assertive 
subjectivity and threatening objectivity. Rather 'he' is seen as a 
generalized social milieu only with regards which, can I in fact develop 
as a fully human person: 'he' is a generalized other. The dyadic ego-
alter form is retained in the work of these theorists but at a meta-
phorical level. Increasingly the generalized other, as an abstract 
metaphysical term is replaced by a detailed concern with the role of 
language and social convention as rule guided practices, in the formation 
ot human consciousness and identity. Philosophy gives way to science. 
(i) Bartre - the transcendental ego 
For Kant, as we have seen, the 'I' is the formal structure of 
consciousness; the transcendental unity of pure apperception is a 
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necessary condition of objective experience. Husserl reifies this formal 
'I' .·-Intentional objects are seen to exist as meaning complexes depend-
ent upon the constituting activity of the transcendental ego in his 
epistemology. 
The young Sartre enthralled with the claim of phenomenology to 
investigate objects in their own right, reacted harshly against RUsserl's 
transcendental turn. Russerl's later affirmation of a transcendental 
ego behind consciousness, seemed to him to involve a betrayal of the 
original and central phenomenological doctrine of intentionality, with 
its realist orientation. It appeared to Sartre as a retreat from a 
conception of consciousness as always turned outward towards its objects, 
to a monadic idealism which no longer investigated objects in their own 
right but regarded them as dependent on the constituting activities of a 
transcenden tal ego. As such this was a sorry departure from an ontolog-
ically motivated theory in which the concept of intentionality is the 
philosophic means of thrusting man back in the 'real world'. Phenomenology 
had become instead an epistemologically motivated theory in which 
intentionality, as a concept, is represented as an ideal world-creating 
process. Within this interpretation man as a concrete existent in a real 
world is subverted and replaced by a transcendental 'pure' consciousness. 
This abstracted self becomes the source and guarantor of the objectivity 
or sense of that constituted world. 
Sartre rails against Husserl's final, spirited defence of egologicism. 
His early work in the phenomenological tradition 2 is fired with the 
conviction that phenomenology must be rescued from its transcendental 
turn and saved from idealism. Sartre demands that phenomenology treat' 
of the concrete and the social (in this demand he follows Scheler and 
Heideigger). However, he attempts to theorize these existential and social 
dimensions within the available terms of a phenomenology rooted in ego-
logicism. This contradiction, the effect of a discursive residue is to 
10 
plague Sartre' s work right up to the 'Critique de, Raison Dialectique' 3; 
a-difficulty in accommodating the materiality of history and society 
within his personalism, his inability to accept the facticity of the 
unconscious whether at the level of the psyche or of linguistic 
structure. His personalistic philosophical anthropology, itself a 
residue of the subject-object couplet of egologicism, pervades his 
work right up to his more recent adoption of a Marxist position. 
For the early Sartre the existential reform of phenomenology 
required -
(i) _ a return to what he regards as the original doctrine 
of intentionality. Consciousness is consciousness of 
something, it is directed towards objects whether 
physical or psychical; both the outer world and my 
ego are objects. 
A reassertion of the directional nature of intentionality leads, 
Sartre believes, to: 
(ii) a rejection of the notion of the transcendental ego. 
The ego is not the owner of consciousness, it is the 
-object of consciousness. The intentional nature of 
consciousness means for Sartre there can be no ego 
'in' or 'behind' consciousness only an object for 
consciousness. 
Sartre by an examination of the concept of intentionality arrives 
at his non-personal theory of consciousness. This in turn leads him 
to question -
(iii) the status of the ego. If it is an object of con-
sciousness what is its nature as object? Eventually 
he identifies the I as the transcendent object of 
the reflexive intentional act. It is not the pro-
ducer of that act, it is its product. It is not a 
subject behind reflection but rather only appears 
at the reflective level as a post-facto construction 
of an otherwise impersonal consciousness. 
An understanding of the post-reflective status of the I leads 
Sartre to -
(iv) deny the role of the transcendental ego as principle 
of unity of consciousness and assert the primacy, of 
the concrete and social instead. He argues that 'I 
think' can accompany our representations, as Kant 
says, but only because it appears on a foundation of 
unity which it did not help to create. For Sartre 
this principle of unity must be found in the 
material world of which we are conscious the 
. , 
world of phyS1Cal being and significant others. 
Sartre attempts by subjecting the concepts of phenomenological 
philosophy to a rigorous cross-examination to break out of the egolog-
ical constraints which Husserl too readily accepted. He begins a 
reworking of the key HUsserlian concepts of 'intentionality', 'ego', 
'object' and 'consciousness', within the new conversational problematic. 
Indeed the structure of both the "Transcendence of the Ego" and "Being 
and Nothingness,,4 is derived from a rethinking of the key concept of 
intentionality. Sartre seems to be undermining egologicism from the 
inSide; a slow erosion of the conceptual foundations of this discourse 
rather than a sudden violent rupture or revolution. In truth what we 
are witnessing in his existential phenomenology is the refraction, 
through the conceptual opaqueness of philosophical anthropology, of 
the profound changes in the organisation of our knowledge which were 
taking place at the turn of the twentieth century. Husserl' s trans-
cendental phenomenology represents one of the last bastions of egological 
discourse; a last attempt, in the face of the new materialism, to 
constrain philosophical discourse within the egological structure of 
classical epistemology. Sartre, on the other hand tunnels his way out 
of these defensive labyrinths. He e:xplores the lind ts of egologicism 
but from the outside. However to breach the ramparts of egologicism 
from within, he has to move a lot of earth. His tools of philosophical 
analysis become moulded by this task, and his exploration of conver-
sational discourse shaped and indeed constrained by his early labours. 
The starting point of his critique of transcendental phenomenology 
is his destruction of the concept of the ego-as-essence. He begins 
with the notion of intentionality. 
To be conscious is to be conscious of something. Consciousness 
is directed towards the world of being. Moreover it exhausts itself 
in aiming at that world. It is always other than the intended objects 
it aims at. It is then the negation, the absolute otherness of the 
plenum of being towards which it is directed. It is nothingness. 
Consciousness then, has no contents, no substance, it is 
"simply a spontaneity, a sheer activity transcending towards 
objects." ( ) "intentionality means that for conscious-
ness there is no being outside of that Erecise obligation to 
be a revealing intuition of something."5 
There is, reasons Sartre, no transcendental ego which fashions the 
contents of consciousness into intended objects. Consciousness has no 
contents, it is nothing. Consciousness contains no ego 'in' or 'behind' 
it, nor any kind of substantial content at all. It reveals itself to 
be rather a nothingness, a void which realizes itself purely in its 
intentional direction outwards to the world of being. 
Furthermore because consciousness is a void directed outwards it 
cannot be separated from the concrete existent world by any process of 
transcendental bracketing as Husserl attempted in his epoche. You 
cannot, Sartre argues, isolate nothing. The existent world cannot be 
bracketed ou~ for beyond these brackets is the nothingness of a 
consciousness totally incomplete in itself. 
"reduction to consciousness would be an annihilation of 
consciousness. ,,6 
Consciousness is then irremedially in the concrete, existent world. 
It derives its peculiar state of being for itself, in terms of ~t being 
the negation of the existent world. 
For Sartre the ego is not a part of the original structure of 
consciousness. Consciousness has no essential structure. The ego 
is constructed rather by consciousness, existing only for consciousness 
as an object in a world of experienced objects. 
"The ego" he tells us, "is not the owner of consciousness; it is 
the 0 bj ect of cons9iousness," and II I is another." 7 The introduction 
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by Husserl of a transcendental ego into consciousness is, believes 
Sartre~ catastrophic. It tears consciousness from itself and involves 
phenomenology in a retreat to a monadology, rather than in a direct 
occupation with human existence in its concrete relation to the world. 8 
It is precisely this relation to a world shared with others and 
communally experienced that is the major theme of the emerging con-
versational discourse. Sartre approaches this theme elliptically via 
his critique of essentialism in phenomenological philosophy of mind and 
self. 
He asks - if the ego exists as an object for consciousness, what 
is the nature of that consciousness? Surely an object pre-supposes a 
subject? Sartre replies emphatically no! The ego, he argues, appears 
to a consciousness which is impersonal. Indeed all acts of consciousness 
are impersonal in that a subject confronted by the objects of conscious-
ness is not aware of his ego or of his ego's intervention in his 
activities. The experiencing consciousness is immersed in the world. 
It is directed to it in an engrossing engagement. No distinction is 
experienced between it and its world, for it is nothing outside of its 
aiming at the world. Sartre distinguishes then between pre-reflective 
and reflective consciousness. The former is the primary relationship 
of man to the world. It is a non-egological, impersonal spontaneity, 
prior to the actualization of the ego. Sartre credits the spontaneous 
conscious activity of man with a new importance. In doing so he is 
follOwing Nietzschesattack on the primacy of the rational reflective 
cognizer of classical epistemology. He was also no doubt influenced 
by the various philosophies of life prevalent at this time, which in 
their own way challenged the egocentric rationalism of the classical 
tradition. 
Pre-reflective consciousness, he argues, involves self-consciousness 
d1rec~, though not consciousness of self -
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Ifconsciousness is consciousness of itself. That is to say 
the type of existence of consciousness is to be conscious 
of itself, it has no need of reflective consciousness in 
order to exist."9 
Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, involves the direction 
of pre-reflective 'lived' consciousness towards a reflected-upon, dead 
consciousness. It is through this art of reflection that ego appears 
as a "transcendent object effecting the permanent synthesis of the 
psychic.,,10 By means of the unifying act of reflection, each new experi-
ental state becomes fastened to the concrete totality - me.However the 
reflection upon any particular state or act, always involves an unre-
flective act of grasping which if it itself is to be grasped, involves 
another lived act of grasping. As he notes: 
"my reflecting consciousness does not take itself for an object 
when I effect the cogito, what it affirms concerns the reflected 
consciousness. ,,11 
In other words the consciousness which declares cogito! - is 
precisely not the consciousness that cogitates. Descartes, Sartre 
argues, following Nietzsche, asserted too much in his cogito ergo sum. 
All he has a right to assert is the existence of thought. 
"The certain content of the pseudo cogito is not 'I have conscious-
ness of this chair' but 'there is consciousness of this chair,.,,12 For 
Sartre the 'I' too,must fall before the stroke of the phenomenological 
reduction. His enquiry into the structure of reflection penetrates to 
the very heart of phenomenological enquiry in the egological mode. 
His demand for an investigation of the genetic conditions for epistem-
ological reflection carries him beyond the limits of that discourse. 
He challenges the epistemological primacy of the ' cogi to' and the entire 
classical tradition which installed the cognizing ego to the position 
. of supreme and absolute sovereignity in the organization of knowledge. 
He argues: 
"reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness 
reflected-on. It is not reflection which reveals the con-
sciousness reflected-on. It is not reflection which 
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reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite 
the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which 
,renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective 
cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito."'3 
However constrained as he is in the residues of egological dis-
course, he is unable, as yet, to challenge the ontological primacy of 
the subject. His ontological critique of the primacy of the cOgito, 
goes someway towards the dissolution of the subject-object axis as 
kernel of classical philosophy. But, the move to making phenomenology 
a philosophical anthropology, evident not only in Sartre' s work but 
also in that of Scheler and Heidegger, although it promises us a 
concrete analysis of human existence constrains that analysis with the 
metaphysical limits of the "person", i.e. the existential or ontolog-
ical subject. 
To recap. For Sartre it is on the reflected level that the ego 
is constituted and on the pre-reflective level that impersonality has its 
place. The appropriation of the ego has then no immediate certainty. 
"When I run after a street car, when I look at the time, when 
I am involved in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. 
There is consciousness of the street car having to be over-
taken •••• and non-positional consciousness of consciousness.,,14 
If the attitude of reflection is not adopted the ego does not appear. 
This ego, of which the I and the me are but two aspects, the I, as 
unity of actions and the me as ur~ty of states and of qualities, is 
a product of our situated conscious experience. The proper meaning 
of Kant's claim that the"I think"must be capable of accompanying all 
our representations, is, Sartre believes, not,tbat there is a trans-
cendental ego of necessity behind our objective experience) but rather 
that this" I think"refers to the possibility of reflection on lived 
experience and consequent appearance, in an act of recollection, of 
the I. 
Each 'I' of a reflected·upon present"in tum becomes incorporated 
into the 'me' of a later state of the self. Each appropriated 
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consciousness is conjoined to previously grasped consciousnesses and 
~ence the 'me' constituted as sedimentation of such reflective exper-
iences. In so far as the 'I' can be conjoined to any ongoing experience 
by an act of reflection, it has an appearance of spontaneity and 
productiveness in comparison with the residual totality of the me. 
"The ego" he notes, "is always surpassed by what it produces".15 
However what spontaneity the 'I' appears to have (Sartre refers to it 
as a pseudo-spontaneity, a semblance) it has by virtue of its relation-
ship to that 'true source of spontaneity', pre-reflective consciousness. 
The tendency to conceive of the 'I' as a real source of spontaneity 
and productivity, still manifest in Mead's 'Mind, Self and Society,16 
as an unfortunate egological residue, is thoroughly attacked by Sartre. 
He brilliantly sketches the form of this illusion which seeks a causal 
subject behind. consciousness and action-
"The ego is a virtual locus of unity, and consciousness 
constitutes it in a direction contrary to that actually taken 
by the production: really consciousnesses are first, through 
these are constituted states; and then through the latter 
the ego is constituted. But, as the order is reversed by 
a consciousness which imprisons itself in the world in order 
to flee from itself, consciousnesses are given as emanating 
from states, and states are produced by the ego. It follows 
that consciousness projects its own spontaneity into the 
ego-object in order to confer on the ego the creative power 
which is absolutely necessary to it. But this spontaneity, 
represented and hypostatized in an object, becomes a degraded 
and bastard spontaneity which magically preserves its creative 
power even while becoming passive. Whence the profound 
irrationality of the notion of an ego."17 
The 'I' is,Sartre argues the object of consciousness, not its 
subject. Rather than the I serving as the principle of the unity of 
consciousness as Kant, Husserl and egological epistemology would have 
it, it is consciousness embodied in the concrete social world which 
makes possible the unity of the ego. The 'I' is an existent, it gives 
itself as transcendent not as transcendental vis a vis consciousness. 
The unity of pre-reflective consciousness is to be found, claims 
Sartre, directly in the world at which it aims. In so far as 
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consciousness is a nothingness, it needs no principle of unity to 
gove~ its active engagement with the world. It unifies itself 
merely by transcending itself, by escaping from itself to the world 
of being. And it is in that world of being that the unity of con-
sciousness is to be found -
"The unity of a thousand active consciousnesses by which 
I have added, do add and shall add two and two to make 
four is the transcendent object two and two make four.,,18 
It is then in the material world that the unity of the consciousnesses 
is to be found. 
The ego or I is then an unnecessary principle of unity. Consequently 
functionalist arguments for the existence of a transcendental ego, such 
as the transcendental deductions of Kant and Husserl are fallacious. 
The I is not originally given in consciousness,it only appears on the 
basis of a reflective intentional act which renders it thematic as an 
object other than immediate consciousness. I is an other. Sartre's 
account of the status of the 'I' is logically little different from 
Strawson's attack on the notion of a pure ego as a primitive concept 
and his assertion of the 'logical primacy' of the concept of a person. 
Strawson writes -
"So, then the word 'I' never refers to this the pure subject. 
But this does not mean, as the no-ownership theorist must 
think, that 'I' in some cases does not refer at all. It 
refers because I am a person among others; and the predicates 
which would, per impossible belong to the pure subject if it 
could be referred to, belong, properly to the person to which 
'I' refer."19 
Ordinary Language philosophy directs its attention to the logic of the 
language of personal ascription rather than to a phenomenology of 
inter-personal relations but its analysis is illuminated by the same 
sociologistic critique of egological philosophy of mind, self and 
language. 
'I' then is an other, and can only be grasped or predicates 
attached to it, in so far as it is a transcendent psycho-physical object 
like other persons to which we ascribe motives, states, actions and 
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qualities. 'I' is a person. Sartre notes _ 
" "If the I becomes a transcendent it participates in all the 
vicissitudes of the world.,,20 
Amongst these we might note, though Sartre does not explore this 
realm, is the grammar of the language we use. Indeed as we have seen 
Nietzsche, whose work stands as an unexplored bridge between existent-
ialist and linguistic philosophy, traces the substantivising and 
subjectivising of the 'I' into a notion of the soul or ego, to the 
subject-predicate form of the grammar of the Ural-Altaic linguistic 
group. 
However the I,once it has been pulled out from the murky depths 
of consciousness and thrust into the real world, is clearly a peculiar 
sort of object. For as Sartre says the ego is given as an object but 
unlike the case of 'non intimate' objects we can not stand back from 
it and succeed in taking a truly external viewpoint for the "me 
accompanies us in this wi thdral,oTal. " Sartre raises the central question 
that cannot be framed with the egological problematic without threat-
ening its very existence - What are the genetic conditions for reflective 
consciousness, and for the emergence of the self as intended object? 
He argues, adopting a clear conversational perspective, that the 
only ego that can achieve that external optic with regards me, is an 
21 
alter ego. Only for an other do I become a truly externally grasped 
object. Thus Sartre reasons I can only appropriate my own ego 
through the perspective of the other. It follows therefore that the 
discovery of my own existence is in fact no more certain than that of 
the other, for the mode of discovery of my own ego is through the 
other. Without the mediation of the other the 'I' would not appear 
in reflection, indeed reflection itself would be impossible. Thus 
at the very heart of the cogito, now understood as a conversational 
accomplishment, we must locate the other as the condition of that 
reflection -
· ."The reflective ekstasis is found on the path to a more 
radical ekstasis - the being for others."22 
For Sartre the sociality of the self is uncovered even at the level 
of the cogito. 
This account of the reflective self as a dialectical conversation 
derivative of ego-alter social interaction is first sketched by Sartre 
in "The Transcendence of the Ego" but finds its fullest expression in 
"Being and Nothingness". 23 
In the earlier essay Sartre had already concluded that this 
dialectical or conversational conception of the self provides the only 
possible refutation of solipsism. If as in egological epistemology, 
we conceive of the ego as the original structure of consciousness then 
an assymetry emerges between ego and alter. The other is always con-
stituted only as an object for the cognitive subject. But, if the ego 
becomes a transcendent, it loses its privileged status as a constituting 
agent. I become for myself an other and as Sartre insists "my I, in 
effect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It 
is only more intimate.,,24 
Sartre stipulates that a 'solution' to the 'problem' of other minds 
will have as its major condition a conception of the negation ego-
alter as an internal and not external relation. That is to say the 
relation of myself and an other is a dialectical reciprocity or object-
ifying equalization by which each of the two elements continually con-
stitutes and reconstitutes itself as a moment in an ongoing conver-
sational process. As an ego I assert my own subjectivity by denying 
that I am the other, and at the same time grasp myself, in my object-
ivity, in my being for an other. This internal structure of the self 
involving a necessar,y relation with the other as constitutive of my 
self-conscious being, Sartre calls being-for-others. This is a 
structure of my being irrevocably mediated by the other. Accordingly 
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my fundamental relationship to the other is not one of kno~ledge, with 
all the difficulties this raises within egological discourse in attempt-
ing to constitute the relationship between epistemological selves each 
of which claims absolute epistemic supremacy. It is instead a relation 
of being. Each of us, I and the other, locked in a given interpersonal 
relationship, is constitutive of what the other is. 
I am an object, an ego, in a world for others. I grasp myself 
as an object not by means of the facility of a superordinate trans-
cendental ego but as an object for the concrete other as subject. It 
is precisely this fundamental ontological relationship, being for an 
other, that a subjective idealism cannot handle. Within transcendental 
idealism the condition for objective experience is the transcendental 
subject's activity as organizer of consciousness into a connected 
system of representations. The other cannot organize our experience, 
such is~rinciple of pure apperception, he is an aspect of that syn-
thesised experience. 
However what Sartre points out to us is that the fundamental nature 
of our experience of the other is that he and not I~is at the centre of 
organization of our experience of him -
"I construct him as an object but the regulative principle 
lies in his subjectivity. tr 25 
Sartre analyses what is ontologically involved in our experience of the 
other in his phenomenological investigation of 'the look'. His 
investigation of the intentional structure of visual interpersonal 
interaction both constitutes a concrete phenomenological analysis of 
an aspect of everyday personal experience and at the same time serves 
as a metaphor to illuminate the essential ontological relation between 
myself as ego and others. 
When the other appears in my vision, he is an object for me of 
course but one who I perceive as having a relation to the world about 
me which is independent of me. In my vision I gather the world about 
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me as'my world, appearing for me and regulated by me. The other though 
he-is-an object in my perceived world, is also making a claim on a 
world which before his appearance was bound solely to me. Now the 
objects in this world are also related to him. He has established 
relations with the world which are beyond my control. Thus notes 
Sartre an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me. 
"Everything is in place; everything still exists for me; but 
everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the 
direction of a new object. The appearance of the other in the 
world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole 
universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines 
the centralization which I am Simultaneously effecting.n26 
However as yet the other is still an object for me defined within 
my world though I perceive him as having his own definition of the world 
which threatens to drain my world of its being. However the other looks 
up and looks at me. I am looked at. I see him but as a look looking 
at me-as-object. My world becomes profoundly more decentralized. 
"All these instrumental things in the midst of which I am, now 
turn towards the other a face which on principle escapes me. 
Thus I am my Ego for the Other in the midst of a world which 
flows toward the other ( ) the flight is without limit, it 
is lost externally; the world flows out of the world and I 
flow outside myself. The Other's look takes me be beyond my 
being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world 
which is at once this world and beyond this world. ,,27 
Thus concludes Sartre the unreflective consciousness does not 
grasp the other directly nor as its cognitive or perceptual object. 
The other as a person is apprehended by me in so far as I am an object 
for the other. It is in his look at me, rather than in my gaze at him 
as object, than I discover him as a person in his subjectivity. And, 
it is in his look and the consciousness of being looked at, that I 
apprehend myself as an object. "The look" he concludes "which the 
eyes ·(of the Other) manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are is 
28 
a pure reference to myself." 
(iiJ Sartre on Other Minds 
It is clear that Sartre's existential phenomenology does not face 
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the same difficulties as Russerl in philosophically justifJ~g the poss-
. ihility of the existence of other minds. For Sartre the ego is a con-
stituted object for an otherwise impersonal consciousness. It is an 
object in the world and as such it has no logical primacy over other egos. 
Thus it cannot assume an absolute status which renders the existence of 
other egos and the world in general dependent on it. My access to my 
own ego is neither immediate nor certain. 
Sartre insists that there is no question of giving a strict proof 
of the existence of others. That existence is something which is given 
directly to us as a facet of our own being. The existence of others in 
fact is a condition of my being what I am. The bracketing out of the 
existence of others as an exercise in a transcendental epoche is ruled 
out of order by Sartre. 29 There can be no reduction to an essential 
ego, for consciousness is a nothingness. We are doomed to live in the 
concrete world with others. There can indeed be no reduction Bl such 
a transcendental ego. The very possibility of reflection itself is 
the othe~ as condition of myekstasis. Sartre's task becomes to analyse 
. ~ 
how and why the pseudo problem of other minds arose in philosophical 
literature. This he does by locating the problem as the effect of the 
grammar of egological discourse. It is when the conversational or 
dialectical nature of the self is ignored by philosophers who abandon 
the consideration of the concrete and social in pursuit of the radical 
and apodictic, that this aberration occurs he argues. 
Sartre diagnoses the failure of Russerl to constitute inter-
subjectivity. He locates three basic premises he feels lie at the 
bottom of all idealist theories of the other. 
1. They postulate other persons in terms of ~ other, 
that is a self which is not myself. 
2. This negation is seen as an external negation i. e • it 
is conceived of as an ideal or real space which separates 
discrete subjects. This negation becomes the condition 
for the isolation of monads. 
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3. The other and myself are only connected through the 
medium of co~ition. ~ecause Husserl has reduced being 
to a set of ldeal meanlngs, the only connection he has 
been able to establish between my being and that of the 
other is one of knowledge. 
Sartre locates at the very core of the cogito itself a dialectical 
relationship with the other. This interpersonal relation is ontologically 
prior to my own conversation with myself in reflection. This conversation 
is the condition of the emergence of myself as an objective being. 
He writes: 
"Thus the cogito itself can not be a point of departure for 
philosophy; in fact it can be born only in consequence of my 
appearance for myself as an individual, and this appearance 
is conditioned by the recognition of the Other. The problem 
of the Other should not be posited in terms of the cogito; 
on the contrary, the existence of the Other renders the cogito 
possible as the abstract moment when the self is apprehended as 
an object."30 
It is this conversational theory of the self which is the point of 
convergence of the seminal theorists in the Phenomenological, Pragmatist, 
Analytic and Marxist traditions, who in the 1920' s broke finally from 
egologicism towards a radically social theory of being human. Mead 
writing during the same years as Sartre's early essays arrives at a 
parallel set of conclusions about the nature of self-consciousness. 
"When the response of the other becomes an essential part in 
the experience or conduct of the individual, when taking the 
attitude of the other becomes an essential part in his 
behaviour - then the individual appears in his own experience, 
as a self, and until this happens he does not appear as a 
self.rr31 
For Sartre the fundamental inter-personality of self-consciousness 
is revealed in the immediacy of the visual interchange rather than in 
the "conversation of gestures" where Mead, Volosinov and indeed Merleau-
Ponty locate it. Sartre despite his claims for the primacy of ontology 
fails to break with the cogni ti vism of earlier egological phenomenologies 
of inter-subjectivity. True the ego's gaze is reflected and returned 
to him in the look of the other, but the analysis of the phenomena of 
being 'looked at' portrays a contentless medium of social interaction in 
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which all social relations are reduced to the perennial struggle between 
subjec.ts. 
. ' 
The other's look is, Sartre asserts, the necessary condition of my 
objectivity. And yet for Sartre it is also the destruction of all 
objectivity for me. The appearance of the other as subject has destroyed 
my capacity to make of the whole world an object. My fundamental relation 
to the other is not that he is an object for me but rather, that I am an 
object for him. Moreover the other in his subjectivity can never be 
given to me as an object of knowledge, as Husserl sought. Such an 
epistemic relation would necessarily make of him an object. In turn 
this would destroy my own objectivity, in so far as it rests on my being 
for another subject. "The other cannot be the meaning of my objectivity", 
writes Sartre for, "he is the concrete, transcending condition of it.,,32 
The other is experienced in his subjectivity (and hence inter-subjectivity 
made possible) in so far as I become an object for him and experience 
myself as such. It follows then in so far as the other appears to me as 
a subject in and through my own objectness before him, that my making 
an object of the other, either epistemologically or emotionally, must 
be a secondary moment to my initial ontological relationship of being-
for-him. 
Sartre has overturned the ego-centricity of classical epistemology 
and challenged the primacy of the solitary if absolute cognizing self. 
However he has not broken out of the subject-object conceptual problematic. 
He has merely inverted this dyad, giving precedence now to the object, 
and adopting a position as a transcendental realist. As yetI he is 
incapable of theorising inter-subjectivity and sociality beyond the 
subject-object fom. Social relations are still conceptualized as being 
constituted within the essential structure of consciousness, although now 
human ontology has passed from its epistemological phase under egologicism 
to a more concrete philosophical anthropology. The other, although given 
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ontological precedence over my being reflectively for myself, is still 
conceptualized as the subject; as the subject which reduces everything 
within its gaze to an object including me and my subjectivity. 
In his theory of the emotions Sartre sketches the implications of 
this ontic structure for interpersonal relations. I, confronted with 
the other's threatening presence, attempt to regain my subjectivity by 
causing the other to appear before me as a 'degraded presence', as a 
mere object. My objectification of the other is a defensive reaction 
to my nakedness before the other as an object. Trapped within the 
subject-obj,ect couplet, social relations appear as essentially a perennial 
struggle between master and slave, self and other. Sadism and masochism 
become the normal forms of human emotional practice. Sociology in turn 
becomes reduced to a phenomenology of inter-personal relations. 
Sartre's early work, despite the challenge it mounts to the idealist 
ego-centricism of Husserl's phenomenology, inherits the terrible residue 
of that philosophy - the subject-object form. He assaults Husserl's 
monadology but remains trapped within the residues of egologicism, 
inescapably metaphysical, incorrigibly philosophical. 
(iii) Merleau-Ponty and the Generalized Other 
Sartre by making my being-for-others a fundamental mode of my being-
in-the-world challenges the monadological structure of transcendental 
phenomenology and breaks from the egological problematic in his assertion 
of a conversational or dialectical theory of the self. However he does 
so partially amd incompletely. He remains unable to conceptualize social 
relations except in the metaphysical terms of the personal interaction of 
ego and concrete other. The almost limitless possibilities of a thoroughly 
materialist theory of being human are foreclosed prematurely. His 
embraCing of a philosophical anthropology, albeit in its nominal.ly 
anti-humanist, existential form, inhibits, any serious study of the 
hi8torically specific form and content of social relations. It prevents 
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any ra~ically rethinking of the import for epistemology of the essential 
so.ciality of man and historicity of knowledge. In turn, existential 
phenomenology substitutes itself in the place of an adequate sociological 
and historical science; all social relations become reduced to inter-
personal ones; intersubjectivity and sociality become confused and conflated 
and the latter reduced to the intentional structure of the former. , a 
phenomenology of interpersonal relations replaces the sciences of History 
and Sociology. Philosophy after the initial threatening challenge of 
the social sciences, incorporates and emasculates their novel vision in 
a philosophic anthropology and regains some of its former composure - at 
science's expense. 
Merleau-Ponty although operating within the same phenomenological 
tradition as Sartre, and who had to also come to terms with the same 
egological residue, is much more conversant with developments in the 
social sciences and their import for philosophic method and theory, than 
the young Sartre of the late twenties and thirties. 33 From the outset 
his philosophical project attempts to give some independent substance 
to the conversational theory of mind, self and language and to settle 
accounts with classical epistemology and its egological structure for 
once and for all. His critique of this discourse is far reaching. He 
attacks the asserted primacy of the pure epistemological ego and at the 
same time subverts the theory of representation and perception which 
underwrites classical epistemology. The starting point of this cn. tique 
is the achilles heel of egological discourse - my Imowledge of the 
existence of other. 
He approaches the question of inter-subjectivity from a consideration 
of arguments for the existence of others by analogy. Husserl, as we have 
seen, attempts in the fifth Cartesian Meditation to constitute the other 
by' analogizing transfer. However as Sartre points out his argument is 
based on the fallacious assumption that Imowledge of my own existence has 
lome sort of logical priority over knowledge of the other. Merleau-Ponty 
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accep~s the Sartrean critique of ego-centricism and also refuses to treat 
self-other. relations from the standpoint of the epistemological 
perspective alone. For him this entails ceasing to theorize these 
relations in terms of the phenomenological category of intentionality. 
He does not believe this fundamentally epistemological category with its 
egological basis can somehow be given an ontological twist or inter-
pretation as Sartre attempts. He notes -
"Positing another person as an other myself is not as a matter 
of fact possible if it is consciousness which must do it. To 
be conscious is to constitute, so that I cannot be conscious 
of another person, since that would involve constituting him 
as constituting, and as constituting in respect to the very 
act through which I constitute him. This difficulty of principle, 
posited as a limit at the beginning of the fifth Cartesian 
Meditation is nowhere eliminated. Husserl disregards it.,,34 
Any solution of the problem of other minds, he concludes can only be 
given by ceasing to approach the issue from the optic of a pure con-
sciousness and instead investigating the nature of concrete corporeal 
and semiotic interaction between embodied and speaking egos. 
Merleau-Ponty begins his analysis of our perception of the other 
with the traditional assertion of all arguments by analogy - namely, 
that I make the other in my own image. But he continues on to ask the 
central question which challenges the ego-centricism typical of 
tradi tional analogy arguments - "but how can there be an image of myself." 
That is like Sartre he identifies the central problem of self-knowledge 
as the achieving of an "outside view upon this totality I am. ,,35 In 
raising the enquiry into the genetic conditions for the emergence of 
reflection to the forefront of philosophic awareness he clearly breaks 
with the ego-centricism of classical epistemology as Sartre, Mead and 
Wi ttgenstein also did. Whereas for Sartre the conditions of this 
ekstasis are traced directly to my being (an object) for a concrete other 
and inter-subjectivity reduced accordingly to immediate, conscious inter-
personal relations, for Merleau-Ponty, Mead and Wittgenstein it is to 
language and social behaviour in general that we must look if we are to 
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theorize inter-subjectivity adequately. 
By 1925 Mead had already noted in his 'Mind, Self and Society' 
"I 1mow of no other form of behaviour than the linguistic 
in which the individual is an 0 bj ect to himself." 36 
Unlike Mead, Wittgenstein and indeed Volosinov Merleau-
Ponty does not begin with language or a consideration of gestural 
exchange. As a phenomenologist his starting point remains consciousness 
and its structure. He re-examines the cogito from the conversational 
standpoint asking - how can the other appear as my image yet as not me? 
The other's existence is given. It is a fact of my existence in the 
world, as Sartre has shown, but how in fact can I perceive him as I do 
i.e. like me but not me? The problem becomes one for Merleau-Ponty of 
explaining how "there is a myself which is other". 
He grasps that the 'solution' of the 'problem' of the other is to 
be unveiled at the level of the cogito itself. The relation of the cogito 
to concrete human life must be explored and "man" rather than his 
transcendental surrogate restored to a central place in philosophical 
theory. He redirects attention away from the other and back to the cogito -
"As we have said we shall never understand how it is that another 
can appear to us: what is before us is an object. We must under-
stand that the problem does not lie there but is to understand 
how I can make myself into two, how I can decentralize myself. "31 
What is sought then are the conditions of reflexivity. The essential 
philosophical problem of self-hood or self-consciousness can only be 
solved by reference to the social relations which constitute consciousness 
as directed.cognition. Mead too asks, as we have seen, this basic question -
"How can an individual get outside himself experientally in 
such a way as to become an object to himself.,,36 
He replies, as does Merleau-Ponty and the other conversational theorists 
"its solution is to be found by referring to the process of 
social conduct or activity in Which the given person or 
individual is implicated." 
For these theorists the cogi to is not the primal point of origin 
of objective cognition but rather the end product of an ontogenetic 
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communicational process which is its condition. Thus as Volosinov i·:ri tes _ 
lIthe individual consciousness not only cannot be used to explain 
anything but on the contrary, is itself in need of explanation 
from the vantage point of the social, ideological realm. "39 
Sartre sees the necessary conditions for my achieving an objective 
distance with regards myself residing in my being for an immediately 
present concrete other, who directly confronts my consciousness. This 
relationship he gives a graphic form in his phenomenological analysis 
of 'the look'. He remains as we have said trapped within the subject-
object couplet in his specification of inter-subjectivity; social 
relations are still conceived as intentional relations of consciousness, 
or consciousnesses, and these relations although described as ontological 
rather than epistemological, are still theorized via the visual metaphor 
of egological epistemology. 
However for Merleau-Ponty, social interaction is no longer forced into 
the phenomenological mould and theorized via the concept of intentional 
constitution in such a way that the starting point of a social phenomenology 
remains the cognitive subject as source of vision or object of it. He, 
like Sartre, eliminates the transcendental consciousness, arguing that 
the life-world is not constituted by consciousness but rather is the 
abiding context within which consciousness comes in contact with an alre~ 
given world, and is formed. However unlike Sartre he attempts to theorize 
what is involved in this contact. In doing so he must trace the role of 
the inter-subjective in the constitution of consciousness. This leads 
him to a consideration of perception and language as the socialized 
medium within which self-other relations develop. 
In so far as I and the other possess bodies which relate to a shared 
kinaesthetic field and share a common language, then there are material 
relations between myself and others which cannot be challenged by 
individual solipsistic doubts. The notion of a generalised other, an 
inter-subjective space, which mediates between myself and the other and 
which is constitutive of each of our being, Merleau-Ponty believes, 
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overcomes the solipsism phenomenological philosophy has implied in the 
PB:st.,', The life world is grasped by him as the interpenetration of subject 
and object. 
From the outset he displaces the centrality of the concept of 
intentionality from his presentation of phenomenology. He does so in 
order to effect a fundamental dec entering of the philosophy of mind and 
self. The pure ego of classical epistemology is replaced by the embodied 
speaking subject which derives its mode of being from the material world, 
corporeal, cultural and historical, within which it is situated. Con-
sciousness no longer thought of in intentional terms, can be grasped as 
institution rather than constitution. As such it is subject to the 
vicissitudes of culture and history. The knowing self is not a pure 
disembodied consciousness engrossed in a solitary contemplation of an 
object world revealed in and through this privileged cognitive vision. 
Rather, argues Merleau-Ponty, the world is given originally to us in the 
concrete corporeal and semiotic relations which we as embodied, speaking 
subjects have to it, and not in the cogito. Through my body and language 
I grasp myself objectively and in turn appropriate the object world for 
myself • 
Neither perception nor speech, he argues, are merely the intentional 
acts of a pure consciousness. 
Perception is for him, always the activity of an embodied being 
si tuated in the world. As such, its structure and operation is revalatory 
of the being of others and not restrictive of the other's being for me 
as the cognitive acts portr~ed by a transcendental phenomenology of course 
are. 
Merleau-Ponty in asserting the materiality of perception is not 
merely offering us an empirical psychological or even phenomenological 
analysis of a sensory process. He is challenging the entire egological 
theor,y of cognition which expresses itself in the metaphor of cognition 
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as vision. He argues that man as the object of phenomenological anal::sis 
is-not· to be reduced to a pure transcendental ego. The existential 
subject which dwells in a concrete world has a body which as a sensory 
modality is the "vehicle of our being in the world." Perception involves 
the whole body as both subject and object in the world, rather than just 
the abstracted and isolated mind. The world as perceived unfolds as a 
field relative to my physical activity within it. Consciousness always 
grasps its perceptual object from a specific perspective which is deter-
mined by my bodily position vis a vis the object. 
My body is the vantage point from which I indeed can see the world 
as a series of configured objects, it -
"carves out within that plenum of the world in which concrete 
movement takes place a zone of reflection and subjectivity: it 
superimposes upon physical space a potential or human space." 
Perception is then always a situated bodily activity and never a pure cognitive 
receptivity. 40 
Perception he insists must not be seen as an act of consciousness 
it must be grasped as a bodily activity and hence dissected as an inter-
subjective structure -
"Everything depends upon the fact that this table over which my 
glance now sweeps, probing its texture, does not belong to any 
'space of consciousness' and inserts itself equally well into 
the circuit of other bodies. Everything depends, that is, upon 
the fact that our glances are not 'acts of consciousness' each 
of which claims an invariable priority, but openings of our 
flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh of 
the world. "41 
Merleau-Ponty stressing the corporality of vision, returns to Sartre's 
analysis of 'the look'. He notes, if the visual exchange with the other 
is treated as the confrontation of two 'I thinks', then the visual inter-
change looking - looked at, ~ appear to reflection as indeed a combat. 
Each ego "can believe itself the winner of the trial (for after all, if 
I think the other is thinking of me) there is still nothing there but one 
of IV thoughts. ,,42 If perceptual exchange is understood in terms of the 
intentional structuring of consciousness, then the combat of glances 
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requires a victor. 
'!I look at him. He sees that I look at him. I see that he 
sees it. He sees.th~t I see that he sees it. The analysis 
is endless; and If It were the measure of all things, glances 
would slip from one to another indefinitely - there would never be 
but a single cogito at a time."43 
And indeed this is Sartre's problem - he acknowledges against 
Husserl, that the other is at the heart of my self appropriation. But, 
this other, experienced in a perceptual exchange, is still understood 
in terms of an egological theory of consciousness. It is an 'I think' 
and as such the negation of my being as centre of consciousness. However 
for Merleau-Ponty, perception must not be modelled on pure consciousness. 
In practice our glances do not rebound off each other in endless reflection 
as each partner seeks to subdue the other within the structure of his 
conscious constitution of the world-as-object. Rather, he argues, that 
in such exchanges we open ourselves up to a shared world and in our 
vision and movement affirm concretely the existence of that inter-
subjective life world. 
"Vision sketches out what is accomplished by desire when it 
pushes two 'thoughts' out toward that line of fire between 
them, that blazing surface where they seek fulfillment which 
will be identically the same for the two of them, as the 
sensible world is for everyone.,,44 
Moreover as Merleau-Ponty points out, speech interrupts this being-
together and carries it forward with a new impetus. It gives a new 
communicative content to the fascination of the visual and gestural 
confrontation. 
The body then, asserts Merleau-Ponty, has a fundamental role in the 
possibility of inter-subjectivity. He declares, 
"there would not be others or other minds for me if I did 
not have a body, and if they had no body, through which they 
slip into my field, multiplying it from wlthin."45 
This concern with the self as 'essentially embodied is paralleled later 
in Strawson' s stress, wi thin analytical philosophy, on the importance of 
P~sical1stic predicates for the identification of others and one's selt. 
Merleau-Ponty traces out the philosophical implications of the Gestalt 
theory of perception in a way not unlike that of Wittgenstein. The 
grasping of the active side of perception he believes, not only overcomes 
the classical alternatives between objective psychology and introspection 
but also challenges the whole classical theory of perception as pure 
cognition by an absolute but passive eye. The Gestalt approach reveals 
the visible world and the sphere of my motor projects as being each 
"total parts of the same Being". For my vision and my bodily action 
overlap in perception and, 
"This ,extraordinary overlapping, which we never think about 
sufficiently, forbids us to conceive of vision as an operation 
of thought that would set up before our mind a picture or a 
representation of the world, a world of immanence and ideality.,,46 
In his reflections on the nature of perception Merleau-Ponty prepares 
the ground for a far ranging assault on the classical theory of represent-
ation and the binary form of the sign. He makes his consideration of 
theories of painting from Descartes to the Impressionists, the occasion 
for rethinking from the conversational standpoint the metaphysics of 
vision. 
"Vision" he insists, "is not the metamorphosis of things them-
selves into the sight of them; it is not a matter of things 
belonging simultaneously to the huge, real world and the small 
private world. It is a thinking that deciphers strictly the 
signs given wi thin the body." 4 7 
He attacks the notion of perception as an inner representation or 
picturing of an already given outside state of affairs. Vision is he 
argues an active symbolic act of interpretation of perceptual signs and 
not the impression on or in the mind of an image. He notes that Descartes 
"Dioptric" epitomises the classicaJ. representationaJ. theory of perception, 
in which the visible, the image, must be constructed according to a 
'model-in-thought'. The image or percept can as we have seen in Descartes 
metaphysic, be allowed no autonomy. It must always be subject to the 
overarching analytic scrutiny of the rational mind. The image as primaril1' 
object of Imowledge is reduced to its status as unreal duplication ot the 
world .of external things-in-themselves. 
~In the world. there is the t~g it~elf, and outside this thing 
1tself there 1S that other thing which is only reflected light 
rays and which happens to have an ordered correspondence with 
the real thing; the:e are two individuals then, bound together 
externally by causall. ty. ,,48 
The nexus of image and object, just as that of sign and referent is 
located within the act of cognition itself, in the activity of the 
cognizing self. Both the binary theory of the sign and causal-correspondence 
notion of correspondence are circumscribed by this egological theory of 
representation. 
t , 
The word image he believes, is in bad repute, "because 
we have thoughtlessly believed that a design was a tracing, a copy, a 
second thing, and that the mental image was such a design belonging to 
our private bric-a-brac. ,,49 
But perception, he argues, is not the pure gaze of an absolute and 
distanced subject on an object world already given and offering itself 
up, as it is in-itself, for this gaze. Perception always involves the in-
terpenetration of subject and object. The world of course always retains 
its material objectivity and transcends our perspectival grasp of it. 
Yet, at the same it is only given to us in and through our perspectives 
on it and through these we humanize it and ourselves transcend it in its 
subjectivity. Subjectivity does not constitute the world, for it has 
only a 'precarious grasp upon the world'. Indeed this subjectivity 
only becomes reflective, a cogito, through its being in that material 
world i.e. through its articulation in speech and through its embodiment 
and subsequent perceptual and motor activity. It is through the body 
and language that I appropriate the world as a meaningful complex and 
it through the body and language that I can grasp my self in that world. 
It is originally through the body that I discover my being in the world 
as a subject-object relationship which invariably unfolds into a world 
With others. 
In the sensory field of my body appear 0 bj ects which are grasped 
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in relation to the embodied me. But amongst these objects is one which 
it~elf·, as Sartre had first noted, has a relation to the objects in my 
perceptual field, and is seen by me as clearly having this relation _ 
the other. When the other, notes Merleau-Ponty, 
"in the midst of my objects begins to make gestures towards them 
to make use of them I cannot doubt for a moment that the world 
to which he is oriented is truly the same world that I perceive."Sa 
For, if the other perceives something, and acts in relation to a 
configuration of objects, that something, those objects, must be my own 
world because it is my world that the other comes into being. Between 
myself and ,the other, Merleau-Ponty asserts, there is a common perceptual-
kinaesthetic field.In so far as the other dwells in this common field 
and demonstrates this to me by acting within and reacting to this field 
as I do then, he is another me. He becomes an other me, yet not me, in 
so far as he partakes in our shared perceptual-gestural world. He is a 
generalized I. Because my body mediates between my cognitive self and the 
world and in my perceptual field is another being who I can perceive 
shares that field, I can gereralize my corporeal relation to the world. 
The other is grasped as a generalized I. Merleau-Ponty notes -
"As long as it adheres to my body like the tunic of Nessus, 
the world exists not only for me but for everyone in it who 
makes gestures towards it."S1 
The very corporali ty of our being-in-the-world plunges us immediately 
into an existential relation with others. However, the corporal is just 
one dimension of our relation with others, which Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
address. As central to our concrete mode of' being in the world is, he 
believes, language. Having grasped the importance of a shared perceptual-
kinaesthetic world for my constitution of the other as like me, he 
suggests -
"Perhaps now we are closer to understanding better the accomplish-
ment language represents for us, how language prolongs and trans-
forms the silent relation with the other."52 
This phenomenology of perception, with its emphasis on the embodied selt, 
ettect! vely challenges the whole egological philosophy of mind which 
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reuuce~ man ~o filS ~ranscendenta1 surrogate - the pure episte~ological 
ego, itself condemned to a solitary if absolute status. Moreover just 
as my own and the other's corporality is a necessary condition of the 
emergence of a shared perceptual world, similarly my own and the other's 
linguistic faculty is the necessary condition for the emergence of a 
shared semiotic world. And, just as through our shared perceptual world 
I grasp the other as like me, so also, the world of inter-subjective 
meaning allows me to grasp the other as an other me. 
The other's speech manages to reach us and signify for us. Our 
words, as his replies attest, reach him and signify for him. Thus we 
prove to each other that we live in a shared world of meaning. And as 
that common semiotic world to which we both have access is constitutive 
of our being, then the other is an other me. The common language we 
speak shares then, many of the characteristics of our inter-subjective 
sensory field. My use of linguistic signs, like my corporeality, generates 
a generalized other whose being mediates between my ego and the particular 
others who share my cultural world -
"This speech is like the other in general, ungraspable, 
unthematizable and to that extent it is generality, not 
individuality.tlS3 
Speech, he demands, should not be seen as merely the translation of 
thought into a public domain by means of ciphers. He attacks the project 
which he ascribes to Husserl, but which is common to all thought within 
ego logical discourse, that tllanguage is one of the objects supremely 
consituted by consciousness, and that actual languages are very special 
cases of a possible language which consciousness holds the key to - that 
they are systems of signs linked to their meaning by univocal relation-
ships which, in their structure as in their function, are susceptible 
to a total explication. ,,54 This view he sees as reducing language to a 
secondary role as an "accompaniment substitute, memorandum, or seconclary 
means of communication." Thus the expressivity of language is seen is this 
translational view of language and binary-correspondence theory of the 
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sign as having its essential source in the ideal meaning i~te~tions 
located in the mind of the speaker. 
Merleau-Ponty totally rejects this egological conception of the 
relation to thought and language. He denies the assertion that to speak 
is to translate a thought into words. The relation of language to thought 
is he believes, more comparable to that of the body to consciousness, than 
to the translation between different private and public symbolic codes. 
In perception we appropriate the world in and through the body and its 
direct relation with the world. The body is not the barrier to the mind's 
immediate access to the object in itself. It is the very condition of any 
access to the object for me. Similarly, language is not merely the public 
means for the expression of thought, entirely transparent to itself and 
fully formed. It is the means by which our thought becomes revealed to 
others and indeed to us ourselves. As Merleau-Ponty notes -
"For the speaking subject, to express is to become aware of; 
he does not express for others, but also to know himself what 
he intends."" 
The thematization of the signifying intention or pure idea does not 
precede speech, because, in fact, it is the result of speech itself, "my 
spoken words surprise me myself and teach me my thought." Speech is then 
~ot some second-order and derived operation we utilise only in order to 
render public our thought, but the vehicle by which we can indeed grasp 
our Significations in a clear and ordered way. 
Wittgenstein comes to a very similar set of conclusions about the 
nature of the relation between thought and language. He declares -
"Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and 
sense to speaking and which it would be possible to detach 
from speaking, rather as the Devil took the shadow of 
Schlemiehl from the ground - ",6 
What he asks, is this mental process of intending? -
"But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the 
sentence (for example) at its beginning? - If it was in my 
mind, still it would not normally be there in some different 
word order. But here we are constructing a misleading picture 
of 'intending', that is, of the use of this word. An intention 
• 
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is embedded ~n its situation, in human customs and instit~tions. 
If the technlque of the game of chess did not exist r could 
not intend to playa game of chess. In so far as r'do intend 
the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made 
possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question.,,57 
Wittgenstein like Merleau-Ponty attacks the translational theory 
of language and the atomistic binary-correspondence theory of the sign 
and meaning. From the standpoint of a conversational theory of language, 
he subverts the dualism which undergirds the egological theory of 
representation and makes of meaning a private mental cause and of 
linguistic form a mere expressive effect. Like Merleau-Ponty he rejects 
the idea of language as a form of secondary representation which trans-
lates the primary representational domain of image based thought; a 
view central to classical theories. For him -
"The mental picture is the picture which is described when 
someone describes what he imagines."58 
It is, in other words, apprehended in and through language. Meaning is 
not some intangible mental process located deep in the mind which gives 
sense to an uttered sentence. It is not a facet of consciousness at all, 
but of language in concrete use in social settings. The meaning of a 
word, Wittgenstein was arguing by the late 1920's, is neither the image 
it conjures up in the mind of speaker or hearer, nor a fixed ostensive 
definition which locates the meaning of a word in an object pointed at. 
Rather, the meaning of a word is its place amongst other words in a 
'grammatical system' of conventional usuage. 
Similarly Merleau-Ponty declares that -
"it is the lateral relation of one sign to another which makes 
each of them significant, so that meaning appears only at the 
intersection or as it were in the interval between words.,,59 
Thus meaning does not in any way transcend or pre-empt language, but 
&J 
appears only in the context of concrete speech use. 
"Since the sign has meaning only in so far as it is profiled 
against other signs, its meaning is entirely involved in 
language. Speech always comes into play against a background 
of speech; it is always only a fold in the immense fabric of 
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language. To understand it, we do not have to consult some 
inner lexicon which gives us the pure thoughts covered up 
by the words or forms we are perceiving; we have only to 
lend ourselves to its life, to its movement of differentiation 
and articulation, and to its eloquent gestures.II61 
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty departing from different positions, 
the former from a naturalistic study of linguistic usuages the latter 
J 
from a phenomenology of perception, converge on a common destination - a 
conversational theory of mind, self and language which commits philosophy 
to a radical retheorizing from the sociologistic standpoint. Are we 
witnessing is this convergence, and the similar ones of Mead and 
Volosinov, ,a set of strange but magnificent coincidences, which mark the 
latter half of the 1920' s as being an epochival period in European 
philosophy? Or, can we trace a historical diffusion of a discrete doctrine 
with a determinate point and time of origin and traceable lines of 
communication and transmission? Or, are we perhaps observing here, a 
set of changes at the same time both less historically coherent than a 
cultural diffusion but more profound in their effect? Are we not 
witnessing a symptom, an index, albeit refracted through the opaqueness 
of a philosophical discourse, as yet not free of its past, of a sub-
terrean rupture in our organization of knowledge? Is not this conver-
sational theory which demarcates the theorists of the 1920' s from their 
egological predecessors and unifies them in this demarcation, not the 
accommodation of philosophy to the newly grasped historicity of our 
thinking and sociality of our being which begins to appear at the end 
of the nineteenth century? Is not Husserl's anachronistic stance, as 
well as their rupture from classical epistemology an effect, a 
reverberation in the ethereal discourse of metaphYSics of this fissure 
in the European episteme which appears in the wake of the appearance of 
the social sciences? 
• 
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T~oughout the 1920's, a crucial period in the redefini~ion of 
modern philosophical thought, the pioneering texts of Heidegger, Head, 
Volosinov and Wittgenstein, rethink the philosophy of language and mind 
from the fundamental starting point of social process and communicational 
practice. This rethinking involved a rupture from ego-logical thought 
and the appearance of a new paradigm of philosophical theoIJ~ and practice 
- the conversational. The structural dimensions of this paradigm can 
be sketched and the more general epistemic discourse which conditions 
the possibility of its existence plotted. The privileged object of that 
discourse is the conversation. 
Again,my aim is not to write a history of the ideas, themes and 
individuals which figure in this philosophical revolution in the second 
half of the 1920's and 1930's. We certainly have a need for such a 
history,which could trace the developments in philosophical thinkingjin 
an age of growing awareness of the import of the social sciencesJand 
trace the correlations and d~endencies between these epistemic events 
and the tumultuous changes taking place in the structure of European 
society after the First World War, and in the wake of a massive crisis 
in the capitalist economy. However, clearly there are questions of 
periodization involved here. And, in the history of ideas and sciences 
this involves questions not merely of chronology (who? where? and when?) 
but primarily of epistemic structure, of inclusion and exclusion, con-
tinuity and discontinuity, unity and dispersal. For as Bachelard 
perceived, in the history of knowledge domains,epistem1c structures do 
not merely impose themselves, in a definite chronological succession, 
on an already defined domain of "knowledge" and "sciences" which have an 
autonomous historical existence. Rather, these structures of inclusion 
and exclusion, continuity and rupture, unity and dispersal, demarcate 
and hence define what knowledge is ,and what a specific science with a 
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distin~~ set of. methods and concepts can be at a specific historical 
conjuncture. We are concerned here not only with the limits of what can 
be said with meaning and scientific credibility in a particular discipline 
in a specific period, but indeed with the emergence, institutionalization, 
decay and dissolution of disciplines per see And indeed, we are concerned 
not only with the theoretical structure of discourses and ruptures at this 
level, but also with the level of technological application and pedagogic 
activity which sustain and realize knowledge domains as social institutions. 
In short, we.are concerned with the conditions of reCOgnition and 
acceptance of disciplines, sciences, schools or theories. 
What separates Merleau-Ponty from Husserl, Mead from Watson the 
. 
• Behaviourist, the later Wittgenstein from his juvenlia in the Tractatus, 
f' 
is not a few years of argument, reflection and progress which can be 
descriptively catalogued in an empirical account of intellectual develop-
ments of the 1920's and 1930's. It is rather a profound rupture in the 
very organization of philosophical knowledge itself, the roots of which 
stretch back into the nineteenth century and the effects of which are 
being felt still today. Mead, Volosinov, Wi ttgenstein, Sartre, "philosophy in 
the 1920' s", must be treated as effects, i.e. as effects of this discon-
tinuity. The conversational paradigm which I have isolated as the 
distinguishing feature of philosophical theorizing in the 1920' s is a 
regional instance or effect of the rupture with egological thought 
consequent upon the development of the historical and social sciences. 
Any history of philosophy in the 1920' s and 1930' s or indeed semiology 
of this conversational paradigm is dependent on an archaeology of the 
dissolution of the classical episteme and emergence of the modern episteme. 
But we are not yet in a position to provide an adequate archaeological 
analysis of the modern episteme. We are, as Foucaul t comments, too close 
to it. We think in and through it, still living its changes. We have 
318. 
not. yet. achieved }he objective distance from it that the passage of 
historical time facilitates. However perhaps we ~ in a position to 
sketch a regional instance of this episteme. This I have attempted to 
do in my analysis of philosophical discourse since the 1920's and in the 
sketch of the conversational paradigm which is the unifying principle of 
this discourse and marks the point of rupture of philosophical theorising 
from the egological episteme. Moreover such regional studies may be able 
to illuminate the general structure of our contemporary organization of 
knowledge. 
til The Conversational Paradigm 
The monistic world of sociological realism/idealism (the terms 
become meaningless) is comprised of a set of conversations, of these, 
some are distributed between individuals as distinct biological units 
in which case the conversation is external, others are distributed within 
individual biological units in which case the conversation is internal 
representing different levels of control.or abstraction within the. 
cognitive functioning of that unit - a thought or problem· solving process. 
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As Mead. says -. "The internalisation in our experience of the external 
conversations of gestures which we carryon with other individuals in 
the social process is the essence of thinking.,,1 Mind then is the 
importation of social process, its ~ is that of a conversation, its 
content the semiotics of the social world. Indeed as Volosinov argues _ 
"Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with 
semiotic content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction.,,2 
Both transcendentalism and psychologism fail to grasp the sociality of 
consciousness. They localise meaning generation in the individual 
consciousness and in so doing they limit the study of Signification, 
language, and culture, to a study of consciousness and its laws, whether 
this be pursued by transcendental deduction or in empirical psychological 
terms. This is precisely the 'error' Husserl commits in his Cartesian 
Me~tions the forcing of inter-subjectivity, i.e. social relations and 
communicational practice into the framework of the individual consciousness, 
albeit an absolute subjectivity. It is also the 'error' of Carnap's essay 
on logical empiricism the Aufbau,where the reduction is psychologistic 
rather than transcendental. 
Take for instance the understanding of language, a problem we will 
be more fully occupied with in a later study. For both idealism and 
empiriCism, in the classical period, understanding as a process becomes 
one of mapping on external signs to subjective internal experience, 
whether this be the non material world of mentalistic concepts or the 
psychologistic world of behavioural responses. Language and signs as an 
external reality become merely a technical means for the expression of 
inner meanings, which are the true source of understanding. Again the 
basic dualisms of ego-logicism .find eJq)ression. Thought is set against 
language; an independent realm restrained but not constituted b.r 
language; a deep structure of meaning struggling to express itself' in 
a surface structure of all. too human language. 
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However for the conversational paradigm, as Merleau Ponty has Said, 
the understanding of a sign is an interpretation, of an apprehended sign 
in terms of an already Imown sign. Language is always unders tood against 
a background of language and social practice. To understand we do not 
have to consult an inner world of intensional meanings which gives us 
the pure thoughts or deep structure of a meaning intention somehow 
obscured by the language we are condemned to use. Understanding then is 
a process of semiotic creativity, moving from sign to sign and then to a 
new sign. It is perfectly consistent and continuous - from one link of 
semiotic nature (hence, also of a material nature) we proceed uninterupt-
edly to another link of exactly the same nature. And nowhere is there a 
break in the chain, "nowhere does the chain plunge into inner being, 
non-material in nature and unembodied in signs. ,,3 Nei ther meaning or 
thought are to be considered as prior to and the condition of language. 
"this act of expression - this joining through transcendence 
of the linguistic meaning of speech and the Signification it 
intends - is not for us speaking subjects a second-order 
operation we supposedly have recourse to only in order to 
communicate our thoughts to others, but our own taking 
posession or acquisition of significations which otherwise 
are present to us only in a muffled way. The reason why the 
thematization of the signified does not precede speech is 
that it is the result of it. ,,4 
The conversational paradigm empties "mind" into the world. The world 
of signs and language is no longer viewed as a means (to express thought) 
but as a realm of being, providing access to Being. As Heidegger notes, 
for man language is not merely "a tool at his disposal rather it is that 
event which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence. nS 
For it is only language "that affords the possibility of standing in the 
openness of the existent." The world as perceived and acted within is 
the set of all conversations •. 'Mind' is a discrete subset of these, 
derived and dependent on this semiotic and social world to give it the 
power of meaning. As Merleau-Ponty says, "my spoken words surprise me 
1IJ8el1' and teach me my thought." 
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The conversational paradigm marks a return to ontology. Mind is 
subservient once more to the world. Meaning has its origin not in the 
cogito but in my being a language user. Intentionality is realised in 
the being of language. For the speaking subject to express.is to become 
aware of, he does not express just for others, but also to know himself 
what he intends. 
Epistemology once more takes its place behind ontology. We mow, 
we who ~ Philosophical anthropology is the form of this ontology. 
Mind is subservient once more to the world but not a 'real' object-
ivist world robbed of concrete man, rather a conversational world 
constituted by the conversation of its members, themselves constituted by 
that conversation. The conversational paradigm restores man as a social 
existent to his world. The human world as cultural object is the 
constituted product not of a transcendental ego but of the meaning endOwing 
acts of interacting concrete existence. Conversational inter-subjectivity 
reconstructs transcendental subjectivity. The world cannot be divorced 
from the self reproducing forms of conversation, for that is its structure 
and their content is its. Nowhere is this more true than in the world 
of language (could there be another world?). Volosinov demands - "The 
sign may not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse 
(seeing that the sign is part of organised social intercourse and cannot 
. 6 
exist, as such, outside it, reverting to a mere physical artifact)." 
To treat language as a natural object has been the characteristic 
of the egological science of language. But to remove language from its 
social context of usage, it is now argued, is to create the theoretical 
problem which has bedevilled egological philosophy of language - the 
relation of language to meaning. Just as we have seen the ignoring of 
the sociality of consciousness led to the 'problem of other minds' so a 
neglect of the eminent sociality of language leads to the "problem of 
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meanin~". Language has no relationship to meaning, for meaning is language 
in use in social settings. However if we abstract, for the practical 
purposes of scientific linguistics, from language in use 1 a reified natural 
object, a language universe from which man as a social agent is absent, 
in so far as we have removed the source of meaning, language becomes 
meaningless and a new sphere is invented to recapture the loss - the 
world of magical mentalistic meanings. And so the problem of the 
relationship is created. Logist abstraction and psychological reduction 
of language is the nihilation of meaning just as the positivist reification 
of 'society' is the nihilation of man as a practico-critical being. 
Thus,philosophical theories of language wi thin the ego-logical para-
digm, whether of an empiricist or rationalist variant are rent by a common 
paradox. This paradox is clearly visible in the culmination and 
exhaustion of egological philosophy in its empiricist and rationalist 
variants in neo-positivist and transcendental phenomenological accounts 
of language. Both forms of ego-logical thought presuppose language and 
communication as a condition of their analysis yet each in its abstraction 
and reductionism systematically erodes the social and pragmatic base of 
language and communication. Neo-positivist semantics as Wittgenstein, 
initially one of its leading proponents, was to grasp in the late 1920's 
nihilates rather than clarifies the basis of meaning, in its attempted 
transcendence of common sense in the ideal language project. Similarly 
transcendental phenomenology in its bracketing out of the Lebenswelt, 
reduces meaning to the pure intentional acts of a single, albei t universal 
ego. And accordingly in seeking a primal point of origin of meaning 
behind language it simply ignores the being, a dense material being, of 
language, while at the same time pre-supposing that being as a condition 
ot its analysis. 
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i) The Epistemological, Common Sense and the Conversational Paradigm 
But the restoration of the primacy of ontology is simultaneously a 
subversion of absolutism by sociologism. The acceptance of the ontological 
primacy of social process and communicative practice directly challenges 
the absolute epistemologies produced within the ego-logical paradigm 
whether of the ra.tionalist - transcendental variant or empiricist-realist 
form. Within the conversational paradigm, no longer can objectivity be 
purchased at the expense of banishing man, as a concrete, existent from 
his world. ,Rather it must be conceived and articulated from the viewpoint 
of the 'a priori of communication. ,7 Objectivity is conceived as the 
realised product of a communication community, whether this be a scientific 
cormnuni ty or one of common people. Knowledge is grasped in turn as a 
socially and historically located material process of production and 
transformation of systems of signs, (theories, methods, facts). Within 
the conversational paradigm objectivity is no longer traced to the con-
stitutive apodicity of a transcendental subject nor to the brute facticity 
of a given real world but rather to the materiality, a human and historical 
materiality, of our communicative practices. The conversational view of 
man and his world, as self reproducing systems of communicative practices, 
challenges both traditional transcendental epistemology and also empiricist 
epistemology naturalized in positivist scientific method. 
The radically differing conception of the relationship between 
philosophic and common sense theorizing held with the two paradigms 
illustrates the epistemological rupture which separates them. 
Empiricist epistemology increasingly naturalized in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centur.1,with the increasing dominance of positivist 
rationality, has founded itself on the easy certainties and metaphysics 
of canmon sense. But,oblivious of those roots, it proceeds to launch an 
assault on the irrationality of common sense. Both accept the ex1.stence 
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of~ objective order in the world, beyond human agency and cognition, 
and on the other hand ,both accept the existence of a fundamental category 
of experience prior to any theories we might have about the world. 
Furthermore,both accept that theories, scientific or common sense, are 
absolutely true or false according to whether they represent the objective 
order correctly, the correspondence being verified by recourse to our 
'pure' empirical experience. The rationality of common sense will stand 
or fall by judge~ent in front of the same tribunal as that of scientific 
theory, namely that of sensory experience. These shared conceptions of 
an independent and objective structure of the world, of a category of 
empirical a-theoretical experience and of truth as the satisfaction of 
a relationship of correspondence between a sentence and a fact, can be 
traced directly to the epistemic structure of the egological paradigm 
and its antinomies. 
Naturalized epistemology and common sense interact then.in a mutually 
supportive way within a common epistemic field of dispersal - the egological. 
The world of common sense, the taken for granted world of unexamined 
facticity, of practical non-theoretically imbued experience, and of over-
burdening neceSSity, became the foundation on which naturalized epistem-
ology began to erect a metaphysical and methodological edifice. Moreover, 
epistemology disciplined by the rigour of scientific method. then proceeds 
to offer a critique of common sense while remaining in its epistemic 
foundations imbued with the same metaphysical illusions. Epistemology 
founds on common' sense, then has the nerve to bite the hand that feeds 
it. Posi ti vist method increasingly struggled in the first decades, of 
the twentieth century to free i tsel! from this contradiction by the 
creation of an ideal language, transparent to the objects it represented; 
a language, sought by 1blssell, Wittgenstein and Carnap, cleansed of the 
assw:r.ptions and ambiguity or ordinary language, which in the Leibni tzian 
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dr~amwould be a perfect instrument of scientific rationality. 
In hindsight we know this project was a failure. The abstraction 
and reductionism involved in the logist project was the death of language 
as a communicative medium. Moreover the failure itself was a necessary 
one, as I think Wittgenstein grasped, in so far as this ideal language 
project was generated and remained trapped within the antinomies of 
egologicism. 
Within the rationalist-transcendental epistemological tradition 
Husserl grasped the subtle unthematized relationship between positivist 
science and its common sense hinterland, i.e., the life world which 
undergirds scientific reality and its standpoint but which remains itself 
taken for granted and uninvestigated by that science. Both common sense 
and positivist science for Husserl operate within what he calls the 
'natural standpoint'. That is they automatically assume the existence 
of an objective fact world 'out there' external to man, then proceed 
onwards in their methods (in positive science namely those of measurement, 
correlation and causal analysis) on the basis of this taken for granted 
thesis of the natural standpoint. A t no point do they ask how such an 
objective fact world is possible as a communicational accomplishment of 
scientific practice. 
However as we mow, Husserl sought that condition of possibility in 
the intentional meaning enduring acts of an absolute transcendental 
subjectivity and not in the social relations and communicative practice 
of historically located human actors. Husserl,like his posi ti vist 
contemporaries,is reluctant to forgo the easy certitude and facticity of 
'I th . the taken for granted common sense world. True he suspends the eS1S 
of the natural standpoint"arid brackets the objective facticity involved 
in that standpoint, but only to replace it with the apodicity of the 
transcendental standpoint with ~ guaranteed noematic objectivity. 
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In-- Husserl' s transcendental phenomenology the necessity of the taken 
for granted and the objectivity provided for by the thesis of the natural 
standpoint are mirrored and reconstituted as the universality of the 
transcendental, act and essence. Transcendental subjectivity is trans-
cendental intersubjectivity declares Husserl. The transcendental 
reduction borrows the certitude of the Lebenswelt, reconstitutes it in 
the absolute form of the transcendental ego, and then from this apodictic 
base attempts to constitute anew that very intersubjectivity of the common 
sense world,_ on which it in fact remains predicated. Yet, and herein lies 
the paradox, the absolute and pure nature of the transcendental ego renders 
the constitution of another intentional ego and hence the constitution of 
intersubjectivity and the social world impossible. 
Again we note the symmetry of the paradoxes wi thin the egological 
paradigm, Neo-positivism in its attempted transcendence of common sense, 
in the ideal language project,nihilates rather than clarifies the basis 
of meaning. Similarly transcendental phenomenology in ~ bracketing out 
of the Lebenswelt, reduces meaning to the pure intentional acts of a 
single, albei t universal ego. Such a reduction, however, and the trans-
cendental investigations it permits, are carried out in and through 
natural language. This system of signification is the unexamined 
auspices of the phenomenological project. Both forms of egological thought 
presuppose language and communication as a condition of their analysis yet 
each in its abstraction and reductionism systematically erodes the social 
and pragmatic base of language and communication. 
As we have seen the investigation of the world of common sense and 
ordinary language as communicational accomplishments embedded wi thin a 
nexus of social relations, has been a dominant interest in philosophy since 
the twenties. Indeed these new interests , albeit expressed in the first 
instance in the heady abstractions of philosophical anthropology, are an 
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ind~x ~f the rupture with ego-logicism, whether in its phenomenological 
or positivist variants, and the new acceptance of the primacy of social 
process and communicational practice. 
The socially constructed and experienced life-world became, as we 
knOW, the central arena of investigation for phenomenology after Husserl. 
In of course the social phenomenologies of Scheler and Schutz, but also 
in the concern with language shown by Heidegger and later Merleau-Ponty, 
and in the phenomenology of inter-personal relations and the emotions 
plotted by Sartre and Emmanuel Mounier. 
Indeed, as we have seen, in the other traditions the same orientation 
is prevalent. Mead settles the account with the German idealist inherit-
ance of Pragmatism and adds a vi tal social dimension to the dominant 
behaviorism of the period. He traces the constitutive role of language 
and social interaction in the genesis of mind. Dewey developed this social 
evolutionism of Mead's into the areas of epistemology, ethics and social 
and educational philosophy. More recently the neo-pragmatists Quine and Rescher 
have set about dismantling the remaining dogmas of empiricism --the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction, the notion of theory-free observation, the corres-
pondence theory of truth and verificational principle. 
Wi thin analytical philosophy since Wi ttgenstein and Austin, a 
parallel set of transformations has occurred. In the theory of language 
. . 
there has been a move away from the logical atomism of the neo-positivist 
period towards an ethnographic analysis of language-use in social contexts. 
Secon~,Wittgenstein's denial of the possibility of private language led 
to a far reaching critique wi thin analytical philosophy of egological 
philosophical psychology. The work of Strawson, Hampshire and R;rle is 
in this tradition. Thirdly, and the latest development to occur chron-
ologically, there has been a rethinking of its philosophy' of science from 
the conversational standpoint and abandonment of the key tenets of the 
poSitivist epistemology. 
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. The common starting point of the new analytic philosophy is a 
challenge to the view that statements, whether in the form of scientific 
theories or ordinary language descriptive utterances, have some fixed 
meaning as a result of their representation offor correspondence to, 
particular empirically given states of affairs. Rather, it is argued, 
that statements have meaning only by virtue of their relations to other 
statements in the structured discourse to which they belong. This con-
textualist theory of meaning implies a conception of science which 
stresses the,se features. 
1. The primacy of the theoretical over the observational. This 
is primarily explicated in terms of the assertion of the 
absence of a neutral pre-theoretical realm of scientific 
evidence, a central tenet of classical empiricism. There is 
no set of facts independent of the scientific observer's 
theoretical optic which constitute neutral evidence. As 
such scientific cognition is no mere reflection of objective 
reality but rather an interpretation and hence appropriation 
of it through the mechanism of theoretical practice. 
2. The incommensurability of scientific paradigms. Scientific 
concepts, methods and theories are intelligible only within 
structured and mutually exclusive universes of discourse. 
A paradigm is "the network of theory through which the 
scientific community deals with the world. ,,8 As scientific 
criteria of selection of hypothesis are internal to paradigms, 
indi vidual scientists lost in their interiors c~ot judge 
these networks by independent criteria. For this would 
require an objective supra-paradigmatic point outside the 
boundaries of current discourse. 
3. The pragmatic and socio-historical dimension of scientific 
discovery. Wi th the abandonment of the notion of a neutral 
realm of facts and attack on invariant criteria of scientific 
rationality (viz. theories of confirmation or refutation) 
implicit in the paradigmatic view, epistemology has begun to 
reorient its structure. Systematic historical and sociological 
study of the concrete practices of the sciences has suggested 
that with regard the selection and acceptance of scientific. 
hypothesis, social institutional constraints and paradigmat1c 
dynamics may be more important than observation and verifying 
exp eriment. 
The stress on these three features in analytical studies of scientific 
method has shifted concern away from a unified positive method for science 
founded on a naive empiricism to a consideration of the social and 
historical parameters of scientific research. I would argue that both 
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th~ contextualist theory of meaning and the paradigmatic view of scientific 
practice, are indices of the emerging centrality of sociologism to modern 
analytic philosophy. 
Indeed,with the recognition that no scientific observation or 
description is theory-independent,analytical philosophy has had to con-
front directly the philosophical problem of relativism more usually 
associated with the social sciences. For if What counts as a fact is 
indeed decided within a theoretical framework then surely it can be argued 
that there does not exist a neutral realm of facts which can function as 
a tribunal of experience by which to judge between competing theories. 
Scientists belonging to different traditions and holding conflicting 
theories actually see the world differently. The import of this per-
spectival theory of cognition is that objective scientific knowledge is 
impossible and that scientific theorizing is always constrained within 
relativistic world views. With the abandonment of the notion of theory -
independent observation and adoption of a perspectival theory comes a 
certain anarchism in scientific practice,and relativism and scepticism 
in truth and knowledge. 
Of course it should be noted that the relativism implied in the 
position of those who reject the empiricist view of theory~independent 
observation is a result of their incomplete rejection of the dogmas of 
empiricism. It is precisely because they still accept that the objectivity 
of scientific practice resides solely in its observational or experimental 
verificational procedures, that, having undennined the validity of these 
regulative mechanisms, they end up with a set of nihilistic conclusions 
about the nature of scientific knowledge. For them I to indicate the 
social and historical dimension of the scientific production of knowledge, 
is to open the gates to relativism and agnosticism. They are incapable of 
theoretising these social relations of scientific practice as material 
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objectivities.. They lack a sense of objective history and awareness of 
the materiality of scientific practices. 
("') Philosophical Method and Sociology 
It is often held that it has been the growth and development of the 
positive natural sciences which led to the crisis of confidence that 
philosophy has suffered in the twentieth century. Anglo-Saxon analytical 
philosophy, which itself has largely reduced epistemology to the philosophy 
of scientific method, has been a major proponent of this view, although 
it also pervades Husserl's work and has surfaced again in Critical Theory. 
What is clear however,is that insufficient attention has been paid 
to the implications for philosophy of the tremendous growth and development 
of the social sciences towards the end of the nineteenth century. The 
hermeneutical and historicist philosophies of the neo-Kantians immediately 
spring to mind as an index of this influence. But more generally,and 
profoundly I would argue, philosophical theorising has, in the twentieth 
century, had to come to terms with the historical and sociological view of 
man so long suppressed by classical epistemology. This accommodation is 
what unifies the philosophical movements in Europe since the 1920's. The 
conversational theory or paradigm sketched above represents precisely 
such an accommodation of philosophical discourse to a more pervasive and 
subterranean rupture in the organization of our knowledge. Foucault has 
unearthed the foundations of this modem episteme9 - the new concern with 
the materiality of history,and social structure and process; the emergence 
of a new interest in language, the body, the unconscious and social 
relations, as determinations of human nature; a corresponding decentering 
of the absolute cognitive subject. This"analytic of finitude and human 
existence" finds expreSSion in the renewed interest in man, not merely 
&s a possible object among others for the exercise of a positivistic 
scientific interest, but as an exemplar of being - human being. As 
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Fou~au1t notes: 
"the threshold of our modernity is situated not by the tt t 
to apply objective methods to the study of man but rat~ere~ s 
the constitution of an empirico-transcendental'doublet WhichY 
was called man. ,,10 
The conversational theory of mind, self and language plotted across 
the four major philosophical traditions in the 1920's represents a regional 
effect in philosophical discourse of this epistemic transformations. For 
Husserl and indeed Russell, there could be no compromise with historicism 
and sociologism and there could be no comprehension of the epistemological 
import of the founding of the sciences of history, political economy and 
semiology. Their work however, remains effected by that absence. 
Philosophy since then has been a thinking through of the implications, 
epistemological, moral and political of man's fundamental sociality and 
historicity. 
Let us be clear here what I am asserting. I am not claiming that the 
academic discipline of Sociology as it has developed and is practised 
today, has been responsible for the mutation of philosophical knowledge 
which has produced in European philosophy, of different schools, a rupture 
from the absolutist ego-logical tradition of the classical period and the 
move to a new position - the sociologistic foundation of the conversational 
paradigm. As we have seen, Sociology itself has been trapped by the 
residues of this same ego-logical discourse and has been slow to reflect 
on the epistemological consequences of its own form of analysis. What I 
am claiming is the occurrence,in the twentieth century,of a fundamentally 
more profound rupture in the field of Imowledge than the mere appearance 
of Sociology. This rupture is first visible in the historically precocious 
work of Nietzsche Marx and indeed Freud, as they wrested the concept of , . 
'man" away from its enlightenment a-social, individualist roots, towards a 
radically social theory of being hwnan. This rupture has in tum rendered 
possible the major trend in twentieth centur.1 philosophy in the four major 
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traditions, phenomenological,pragmatist, anglo-saxon analytic and Marxist 
pbilosophy. 
It has lead philosophy,once it has begun to afford a central place 
in its theorizing to social process and communicational practice,"through 
the back door" into the epistemic area traditionally occupied by the 
Geisteswissenschaften. The existentialist philosophical anthropology of 
phenomenology, pragmatism's evolutionary and semiological interests, the 
ethnographic orientation of ordinary language philosophy, its 'socialized' 
pbilosophical psychology and the new sociologistic philosophy of scientific 
method sketched by Kuhn, are all indexes of this fundamental restructuring 
of philosophical discourse and the new relation with the social sciences. 
The radical reflection on these investigations, as modes of social 
enquiry, became the situation for a critique of egological thought and 
for the initial tentative explication of a conversational epistemology. 
However the different traditions, phenomenology, marxism, pragmatism and 
analytical philosophy, the former two of a Continental habitus the latter 
of a distinctive Anglo-Saxon one, have shown different propensities to 
engage in such a radical reflection on the auspices of their mode of 
enquiry. 
(a) Analytical Philosophy 
The dominant institutionalized school and tradition in the Anglo-
Saxon world is undoubtedly analytical philosophy. This approach, despite 
its post war ordinary language developments, has been slow to acknowledge 
the new intimacy of philosophy, in the conversational mode, with the 
social sciences. Indeed analytical philOSOphy has fought a vigorous 
rearguard action against encroachment on 'philosophical problems' by the 
80cial sciences. As epistemology became increasingly naturalized, in the 
twentieth century, and reduced to the philosophy of scientific method, 
analytical philosophy has been forced to abandon the classical claim ot 
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p~los9Phy to be 'king of the sciences', systematising all knowledge and 
providing it with indubitable foundations. Analytical philo sophy has 
embraced instead a conception of philosophy as a second order activity 
directed at clarifying concepts and dispelling methodological problems 
in the first level discourses of various scientific disciplines. The 
role of philosophy is seen as one of clearing away the conceptUal and 
methodological obstacles which occur in scientific discourse and which 
impede the progress of science. The assumption seems to be made by 
philosophers who adhere to this 'under-labourer' conception of philosophical 
practice, that scientists themselves are incapable of such theoretical 
and discursive activity and need the help of patient philosophers who 
will help them over their conceptual muddles. As Ted Benton notes: 
"The under-labourer conception affects to give the philosopher 
a very modest role - but this humility is, I shall argue, 
misleading. "11 
Indeed it is. In analytical philosophy's 'second order' relations 
with Sociology,the specificity of philosophical method, and by implication 
its conceptual priority over social theory, is asserted despite, as we 
have witnessed, the sociologistic foundation of analytical philosophy in 
its ordinary language phase. Indeed Winch goes as far as to acknowledge 
this conununicational and social foundation of philosophic method. Noting 
that: 
"to be clear about the nature of philosophy and to be clear 
about the nature of the social studies amount to the same thing. 
For any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in 
character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with 
the nature of human society. ,,12 
But he ends up not merely establishing an identification at the 
methodological level between the two disciplines but rather reducing 
Sociology to the Philosophy of "Language and Action. Sociology becomes 
construed as misbegotten epistemology. Thus despite his perception that 
Phi~BOPhy in dealing with language and thought is treating of essentially 
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social~elations, he adheres to the view, central to the underlabourer 
conception of philosophy, that philosophical method has a logical 
priori ty and specificity vis-a-vis sociology, because it deals with the 
formal and conceptual features of social relations. Winch takes issue 
with the underlabourer conception in his argume~t of the importance of 
grasping the central consequences,for epistemologyfof sociality. He 
refuses to confine the study of social relations to the regional area of 
Sociology and argues for the rejection of a second order philosophy of 
this regional area of Sociological discourse and its replacement with a 
serious reflection on the import for the key philosophical area of 
epistemology, of social reality. However in the end, he implicitly 
invokes the second order conception of philosophy with its claim to logical 
priOrity over first order empirical discourses in order to reduce Sociology 
to socialized epistemology. 
This general assumption held by analytical philosopher, including 
Winch, of the specificity and indeed 'logical' superiority of philosophical 
method vis-a-vis Sociology or the other social sciences, rests apparently 
on a single assumption. It is held that philosophers and sociologists 
ask Illogically different types of questions". The former is concerned 
with 'formal', 'conceptual' or 'logical' enquiries into the meaning of 
concepts and scientific practices with a view to clarifying or legitimating 
these. The latter is concerned with empirical investigations into regular-
ities in social life, the explanation of these,and accumulation of a bodT 
of substantive knowledge. 
However as we have seen, since Wi ttgenstein, ordinary language 
philosophy has abandoned the lOfsm and crude positivist theory of meaning 
characteristic of the early reconstructionalist period of analytical 
philosophy. The search for an ideal language modelled on a calculus of 
SCientific signification has been abandoned in favour of an analysis ot 
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language in its social and pragmatic context of usage. 
, - M6~e recently Quine has demonstrated,1 3 in a rather more formal manner 
than Wittgenstein's ordinary language analysis, that the importation of 
logistic approaches into the study of natural languages is unwarranted. 
Such an approach, he argues, rests on a confusion and conflation between 
logical relations and relations of meaning or synonomy. 
The notion of analyticity in natural language where it does not rest 
on the analyticity of pure tautology, e.g. all spades are spades, is based 
on a prior notion of synonomy e.g. in the proposition: no bachelor is 
married. The assertion of the analytic nature of the statement, the 
'logical' nature of its truth rests on the postulated synonomy of the 
terms bachelor and unmarried man. But however, the notion of synonomy 
utilized here, vis inter-changeability of the terms without change of truth 
value of the statement itself pre-supposes the notion of analyticity, for 
it is the case that the term bachelor is regarded as synonomou5 with 
unmarried man if and only if the statement - all and only bachelors are 
unmaITied men - is analytic. 
Hence a certain circularity ensues with the importation of the notion 
of analyticity into the analysis of meaning relations without any prior 
independent clarification of the notion of synonomy. 
The notion of synonomy invoked by ordinary language analysis, the so 
called 'informal logic' or 'logical geography' of our concepts is based 
no longer on a principle of fonnal analyticity between formulae of an 
axiomatic system but rather on identities of meaning conventionally rooted 
in the us ages particular to various social contexts and activities. 
To invoke the notion of 'informal logic' to describe these normative 
conventions of speech and word use is somewhat confusing and contradictol'7. 
For it is the case that the chief characteristic of logical or axiomatic 
systems is their purely formal nature. Proposi tions are related not b7 
substantive relations of meaning but rather by formal rules of inference. 
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The sentence used to express logical truths must be formulas of a formal 
. 
language i.e. a language that can be specified without any reference at 
all, direct or indirect, to the meaning of the formulas of the language. 
Modern logic clearly sees itself as a branch of formal axiomatic theory, 
concerned with the investigation of the transmission of formal truth 
functions in axiomatic systems by valid rules of inference. The concept 
of meaning has long since been banished from its concerns. 
And, on the other hand for post-Wittgensteinian philosophers, it is 
the normative rules of everyday language with their social origin in a 
form of life, rather than the rules of implication of logical systems which 
constitutes both the object and framework of their analysis. 
Analytic philosophy has made the move from a form of linguistic analysis 
based on the construction of a logico-syntactical framework for the language 
of science which demarcated the possibility and limits of meaningfulness, 
an ideal language project, to, on the other hand, a form of language analysis 
based on the descriptive analysis of the usage of ordinary language in 
various social contexts, with little or no self-reflection on the epistem-
ological consequences of this very move from an objectivist standpoint to 
a socio-logistic position. It has suffered from a problem of residue. 
For analytic philosophers since the 1920' s it became more and more 
apparent that language owed its form not only to logical syntax, nor even 
referential semantics, but primarily to what Charles Morris christened 
'pragmatics' i.e. to the use everyday people made of it in specific social 
contexts; to specific language games with constitutive rules. However this 
awareness was not accompanied by a corresponding self-reflection on the 
fundamental rupture in philosophical knowledge, in both the areas of 
epistemology and ontology, that the move to a conventionalist approach to 
language analysis entailed. To quote Karl Otto Apel: 
"The logic of science as it was developed by the logical positivists 
has not, up to now, ref'lected upon the fact that, after the exposure 
of' the hidden metaphysics of its early days it moved to the new 
ground of' the a priori of' Communication. Instead of refiecting upon 
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. this new presupposition of its conventionalist phase it has 
tacitly held on to its former pre-suppositions inherited from 
logical atomism which implied methodological solipsism."'4 
Apel's claim is that language communication provides the prior method-
ological basis for all science,social or natural. Since Dilthey and Weber, 
the specificity and irreducibility of social science has been held to 
reside both in the nature of its object viz. systems of cultural meaning 
and value,and in the form of its method - interpretative or hermeneutic 
understanding. 
For Apel however,natural science and its traditional positivist 
philosophy is also founded on the possibility of inter-subjective cornmunica-
tion. Not merely because such communication is a material condition for 
carrying out research and transmitting results,but also because of the form 
of neo-positivistic logic of science. Analytical philosophy of science is 
characterized since Russell by its having taken 'the linguistic tum'. It 
is held that language is a necessary inter-subjective mediation between 
mind and the real world. Initially this entailed the search for an ideal 
language of science which could bring together mathematical logic and 
primitive referential propOSitions to produce a systematic calculus ratio-
cinator, the embodiment of scientific rationality. However this project 
was soon to flounder when it became apparent that the ontological status 
of logical connectives and observational statements was unclear. For both 
of these elements of the ideal language rested on a conventional basis 
and thus involved is sues of the clarification of meaning and implementation 
of rules of usage. Conventions cannot be reduced from first principles 
wi thin a calculus, nor can they be derived from empirical observation or 
by induction from such observation. Rather,they pre-suppose inter-
subjective communication, language-games with distinctive rules. Rule 
follOwing, convention adherence, as Wittgenstein has showed itself pre-
SUpposes sociality and communication; a solitary ego cannot be said to 
follow a rule. 
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TlJ,e cognitive operations of science presuppose then a 'community of 
interpretators' who arrive at both tacit conventions about the use of 
basic terms, observational and theoretical,as well as explicit conventions 
about definitions, theoretical constructs etc. As such, Apel claims, the 
'a priori of communication' is the 'transcendental' foundation of natural 
science as much as that of social and cultural science. It is the auspices 
of analytic philosophy's linguistic method.* 
The consequences for analytical philosophy of this unthinking, this 
oversight o~ an absent presence - the newly emergent sociologistic 
foundation of their conscious analysis - have been just the arrival at 
this contradictory notion of informal logics. The foundation and form of 
linguistic analysis moves from the 'ideal language project' to the description 
*Apel's notion of thelia priori of communication" and the source of its 
derivation in Habermas's concept of a 'quasi-transcendental' set of 
different research guiding interests operative in the natural sciences, 
hermeneutic-cultural sciences, and critical theory) remains particularly 
obscure. Habermas, revealing his closeness to the German idealist 
tradition, confers upon these interests, which precondition the possibility 
of the methods and results of the various branches of science, the status 
of a 'phenomenological a priori'. He appears to reduce epistemology to a 
philosophical anthropology of knowledge of the most abstract sort. The 
historical and empirically material dimension of the structuration of 
scientific practices and discourses is replaced by an essentialist and 
completely a-historical ontology of the human being-as-knowing-agent. 
In this study I have attempted to plot some of the epistemic conditions 
of existence of Apel' s 'a priori of communication'. My analysis of the 
conversational paradigm, while undeveloped at the level of materialist 
extra-discursive dependencies, attempts to portray the historical 
specificity of the communicationally informed approach to epistemology. 
By invoking the notion of discursive structure and eventually plotting 
the relations of dependency between discursive events and other social 
practices we will eventually be in a position to give some body to 
Foucaul t 's intriguing term "the historical a priori". It is only wi thin 
the ambit of such a discursive analysis of a historical-materialist 
nature than we can in fact clarify the obscure status of Apel and 
Habermas's 'quasi-transcendental research guiding interests.' The 
anthropological and essentialist form of critical theory operates as a 
considerable obstacle in the path of a development of a properlY'5 
materialist epistemology. A sociologized theory of meta science is no 
substitute for the painstaking historical and discursive analysis ot the 
specific conditions of existence of discrete systems of knowledge at 
particular historical periods. 
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of everyday usage; {Tom a notion of language as a logico-syntactic 
framework and universal object language to one of a series of socially 
contextualized language games. However the terms of the surface discourse 
of ordinary language analysis are carried over from the objectivist-formal 
theories of the ideal language proj ect . Not only in the very notion of 
an informal logic,but also in the maintenance of the rigid distinctions 
between 'formal' and 'substantive' questions, 'conceptual' and 'empirical' 
issues, 'analytic' and 'synthetic truths' and in talk of 'logically 
necessary conditions' for the application of concepts. All of this is 
quite inapplicable to a conventionalist approach to language and meaning. 
In what sense at all, if one abandons the neo-positivist reduction of 
language to logical syntax and universal object language, can one talk 
of a purely formal analysis of concepts and discourse. 
A further consequence of the carrying over of these logistic terms 
into the discourse of ordinary language analysis has been to preserve 
the specificity of the philosophic approach over and above the sociological 
despite, as I have asserted, their common epistemic foundation in the 'A 
priori of Communication'. This assertion of specificity rests on the very 
c~ of the specific formal and conceptual nature of philosophical 
analYSis as opposed to the substantive empirical approaches of sociology. 
Indeed,the traditional hostility of philosophers to Sociology itself 
as a discipline can be seen partly as the consequence of this same 
inabili ty or unwillingness of philosophers to radically reflect on the 
auspices of their own analysiS, namely on the central tenet of that 
analysis an essential sociologism. 
Thus it is paradoxical ,yet understandable, that analytical philosopb7 
should recoil in horror from tlie implied relativism of a sociology of 
knowledge,which in confronting Western thought with its own radical 
SOCiality and historicity,subverts the traditional epistemological and 
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moral absolutisms characteristic of that thought in its search for the 
apodictic. For, if it is the case as my symptomatic re-reading of analJ~ic 
philosophy suggests, that linguistic philosophy now occupies, wittingly 
or not, a common epistemic space with Sociology, the 'A priori of 
Communication' or conversational paradigm, then the new problems posed by 
this major move in Western thought to a sociologistic problematic must 
also be thought by analytical philosophy. 
The 'logic' of linguistic analysis explicated in the notion of language 
games and fO,rms of life, has clearly abandoned the previous objectivism of 
the neo-positivist period. The obscurantist clinging to the terms and 
categories of the former problematic may preserve the illusion of object-
ivity. But the very fragility of these outmoded terms cannot conceal the 
spectre of a lurking relativism more threatening because more ungrasped, 
than any resulting from sociological enquiry. The replacement of the 
outmoded categories of the neo-positivist problematic is the prime theor-
etical obligation of analytical philosophy today. 
For analytical philosophers of science, it is necessar,y to rethink the 
problem of relativism in the light of the recent developments in the 
philosophy of science and meaning, rather than continue to address it from 
the standpoint of an outmoded positivist philosophy of science. 
What we are required to think by the occasion of the emergence of the 
conversational paradigm and the revolution in philosophic thought since 
the 1920' s, is the specificity of philosophical method and practice in an 
age of sociological reason. The phenomenological Sociology of Knowledge, 
Critical Theory and Marxist materialist epistemology of the French school 
represent attempts, with varying degress of success, to do preciselJ this. 
These forms of analysis in their unity and in their important 
differences, explicate the novel epistemological directions made possible 
b7 the opening up of that field of knowledge first chartered b7 the 
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analysis of self, mind and language from the social standpoint. That 
field, the conversational, which is the condition of possibility of 
reflective analysis on the social conditions of the production of know-
ledges, in turn become an object of such epistemological investigation. 
The sociologistic approach to epistemology encourages pnd sharpens the 
reflexi vi ty of philosophical thought. 
A materialist epistemology, which addresses the conditions of production, 
epistemic, ideological and socio-material of specific knowledge domains 
represents the most developed and historically appropriate form of 
philosophical reflection practised to date. It,in the end, is the only 
tradition capable of posing the issue of the objectivity of scientific 
theory and practice when the process of the production of scientific know-
ledges is understood in socio-relational terms. Both the phenomenological 
Sociology of Knowledge and Critical Theory stand unsteadily on their feet 
when they face this issue. They sway dizzily towards the twin supports 
of nihilism-relativism and transcendentalism which flank them on either 
side. They find in various existential and humanistic anthropologies a 
mediation of the two poles which still circumscribe them. Behind the 
multifarious reductions and scepticisms they employ to "render problematic" 
the world as "naively given", lies one bedrock, one absolute objectivity -
II II 
man, the incarnate subject-object of moral ideology. This "man" is a 
residue, the last figure in a long line of dramaturgical chimera -the 
Cartesian cogito, Kant's I think, Husser1's transcendental self, Sartre's 
existential subj ect, Mounier' s person, Fromm I s "mann. Having disposed of 
the pure subject, must science now suffer its reincarnation in 
this transcendental doublet II~~ Can no one rid of this troublesome 
character; this anti-science? 
(b) Towards a Materialist EpistemologY 
There is of course a genuine problem here in retb1nking the concept ot 
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science that is appropriate in an age of sociological reason. The problem 
to date has chrystallised around the problem of relativism and the related 
one of establishing criteria of sCientificity which demarcate science 
from ideology. The central problem within philosophy in the conversational 
mode has become how to theorize ~rtain social relations as constitutive 
of scientific practice but maintain a non-reductive and hence non-
relativist account of their relationship. This is the refonnulated problem 
of relativism and even this form retains a burdening level of abstractness, 
generality and a-historicality. However,neither the phenomenologically 
oriented Sociology of Knowledge nor contemporary analytical Philosophy of 
Science has been able or willing to think through this reformulation. 
The former retreats to philosophical anthropology and the existential 
encounter Merleau-Ponty offers us. The latter follows Kuhn and Feyerabend 
up the anarchic and irrationalist cul-de-sac they have entered. Both 
responses lead to subjectivism and a self-defeating relativism and 
scepticism. 
The greatest advances in the 'solution' of this 'problem' of relativism 
have come from the French epistemologists operating in the Marxist tradition 
who insist on reposing the 'problem' from the standpoint of a historical-
materialist theory of scientific practices. This analysis reveals a 
historically, 0 bj ecti vely given, "hard wall" of insti tutionali zed activity 
carried out wi thin given social conditions and organized on the basis ot 
determinate economic, political, ideological and theoretical relations, 
which carmot be merely dissolved by the phenomenologists' or perspectivists' 
doubt. In a real sense only this materialist tradition bas been able to 
trace the import tor our understanding ot science and Imowledge, ot the 
new centrality ot sociological reason and historical method, without 
lapsing into either the scepticism or anthropologism which is the death 
of Science. 
As early as the pioneering work of Marx and Fietzsche the t t" 
, con ras Lng 
directions for epistemology sociologized were there. Either the develop-
ment of a materialist approach to the social sciences which sought to 
extend the systematic and anti-idealist traditions of the natural sciences 
to the study of history and society and in turn rethink our concepts of 
science and epistemology from the viewpoint of a historical-materialist 
analytical practice: Or alternatively, the collapse of philosophical 
thought to a position of profound nihilism, from which philosophy can 
only be rescued by a profound leap of faith in God, man, life or any 
other abstraction provided by an 'engaged' philosophical anthropology. 
Nietzsche at least had the consisten~ . to resign himself to his 
nihili sm, to hi s madne s s . 
Quite clearly, that irrationalism and nihilism while constituting 
in Nietzsche's hands a hammer with which to smash the idols of classical 
metaphySics and accordingly serving as a "progressive force" in the 
development of a materialist conception of philosophic practice, is now 
in the present period, an epistemological obstacle to the development 
of such a materialist theory of knowledges. 
In this last section I wish to sketch the foundations of a materialist 
theory of knowledge. I shall be concerned here with the problems of 
science not of cognition in general. In particular I am concerned to 
outline the elements of a historically and sociologically informed 
analysis of scientific practices which is non-reductionist and demarcative 
with regard to ideology. 
The problem of relativism as traditionally stated i.e. unreformulated 
is a consequence of empiricist epistemology. Because empiricism has 
traditionally conceived of science in logical and experiental terms, it 
restricted its analysis to fomal proof and evidential support. This 
has led to an impoverished, rarified conception of science. In particular 
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the whole processes of discovery and dissemination which are . 1 l.naccessib e 
to logical analysis are ignored. As a result the analysis of these 
processes of discovery and dissemination, in the end social processes, 
are artifically separated from issues of proof and verification of for-
mulated hypothesis. Empiricist epistemology becomes "a broken backed 
compromise between the unrestricted realm of an individual subjectivity 
that creates and the absolute restrictions imposed by a timeless true 
sphere of confirmation or falsification in its proof.,,16 
The subjectivisation of the creative moment is accompanied by the 
reification of the verificational process; both result from the impover-
ished and abstracted conception of science. The more freedom given to 
the subject-hypothesisor, the tighter the objective controls on the 
verification/refutation of hypothesis viz. Popper's logic of science. 
Within this couplet 
subjectivity 
creativity 
objectivity 
verification, 
the freedom of subjective 
creativity 
is purchased by constricting the verificational process within impossible 
limits (impossible because science actually does not operate according to 
this logic.) Correspondingly any concern with the creative moment within 
the couplet implies a move to the subjective pole and the problem of 
relativism threatens. There is no investigation of the objective-material 
i.e. historical and epistemic conditions for the production of scientific 
Imowledge. These objective conditions which include the social and 
historical context of particular scientific communities and individuals, 
the dominant structurations of knowledge in a science at a given period 
and indeed the technological conditions for experimental work are not 
theorised within empiricist theory of science. They are obscured and 
ignored under the psychologized notion of 'creativity' and the sole 
obj ecti ve conditions for the emergence of scientific Imowledge located 
in the realm of an invariant verification procedure. nScientificity" 
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then resides in the prescriptions for an ideal sCloence, often a stylised 
model of physics, and philosophers of science sit in judgement of the 
methodology of various areas, a constant overarching vigilance. 
Against this supreme yardstick of scientific rationality, social 
theory is effectively disenfranchised as an autonomous area of scientific 
practice. 
However, theories which take as their object the whole of knowledge, 
seeking an epistemology for all scientific practices in a general theory 
of cognition, set up the conditions for their own dissolution in scepticism. 
This is so for two reasons. Firstly the difficulty of conceiving knowledge 
as a unity given the obvious specific and differentiating nature of various 
sciences. Secondly, any half-blown historical or sociological study of 
a science reveals that scientific practice simply does not correspond to 
the legislative canons of positivist epistemology. Indeed it could be 
argued that the very notion of invariant criteria of scientific rationality 
is in fact only necessary if the terms of scepticism are accepted. If 
one accepts the materiality of scientific production of knowledge, and 
realizes that scientific practice has an objectivity which cannot be 
reduced just to an invariant hypothesis selection procedure, then in 
what sense can knowledge be cast in doubt? Can we doubt the material 
existence of research reports, conference papers, scientific abstracts, 
journal and books? Can we doubt the collection of scientific data, its 
storage and calibration, its utilization in technological process, its 
diSSemination in educational programmes? 
Etienne Balibar, writing about Gaston Bachelard the 'father'of 
historical epistemology, or at least its French variant, notes, 
"Obj ecti vi ty is not the name of a t critical t questioning 
followed by the reassurance of a ricti tious 'guarantee'. 
Rather it posed initi~, as a fact, not a simple fact 
but one which is not to be doubted of. In other words, contr&r7 
to the whole tradition which flounders about interminablT in 
the obvious incompatability between the idea of an objectivity 
346. 
of sciences (hence the idea of a truth in their result ) 
and the idea of their historicitl (hence the idea of t~ 
'relativity' of their results, theories concepts and e 
givens of fact), Bachelard shows from the start that onl 
objectivity of scientific knowledge permits the rigorousY 
thinking of its history. ,,17 
Empiricism confuses and conflates two questions: 
How is science possible? 
How are human minds able to gain knowledge of the world? 
A failure to answer the latter question, provokes a retreat to scepticism 
which means that the former problem cannot be objectively and rationally 
approached~ Because,within empiricism the sciences privileged epistemic 
status is guaranteed by an invariant verification principle,any assault 
on this principle,as in Kuhn or Feyerabend,results in a problem of 
relativism. This epistemological edifice is built like a house of cards, 
tamper with the key card and the whole house collapses. 
A materialist epistemology on the other hand,attempts to wrench 
epistemology from its traditional concerns viz. the truth-scepticism 
opposition,and to reconstitute its form by a systematic study of the 
concrete practices of the distinctive sciences. The central task of such 
an epistemology is to theoretise the objective conditions of production 
of scientific knowledges. The major assumptions of this approach are: 
1. Science is epistemology functioning in its practical state. 
The epistemology must be extracted from the historical 
process of the development of various sciences by way of 
concepts which specify the conditions of possibility of 
that science and its development. 
1.1 As such,epistemology interacts with history of science 
which is given a new privileged position in relation to 
epistemological concepts. A link is forged between 
epistemology and the actual practice of the history of 
the sciences. 
1.2 Historical conditions do not exhaust the objective 
conditions of possibility of particular sciences. 
Scientific practice has a degree of autonomy with 
regards the material determinants of historical process. 
It 1s governed then by epistemic dynamics and structures 
which cannot be reduced to those of other levels of social 
fonnation - economy, polity etc. As such,eplstemology 
must draw on the resource of a theory of discourse. That 
.. -.".J..t! 
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is,an objective analysis which can formalize the 
structur7 ~f.thought systems in their distinct 
systematlcltles and which can in particular 
theoretize the specificity of various scien~e 
. t .. s as 
slgns sys ems VlZ. a VlZ. ideology. Kulm' s uncI 
t · f ' di'·· ear no lon 0 a para. gm lS lnadequate as an analysis 
of the structuratlon of scientific knowledge. It 
must be replaced by a rigorous semiotic study of 
scientific discourses. 
2. The object of such an epistemology is the distinctive 
practices of specific sciences. 
2.1 This is a denial of the notion of a unitary science. 
Such a unity depends in its conception on a belief 
in a universal invariant methodology, such a belief 
is counter factual. The singular term 'science' is 
in fact an imaginary unity constituted by philosophers 
of science. 
2.2 Accordingly the demarcation between science and ideology 
is not an invariant, absolute and universal one but 
rather specific to various scientific practices which 
struggle to differentiate themselves from their ideol-
ogical context, a struggle objectively represented in 
their discrete systematicity of theory and method. 
Galileo's defence of Copernicanism and the emerging 
construction of classical mechanics illustrates such 
a struggle and the historical specificity of the science/ 
ideology opposition. 
2.3 EPistemological intervention plays a subsidiary,auxiliar.y 
role wi thin actual scientific practice. Epistemology 
must abandon its second order pretensions as a legislator 
of invariant scientific rationality. Such prescriptions 
of traditional epistemology have often functioned so as 
to hinder the production of scientific knowledge e.g. the 
effects of positivism on social science, in particular 
sociological theor.y. 
'Science' then,is characterized in terms of the metaphor of production. 
Scientific practice is seen as a complex of definite processes of production 
of knowledge, the unifying principle of which is a common conceptual field~ 
and set of discrete methods. The metaphor serves to challenge the whole 
atomistic and abstracted conception of knowledge. In turn it stresses 
the historical, epistemic and indeed institutional and technological 
situatedness of scientific practice, factors which condition the ver.y 
possibility of that practice. The major concern of epistemology is then 
conceived of as the analysis of the process of production of knowledge -
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f~The transformation of a given raw material (scientific 
knowledge and/or pre-scientific representation) into a 
given product (new scientific knowledge); this transfor-
mation would take place by the application of definite 
scientific agents of production using definite means of 
labour (concepts, theOries, methods) in definite production 
conditions (both material and social). 1118 
With 'science' grasped in its material situatedness, a materiality 
which is constitutive of scientific practices, and with epistemology 
conceived as an analysis of the conditions of possibility, historical 
and epistemic, of discrete scientific practices,then the question of 
objectivit~ can be seen in completely different light than within the 
rarified optic of positivism. Objectivity is no longer held to reside 
merely in the invariant hypothesis selection controls,but rather to be 
a function of a sciences form as a definite i.e. historically and 
materially given means of conceptual labour in definite production 
conditions. The question of the historicity of science is not merely 
to do with the external conditions i. e. the social, economic and political 
'context' of scientific institutions addressed by the empiricist History 
of Ideas or Sociology of Science. Rather it involves the core issue 
of the historical conditions of possibility of the production of the 
conc~pts and methods of a particular science. This historicized con-
ception of the objectivity of discrete scientific practices, an objectivity 
which reSides first and foremost in the posing of problems within a 
determinate discourse of theoretical concepts and methodological and 
experimental techniques rather than in the answers given to these and 
the strategies of verification employed to validate these, "introduces 
into the very heart of scientific activity a material constraint". 
SCientific practice can no longer be seen as the free play of the mind 
and reduced to an egological theory of cognition stripped of its sociali t1'. 
The objectivity of scientific Imowledge must be theoretized from the 
historical and discursive point of view and not from that of an au tmaded 
34~. 
po~it~vist theory of cognition. 
On the other hand the materiality of scientific practices, a 
historical and discursive materiality, cannot be reduced to a social 
phenomenology of the scientific 'community'. The social relations of 
scientific production, institutional, economic, political and ideological 
cannot be reduced to the inter-personal interaction and cultural-
ideological dispositions of a community of investigators. To assert that 
scientific practice is objectively determined is to deny that the social 
and structural relations of scientific production of knowledge can be 
reduced to the subjectivity or indeed inter-personal subjectivity of an 
individual scientist or group of scientists. It is this reduction of 
the social relations of scientific practices to those of a set of inter-
acting subjectivities, involved in interpersonal communication, charact-
eristic of the first phenomenological phase of the conversational 
paradigm, that leads to the very subjectivism and relativism that 
epistemology sociologized has been accused of. The materiality and 
objectivity of the social relations of scientific production is of the 
essentially same nature as that of other aspects of social production. 
Marx reminds us: 
trIn the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations that are indispensible and independent 
of their will, relations of production which correspond 
to a definite stage of development of their material pro-
ductive forces.,,19 
A historical materialist theory means that for the first time it is 
possible to theoretise the social relations of scientific production as 
constitutive of scientific practice, without a relapse to the relativism 
characteristic of phenomenological conceptions of inter-subjectivity. 
Secondly with the development of a theory of semiotics i. e. a theor,y 
of discursive practice, originally derivative of the science of linguistics 
but increasingly differentiating itself as it develops its own specifiC 
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concepts and methods, it has become possible to theoretise the .f'. spec~ 1c~ty 
and relative autonomy of the production of knowledge. Given as we have 
seen that scientific 'perception' and hypotheSising takes place within 
determinate structurations of theory and concepts, then the adequate 
analysis of these discursive structures is of a paramount importance if 
we are to grasp the totality of the conditions of production of scientific 
knowledge. The key concept here is problematic rather than paradigm, for 
this term stresses that structurations of knowledge are not merely the 
ossified product of scientific practice but rather the mechanism by which 
scientific practice operates and hence the condition of that practice. 
We must understand how this specific machine operates. As it is in form 
a set of irreducible discursive practices ,then the analysis of its mode 
of effectivity is a task for semiotics. Sign systems such as scientific 
Imowledge can be analysed formally as distinct 0 bj ecti vi ties. 
Within the circumscribing materiality of history it is possible to 
analyse the structural systematicity and discursive objectivity of systems 
of scientific knowledge. Materialist epistemology is then a synthesis 
between a history of scientific practices and a semiotic study of 
scientific discourses. This synthesis is accomplished within the theoret-
ical ambit of historical materialism, the science of social formations 
on the and their determining form by Louis Althusser, who draws 
historian of science Gaston Bachelard. Althusser's student Michel 
Foucaul t has developed the perspective and applied it in his . 
historical and structural study of the social sciences. In England the 
Marxist orientated journal "Economy and Society" has championed the new 
epistemology reprinting many articles of French and Italian origin. 
The issue then is the specificity of philosophical practice in an 
age of Sociological reason. Materialist epistemology attempts to delineate 
the terrain on which we might expect to find an adequate philosqpbical 
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~~act~ce. It. accepts the subordinate and aUxilary role of the philosophy 
of scientific practices in comparison to actual scientific activity. It 
rejects the notion of a universal philosophy of science concerned with 
legislating invariant criteria of sCientificity, objectivity and control, 
by reference to imposed invariant standards or guarantees of verification 
and data collection. It rejects the notion of epistemology as a search 
for principles of legitimacy to "guarantee" or control the methods and 
findings of the sciences. This involves a critique of both positivist 
philosophies of Science which seek their own foundation on natural 
. -
scientific method and also those epistemologies which seek a philosophical 
foundation ~ science such as Husserl's transcendental search for the 
apodictic,or Critical Theory's postulated "research guiding interests". 
20 As Manuel Castells has argued, the latter variant i.e. the search for 
an epistemological principle of legitimacy external to scientific research 
itself, has become the dominant philosophical response within social 
science itself. Having abandoned its former positivistic optimism,and 
standing naked, to the implacable criticism of social practice, Sociology, 
like Hans Christian Anderson's Emperor, dons its make believe garments. 
However, no "epistemology", grand "search for method", "dialogic inwardness" 
can hide this essential-stark-nakedness. Sociology increasingly reduced 
to the activity of parading before a gullible public in these borrowed 
clothes, indeed faces, like the deluded monarch, a coming crisis. 
However 
/"00 those of us trained in the analytical tradition of the Philosophy 
of SCience, with its traditional attachment to neo-positivist method 
and Unified Science Programme, the historical epistemology of the 
materialist still seems to leave certain key questions begging. 
Firstly, there is the question of the nature of the relationship 
(if any) between the descriptive historical and structural analysis ot 
knoWledge domains.as s.ystems of social relations both institutional and 
discursive, and between the activity of prescriptive intervention in the 
practice of various sciences aimed at defending and strengthening their 
objectivity and scientificity generally. It has to be recognized that 
analytical Philosophy of Science ~ attempt to address the central 
issues of the conditions of adequate scientific practice although it 
did so in terms of legislating as an external epistemic institution 
invariant standards of,objectivity based on empiricistic realism, of 
explanation explicated in terms of the deductive-nomological model, and 
of hypothe~is control and selection founded on logically justified 
criteria of verification. This legislation may have had some effect on 
the actual practices of the sciences, we are not in a position to 
actually know. 
,. 
However,what we are concerned with here,is how does the historical 
epistemology of past scientific and ideological discourses make any 
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contribution to the current development of the sciences? Can it? 
The clearly different motives of analytical-prescriptive Philosophy 
of ' Science and Historical Epistemology is displayed in the radically 
different ways they approach the issue of objectivity in scientific 
practice •. For Bachelard and the French tradition he inspires, the 
objectivity of sciences is not in particular, as we have seen, a problem. 
Seeking as they do no absolute guarantee of truth for knowledge areas, 
they accordingly understand the objectivity of scientific practices in 
terms of their material givenness as a system of social relations of 
theoretical production in a specific historical period. The objectivity 
described,is precisely this material givenness of science as a set of 
social practices. This objectivity is the very condition of the histor-
ical recognition of sciences as specific social practices. 
The Posi ti vist on the other hand sees the establishment of absolute 
truth conditions for the verification or refutation of hYPothesis as 
the condition for the correct ascription of the label "scientifiC" to a 
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particular theoretical activity. The verification principle or its 
Popperian variants, becomes the demarcative criteria for the identification 
of scientificity. 
The former notion is descriptive, based on a theoretical under-
standing of the facticity of the historical and social. The latter notion 
is prescriptive. It seeks to divine and then legislate for Science by 
establishing the general and invariant conditions for intersubjective 
truth or indeed meaningfullness, in order to establish the demarcative 
criteria of scientificity. Caught in the gaze of its own idealized 
creation it turns its back on the history of sciences or forces that 
study to search for an essential teleology - the steady rational historical 
progress towards this ideal Unified Science. 
It should be noted that in the first instance Althusser, operating 
in the historical and structural tradition, was able to overcome this 
gulf between the descriptive-structural analysis of sciences and the 
traditional prescriptive concern of epistemology with standards of 
scientific rigour. The threatening vent between these two interests 
was repaired in his early discourse by the utilization of the resource 
of invariant criteria or mechanisms for the identification of scient-
ificity in theoretical production. As we have noted, Althusser sketches 
the sCience/ideology break in a universalistic manner. He invokes a 
general concept of Science and of Ideology in order to characterize 
the nature of the discontinuities between them. He ends up posing the 
abstract and general thesis of an absolute and universal opposition 
between science and ideology rather than describing the historic~ 
situated form of this break in ~ecific sciences at a particular con-
juncture. This thesis is, despite its materialist declarations, too 
close for comfort to neo-positivist demarcations, though of course 
Althusser's motive in defending such an invariant demarcation is quite 
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different, based as it is on providing a validation for the sc· t·f·. len 1 lClty 
of Marxism, (independent of revolutionary practice) by establishing general 
criteria of scientificity which legitimise the particular science of 
Historical Materialism. 
Accordingly,having established such invariant criteria by isolation 
of a general science/ideology break, a Source is provided for the location 
of the conditions of "normal science". The structural description of 
the scientific problematic easily translates itself into prescriptions 
to guide sc~entific practice i.e. into norms to be realised or indeed to 
be imposed 2!!. science. Philosophy as the "theory of theoretical practices" 
lends itself ,only too eaSily, to this subtle shift from structural analysis 
to methodological prescription and interference; a sleight of hand 
already with a distinctive historical pedigree since Stalin's '~ialectical 
Materialism". This move, i.e. this form of the linking of philosophical 
theory and scientific practice, made in the blessed name of the "relevance" 
of philosophy spells, as in the Stalinist Third International, the death 
of sciences, including the political science of Revolutionary Marxism 
itself. 
But,perhaps we can -~pose the problem of the relationship of an 
archaeology of knowledge to current scientific practices i.e. its 
obligation, in different terms. The problem is, I would argue, no 
different from those which surround the issue of how Historical 
Materialism as the historical science of social formations infonns 
current Marxist political practice and struggle. I am not it should be 
noted posing here a general question about the relationship of historical 
unde standing to social planning, the anguished enquiry into 
history's "relevance". Rather, I am addressing the relationship of a 
particular theoretical-practice viz. historical materialism to a practical-
practice viz. political struggle. 
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In the specific realm of Marxist political science we have no 
difficulty in conceptualizing the above issue in terms of the relation-
ship of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. In this context 
we have no difficulty in posing this relation concretely in terms of the 
role of a mass Workers' Party, democratically committed to a programme 
based on this historical understanding, on a related analysis of the 
current conjuncture and its points of crisis and on the estimation on 
the basis of tendential laws, moderated in their effects by the state of 
class struggle, of likely future social and political developments and 
appropriate strategies of political intervention. 
As Mao notes, 
"Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only 
because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but 
merely prate about it, pidgeonhole it and do not put it into 
practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. rr21 
We have no difficulty in seeing the role of the revolutionary cadre 
or organic intellectual (dare we say Philosophert) as the intervention 
in already given political practices to strengthen the revolutionary 
struggle of the worker's movement and give it a sharper focus in its 
sectional struggles with Capital. We easily understand the basis of 
that intervention to be the employment of the correct strategy and 
tactics for mobilizing workers in conscious class struggle i.e. for 
raising the level of political consciousness of workers of the historical 
and material determinants of their concrete struggles. This involves 
challenging the ideological control of the ruling classes over the minds 
and poll tical organs of the working classes precisely by raising their 
level of class consciousness and political activity in and through their 
involvement in economic and po;Litical struggles. It also entails safe-
guarding the classical but accummulative tradition of Marxism from 
revisionism and various types of opportunism which threaten its develop-
ment and progressive refinement as a living body of theory and practice. 
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~e ,ight for the correct programme for the workers' parties to combat 
Capitalism in the present era, and the struggle to implement this pro-
gramme in and through the rank and file struggles of the working class, 
is the concrete means for effecting the unity of theory and practice in 
Marxist science. 
The problem of the relationship of philosophical method to scientific 
practice is, I would suggest, of this order; theory as an intervention 
in practice. 
And indeed Althusser late in the day after the chastizements of 
his fellow Schoolmen,and,with a burdening sense of his party's failings 
in May '68,has come to realize that political science and practice might 
directly inform our understanding of the role of philosophy vis-a-vis 
science. He has renounced his earlier "theoreticism" and returning to 
his study of Mao, announces the primacy of practice over theory. But we 
aSk,is the organizational form of the political practice he espouses, 
the French Communist Party, likely to operate as the concrete means for 
linking revolutionary theory and practice and as the catalyst for 
thinking that relation at the level of theoretical reflection? 
Practice, he announces, precedes theory and constantly goes beyond 
it, both the practice of science and that of the revolutionary struggle 
of the workers' movement. But, he has moved see - saw - like from one 
absolute pole in the theory-practice equation viz. theor.y, to the other 
viz. practice. His earlier position invoked a notion of pure theor.y and 
reduces science to theoretical practice and the intellectual to the 
Scholastic. His latter stance inverts the reduction affording practice, 
a pure and primary state. In truth Althusser seems incapable of 
grasping the relationship of rOevolutionary theory and revolutional7 
practice as a properly dialectical one. 
At the political level he ends up divorcing theory and practice b7 
3S 7 " 
ignoring the question of the crucial role of programme st t 
. , ra egy and 
tactics in mediating theory and practice. His recent criticisms of 
the P.C.F. are delivered merely in terms of the organizatl."onal d f"" . e l.Cl.enCl.es of 
the party, i.e. an attack on the lack of internal democracy within it. He 
seems incapable of tracing the concrete relationship between the bureau-
cratic non-democratic form of the party organization (revealed in the 
leadership's sabotage of the Union of the Left and the Common Programme 
in cynical disregard to rank and file feeling and conference decisions) 
and the his,torlcal adoption by the party since the 1930' S of a Stalinist 
programme and strategy. He offers no alternative to this degenerated 
programme other than the piecemeal democratization of the Party. 
In turn, in his later work,Althusser turns his efforts from prOviding 
a general conceptualization of Science to establishing the discrete scientific 
specifici ty of Marxism as a particular area of theoretical practice. He 
moves in turn,to a different model of philosophy-as-political-intervention 
in science. 
But again.he understands this relationship only in abstract terms, 
i.e. not concretely,in practice. He sees the intervention of philosopny 
as being one with an external origin i. e. from Philosophy a separate 
theory, on the autonomous discourse and practices of Science. Both in 
politics and science, theory is set in absolute opposition to practice. 
In the former domain ,he is unable to grasp the dialectical relationship 
of theory and practice in the Workers' Movement largely, I would argue, 
because of his inability to break with the P.C.F. Stalinist programme 
which in its very ossification of the class-struggle in stultifYing 
bureaucratic forms: destroys the role of the revolutionaI7 programme 
strategy and tactics as the instrument for forging the link of theor,r 
to practice J practice to theory. He falls back instead to a crippling 
intellectualism; not to that of the Second International's deterministic 
remove. but to the new scholasticism of the intellectual in a Stalinist 
3~8o 
party. The intellectual and his work, his "theoretical pr to " 0 
. ac lce , lS 
pushed to the sidelines of party organizational activity safely away 
from the key areas of programme and strategy. There he stalks in the 
wilderness of esoteric theory divorced from a concrete relationship to 
as 
the workers' struggle in so far as/an intellectual he is removed from 
the fight for the programme. The intellectual in the Communist Party 
today, his practico-critica1 activities banned from the core programmatic 
policy decisions in the party, returns to his cloister. 
The key to understanding A1thusser's difficulties and indeed the new 
scholasticism of the intellectual left is the increaSing rift between the 
intellectual and revolutionary political practice ~ the workers' 
movement. This is conditioned in turn by the political degeneration of 
the Marxist programme as a living guide to practice in the hands of the 
Stalinist Third International. The intellectual's emasculation is 
accompanied and completed by his increasing incorporation into the 
higher educational system in which he seeks a new social basis for his 
activities. 
In the domain of science A1thusser is simi1ari1y unwilling to 
grant scientists the ability to politically intervene in their own 
practices to defend science -against ideological encroachments. Because 
this intervention is defined by him in tems of an ideological struggle, 
and ideological considerations are defined by him as outside the realm 
of science (Science is conceptualized in tems of an absolute opposition 
to ideology, practice in turn, is seen in the end as the antithesis ot 
theor,y i.e. as non-reflexive, non-conscious~Accordingly,the sciences 
in their treatment of epistemological obstacles of an ideological nature, 
must be assisted by the extem8lly based interventions of a philosoph1' 
commi tted to defending scientific rigour. Scientists as practitioners 
are apparently incapable of such interventions i.e of becoming conscious 
of the material au~ices of their practices. 
This judgement goes against the experience of the history of the 
sciences. For instancetthe Royal Society the foremost body in England 
promoting natural scientific practice in the second half of the seven-
teenth century, clearly saw its task as not only prOviding the technical 
and theoretical apparatus for the pursuit of experimental sCience, which 
it in fact did, but also defending the "new philosophy" from ideological 
assaults, whether from the Aristotelian traditions of the Universities , 
from the Royalists who resented the p~itan roots of the SOCiety or from 
indeed the ~topian reformers like Hartlib and Comenius who sought to 
harness "real studies" to their fabulous schemes for the creation of a 
"Pansophia" . Seth Ward, John Wilkins, Christopher Wren, fought a running 
battle with the Universities in their pamphlets, speeches and indeed 
sermons from the pulpit defending experimental science and launching 
into the "epistemological obstacles" which stood in the way of the 
development of the "new philosophy". They were their own ideologists and 
philosophers accompanied but certainly not led by Locke the anatomist. 
Moreover, what are we to make of Marx himself and his work? Does 
not this corpus present us with the clearest example of the unity of 
science and philosophy within a common set of theoretical practices? 
Is not his Critique of Political Economy a conscious rupture with the dominant 
bourgeois ideology of his day and its theoretical expression in classical 
political economy. Is not thi s critique a conscious critical rupture 
from this specific ideology, grasped as the signif,ying practice of a 
particular social class, and in turn the condition for laying the 
theoretical foundations for a new terrain of scientific practice? And 
what of Nietzsche? And Freud? Heisenberg? Foucault! Are not these 
concrete unities of philosophico-ideological theorizing and scientific 
practice not a real refutation of the judgement that philosophy is 
diStinguished from a pure science because 
360. 
"it alone can represent within the science and within "t 
'theoretical practices' the instance of the non-theore~"sal 
social practices and of class struggle which informs th~~.ft22 
Surely what is in fact implied in Althusser I s analysis is not that 
"Philosophy" has a pure and independent status ,external to specific 
sciences,but that with the development of a materialist epistemology, 
itself derivative of the scientific practice of Historical Materialism , 
it is now possible to incorporate the class theoretical view in the very 
heartland of scientific practice where it may inform scientists of the 
material determinants of their theoretical and institutional practices? 
What is entailed here is the dialectical and dynamic relationship within 
the social institutions of science, UniverSities, Research Institutes, 
literature and records, between a pure scientific practice necessarily 
engrossed in its own interiority, yet materially dependent on outside 
bodies for resources and subject to political and class interests and 
control, and on the other hand a critical materialist reflection on these 
ideological and material constraints on scientific theory and practice 
in the current era of monopoly capitalism and world imperialism. This 
mediation is to be forged, as it has been historically, by pedagogic 
activity and in the present era,by opening up science as a social 
institution to public debate and democratic accountability and thu~ of 
neceSSity, to worker's control. In this sense the intervention of 
philosophy and its responSibility, ~ a political one. 
We are now in a position to address the second question that seems 
to arise with the new ascendency of historical epistemology. This is the 
issue of the ~ecificity and role of philosophy as a theoretical practice 
given the apparent drastic reduction of the terrain on which its objects 
are to be found. This reduction has resulted from firstlY the secession 
of the natural sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
the independence clawed from it by the social, cul tural and historical 
361 . 
sciences in the nineteenth. In the twentieth century furthermore, as 
we have seen, historical understanding and semiological anal . hall ys~s c enge 
the very kernel of classical philosophical reason - epistemology itself. 
Faced with these encroachments and challenges, philosophy has attempted 
to come to terms with both natural and social science. , to the former by 
reducing epistemology to the prescriptive explication of scientific 
method in the positivist project; to the latter in the conversational 
paradigm itself; an attempt to accommodate to sociological reason and 
historical ~derstanding by binding them to a foundational philosophical 
anthropology, a humanism. 
The problem of the specificity of philosophic method in an age of 
sociological reason is I have suggested posed in its clearest form by 
Marx and Nietzsch~. They and indeed they alone, struggled to think the 
unity of science and philosophy and forge it in their own theoretical 
practices. 
More recently a f)\aterialist ~istemology, itself the result of the 
extension of flistorical Materialism and Semiology. to science itself as a 
.I 
set of social relations and discursive practices, has given us the 
concepts with which to think that unity in a more systematic form. 
This unity does not, it must be insisted, involve a reduction of 
philosophy to the empirical history of ideas or sociology of knowledges. 
Such a reduction and the relativism it invariably leads to, is the death 
Of philosophy. It is an anti-science. In the archaeology of knowledge 
and the historical epistemology it permits, epistemology retains its 
methodological primacy over empirical history. History can only proceed 
in its empirical investigations on the basis of an epistemological theo17 
about the rules for the identification and analysis of discourses. 
the other hand this theory can only be distilled and refined in the 
course of particular historical studies of specific sciences and 
Ckl 
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l.·d_eolo~cal discourses. We are necessarol ht b- 1 Y caug in a circle here. 
This circle is the unity of philosophy and history in their dialectical 
fusion. It is the current dynamic of philosophical method. 
In turn philosophy once we accept its status as a momentum towards 
greater theoretical reflexivity and political intervention within 
scientific discourse can be redemarcated as a set of theoretical practices. 
These can be understood in terms of philosophy's role in representing 
within various sciences the instance of non-theoretical social practices, 
the historical and political conditions which determine these, and their 
effectivity on the production, distribution, and use of sciences knowledge. 
In particular we now increasingly understand the discontinuities 
which demarcate the emergence and transformations of sciences and 
ideological discourses in terms of a break which is irreversible but 
incomplete. It is in other words a process, a continuing break. We have 
in this study located as the other side of the incompleteness of this 
break the problem of residues from previous discourses. The conversational 
paradigm is itself, partly to be understood as formed wi th its specific 
discursi ve structure, as the product of a break with egologicism,but also 
simul taneously as a residual effect of egological discourse. What we have 
sketched is not an instantaneous and historically discrete event but 
rather, "the beginning of a process which has no end." Philosophy as I 
have suggested must think through the consequences of its conversational 
rupture. 
Philosophy as a moment within scientific practice, engages these 
problems of residue and lapse, and the epistemological obstacles created 
by the very incompleteness of scientific revolutions. It does so b7 
strengthening the tendency wi thin sciences towards greater theoretical 
rei'lexi vi ty. It helps sciences to "think" the break that is the condition 
of their emergence or revolution and the progressive continuation of which 
3b3. 
is. the safeguard of their scientificity. 
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